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221. “The Best Possible Sanction:” Kim Jong-un and the Quest for Credible Nuclear Deterrence

Author:
Gary J. Sampson
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
In 2017, North Korea under Kim Jong-un has made significant strides toward the capabilities needed for a credible nuclear deterrent. This article analyzes the most recent achievements of the North Korean nuclear weapons program, including its September 2017 nuclear test and its three long-range missile tests in the latter half of 2017. Observers should not discount Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. However, other capabilities such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and targeting require further development to achieve the full range of capabilities associated with a credible nuclear deterrent. Because of the high costs associated with the development of robust strategic intelligence and targeting capabilities, Pyongyang may be willing to settle for lower levels of capability in these areas, which may still be sufficient to guide nuclear attacks. As a result, policymakers must move to a bargaining strategy that acknowledges the reality of North Korea’s nuclear capability, marking a significant policy shift among regional allies. Pyongyang’s long-held desire to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its regional allies may be coming to fruition. Kim Jong-un has shrewdly played his hand from a position of weakness and succeeded where many others failed—a high-risk path upon which he still walks. China’s minimum credible nuclear deterrent may be a model for Kim Jong-un’s development of North Korean nuclear capability.
Topic:
Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, Surveillance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

222. The Interdiction of Asylum Seekers at Sea: Law and (mal)practice in Europe and Australia

Author:
Violeta Moreno-Lax
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Andrew & Renata Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law at UNSW Sydney
Abstract:
The phenomenon of irregular migration by sea or ‘boat migration’ is not new, 1 but it has drawn significant attention since the Tampa affair in Australia in 2001 and during the so-called ‘migration/refugee crisis’ in the Mediterranean in 2015–2016. Both regions have replaced proactive search and rescue (SAR) efforts with militarised border security missions, which has had detrimental effects on those seeking asylum. This policy brief explores this evolution and critically evaluates policies and practices of deterrence at sea against the standards set by international law. It considers:  State powers of interception, as regulated by the law of the sea for the different maritime zones, in particular as they relate to flagless (migrant) vessels;  The duties of SAR for flag and coastal States, clarifying notions of ‘distress’, ‘rescue’, ‘disembarkation’ and ‘place of safety’ as applied to asylum seekers;  The interaction of State obligations under the law of the sea with their obligations under human rights and refugee law, especially with respect to the principle of non-refoulement, non-arbitrary detention and due process guarantees, as well as issues of extraterritoriality and ‘effective control’. The policy brief concludes that current strategies in Europe and Australia are not viable in the long term. It recommends that both regions abandon practices of containment without protection, engage in genuine SAR actions, and embrace a comprehensive approach to ‘boat migration’ that conforms with States’ international legal obligations and the rights of refugees and migrants.
Topic:
International Law, Migration, Refugee Crisis, Deterrence, Protection, and Asylum Seekers
Political Geography:
Europe and Australia

223. Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict

Author:
Bastain Giegerich
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
The idea that international conflict might be seeing more hybrid warfare and hybrid threats has animated debate among security and defense establishments in the run-up to NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit. While the Alliance has located the issue of hybrid war in the specific context of the Russia/Ukraine crisis and in 2014 triggered efforts to prepare NATO to effectively meet hybrid warfare threats, the scope of the challenge is much wider and the core dynamics are often located outside of the military realm. The article reviews the recent conceptual debates about hybrid warfare, suggesting that hybrid conflicts defy our attempts to press them into known categories and locate them clearly on a spectrum of war and peace. NATO Member States will have to invest in resilience and conventional deterrence to counter hybrid threats.
Topic:
NATO, Imperialism, Military Strategy, Deterrence, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

224. NATO Nuclear Deterrence: The Warsaw Summit and Beyond

Author:
Matthew P. Anderson
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Connections
Institution:
Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
Abstract:
NATO’s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR, 2012), concluded that “the Alliance’s nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture.” In addition to the strategic nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, NATO’s “posture” notably included, then and now, some 200 B-61 “tactical” nuclear bombs stored at sites in five longtime member states. Since release of the DDPR, NATO relations with Russia have deteriorated. It would appear that the American B-61 nukes, soon to be improved through a multibillion-dollar life extension program, are destined to stay in Europe. Beneath the surface, however, linger disquieting questions about the fabled three-C’s of NATO’s deterrence – its military capability, its credibility and its communication to potential adversaries and partners alike. This paper suggests six nuclear deterrence reforms that NATO should consider following the Warsaw Summit in July 2016 in order to regain the credibility it once had during the Cold War.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

225. North Korea’s Nuclear and Ballistic Threats and the Tailored Deterrence Strategy

Author:
Sam-man Chung
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs threaten South Korea and its neighbors. Pyongyang’s engineers are likely capable of producing a warhead small enough to place it atop a missile. As its ability to engineer warheads for flight and reentry improves, North Korea increasingly endangers the United States. Deterring Pyongyang is extremely difficult given North Korea’s conventional, unconventional, and cyber capabilities. South Korean and American strategists have reponspded by developing a tailored deterrence strategy to address specific threats. At the operational level, this is supported by the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan. Ballistic missile defense, including the ability to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy North Korea’s missiles, is critical to the success of the tailored deterrence strategy. South Korea opted to develop its Korean Air and Missile Defense and Kill Chain system. These systems are independent of American ballistic missile defense systems. The Korean systerms were conceived and developed amidst plans to transfer Wartime Operational Control from the U.S. to South Korea. Because transfer has been postponted, there is less rationale for maintaing separate systems. Despite the official desire to keep these systems independent, South Korea needs to develop options for enhancing interoperability with American missile defense systems to support the tailored deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

