The bush administration is requesting $343.2 billion for the Pentagon in Fiscal Year 2002. This is $32.6 billion above current levels, and includes the $14.2 billion increase requested for the military in the March budget release (see below). This total also includes $14.3 billion for the defense functions of the Department of Energy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
To prove he is serious about National Missile Defense, President George W. Bush must abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty now, according to the most strident critics of the treaty. The longstanding ABM accord with Russia, it is said, is thwarting the technology needed for missile defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The security environment in Asia has become highly complex since the end of the Cold War. A legacy from that superpower struggle still affects security relations, but what is surprising is the re-emergence of issues associated with World War II and before. Asians have long memories. Their injuries are not forgotten. Past history is just yesterday.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
If we go to war with Iraq, we will go to war with forces that are the military equivalent of a wounded poisonous snake. They are weakened, but still dangerous, and they may lash out in ways that are truly dangerous. In broad terms, Iraq's forces have been in steadily decline ever since the beginning of the fighting in the Gulf War. They have been weakened by military defeat, by the impact of UN inspections, by wars of underfunding and by a decade without significant arms imports. At the same time, they are still the most powerful conventional forces in the Gulf, and Iraq may have some very unconventional weapons.
The most important single message that anyone can communicate in regard to biological weapons is that we face a very uncertain mix of existing threats politics, commercial development, and technology will change constantly as far into the future as we can look. The issue is not what we know, but how little we know and how little we can predict.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
This draft analysis is be circulated for comment as part of the CSIS “Saudi Arabia Enters the 21 st Century Project.” It will be extensively revised before final publication.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Arabia, and Saudi Arabia
Chemical weapons have not been used effectively in attacks on the American homeland. Reports that the bombers of the World Trade Center considered trying to add a chemical weapon like sodium cyanide to their explosives seem to be untrue, and led to an unsubstantiated assertion by the trial judge. There have, however, been a number of attempts to use chemical weapons by domestic extremists and individuals. For example, in 1997, members of the KKK plotted to place an improvised explosive device on a hydrogen sulfide tank at a refinery near Dallas, Texas. There is a well-established, low-level risk that such weapons will be used in the future, although there is no way to predict the frequency of such attacks, their scale, potential success, or lethality.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
For several months prior to the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, a videotape calling Muslims to a holy war against forces described as Crusaders and Jews circulated underground in the Arab world. Produced on behalf of Osama bin Laden and prominently featuring his image, words, and ideas, the tape is designed to recruit young Arab men to journey to Afghanistan and train for a war in defense of Islam.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Ethnic Conflict, Government, International Cooperation, International Law, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Middle East, and Arabia
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. It is a real honour for me to be here today to address you on the complex subject of European Defence: Vision and Realities. I am grateful as ever to Bertel Heurlin and David Munis Zepernick for arranging this chance to discuss with you European defence at what is a crucial moment. Last time I was here I spoke a lot about visions, so today, as you will hear, the emphasis will be on realities rather than visions.
The past ten years have seen the steady escalation of attempts to securitise the EU which, for good or for bad, are now beginning to succeed. Across Europe the EU is fast becoming a convincing reason for groups to mobilise in protest and action - from Copenhagen to Nice to Gothenburg the EU has become a synonym for 'threat'. As this paper will explore, the securisation of the EU is occurring as it begins to be represented as a threat to ontological security, and eventually existential security, in the lives of Europeans and non-Europeans. But how best to think about the European [security] Union as it attempts to balance the headline security concerns of conflicts on its border with the structural security concerns of its citizens. This thinking involves questioning the very nature of the security the EU is attempting to secure through a series of reflections on the many dimensions of security, the ontopolitical assumptions of differing metatheoretical positions, and finally arguing the need to desecuritise the EU.