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391. An Independent Review of Foreign National Access Management for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Author:
Dick Thornburgh
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA)
Abstract:
Over the last year, security incidents involving foreign nationals at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) research Centers have drawn the attention of the NASA Administrator and other agency leaders, Congress, and the media. Recognizing the growing threat of cyber-attacks and espionage aimed at government agencies by hostile nation-states and foreign adversaries, NASA asked the National Academy of Public Administration (the Academy) to conduct this review of its foreign national management processes. Having a well-run Foreign National Access Management (FNAM) program is in the best interests of NASA, both in terms of protecting vital U.S. security and proprietary information, as well as capitalizing on the talents of foreign nationals. This Academy review examined the Agency’s entire FNAM process from the initial request from a requestor or sponsor through foreign national vetting, credentialing, information technology security, counterintelligence, hosting and escort procedures, and export controls.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Space
Political Geography:
United States and North America

392. Journal of Public and International Affairs 2014

Author:
Daphne McCurdy, Chikara Onda, Aaron Aitken, Lucia Adriana Baltazar Vazquez, John Paul Bumpus, John Speed Meyers, Pierina Ana Sanchez, Yolaine Frossard de Saugy, Melanie Harris, Steve Moilanen, Stephen Pritchard, Nicolas Collin dit de Montesson, and Naomi Crowther
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Public and International Affairs (JPIA)
Institution:
School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA), Princeton University
Abstract:
From pressing foreign policy issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea and homicide rates in Honduras to contentious domestic policy debates such as the rights of Mexican immigrants in the United States and the construction of the Keystone pipeline, the topics in this year’s journal are wide-ranging in both functional and geographic focus. However, they all share a strong commitment to seeking solutions to the world’s most serious challenges through sound policy.
Topic:
Crime, Government, Oil, Poverty, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, Foreign Aid, Immigration, Governance, Law, Cybersecurity, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Iran, Canada, Philippines, Mexico, Honduras, United States of America, and South China Sea

393. 2013-14 IGCC White Paper on Defense Transparency in Northeast Asia

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung and Jordan Wilson
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The 2013‒2014 Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index (DTI) measures transparency in de-fense activities in one of the most strategically important but politically volatile regions of the world. In the fifth year of this Index, its central goal remains to provide a rigorous, quantitative-based measurement of this essential but contested concept. Improving trust, confidence, and credibility in Northeast Asia’s security environment is becoming ever more pressing as arms competition intensifies among major regional powers and security interests become increasingly entangled. In this climate of growing security anxiety, the demand for timely and relevant defense information has grown, not only from governments and their mil-itaries but also from many other quarters, including the general public, media, and business com-munity. But while the case has been made by policy and academic experts that increased transpar-ency could potentially meet some of these demands and strengthen mutual trust between states, defense transparency lacks agreed-upon definitions and standardized means of measurement. The Institute on Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) has sought to address this analytical gap to provide a general framework for defining and measuring defense transparency, specifically for the six states covered in the DTI: the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of Korea (ROK), the Russian Federation (Russia), and the United States.The brief begins by presenting the methodology used by IGCC to initially develop the DTI, then highlights changes made to improve the process in this latest edition. This is followed by the final scores achieved by states in the 2013–2014 DTI, which are compared with previous years. The Analysis section examines what brought about scoring changes for these states from the previous editions of the index. Finally, the Country Assessments and Recommendations section summarizes trends for each of the six countries. By taking a comprehensive approach to defense transparency and continuing to refine our meth-odology, we want to ensure that the DTI will remain an informative, relevant and adaptive tool for measuring defense transparency going forward, enabling comparison both across states and over time.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Budget, Cybersecurity, Media, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Korea, and United States of America

394. Proxy wars in cyberspace: The Evolving International Law of Attribution

Author:
Michael N. Schmitt and Liis Vihul
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Cyberspace offers a relative degree of anonymity for states to conduct hostile activities against other states, as the challenges of accurate attribution remain a strong barrier to retaliation for these activities. As international law grapples with how to govern this theater of conflict, what should the international community to do if states increasingly turn to using non-state actors as proxies to further cover their tracks? Schmitt and Vihul examine the current legal landscape for such proxy operations.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Non State Actors, Cybersecurity, Conflict, International Community, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

