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41. China’s Emerging Approach to Taiwan: Blockade and Disinformation

Author:
Chihwei Yu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
It has been suggested that China intends to unify Taiwan through a military operation within the next five years. However, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) actions during the 1945-1949 civil war, military means may not be the most effective way for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to achieve its longstanding goal of unification with Taiwan. Since its inception in 1921, the CCP has relied on producing and disseminating disinformation to advance its policy objectives. This strategy is also frequently employed by China towards Taiwan, with the aim of undermining the morale of Taiwanese society through the spread of certain kinds of false information, for example, by claiming that the U.S. will eventually betray Taiwan. In fact, the CCP’s military tactics during the civil war share some similarities with its current Taiwan policy, particularly with regard to the so-called “Peiping Mode” (北平模式). This approach seeks to achieve its goals through a combination of deterring the opponent through superior force and employing United Front work, including deploying agents and spreading fake news to persuade opponents.
Topic:
Security, Disinformation, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Military, and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

42. The changing face of Russia’s information war against Ukraine and other democratic countries: Lessons and recommendations. Interview with Professor Sinan Aral

Author:
Sinan Aral
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Aral: Pre-2020 strategies of misinformation and disinformation have evolved over the last 5 years but they have not been any less intense. In fact, they have potentially been at least as intense and sometimes more intense. The tactics have changed. Before 2020, the western world was not as cognisant or prepared to deal with Russian dis- and misinformation online. And so, Russian tactics were much more overt. In particular, what they would do was use bots and human trolls and sock pockets to spread mis- and disinformation. And bots were a big part of it.3 I think that now what you see more of is the amplification of real voices because those are harder to take down. So instead of putting a false narrative out there, they would do a search for real people creating the narrative they want to promote and then amplify that narrative through reshares, retweets, likes, and amplifications as best as they can. And when the platforms look at that, they say ‘we can’t take this down because the originator of the post is a real human being that we can verify as real, not a Russian spy etc.’
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Disinformation, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

43. Implications of the war in Ukraine for the strategic communication system of the Polish Ministry of National Defence

Author:
Agnieszka Glapiak
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The paper explores the evolving role of strategic communication at the operations centre of the Minister of National Defence in Poland, particularly in the period leading up to and during the Russian Federation’s military aggression against Ukraine. The study investigates both proactive communication initiatives and reactive communication in response to citizens’ needs. Our research methodology primarily involved analysing official Polish national defence documents and comparing findings from studies conducted before and during the war in Ukraine. The results show that the conflict had a profound influence on the MOD’s strategic communication, emphasising the pivotal role of the Operations Centre of the Minister of National Defence. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the need for a comprehensive communication approach that encompasses both domestic and international audiences, spanning traditional and social media.
Topic:
Security, Communications, Disinformation, Military, Information, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

44. In the Shadows of Disinformation: Fake News and Violations of Human Rights

Author:
Daniele Battista
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Review of Human Rights
Institution:
Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
Abstract:
This study examines the interconnected phenomenon of disinformation and fake news and their relationship to the struggle for human rights. Through an interdisciplinary perspective, we explore the crucial role of the deliberate dissemination of false information in threatening and violating human rights globally. The focus is on how disinformation has become a subtle form of conflict, often circumventing traditional perceptions of war and confrontation. Our study reflects on developing effective strategies and mechanisms to counter disinformation. It suggests multidimensional approaches combining legislative, educational, and technological efforts to comprehensively address this emerging challenge.
Topic:
Human Rights, Disinformation, Fake News, Information Warfare, and Countermeasures
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. Safeguarding Democracy against Disinformation: Insights from Taiwanese Civil Society

