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901. Beyond the Asterisk Agreement

Author:
Pasqualina Lepore
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In the context of the ongoing EU-mediated dialogue, Serbia and Kosovo have reached several agreements, the most important of which being that on regional representation and cooperation. Also known as the “asterisk agreement”, the agreement reached in February 2012 allows Kosovo to represent itself at all regional meetings with the nameplate of “Kosovo*”. While widely appreciated by the international community, it has generated divergent interpretations in Belgrade and Pristina and has provoked turmoil in both countries. On the whole, the agreement has enhanced Kosovo's and Serbia's path towards the EU, with the mandate for a feasibility study for the former and EU candidacy for the latter being achieved. However, the agreement has not addressed the key bones of contention between the parties, namely North Kosovo and Pristina's status. As a result, the situation remains unsustainable and a more comprehensive solution needs to be found.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, and Balkans

902. Relations With Iraq's Kurds: Toward A Working Partnership

Author:
Ramzy Mardini
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani will be visiting the White House on April 4 and meeting with President Barack Obama. Discussions are likely to involve Kurdish concerns about Iraq's prime minister, but may largely focus on defining what Vice President Joseph Biden termed as a "special relationship" between the U.S. and Kurds during his visit to Arbil last December. Relations between the governments of the United States and Kurdish Region have grown and deepened considerably since the 2003 U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. The Kurds continued to be staunch proponents of the American presence and ongoing engagement in Iraq.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Sectarianism, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, and Middle East

903. The Challenge of Social Media in Security Policy Institutions: A Note of Caution

Author:
LtCol Mario Masdea
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
"New Media," "social media," "followers," and "likers" are words which in recent years have entered the mainstream of communication parlance. Communicators, researchers and academics enthusiastically underline the power of new and social media, as well as the major opportunity they offer to communicate better and reach a wider audience. Institutions everywhere are involved in the trendy use of these tools, in some cases not so much focusing on the specificities of their field of business as simply spreading information and trying to reach as many people as possible.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Communications, and Governance

904. CHINA SPOOKING ALLIES WITH THE SEE-SAW BETWEEN SOFT AND HARD POWER

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
Chinese leaders spend considerable time and energy in assuring the international community that they have no reason to be afraid of China’s “peaceful rise” and rapid emergence as one of the most important economic and diplomatic players on the international stage. Many countries, however, equate China’s growing economic might with greater political influence and are less accepting of the benign image that Beijing now wants to portray to the world. Although China’s current policy may appear at first impression to be a rather soft variety of imperialism, it is still perceived by many as “hard” imperialism. There are now mounting signs that other countries, especially China’s neighbors, are not totally convinced of Beijing’s proclaimed benevolent intent. Those countries are presently taking measures to protect themselves in case China’s “soft” imperialism eventually turns out to be more aggressive or of the “hard power” variety.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Imperialism, International Cooperation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Asia, South Korea, Philippines, Cambodia, Australia, and Myanmar

905. Missile Defense System Negotiations: Washington-Warsaw-Moscow Triangle

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
When in March 1983 Ronald Reagan announced the initial plans to build a missile defense system purported to be able to “intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our [U.S.] own soil or that of our allies,” he in reality proclaimed the end of the deterrence and so called “balance of terror” doctrines which had formed the basis of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union during what is known as the Cold War. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), more commonly known at the time as "Star Wars," reformulated the power equation that had underpinned the “détente" period (1971-80). This project was abandoned with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in1991, which marked the end of the Cold War. However, more than ten years later, President George W. Bush reactivated it, signing bilateral agreements with the Czech Republic and Poland for the deployment of a radar system and advanced land based missile interceptors. With the election of President Barack Obama, the missile defense system was transformed from a bilateral project to a multilateral one, directly involving European allies and the very structure of the NATO alliance. The Kremlin strongly opposed the Euro-American missile deployment project, first in the 1980s and again into the 21th Century. Today as in the past, Russia’s complaints and rhetoric remain basically unchanged. It claims that the shield would compromise the effectiveness of the Russian long-range nuclear arsenal, thus drastically alter the balance of power with the West. A turning point seemed to have taken place at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November 2010. Following a lively debate among diplomats, the European allies unanimously signed an agreement for the deployment of a missile defense system, which would provide “full coverage” of the Alliance area by 2020. More importantly, the final declaration of the summit heralded the birth of “cooperation with Russia in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence.” However, such good intentions and noble sentiments are regarded as mere words by some, as there is no serious likelihood that both sides will cooperate on a joint defense project of this nature.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Poland, North America, and United States of America

