Bosnia's economic reality is still bleak. After more than five years and five billion dollars of Dayton implementation, the country seems only at the beginning of an economic transition that should have begun in 1996.
Topic:
International Relations, Development, and Economics
This paper focuses on the Brazilian privatization program undertaken in the 1990s, one of the largest in the world, as a result of which over US$71 billion worth of equity capital and US$17 billion of debt owed by the former state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were transferred to private owners, both at the federal and state levels.
The World Bank has a dismal environmental record that environmentalists have long condemned. Its lending policies have financed ecological destruction, human rights violations, and forced resettlement, and its projects have suffered from high failure rates, according to the bank's own criteria.
Topic:
Development, Environment, and International Organization
"There's got to be priorities," George W. Bush responded when asked about Africa in the second presidential campaign debate. Africa did not make his short list: the Middle East, Europe, the Far East, and the Americas. A Bush presidency portends a return to the blatantly anti-African policies of the Reagan-Bush years, characterized by a general disregard for black people and a perception of Africa as a social welfare case. Vice President Dick Cheney is widely expected to steer the younger Bush on most policy matters especially foreign affairs. Cheney's perspective on Africa in the 1980s was epitomized by his 1986 vote in favor of keeping Nelson Mandela in prison and his consistent opposition to sanctions against apartheid South Africa.
HIV/AIDS continues to cut into the fabric of African households and societies. It is not uncommon to hear that a quarter to a third of the adult population in several african countries are HIV infected. Against this reality of a rapidly spreading epidemic, some two decades of prevention interventions have met with but limited success. Whatever successes there might be are not to be lightly dismissed. The reasons for those successes, however, are not well understood and thus not readily applicable elsewhere. To date, most prevention efforts have focused on increasing individual awareness about risks of transmission and promoting individual risk reduction through a variety of means.
The Case For Middle-Class-Oriented Development International financial architecture works best when it serves social goals that command widespread support and legitimacy. Without neglecting the more conventional goal of allowing the greatest possible global flow of capital with the least risk of financial crisis, the primary goal of international financial reform, for both economic and political reasons, ought to be to promote middle-class-oriented development around the world.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Government, and International Trade and Finance
How can one best explain China's remarkable economic growth during twenty-one years and its rise from autarky to world economic power? The exercise requires chutzpah; it demands simplification; it cries out for the trained capacity to present a unifying theme with a weighty set of policy implications.
One goal of Russia's economic reforms during the last ten years has been to establish a new class of businessmen and owners of private property—people who could form the foundation for a new model post-Soviet citizen. However, the experience of this post-communist economic “revolution” has turned out to be very different from the original expectations. For as people became disillusioned with communism due to its broken promises, the words “democracy” and “reform” quickly became equally as unbearable to large sectors of the Russian public after 1991. Such disillusion was achieved in less than ten years—a record revolutionary burnout that would be the envy of any anti-Bolshevik.
Topic:
Communism, Democratization, Development, Economics, and Government
The accession of Finland and Sweden as well as the ongoing enlargement process, which offers the perspective of EU membership to the Baltic States, has put the question of security and stability in Northern Europe on the Agenda of the European Union.
Since 1966 and even before, the policies pursued by France toward NATO have been both the object of a certain amount of Gallic pride and the source of considerable confusion, not to say irritation, among France's partners. Why have these policies been pursued? The aim of this article is to address this question by means of an examination of the domestic pressures and constraints that have helped to shape France's policies toward NATO. It reveals a striking paradox: the decision-making arrangements that developed around and emerged out of de Gaulle's single-minded quest to achieve international independence for France were specifically designed to provide him with the freedom to pursue policies of his own choosing. They increasingly came, however, to hamstring the efforts of French political leaders to do likewise, particularly when, in the aftermath of the Cold War, they came to realize that traditional Gaullist policies were no longer serving France as well as they once had.