Author:
Nelson Wen
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Ambassadors Review
Institution:
Council of American Ambassadors
Abstract:
On August 2, 2022, pedestrians near convenience stores and a few public spaces around Taiwan began noticing that the content on digital billboards had been replaced with strident messages in Chinese, such as “Greater China will ultimately be unified!” That same month, the websites of a Taiwan university and other organizations were defaced with messages, including “There is only one China in the world!” Meanwhile, the military of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was conducting days of drills and missile launches on a scale previously unseen, though certain photos and videos claiming to show Chinese military exercises near Taiwan were later proven by Taiwan-based fact-checking organizations to be doctored or fabricated. This combination of disinformation, military saber rattling and hacking activity was the latest example of what Taiwan authorities, scholars and civil society have termed “cognitive warfare.” The experiences of Taiwan in trying to protect the integrity of its information environment against such influence attempts merit close attention from all societies and the United States in particular. This is because Taiwan provides a model for a multifaceted, grassroots response to combat disinformation, and also because a large proportion of disinformation in Taiwan relates to discrediting the United States as a reliable security partner.[ii] Based on interviews with a select group of Taiwan non-governmental organizations (NGOs), this article will illustrate how parts of Taiwan’s civil society are dealing with the challenges posed by foreign and homegrown disinformation.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

46. Russian Disinformation and Propaganda Campaign Justifying the Annexing of Crimea in 2014

Author:
Oksana Voytyuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
On February 26, 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Russia's offensive actions have been condemned in the international arena, but this has in no way changed the decision of the authorities in the Kremlin. In order to prove the credibility of the occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation launched a disinformation and propaganda campaign aimed primarily at the internal arena, ie at the Russians. The aim of the article is to analyze selected statements by Vladimir Putin regarding the annexation of Crimea and to try to answer the question of whether disinformation and internal propaganda were effective in convincing Russians that the occupation of Crimea was an act of restoring historical justice. For the purposes of the article, research methods appropriate for international relations were used.
Topic:
Propaganda, Annexation, Disinformation, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

47. A US agenda for action in Sudan’s information environment

Author:
Cameron Hudson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
There are few African countries that have received the same degree of high-level and sustained attention from the US government, during the administrations of both Donald Trump and Joe Biden, as the Republic of Sudan. While this engagement stems in large part from a long history of Washington leading diplomatic efforts to isolate the Sudanese government for its support for terrorism during the 1990s, advance the peace process in the country’s north-south civil war, and eventually punish the government for the Darfur genocide, Washington’s renewed diplomatic engagement at the time of Sudan’s 2018 popular uprising reflected a sense of opportunity that real change was potentially coming to the country. The historic events during the spring and summer of 2019, beginning with longtime dictator Omar al-Bashir’s arrest and removal by senior army officers and the brokering of a civilian-military hybrid government, created both an opportunity and what many in Washington saw as an obligation to help Sudan’s transition succeed. After decades of economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation, the installation of a civilian-led government created the minimal condition that allowed Washington and Western allied governments to begin the task of providing a trusted local partner with the assistance to begin reforming the political system, stabilizing the economy, and transforming the armed forces that would eventually enable a full transition to democracy, one of the popular demands of the revolution. By late 2019, during a historic visit to Washington by Sudan’s newly named prime minister, Abdallah Hamdok, the Trump administration announced a process to normalize diplomatic relations with Sudan through an exchange of ambassadors, among other steps. Privately, the Trump administration also set about the task of constructing an assistance package that would meet the moment and provide the technical, financial, and development assistance needed to demonstrate a true “democracy dividend” to the vast majority of average Sudanese who were by this time struggling under the weight of financial collapse brought on by the one-two punch of regime neglect and, soon, COVID-19 shutdowns. Washington, however, was both ill-postured and slow to foresee the monumental political opening occurring in the early days of the revolution and then further delayed by an interlocking web of restrictions and prohibitions, some of them self-imposed and some imposed by the US Congress, that limited its ability to scale up resources in a timely manner. In addition to the challenges of having to undo more than twenty-five years of bureaucratic restrictions and red tape, Washington also needed to scale up its human resources inside Sudan that had largely dwindled over the years.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Media, Internet, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, North America, and United States of America