906. The Foreign Policy Case For Senate Reform

Author:
Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
In a famous story about the creation of the Senate, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington were debating a possible upper legislative chamber over tea, and Jefferson wanted to know why it was necessary to create an undemocratic body like the Senate. In response, Washington asked Jefferson why he had poured some of his tea into a saucer. “To cool it,” Jefferson answered, to which Washington replied “Even so, we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.” The story (even if it might be apocryphal) illustrates that the slowness and deliberation of the Senate were intentional and designed to offset the popular passions that might govern the House of Representatives. The Senate’s rules were designed to emulate a gentleman’s club (such as the filibuster, which originated from the idea that gentlemen would have the good sense to limit the length of their speeches and that it would be rude to cut them off) but have become archaic as the body changed from a club to a typical legislative chamber. The rules of the Senate as they are currently designed have resulted in giving the opposition a trump card that is usually disproportionate to their legislative power. While its original structure incentivized moderation and compromise, the electoral system that populates its membership has incentivized partisanship. As a result the Senate has changed its form but not its function. The Senate can be deferential and deliberate or it can be factional and partisan, but it can’t be both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

907. What a Tangled Web: India Caught Between U.S. and Iranian Interests

Author:
Felix Imonti
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Diplomatic Courier
Abstract:
India is caught between the consequences of provoking a United States driven by its fixation upon the Iranian nuclear program and by an Iran that is a major supplier of oil, providing India with access to its vital interests in Afghanistan. The best that the Ind
Topic:
Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

908. The Ecuador Situation Facing the Summit of the Americas and Other Foreign Policy Issues

Author:
Camilla Lanusse
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institute for the Study of International Development, McGill University
Abstract:
While Ecuador has maintained its decision not to participate , other countries such as Argentina and Brazil – whose governments maintain close relationships with their peers in ALBA – have confirmed that they will bring up in Cartagena the need to include Cuba in the future, hoping that this will be the last Summit that will take place without the island. Thus, although Ecuador failed to convince others to join in “boycotting the Summit,” its declarations succeeded in bringing attention to the nature of the Summit and the exclusion of Cuba. President Correa’s proposal to include Cuba comes at a time in which the President’s stance on human rights – such as the freedom of expression – has been strongly criticised by international organisations like the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the United Nations Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression, as well as by international human rights NGOs and media around the world. The President’s reaction has been to denounce such scrutiny and link them to alleged interests of Northern countries, including the US. However, the questions raised internationally have thus far failed to generate any significant doubts in the conscience of Ecuadorian citizens. With half a year before the official start of his re-election campaign, public opinion favours President Correa’s management – approval that is reflected in his high level of popularity and the acceptance of his messages, which often question the role of international organisations or supranational bodies. As will be described in the pages that follow, the foreign policy of the last five years under President Correa reveals a government that challenges and questions the traditional bodies, forums and regional blocs of the international system, integration based on trade, and institutions associated with liberal democracy. At the same time, it encourages participation in alternative forums or regional political blocs, in which it seeks to propose its own stances on issues such as human rights, the freedom of expression, integration and trade relations. In the following paragraphs, there will be a brief description of the management of current Ecuadorian foreign policy and Ecuador’s position on the inter-American system. Interviews with academics and diplomats, in addition to various news sources, have been used in the writing of this report.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Central America and Ecuador

909. The Nuclear Security Summit and South Korea’s Growing International Role

Author:
Sang-Hyun Lee
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
On March 26-27, 2012, South Korea successfully held the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. This was the largest diplomatic gathering ever held in South Korea with fifty-three countries and four international non-governmental organizations participating. Alongside the summit, President Lee Myung-bak held twenty-seven bilateral talks which helped to elevate South Korea’s international role. The Seoul Summit has been judged to have produced a more concrete outcome that has strongly supported the achievements made at the Washington Summit in 2010. The result is the Seoul Communiqué, which states that nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the shared goals of humanity while also reconfirming the commitment to seeking a safer world for all and sharing the objective of nuclear security. Moreover, the communiqué stresses the fundamental responsibility of all countries, consistent with their respective national and international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear material, which includes nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities under their control, as well as to prevent non-state actors from acquiring such materials and from obtaining information or technology required to use them for malicious purposes. The communiqué further reaffirms that measures to strengthen nuclear security will not hamper the rights of states to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. With North Korea’s nuclear threat still overshadowing the Korean Peninsula, the summit had some meaningful implications. South Korea will have undoubtedly enhanced its national image from passive recipient to an active rule-maker in international norms. In preparing for the summit, the South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) focused on comprehensive and action-oriented measures under the belief that by only transforming political commitments from the Washington Summit into action would guarantee the success of the summit. As a result, the Seoul Summit has demonstrated that the promises from the 2010 Washington Summit have now advanced to fruitful outcomes. The seventy-two commitments from that summit have now been almost realized with only a few still to be finalized. In addition, the Seoul Summit has proven itself to be the transition point for global nuclear security moving from political declaration to concrete implementation. The summit itself has also widened its agenda including nuclear safety, the safe use of nuclear energy and radioactive materials, therefore able to address some of the key issues raised following the Fukushima accident. Despite the achievements, some limitations are evident when looking at the preparations for the summit and its aftermath. In the build-up to the summit in South Korea, there were problems in communication between state and people. While the summit is dedicated to preventing nuclear terrorism, some questioned why South Korea was hosting a summit that did not address issues closer to home such as the North Korean nuclear issue or the U.S.-Korea nuclear energy agreement controversy. Such criticism required strong justification of why South Korea was hosting the summit. Another area of difficulty was that nuclear security itself actually lacks a clear definition even among experts. To cope with such questions, MOFAT sought for advice and creative ideas by hosting advisory board meetings during the preparation for the summit.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Summit
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