395. Regional Cyber Security: Moving Towards a Resilient ASEAN Cyber Security Regime

Author:
Caitriona Heinl
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper outlines regional level cooperation efforts of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to counter serious cross-border cyber threats and identifies where gaps might exist, which require further and urgent consideration. It considers whether more might be done to create a comprehensive approach to cyber security in the ASEAN region. Finally, it aims to fill identified gaps by providing several recommendations for possible future development and implementation to create a resilient regional cyber security regime.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, Cybersecurity, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Asia and Southeast Asia

396. Basic Attack Strategy of Stuxnet 0.5 rev. 1

Author:
Institute for Science and International Security
Publication Date:
02-2013
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Symantec has recently established that an earlier attack strategy of the malware Stuxnet involved the secret closing of a set of valves in six of 18 cascades in a module at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). 1 This attack strategy was apparently active by late 2007, when Iran was setting up and operating its first module of about 2,952 IR-1 centrifuges. The reason for attacking only one third of a module’s cascades is unclear. But this attack could have damaged many centrifuges without destroying so many that the plant operator would have become suspicious. The code takes over the monitoring system, keeping the operator unaware of the attack. The attack involves singling out a set of centrifuges in the cascade. Figure 1 lists the Natanz cascade of 164 IR-1 centrifuges organized into 15 stages and the 110 centrifuges that are isolated during the attack. None of the affected centrifuges are in the feed stage, which is stage 10 in the table and includes 24 centrifuges. In total, 54 centrifuges are not affected. By themselves, these 54 centrifuges form a cascade of 11 stages, the stages of which are all very narrow except for a very wide feed stage. Based on an analysis of the code and the Natanz cascade, the most likely valves closed are the three fast acting valves on the three thin pipes for feed, product, and waste (or tails) that pass through the top cap of an IR-1 centrifuge (see figure 2). The three fast-acting electronically-controlled valves are part of an emergency response system of the cascade aimed at protecting the remaining centrifuges in the cascade from the effects of a crashing centrifuge. If a centrifuge crashes, or there is an imminent risk of one crashing, the computer monitoring system closes the valves of the affected centrifuge rapidly, effectively isolating it. The kinetic energy of a rotating centrifuge is huge. Because this energy is converted mainly into heat, a crashing centrifuge produces a large pulse of hot uranium hexafluoride gas and other gases that must be contained. Otherwise, this pulse travels down the cascade, taking out additional centrifuges in its path. Thus, the emergency system is designed to act within milliseconds in the event of an anticipated crash and isolate the centrifuge from the cascade. The Natanz cascade emergency response system appears to rely principally on a vibration sensor, an accelerometer, on each centrifuge. Many pressure transducers are also in each cascade to measure pressure, but the most important sensor to detect crashing appears to be the accelerometer. This sensor sends a shut-off signal to the computer monitoring system if the vibration level exceeds a certain, dangerous value. This earlier version of Stuxnet appears to exploit this emergency response system. The attack closes 330 fast-acting valves of 110 centrifuges in the cascade while leaving the valves on the other 54 open. 2 As Symantec has explained, the attack lasts for a fixed period of time or until certain conditions are met. One of these conditions is that the pressure near the feed stage registers five times its normal value. Based on a theoretical analysis, the wall pressure in an IR-1 centrifuge could be about 20-30 torr. Uranium hexafluoride condenses at about 130 torr at a temperature of 300 Kelvin. Thus, raising the pressure five-fold would raise the wall pressure of the uranium hexafluoride gas to near its condensation point. If the uranium hexafluoride gas reaches a pressure exceeding 130 torr, it will condense and form a uranium solid, likely uranium hexafluoride. This solid will attach to the wall of the rapidly spinning rotor. A non-uniform buildup of solid material could cause an imbalance in the rotor, causing it to wobble, possibly damaging the bearings or causing the rotor to strike the side of the outer casing. Both would destroy the centrifuge. Alternatively, the solid would add extra mass to the rotor wall, causing it to fail. So, the analysis suggests that an attack aims to raise the pressure of the uranium hexafluoride gas sufficiently to damage or destroy the centrifuges.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), and Centrifuges
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

397. The Digital Diplomacy Revolution: Why is Canada Lagging Behind?

Author:
Roland Paris
Publication Date:
06-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The practice of international diplomacy is undergoing a revolution. As activists, private and public organizations, political leaders and mass publics embrace Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media, foreign ministries have come under increasing pressure to update their operating methods. Many countries, including the US and Britain, are now encouraging their diplomats to use social media as a regular part of their job – not simply as a virtual “listening post” to monitor political discussions, nor merely as a megaphone for broadcasting press releases, but as a forum for participating directly in these discussions. Foreign ministries that fail to adapt to the social media revolution will lose influence over time: they will forgo opportunities to shape public discussions that are increasingly channeled through social media, to correct errors of fact or interpretation in real-time, and to build networks of interlocutors and followers. Canada is lagging far behind the US and Britain in digital diplomacy. Aside from a few recent experiments, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has largely sat on the sidelines of this revolution. DFAIT operates few social media channels and these channels tend to have few followers, compared to our two closest allies. Further, the Conservative government’s centralized control of public communications makes it virtually impossible for Canadian diplomats to engage in real-time substantive exchanges, which is the currency of the medium. Unless DFAIT joins its American and British counterparts in embracing new channels and methods of diplomacy, Canada’s voice will progressively fade in international affairs.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Cybersecurity, and Digital Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

398. Shutting the Backdoor: The Perils of National Security and Digital Surveillance Programs

Author:
Ronald J. Deibert
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
As governments have sought to monitor digital communications for security purposes, the “backdoor” paradigm has become the predominant approach. Strictly speaking, backdoors refer to special methods of bypassing normal authentication procedures to secretly access computing systems. But here the concept is used in a broader sense to describe a range of policies and practices whereby governments compel, or otherwise get the cooperation of, private sector companies to provide access to data they control. The backdoor paradigm is not only a concern for political reasons, particularly for civil liberties, it is also bad for digital security and foreign policy. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should instead seek to work within the information-rich world of Big Data that surrounds us with any access to private communications made exceptional and strictly controlled by lawful procedures and oversight mechanisms.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, Surveillance, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

399. Cybersecurity in Russian-U.S. Relations

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Threats to cyberspace and to information security are emerging as central elements of Russian-U.S. security relations. As much as U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Russian-sponsored cyber-activities, Russia is equally concerned about U.S. military intentions in the cyber domain. Differing definitions of what activities pose a threat complicates relations on this issue. While the United States is concerned primarily with threats to technology and economic well-being, Russia is also concerned about activities that threaten interference in Russian sovereign affairs. Russian concerns have been heightened by repeated U.S. rebuffs on draft U.N. resolutions to address some threats. U.S. and NATO pronouncements about the need for collective defense against cyberattacks have raised similar concerns. Ongoing Russian-U.S. cooperation at the highest level demonstrates that the states recognize the common interests at stake, but officials will have to work on a mutually beneficial basis to make any level of cooperation work.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Information Security
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

400. Countering Chinese Cyber Operations: Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Interests

Author:
Mark Stokes and L. C. Russell Hsiao
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Chinese cyber espionage poses an advanced persistent threat to U.S. national and economic security. Groups operating from PRC territory are believed to be waging a coordinated cyber espionage campaign targeting U.S. government, industrial, and think tank computer networks. A dozen of these groups have been identified and linked with the PLA, and others connected with universities and information security enterprises. The largest and most active of these groups may operate from Beijing and Shanghai.
Topic:
Government, Cybersecurity, Economy, and Espionage
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America