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1031. Challenges of Security Sector Governance in Kuwait

Author:
Ghanim Al-Najjar
Publication Date:
08-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The security apparatus in Kuwait is divided into three main institutions, namely the Army, the Police, and the National Guard. The division of labour amongst the three institutions is clear. While the army is re sponsible for external defence duties (since offensive war is prohibited by the Constitution), the police are responsible for internal security, and the National Guard is responsible for providing emergency and supporting duties. According to the Constitution, the army is headed by the Amir (the Head of State) being the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, while in reality the army is headed by the Minister of De fence who is currently Sheikh Jaber Mubarak Alsabah, and operationally headed by the Chief-of-Staff Fahad Alamir. Although the military side of the army is run on a daily basis by the military staff, the Ministry of Defence that is basically civilian in its composition has a major impact on any work and decision-making that affects army affairs. The police on the other hand are completely administered through the Ministry of the Interior; the current Minister of the Interior is Sheikh Nawwaf Alahmad Alsabah. The currently Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior is Nasser Alothman and he is assisted by seven Assistant Under-Secretary's for administering the daily operations of the police. Six out of the seven Under-Secretaries are police officers. Almost 90% of the top management of the Ministry of the Interior is made up of police officers, and this situation differs greatly from the state of affairs that is to be found in the Ministry of Defence. The National Guard is an independent institution of the Armed Forces, which reports directly to the Supreme Council of Defence, which is headed by a senior sheikh (currently Sheikh Salim Alali Alsabah and his deputy Sheikh Mishal Alahmad Alsabah).
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Defense Policy, and Governance
Political Geography:
Middle East and Kuwait

1032. The Best Papers from the 2003 DCAF-IISS Young Faces Conference

Author:
Nicu Popescu, Margareta Mamaliga, and Ivan Zverzhanovski
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Following a decade of devastating conflicts, the countries of South Eastern Europe have now intensified their efforts to reform the security sector, foster security cooperation in the region and move more swiftly towards the membership in Euro-Atlantic integrations. Beyond any doubt, to succeed in these efforts, the whole region will have to develop and heavily rely upon a new generation of civilian security and defence experts.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

1033. Democratic Decision-Making and Deployments:The Case of the Netherland's Peacekeepers in Srebenica and Iraq

Author:
René Moelker
Publication Date:
07-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The question posed in this paper is whether the lessons learned from Srebrenica and the experiences of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) have led to a cultural change in civil-military relations. To demonstrate evidence of cultural change the decision-making process during this period was studied. The decision-making process at the time of UNPROFOR is exemplary of a clash between military and civilian cultures. After a parliamentary inquiry into Srebrenica, decision-making procedures regarding deployments were improved by use of a set of criteria called the 'Toetsingskader'. Parliamentarians use these criteria to question the government about many important issues regarding deployment. The criteria were adequately applied to the deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea, however, Ethiopia and Eritrea was a 'classical' first generation peacekeeping situation, which perhaps made it easier to apply the criteria for decisionmaking. The criteria in the 'Toetsingskader' were put to a more severe test in the decision-making process regarding participation in the Stabilisation Force Iraq (SFIR) in 2003. On the one hand, the 'Toetsingskader' proved to be a useful tool for parliamentary control, being able to bridge the gap between military and civilian political culture. On the other hand, the risk of teleological reasoning remains. The criteria can easily be used to justify participation by rationalising goals of the deployment and/or ignoring critical questions.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Netherlands

1034. Vision Of A New Hungarian Intelligence Architecture

Author:
Tibor Babos
Publication Date:
03-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Hungary has come a long way. The National Assembly has effectively developed oversight of the military through budget, approval of the Basic Principles of National Defense and the Defense Bill, and deployment of the Armed Forces. The Constitutional Court has effectively addressed the problems caused by the October 1989 Constitution and 1 December 1989 Defense Reform; and its decisions have been respected. The military has evidenced significant reform; it has been restructured to accommodate NATO, but force modernization continues to be greatly restrained by scarce resources. But Hungary still has a number of tasks to achieve effective civilian oversight.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Europe