910. Predictions on Power Structure and Policy Changes of the Kim Jong-un Regime

Author:
Chang-Hyun Jung
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The East Asia Institute takes no institutional position on policy issues and has no affiliation with the Korean government. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in its publications are the sole responsibility of the author or authors. The new stage of North Korea’s leadership succession began with the rise to power of the third generation leader Kim Jong-un. On 15 April 2012, the newly-appointed First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong-un made his first public speech during a military parade to commemorate Kim Il-sung’s centenary. It was the official announcement of the opening of the Kim Jong-un regime toward the world. A series of political events from the Meeting of Party Representatives to the Kim Il-sung centenary celebrations clearly show that the third generation of leadership is emerging as a new core power group backed by the second generation. This move means more than just a generational shift in North Korea’s power structure. It indicative of possible changes in policy lines on its internal and external affairs. Kim Jong-un conducted political reshuffles before and after the Meeting of Party Representatives in April 2012, as part of actions to implement a moderate shift in generation and to firmly secure his control over the military. Since smoothly establishing the hereditary succession process, Kim Jong-un not only moved toward assuming political leadership but also swiftly acquired a firm grip on the power elites in the party, government, and military by reorganizing and uniting power elites. It would seem Kim Jong-un’s rule is stable, at least in terms of power structure. The power structure of the Kim Jong-un regime has turned out to be a single leadership where the country is ruled by one strong man rather than a collective leadership. Instead of having “specific figures” as a regent or a guardian through a decentralization of power, North Korea seems to prefer to support the new supreme leader through “collective consultation.” The policies designed and implemented during the last three years of Kim Jong-il’s rule were in fact intended as a policy transformation process to prepare preparation for Kim Jong-un’s rule. These policy directions have been maintained since Kim Jong-un came to power. His first public speech on 15 April can be translated as an announcement on limited changes for a “knowledge-based economy.” This established a new period while inheriting the values of Jaju or independence from the Kim Il-sung era and Songun or military first politics from the Kim Jong-il era. In particular, Kim Jong-un emphasized the significance of “peace,” by stating in the speech, “for our party and the Republic’s government that consider powerful state construction and people’s livelihood improvement to be their general goal, peace cannot be more valuable.” Under Kim Jong-un’s rule with the keyword of “knowledge-based economy,” North Korea is expected to place priorities on improving people’s livelihood and will take on more flexible policy decisions from 2013 when the next administrations in South Korea and the United States will be established. As such it is an inevitable option for North Korea to rebuild its economy and attract foreign investment. Against this backdrop, the administrations in South Korea and the United States should not pressure North Korea but rather wait and respond calmly until the policy lines of the Kim Jong-un regime on economic change and openness are clearer. Above all the first priority should be placed on stable management of North Korean issues, given that many of the participants of the Six-Party Talks will enter into power transition process at the end of 2012. First, the U.S. administration needs to resume contacts with North Korea in order to implement the Leap Day Deal in which Pyongyang would place a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests, as well as freeze its nuclear programs. If the diplomatic pressure from the international community successfully leads North Korea to give up its nuclear activities and ease tensions, it would create the right environment for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Second, it will be worthwhile establishing contact through high-level channels to develop a clearer picture of what are Kim Jong-un’s intention regarding North Korea’s nuclear activities. In providing new opportunities for the North Korean leadership, a policy shift by Pyongyang may take place. Third, it is important that the Lee Myung-bak administration reopens channels for inter-Korean talks even at low-level so as to not leave too much of a burden for the next administration. Offering to hold inter-Korean family reunions for the second half of the year 2012 would be a good start. Fourth, the next administration in South Korea should be committed to establishing a more sustainable North Korean policy that can maintain consistency regardless of any power shift by comprehensively reflecting public opinion during a time when conflict among South Koreans on approaches toward North Korea is becoming worse. Whoever comes into power in South Korea after the presidential election, the main agenda of inter-Korean relations will be on the next inter-Korean Summit. Kim Jong-un has already expressed his willingness to talk, stating “(we) will go hand in hand with anyone who truly desires the country’s reunification and peaceful prosperity.” If the third inter-Korean Summit can be held in 2013, it would be a significant breakthrough in building confidence between two Koreas and solving the North Korean nuclear crisis as well as making progress toward peaceful coexistence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea