Search

Begin New Search Topic Cybersecurity

231. Cybercrime in Southeast Asia: Combating a global threat locally

Author:
Jonathan Lusthaus
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
What’s the problem? Cybercrime is a serious threat facing Australia and the world, but this criminal activity is often wrongly viewed as a near invisible online phenomenon, rather than a ‘real world’ concern. Behind every attack sits one or more people in a physical location. Those people are products of particular socio-economic conditions, which influence the types of regional and local cybercrime activity they specialise in. Cybercrime isn’t evenly distributed around the globe, but is centred around hotspots, which offer potential breeding grounds or safe harbours from where offenders can strike. This is true in Australia’s own region, where some Southeast Asian countries are emerging as bases for serious regional, and even global, cybercrime threats. We’re not proactively tackling the locations where the cybercrime threat develops and matures. What’s the solution? Australia’s current approach to fighting cybercrime needs to be augmented to account more seriously for this local dimension, particularly in Southeast Asia, and our fight against cybercrime should be more targeted, enduring and forward-looking. While it makes sense to support international cooperation in the fight against cybercrime, those efforts need to be targeted to specific hotspots where the problem is the most acute and Australia’s contributions can provide the greatest value for money. This involves the identification of current or future cybercriminal hotspots within Australia’s near region. Australia’s existing law enforcement capacity-building programs should be matched specifically to those countries producing the biggest cybercrime threat. Deeper relationships should also be developed between investigators in Australia and those countries through more cyber liaison posts and exchange programs. Finally, Australia should adopt prevention programs that seek to block offenders’ pathways into cybercrime and promote those programs to suitable cybercrime hotspots in the region.
Topic:
Crime, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Internet
Political Geography:
Australia and Southeast Asia

232. National security agencies and the cloud: An urgent capability issue for Australia

Author:
John Coyne, Michael Shoebridge, and Albert Zhang
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This new ASPI report, argues for the development of a national security cloud. If the community doesn’t shift to cloud infrastructure, it’ll cut itself off from the most powerful software and applications available, placing itself in a less capable position using legacy software that vendors no longer support. The report’s authors argue that if this need isn’t addressed rapidly and comprehensively, Australia will quite simply be at a major disadvantage against potential adversaries who are using this effective new technology at scale to advance their own analysis and operational performance. The report identifies four significant obstacles that stand in the way of Australia’s national security community moving to cloud infrastructure. These obstacles need to be crossed, and the change needs to be driven by ministers and agency heads. Ministers and agency heads have both the responsibility and perspective to look beyond the important current technical security standards and rules and think about the capability benefit that cloud computing can bring to Australia’s national security. They’re the ones who must balance opportunity and risk.
Topic:
National Security, Cybersecurity, and Internet
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

233. Weaponised deep fakes

Author:
Hannah Smith and Katherine Mansted
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Fakes are all around us. Academic analysis suggests that they’re difficult to spot without new sensors, software or other specialised equipment, with 1 in 5 photos you see being fraudulent. The exposure of deep fakes and the services they facilitate can potentially lead to suppression of information and a general breakdown in confidence in public authorities and trust. We need to react not just to false or compromised claims but to those who would try to exploit them for nefarious purposes. We should not assume the existence of fake news unless we have compelling evidence to the contrary, but when we do, we should not allow the propaganda. I’ve never been more sure of this point than today. —GPT-2 deep learning algorithm The foreword to this report was written by a machine. The machine used a ‘deep fake’ algorithm — a form of artificial intelligence (AI) — to generate text and a headshot. Deep fakes are increasingly realistic and easy to create. The foreword took us approximately five minutes to generate, using free, open-source software.1
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

234. Australia's next cybersecurity strategy: Views from The Strategist

Author:
Fergus Hanson, Gai Brodtmann, Rachael Falk, Nigel Phair, Lesley Seebeck, and Peter A. Dutton
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Back in 2016, Australia launched a new national cybersecurity strategy. The strategy covers a four-year period to 2020, and given the changes in the security environment, an update is now clearly warranted. To that end, the government has just released a discussion paper to kick off the public consultation. The closing date for submissions on the discussion paper is 1 November. To complement the public submission process, ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre is initiating a public debate on what should be included in the next cybersecurity strategy. Contributions will be compiled into a report that we will deliver to the Department of Home Affairs to inform the strategy’s development. This Strategic Insight includes views from The Strategist published in late 2019.
Topic:
Development, Government, Science and Technology, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

235. The Use of Cyberspace in the Context of Hybrid Warfare. Means, Challenges and Trends

Author:
Cholpon Abdyraeva
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This paper aims to introduce the state of art on hybrid warfare and seeks to address the conceptual confusion regarding an ever-expanding concept of hybrid warfare. By doing so, this paper simultaneously attempts to assess the growing significance of cyber and information domains within the hybrid warfare, which can be clearly illustrated by the example of the Russian hybrid warfare strategy. The Russian approach to hybrid warfare has considerably broadened the scope of hybrid warfare and changed the focus of debates from military to non-military components of hybrid warfare. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is: 1) to produce a deeper insight into hybrid warfare, including related trends, and 2) to assess the role and impact of cyber and information warfare with a particular focus on Russia. This paper can serve as an introduction that guides policy makers with expert opinions, and as such, intends to motivate further investigation in this field.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Conflict, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