48. Global Futures Bulletin: The growing threat of disinformation and misinformation in Latin America and how to fight back

Author:
Igarapé Institute
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Igarapé Institute
Abstract:
The rapid spread and borderless reach of disinformation and misinformation are amplified by our growing reliance on digital connections and devices and supercharged by artificial intelligence (AI). The proliferation of fake news, conspiracies, and malign content coincides with declining trust in mainstream media and waning support for democracy. While all countries are susceptible to an unchecked infodemic, some are more vulnerable than others. Concerns over digital harms are already afflicting the major democratic powers of North America and Western Europe. Yet the threat is also rising fast in emerging nations, such as Brazil, where social media is ubiquitous, and the consolidation of democratic institutions is still underway.As fake and malicious news grew in visibility and audience share across the media, Brazilian authorities moved forcefully to contain the threat, expunge egregious misinformation, and keep elections free and fair. Brazil’s judiciary, and especially the electoral court, spearheaded those efforts, while also enjoining political parties, civil society actors, and social media companies in the campaign. With societies everywhere puzzling over the challenge of how to contain the spread of online harms, Latin America’s largest nation offers lessons that can and should have broader relevance for democracies, globally.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Internet, Disinformation, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Brazil, South America, and Latin America

49. EU Digital Services Act and Its Implications to the Potential Regulatory Regime of Disinformation in Asia

Author:
Sofia Calabrese
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
In 2022, after two years of heated negotiations, European Union (EU) institutions reached an agreement on the final text of the Digital Services Act, the new EU law to tackle illegal content online. “The Digital Services Act will set new global standards. [...] We have finally made sure that what is illegal offline is also illegal online,” said Christel Schaldemose, the lead Member of the European Parliament on the file, after the agreement was reached (European Parliament 2022). In a nutshell, this reflects the ambitions of EU policymakers for the file to become both a new golden standard for platform regulation in the EU and beyond; and to fulfil its primary goal to tackle illegal content online. This article will focus on these two aspects: on one hand we will explain how, despite its scope being limited to illegal content, the Digital Services Act can also be effective in addressing online disinformation; and on the other hand we will explore the potential impact of the Digital Services Act beyond the EU, in particular on potential regulatory regimes on disinformation in Asia.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Disinformation, Online Platforms, and Digital Services
Political Geography:
Europe

50. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Rachel E. Brooks, Taro Nishikawa, Ryohei Suzuki, Jonathon Marek, and Koutaka Yuichiro
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Pacific Forum, like the US government and much of the international security community, considers the information space a crucial theater in the United States’ ongoing great power competition with the People’s Republic of China and Russia. To meet the need for fresh policy ideas, as well as Pacific Forum’s long-standing mandate to train the next generation of policy professions in the US and its partners, we present to you this volume. In it, readers will find the finalists of our Young Professionals Essay Contest, as part of our ongoing program, The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation. Open to nationals of the two countries, the contest received numerous entries and the final decision was not an easy one—especially when comparing our finalists. On the Japanese side, Yuichiro Kotaka raises the threat posed by generative AI and poses solutions for how governments can address it, while Ryohei Suzuki suggests putting the public broadcaster NHK to use. On the US side, Jonathon Marek raises the alarm over the threat posed by authoritarian governments who have recognized disinformation as a valuable tool, while Thomas Ramage offers suggestion on how the alliance itself can address the threat that disinformation poses. However, our committee ultimately settled on two essays that stood out above the rest: on the Japanese side, Taro Nishikawa’s essay on counter-disinformation campaigns in the age of cognitive warfare was singled out for addressing the current discourse within China and for its focus on US-Japan responses. Among the American entries, Rachel Brooks’ take on how countering disinformation can be part of school curriculums received praise for its originality, creativity, and for providing both an educator’s narrative and an educator’s solution. We thank all of our contestants for their participation, and for contributing potential solutions in this age of information competition.
Topic:
International Security, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America