The Clinton administration underestimated the technological ability of several of the “rogue” states to develop long-range missiles and politicized its intelligence estimate. However, missile threats to the United States from any one of those states also depend on the intentions of that state and political developments that might affect those intentions.
Christer Pursiainen, Pekka Haavisto, and Nikita Lomagin
Publication Date:
01-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the traditional security dilemma based on the perception of a military threat between Russia and the West has largely given way to a variety of new challenges related to non-military security, so-called soft security threats. These threats are not merely problems internal to Russia, but constitute existing or potential problems for other countries as well.
On September 11, terrorists attacked freedom. The world has responded with an unprecedented coalition against international terrorism. In the first 100 days of the war, President George W. Bush increased America's homeland security and built a worldwide coalition that: Began to destroy al-Qaeda's grip on Afghanistan by driving the Taliban from power. Disrupted al-Qaeda's global operations and terrorist financing networks. Destroyed al-Qaeda terrorist training camps. Helped the innocent people of Afghanistan recover from the Taliban's reign of terror. Helped Afghans put aside long-standing differences to form a new interim government that represents all Afghans – including women.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and War
The battle against international bribery and other forms of public corruption remains a high priority for the United States. As President George W. Bush stated in his May 2001 message to the Second Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, “The corruption of governmental institutions threatens our common interests in promoting political and economic stability, upholding core democratic values, ending the reign of dictators, and creating a level playing field for lawful business activities.
Section 218 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law (PL) 106-398 (at Appendix A) requires the submission of a report to the congressional defense committees on the acquisition of biological defense vaccines for the Department of Defense (DoD). As required by section 218, PL 106-398, this report addresses: 1) the implications of relying on the commercial sector to meet the DoD's biological defense vaccine requirements; 2) a design for a government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) vaccine production facility; 3) preliminary cost estimates and schedule for the facility; 4) consultation with the Surgeon General on the utility of such a facility for the production of vaccines for the civilian sector and the impact of civilian production on meeting Armed Forces needs and facility operating costs; and 5) the impact of international vaccine requirements and the production of vaccines to meet those requirements on meeting Armed Forces needs and facility operating costs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Human Welfare, and Science and Technology
Several decades of science and technology, concept development, and engineering development have provided the underpinnings for a significant contribution by high-energy lasers (HELs) to national security needs. The potential for speed-of-light response with a wide variety of effects to support a variety of missions suggests a new level of flexibility and adaptability-attributes that are particularly valuable in the complex national security environment currently existing and unfolding. As in the case of most important new technologies, we are just beginning to understand and exploit the potential of high-energy lasers. It is nonetheless important to realize the extent of this potential. Directed-energy weapons can add a new dimension to a wide range of missions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Energy Policy, and Science and Technology
The Defense Science Board Task Force was formed to address questions related to the development of X-band, active, electronically steered arrays (AESAs) for airborne platforms. Areas focused on were advanced radar capabilities for ground targets and air targets.The airborne radar inventory can be divided into three broad categories:(1) Air target surveillance and cueing radars mounted in rotodomes (e.g., AWACS,-2C).(2) Nose- mounted fighter radars for air and ground targets (e.g., F-15, F-16, F-22, JSF).(3) Side-looking radars for ground reconnaissance, surveillance, and cueing (e.g., U-2, JSTARS, Global Hawk). Categories (2) and (3) are dominated by X-band radars; the insertion of AESA technology into category (3) was the primary subject for this task force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology
In its 1996 report, the Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended that the Pentagon invest an additional $3 billion to strengthen defenses of its information networks. This report was viewed by some as unrealistic and prophetic by others, but in all cases it faced a readership with a very uneven appreciation of the effects of disruptive technology and dicontinuous change. The defense establishment has increased its intellectual capital on the subject of Defensive Information Systems (DIO) considerably since 1996. However, it has yet to fully accomodate the realities of an information intensive future in its architecture, processes, and investments. Technology has continued to evolve and the problems have become much more difficult and complex. DoD must now accomplish more than anyone could have imagined in 1996. Perhaps more important is the dawning realization that incremental modifications to our existing institutions and processes will not produce the adaptation we need.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Science and Technology
The United States and its allies face a diverse set of challenges to collective security. These include regional or state-centered threats (such as regional aggressors); transnational threats (including terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, and illicit arms trafficking); the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and the spread of dangerous technologies (including non-safeguarded, dual-use technologies). Additional challenges include threats to the environment and public health (e.g., new infectious diseases), and from foreign intelligence collection, failed states, and other states that tolerate or actively engage in human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing, or acts of genocide that can endanger regional stability by sparking civil wars and refugee crises.
The Under Secretary of Defense (AT) requested that the DSB form a brief study of ongoing Navy and Air Force programs aimed at developing advanced laser guided weapon targeting pods for their tactical aircraft. This request for a DSB Task Force was occasioned by Congressional interest in the possibilities of a Joint development and production program for these pods.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, and Science and Technology