236. NATO and 5G: Managing “High Risk” Vendors and Other Outsourced Infrastructure

Author:
Clodagh Quain and Isabelle Roccia
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
Fifth-generation telecommunications (5G) technology promises to dramatically increase the interconnectedness and efficiency of commercial and civilian communication infrastructures. 5G will also enable other advances. On the civilian side, it will improve existing applications and give rise to others, from telemedicine to connected cars. It also presents an opportunity to enhance NATO’s capabilities, improving logistics, maintenance, and communications. For instance, 5G will speed communication and improve response time in a theater of operation.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, International Security, Communications, Cybersecurity, 5G, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

237. C-Suite Challenge™ 2020: Japan Edition

Author:
Bart van Ark, Rebecca L. Ray, Charles Mitchell, and Ilaria Maselli
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
The Japanese regional edition of this year’s C-Suite Challenge™ survey focuses on internal and external stress points faced by businesses, the objectives, barriers and benefits of successful collaboration initiatives, and the importance of data privacy and cyber security. Emphasis is also given on the business strategies Japanese CEOs focus on in order to enhance productivity growth. The shifting priorities between now and in the future reveals CEO awareness to improve productivity as technology evolves and customer demands change.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Privacy, Economy, and Business
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

238. Cyberspace and Geopolitics: Assessing Global Cybersecurity Norm Processes at a Crossroads

Author:
Christian Ruhl, Duncan Hollis, Wyatt Hoffman, and Tim Maurer
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As cyber insecurity has become a growing problem worldwide, states and other stakeholders have sought to increase stability for cyberspace. As a result, a new ecosystem of “cyber norm” processes has emerged in diverse fora and formats. Today, United Nations (UN) groups (for example, the Group of Governmental Experts [GGE] and the Open-Ended Working Group [OEWG]), expert commissions (for example, the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace), industry coalitions (for example, the Tech Accord, the Charter of Trust), and multistakeholder collectives (for example, the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace) all purport to identify or operationalize various normative standards of behavior for states and/or other stakeholders in cyberspace. As some of these processes wind down (for example, the Global Commission) and others wind up (for example, the OEWG), cyber norms are at a crossroads where each process’s potential (and problems) looms large.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Global Focus

239. Hitting Home: Cyber-Hybrid Warfare in Ukraine and Its Impact on the United States

Author:
Yuriy Danyk, Chad Michael Briggs, and Tamara Maliarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
The conflict in Ukraine has received renewed attention in Washington D.C., and it is worth considering the relevance of this conflict to US national security interests. The open conflict in eastern Ukraine since 2014 has been part of a larger hybrid war, including political and information warfare, cyber warfare, assassinations, promotion of corruption, and traditional (kinetic) warfare carried out by destructive geopolitical actors (DGAs) [1]. The conventional conflict cannot be taken out of context, and it is the less visible and “dark” aspects of hybrid warfare that should particularly worry the United States. Hybrid warfare consists of a wide spectrum of attacks, from conventional to covert, carried out to destabilize one’s opponent. Rather than being isolated incidents, cyber attacks often represent part of a wide spectrum of coordinated, offensive strategies against countries like Ukraine and the United States.
Topic:
National Security, War, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

240. Cyber Conflict Uncoded: The EU and conflict prevention in cyberspace

Author:
Patryk Pawlak, Eneken Tikk, and Mika Kerttunen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Supreme Leader of Iran promised revenge in response to the killing of General Suleimani in January 2020, the possibility of offensive cyber operations against US targets was suggested. Eventually, Iran resorted to a more conventional response, launching missiles against US military bases in Iraq. However, this episode points to a shift in our understanding of what conflict means. In January 2019, the French Minister of Armed Forces, Florence Parly, stated that “cyber warfare has begun and France must be ready to fight it” as she announced the new French Military Cyber Strategy. In a similar vein, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, announced in September 2019 that Britain is “at war every day” due to constant cyber-attacks from Russia and elsewhere and warned that with the evolving character of warfare, the distinction between peace and war no longer exists in the modern world. The proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), both the expansion of usage and the increased availability of harmful means, has brought about new ways of power projection. Political and economic contestation between states now involves targeted cyber-attacks against other countries’ utilities, financial networks, election infrastructure and governance systems. Cyber-attacks – a deliberate use of malicious software for exploiting or altering computer code, data or logic to cause harm – offer new methods to target internet infrastructure, telecommunications networks, information systems, as well as computers and computer systems. Such activities might have the objective of destroying or affecting the proper functioning of these systems with adverse effects for their users – whether states, companies, public service providers or individuals. As a result, power projection does not have to involve tanks or missiles; nor does it have to result in direct death and destruction comparable to armed conflict. Confrontation is, however, a constant in states’ ambitions, attitudes and capabilities, blurring the line between war and peace. This Conflict Series Brief examines the current practices and future possibilities of preventive action in relation to conflict in cyberspace. When categorising state uses of ICTs as a form of conflict, attention should be paid to three considerations. First, hostile uses of ICTs rarely occur outside of a pre-existing or broader politico-military dispute. Second, a malicious state use of ICTs can lead to an escalation in pre-existing adversarial relations. Third, the use of cyber capabilities in a conflict situation often includes the targeting of civilian infrastructure and therefore has wide-ranging implications for the proper functioning of societies. Against this background, this Brief argues that the use of malicious cyber tools for power projection can and must be prevented.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Transnational Actors, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Europe