Section 2504 of title 10, United States Code, requires that the Secretary of Defense submit an annual report to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, by March 1st of each year.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Recent operations in Iraq raised concerns that foreign nations might restrict or preclude shipments of defense articles for DoD applications during internationally unpopular engagements. Given this possibility, the Department of Defense decided to review the extent to which it depends on foreign suppliers for operationally important defense systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, and Science and Technology
This report covers Phase III of the work of the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Missile Defense. Phase I examined mid-course discrimination. Phase II, a 2002 DSB Summer Study, examined the four issues shown in the chart above. Following completion of the Phase II report, the Director, Missile Defense Agency (MDA) asked the Task Force to examine modeling and simulation (M). The Under Secretary Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT]) concurred. The request was further refined to the five areas shown. After a brief introduction, this report will cover each of the five issues in turn.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Lessons from recent combat experiences in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that UAVs can provide vastly improved acquisition and more rapid dissemination of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data. They are one of the principal contributors to successful outcomes for the United States. in these campaigns. The benefits and promise offered by UAVs in surveillance, targeting and attack have captured the attention of senior military and civilian officials in the Defense Department (DoD), members of Congress, and the public alike. Indeed, these recent combat operations appear to indicate that unmanned air systems have at last come of age.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Defense Science Board Summer Study Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces looks to the 30-year future with the objective of providing the President with a broad range of strike options to Protect the United States and our forces abroad, Assure friends and allies of our future commitment, and Deal with future adversaries on terms favorable to the United States. The Task Force identified currently planned systems that will still be relevant and recommended new systems for development.
In February 2003, the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, ODUSD(IP), produced Transforming the Defense Industrial Base: A Roadmap. This report identified the need for systematic evaluation of the ability of the defense industrial base to develop and provide functional, operational effects-based warfighting capabilities. The Defense Industrial Base Capabilities Study (DIBCS) series begins a systematic assessment of critical technologies and industrial capabilities needed in the 21st century defense industrial base to meet warfighter requirements as framed by the Joint Staff's Functional Concepts and Joint Operational Architecture. The DIBCS series ties directly to warfighter needs by linking industrial base capabilities to warfighter capabilities derived from the Functional Concepts. This report addresses the first of those functional concepts, Battlespace Awareness.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, and Science and Technology
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The Kerry campaign has announced its list of retired generals and admirals endorsing their candidate; the Bush campaign will soon produce its list, and no doubt both will mobilize more retired stars for the coming fight. One need not be paranoid about civil-military relations to think this a bad business, reckless on the part of the politicians and destructive on the part of the former flags. By serving as props for presidential candidates, the retired generals put at risk the confidence that citizens and officials alike place in the political neutrality of the armed forces. They have every legal and constitutional right to behave this way, of course, as they have every right to make second careers as pole dancers in Vegas. But in so doing they diminish American politics and damage the national defense.
Currently, the term security sector is not only understood in terms of traditional military-political institutions such as army, external intelligence, and command and control systems. As the edition of the UK Department for International Development "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform" puts it: "[...] in broad terms the security sector comprises all those responsible for protecting the state and communities within it." Accordingly, police, justice, public and nongovernmental organizations and human rights protection institutions can also be included in the security actors' list.
For the decade preceding September 11, 2001, the Caucasus were a "C list" foreign policy priority for the United States. The region neither presented an imminent threat to the United States nor its security interests. American policy was focused on "securing the Cold War victory" whilst regional interests in the Caucasus were defined by economic considerations and a pseudo-policy of neo-containment of Russia. However, 9/11 changed American perspectives on its security interests. The sources of terrorism, the reality of the threat posed by failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became the new foreign policy dogma. Under these new circumstances, the Caucasus, arguably, migrated to a "B list" priority or one in which American interests were threatened.
Security Sector Governance in Georgia is a topic which is certainly not easy to explore. First of all there is no up-to-date literature, at least none which considers the entire complexity of the relevant aspects and elements influencing security sector governance and security sector reform (SSR) in the country. Second research work on security sector governance relevant issues looks like a patch-work quilt. There is no comprehensive evaluation of the standing of security sector reform: Studies mainly focus on singled-out aspects and the various threads are not brought together, at least not in a way which would allow an evaluation of the overall situation of security sector governance in Georgia. The closest to those needs comes the Center for Civil Military Relations and Security Studies (CCMRSS) in Tbilisi. The research work of David Darchiashvili and Tamara Pataraia provides crucial insights and profound background information on security sector relevant issues.