1035. Unsheathing the Samurai Sword: Japan's Changing Security Policy

Author:
Alan Dupont
Publication Date:
11-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Lowy Institute for International Policy
Abstract:
This Lowy Institute Paper sheds analytical light on Japan's changing security policy and seeks answers to several important questions that are of major consequence for Australia and the wider region. What are Japan's strategic aspirations and what does Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi really mean when he talks about Japan becoming a 'normal country'? How signifi cant are the mooted revisions to the peace constitution and how different will the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF) be in capability and structure a decade hence? As domestic anxieties increase will Japan move closer to the US or seek greater autonomy within the framework of the US alliance? Is it conceivable that the alliance itself could fracture or dissolve entirely? Will cooperation with the US on missile defence weaken the prohibition on collective self defence and under what circumstances might Japan acquire nuclear weapons?
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Japan, Israel, Asia, and Australia

1036. Iraq Reconstruction Update #5: Retaking Fallujah

Author:
Michael Donovan
Publication Date:
12-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Defense Information
Abstract:
The insurgency in Iraq has grown in size and effectiveness in the months since a U.S.-led coalition invaded the country. By the summer of 2004, Pentagon officials were revising their initial estimates of the size of the insurgency by a factor of four. Baghdad and Mosul remained open cities to insurgents, and coalition casualty figures were rising steadily. Even as coalition authorities and the Iraqi interim government began to consider preparations for elections to be held in 2005, 20-30 towns in northeastern Iraq remained outside of coalition control. In an effort to pacify these predominantly Sunni areas, coalition officials devised a plan to retake key towns, and, it was hoped, strike at the heart of the insurgency. As a centerpiece to this plan, on Nov. 8, 2004, U.S. Marine and Army units, complemented by some Iraqi troops, embarked on Operation Phantom Fury, the retaking of the town of Fallujah.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Human Rights, and War
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Arab Countries

1037. Getting to “Yes” on Missile Defense: The Need to Rebalance U.S. Priorities & The Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation

Author:
Jeffrey P. Bialos and Stuart L. Koehl
Publication Date:
01-2004
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:
At the end of the day, missile defense is and should be here to stay as a key element of U.S., and in all likelihood, European defense strategy for the twenty-first century. The threats are real and there is an emerging consensus about creating defenses against it. While the “macro” issues of ABM withdrawal and initial fielding of the U.S. midcourse segment are behind us, there are very legitimate issues that warrant debate on both sides of the Atlantic. We now need to focus on making the right choices to provide a better balance of capabilities between various strategic, regional, force protection, and homeland security needs. Moreover, U.S.-European engagement on missile defense is potentially, but not inevitably, a win-win proposition—binding alliance partners together geo-politically, creating a layered, multi-national plug and play “system of system” architecture, and enhancing our ability to fight wars together. And, an enhanced coalition war fighting capability is likely to have beneficial spillover effects on the broader Transatlantic relationship; it is axiomatic that countries that fight wars together tend to have congruent interests in a range of areas. But for this to happen, Europe needs to begin to seriously consider its missile defense needs soon and apply resources to the task and the United States needs to resolve the underlying technology transfer issues and questions of roles and responsibilities. Thus, with hard work and good will, multi-national cooperation between the United States and its allies offers “win-win” from the standpoint of strengthening the alliance and our mutual security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Europe

1038. A Changing of the Guard: The U.S. National Guard and Homeland Defense

Author:
Jay Smith
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Since the September 11 attacks, the federal government has undertaken a fundamental review of the U.S. defense priorities. The terrorist strikes against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon exposed the extraordinary vulnerability of the U.S. homeland that some had warned against over the last several years. There is now widespread agreement that the threat of terrorist attack against the United States is likely to be a long-term reality. Given this situation, the Bush administration's decision to reassess its policy on homeland security is wholly appropriate.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States

1039. Missile Defense: Defending America or Building Empire?

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The rationale for missile defense put forward by its advocates is often a “doom and gloom” picture: America and its citizens are defenseless against the threat of ballistic missiles, and missile defense is supposed to protect the American people. The administration's vision of missile defense is not just a global system that protects the United States against long-range missiles but a global system capable of engaging all classes of ballistic missiles to protect U.S. forces deployed worldwide, U.S. allies, and other friendly countries. Thus, the purpose of missile defense is extended well beyond protecting America and Americans.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States and America

1040. Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Author:
Doug Bandow
Publication Date:
05-2003
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Ever since North Korea's dramatic revelation that it was producing materials that could be used to make nuclear weapons, the Bush administration has considered a range of policy options—including a military strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. Although the administration officially dismisses such talk, President Bush has left the military option on the table, and influential advisers outside of the administration have openly called for military action along the lines of the Israeli attack on Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak in 1981.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Israel, and North Korea