The mission of the Department of Defense is to defend the nation and when necessary, defeat its enemies. Very few endeavors in life are so focused and results oriented. While we continue this primary mission of prosecuting the global war on terrorism and simultaneously defending our nation, we cannot overlook the fact that we must more effectively and efficiently manage the Department.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and War
Events of the past decade provide compelling evidence that the national security environment continues to evolve at a rapid pace and in unpredictable directions. Further, it is clear that meeting the demands of the evolving environment calls for new levels of adaptable military capabilities that, in turn, demand joint forces that are responsive and effective across a range of operations from small scale operations through major theater conflict. In the two most recent major contingencies – Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) - we have seen new levels of understanding of the need for truly integrated joint capabilities and new levels of innovation in leveraging existing capabilities to achieve the needed level of effectiveness. Lessons Learned activities have verified important shifts in focus leading to a series of emerging concepts for more effectively integrating capabilities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Environment, and National Security
The vertical lift industrial base still is being shaped by government and industry responses to the Nunn-McCurdy cost breaches of 2001 and the unintended consequences of Department-endorsed teaming arrangements that resulted in an interlocked industrial base that restricted Department and industry flexibility. The Department's budget-driven remanufacture strategy in the 1990s produced a series of sole-sourced relationships, leaving few real competitive opportunities among the helicopter prime contractors to force technology refresh cycles. With limited competition, few new platform contracts, and declining government technology investments, industry was left little incentive to invest in independent research.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, and Science and Technology
In accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2004, the Defense Science Board (DSB) was asked to assess the potential contributions of a Space Based Radar (SBR) to missile defense. In response, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD (AT), and the Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) directed that the DSB Task Force on the Contribution of a Space Based Radar to Missile Defense perform the following tasks: Assess the impact of adding a missile defense mission on the ability of SBR satellites to conduct their primary missions; Assess how different SBR architectures and technical approaches might affect the ability of the satellites to achieve their primary missions and to contribute to missile defense; Assess the value of potential SBR capabilities in the context of the family of sensors being developed by the Missile Defense Agency; and Recommend any future actions that might be desirable related to SBR contributions to missile defense.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
In February 2003, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, ODUSD(IP), produced Transforming the Defense Industrial Base: A Roadmap. This report identified the need for systematic evaluation of the ability of the defense industrial base to develop and provide functional, operational effects-based warfighting capabilities. The Defense Industrial Base Capabilities Study (DIBCS) series is a systematic assessment of critical technologies needed in the 21st century defense industrial base to meet warfighter requirements as framed by the Joint Staff's functional concepts. In addition, the DIBCS series provides the basis for strengthening the industrial base that provides solutions to warfighting needs—and from which the Joint Staff develops its Joint Integrating Concepts and Joint Operating Concepts. This report addresses the second of those functional concepts, Joint Command and Control.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, and Science and Technology
In this report, clandestine nuclear attack means a nuclear or radiological attack By anyone for any purpose, Against the United States and/or U.S. military operations, Delivered by means other than (military) missiles or aircraft. A large subset of this threat is the smuggling of nuclear weapons, devices, or materials for use against the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the role of the Department of Defense in domestic emergency preparedness and response is under scrutiny. Ever since President Carter established the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1978, the Defense Department has considered its domestic emergency response role to be one of providing support or assistance to civil authority. Military planners assume that civil agencies will always lead domestic emergency preparedness and response efforts, with the Department of Defense providing resources only in response to appeals from state and local governments to the President. Local and state governments are expected to use their resources first. While National Guard capabilities may be called into play by the Governor under Title 32 status, military commanders and planners have usually assumed that other Department of Defense assets will be called into play only when local, state, and other federal resources are overwhelmed. Concerns about the Posse Comitatus Act and misunderstandings of its scope have also tended to restrict the deployment of Department of Defense assets where their use might be construed as augmenting state and local law enforcement agencies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, and Science and Technology
In 2003, terrorists struck at targets around the world, even as Iraq became a central front in the global war against terrorism and the locus of so many deadly attacks against civilians. Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups made clear once again their relentless pursuit of evil in defiance of any law—human or divine. The year saw heinous crimes against the international community, humanitarian organizations, and people dedicated to helping mankind.
This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft report GAO-02- 1003, “MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on U.S. Use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War,” dated August 6, 2002 (GAO code 350068). The Department found a number of factual inaccuracies in the draft report. These inaccuracies were pointed out to GAO representatives during the August 7, 2002 draft report meeting and in subsequent exchanges. This response addresses DoD concerns with the report in general, rather than reiterating a list of line-by- line corrections.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Human Welfare
On Friday, February 27, 2004, the Administration announced a new United States policy on landmines. This policy is a significant departure from past approaches to landmines. It will ensure protection for both military forces and civilians alike, and will continue U.S. leadership in humanitarian mine action – those activities that contribute most directly toward eliminating the landmine problem.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Human Welfare