226. The ROK–U.S. Alliance and the Third Offset Strategy

Author:
Patrick M. Cronin and Seongwon Lee
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
The United States relies on its ability to project military power far forward of its shores in defense of national and allied interests. Yet the diffusion of technology, especially long-range and precision-guided munitions, poses profound challenges to this core assumption undergirding U.S. extended deterrence and alliance contingency response. The U.S. Department of Defense is seeking technological and operational innovations to deal with these unfavorable trends, largely through military modernization programs that are designed to preserve the United States’ capacity to deter aggression, dissuade adventurism, reassure allies, and defend allied and national interests in the event of conflict. Most analysis of America’s so-called “Third Offset Strategy” has focused on deploying leading-edge technologies to overcome China’s military modernization programs. Almost nothing has been written about a Third Offset Strategy through the prism of the Korean Peninsula. Yet the Third Offset Strategy can bolster the alliance’s response to North Korea, reinforce deterrence, and support regional security. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the analysis by assessing the emerging U.S. defense programs with respect to North Korea, Peninsula contingencies, and ROK–U.S. alliance cooperation on regional and outof-area security issues.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, South America, and United States of America

227. Penalising Environmental Violations: An Analysis of The Ministry’s Proposal

Author:
Shibani Ghosh
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
In October 2015, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change released a Draft Environment Laws (Amendment) Bill 2015 proposing amendments to the Environment (Protection) Act 1986 and the National Green Tribunal Act 2010. The stated objective of the Bill is to provide ‘effective deterrent penal provisions’ and to introduce the concept of monetary penalty. It also aims ‘to minimise the exercise of discretion and make an unambiguous framework’. This paper summarises the text of the Bill and analyses whether it will complement the environmental objectives the parent laws espouse. It discusses some of the major concerns relating to the proposed amendments under three broad themes: environmental damage and penalties, adjudicating authorities and rule making powers. It concludes that although penalties that effectively deter violators are certainly the need of the hour, the proposed amendments are unlikely to achieve this objective.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Law Enforcement, Law, Legislation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Asia

228. Strengthening the Strategic Balance in the Baltic Sea Area

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu and Henrik Praks
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Defence Committee of the Riigikogu (Estonian Parliament) commissioned ICDS to conduct a study on the strategic balance in the Baltic Sea region with aim to contribute, in the run up to the Warsaw Summit, to the discussion on the optimum Alliance military posture in the region. Assumptions: Russia follows an increasingly aggressive anti-Western policy of revisionism and has become a direct and open threat to NATO. It is implementing an ambitious military modernisation programme and has demonstrated a tendency to use force against weaker neighbours. NATO´s overall superiority vis-à-vis Russia is not reflected equally in the Baltic Sea region, especially by taking into account geography and force postures. The Alliance military power is not sufficiently available in the region. Russia will strive to avoid a full-scale war with NATO, but it could be tempted, nevertheless, while being guided by misperceptions, to provoke and exploit a “local conflict” to test and undermine the Alliance. Key findings: Credible NATO deterrence in the eastern flank of the Alliance requires an optimum balance between deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Present NATO defence posture in the Baltic Sea region is inadequate for the effective deterrence by denial. Notable capability gaps exist as regards air and missile defence and naval presence. Russia has the ability to impose an A2/AD “bubble” over the Baltic states and large parts of the Baltic Sea. The major concentration of Russian forces in the areas surrounding Baltic states clearly exceeds defensive needs. Many of these units are offensive in their nature. Russia is frequently exercising military actions against Baltic states and their separation from the rest of the Alliance In military terms Belarus is an extension of Russian armed forces and performs an important geopolitical role, especially with regard to the “Suwalki gap”. The most likely worst scenario is not a “hybrid crisis” or limited incursion, but the separation and possible conquest of the Baltic states by conventional military means. Conclusions and recommendations The Russian threat has to be clearly acknowledged, treated as a strategic long-term challenge and taken fully into account in NATO’s defence planning and future posture in the Baltic Sea area. Effective deterrence requires a clearly increased presence of Allied forces in the region. NATO’s forward defence has to move from a symbolic to a meaningful presence. The Alliance’s forward presence must balance two key aspects: military effectiveness and multinationality. Military effectiveness requires the forces to be combat ready. The United States should exercise leadership by providing the framework and certain key capabilities, which would then be complemented by contributions from other Allies. In terms of manoeuvre formations, the baseline consideration should be brigade-sized units. A continuous presence of two brigades would be necessary, in addition to the indigenous forces of the Baltic countries. An increased presence of air assets, including transition from Air Policing mission to Air Defence, and maintenance of a robust naval presence in the Baltic Sea, is required. The Baltic countries will need to allocate additional resources for the Host Nation Support, including the development of necessary infrastructure. Alongside the strengthening of the forward presence component, the Alliance needs to refine capabilities for the deployment of reinforcements and follow-on forces, and for the neutralization of Russia´s A2/AD capabilities. The Allies should demonstrate their ability, in collective defence exercises, to rapidly move large numbers of troops to the Baltic region.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

229. Closing NATO’s Baltic Gap

Author:
Wesley K. Clark, Juri Luik, Egon Ramms, and Richard Shirreff
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report was prepared as an input to the forthcoming NATO’s Warsaw Summit by three former NATO commanders with considerable experience of Allied strategy, operations and capabilities: a former Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a former Deputy SACEUR and a former Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum. Political experience and context are provided by a former ambassador to NATO.
Topic:
NATO, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

230. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea