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152. Don’t Panic! How to Give Germany’s Crisis Management Strategic Footing
- Author:
- Tobias Bergner and Roderick Parkes
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
- Abstract:
- Crises cannot be predicted. But that is no excuse for being unprepared. By evaluating how previous crises were handled, governments can improve future crisis management and give it strategic footing. This paper presents reforms based on past experience, and it shows how they might fit into Germany’s planned National Security Strategy (NSS). As such, it rethinks the relationship between crisis response and strategy.
- Topic:
- European Union, Democracy, Crisis Management, and International Order
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
153. The COVID-19 Pandemic in Oceania: Health Policy Decisions Matter
- Author:
- Neal A. Palafox and Wilfred C. Alik
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- Neal A. Palafox, MD, MPH, Professor, Department of Family Medicine and Community Health, John A. Burns School of Medicine, University of Hawaii, & Wilfred C. Alik, MD, Clinic Chief for the Kaiser Permanente Medical Center in Hilo, HI, Co-Founder of the Micronesian Health Advisory Coalition, and Chairman of Marshallese COVID-19 Task Force, "articulate a disparate range of pandemic experiences across Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs), in terms of COVID 19 community transmission, cases, mortality, and vaccination rates." Additional titles in the Asia Pacific Bulletin series This brief compares COVID-19 data across Pacific countries through the first week of June 2022. Data is drawn from regional reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) , which has monitored the pandemic in Oceania since early March 2020, and situation reports on US-affiliated Pacific Islands compiled by the Pacific Islanders Health Organization Associations (PIHOA). These reports articulate a disparate range of pandemic experiences across Pacific Island countries and territories (PICTs), in terms of COVID 19 community transmission, cases, mortality, and vaccination rates.
- Topic:
- Health Care Policy, Crisis Management, Vaccine, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Oceania
154. Social Housing 2.0
- Author:
- Gianpaolo Baiocchi and H. Jacob Carlson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
- Abstract:
- The global housing crisis shows few signs of letting up. This report from Gianpaolo Baiocchi (Director of the Urban Democracy Lab, Professor of Individualized Studies and Sociology at NYU) and H. Jacob Carlson (postdoctoral research associate at S4 at Brown University) argues that the solutions can be found in "social housing." This report makes the case that social housing is desirable, viable, and achievable. The intractability of the global housing crisis requires new thinking and action, even if it draws on lessons that are quite old. As housing costs continue to skyrocket, policymakers and social movements have an opportunity to set their communities on a new path—one that guarantees a fundamental right to housing.
- Topic:
- Inequality, Crisis Management, and Housing
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
155. Of Dark Clouds and eir Silver Linings: Crisis as Opportunity in the Economic and Social Rigths Jurisprundence of the European Court of Human Rights
- Author:
- Caroline Omari Lichuma
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- The Goettingen Journal of International Law
- Institution:
- The Goettingen Journal of International Law
- Abstract:
- We live in a world in crisis. These crises are experienced globally, regionally, by individual States and mostly by individuals themselves. Despite our differences, we are all united by crisis. However, adopting a regional outlook, this paper focuses on Europe, which, like much of the rest of the world, has in recent times been buffeted by multiple crises ranging from the financial and economic crisis that begun in 2008, to the climate change crisis, to the migrant and refugee crisis, to the Brexit crisis, to the COVID-19 pandemic that has rocked the entire globe. In times of crisis, it is commonplace to turn to legal and institutional frameworks in the hopes of finding some reprieve. Within Europe, one such institution is the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This Court, also known as the Strasbourg court, was established in 1959 under Article 19 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Despite its primarily Civil and Political Rights (CPRs) mandate, the ECtHR has in numerous cases proven to be fertile ground for planting the seeds of Economic and Social Rights (ESRs) protection, which is/was inevitable, given the widely accepted indivisible, interdependent and interrelated nature of all human rights, whether CPRs or ESRs. The ECtHR explicates that “the Convention is a living instrument which […] must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.” In the present day conditions of numerous crises that have only exacerbated the already precarious conditions of numerous vulnerable rightsholders in the family of European States, the question then becomes what jurisprudential trends, prospects and pitfalls exist for the ECtHR in its dynamic interpretation of the ECHR to include ESRs. In seeking answers to this question, this paper analyzes the ESRs jurisprudence of the ECtHR with the intention of illuminating how the Court has, and ought to utilize its institutional role as an enforcer of human rights in general and ESRs in particular in the quest to mitigate the effects on rightsholders, of the crises being experienced within Europe. At the heart of this inquiry lies the assertion that in line with the ECtHR’s ESRs jurisprudence thus far, which evinces a willingness on the part of the Court to vindicate ESRs in order to bring these rights to life for the vulnerable rightsholders who need them the most, the myriad crises currently plaguing Europe continue to create opportunities for the ECtHR to craft a principled and consistent ESRs jurisprudence while simultaneously respecting the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the respective European States. This paper does not analyze State responses under Article 15 of the ECHR, which specifically allows the High Contracting Parties to derogate from their obligations under the Convention in times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Rather, the analysis will be restricted to the ESRs jurisprudence of the ECtHR in times of the specific crises outlined below and where the States in question have not made an Article 15 derogation. The paper will proceed in three parts. Part A will give a brief overview of how the ECtHR has vindicated ESRs through its interpretation of the primarily CPRs found in the ECHR. Part B will thereafter briefly analyze three specific crises that have shaped the more recent ESRs jurisprudence of the Court: the financial and economic crisis, the migrant and refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, Part C will offer some tentative recommendations on the way forward, arguing that while some progress has been made by the ECtHR in centering ESRs as a very necessary part of its response to contemporary European and global crises, the battle is far from won.
- Topic:
- Crisis Management, Economic Rights, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Jurisprudence, and Social Rights
- Political Geography:
- Europe
156. Nordic resilience: Strengthening cooperation on security of supply and crisis preparedness
- Author:
- Mikael Wigell, Mariette Hagglund, Christian Fjader, Emma Hakala, and Johanna Ketola
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, crisis preparedness and security of supply have taken on a new urgency. The recent events have demonstrated the fragility of many of the international flows of critical goods, products and services on which the Nordics also depend. As one of the most interconnected regions in the world, it is only through cooperation that the Nordics can avoid supply disturbances and crises that cascade throughout the region. The Nordics are well placed to enhance such cooperation. Based on extensive comparative analysis, the report shows how the Nordics share key characteristics in their approach to crisis preparedness and security of supply. What this report calls the Nordic resilience approach thus also forms a solid basis for joint action at the regional level. Finland’s and Sweden’s pending NATO accession will further strengthen the potential for Nordic cooperation. It is with this potential in mind that the present report investigates Nordic crisis preparedness and security of supply models, reviews existing cooperation and provides practical recommendations on how to jointly strengthen Nordic resilience.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Regional Integration, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, and Nordic Nations
157. Finland in Afghanistan 2001–2021: From stabilization to advancing foreign and security policy relations
- Author:
- Katariina Mustasilta, Tyyne Karjalainen, Timo R. Stewart, and Mathilda Salo
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
- Abstract:
- Finland participated in the international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, contributing around 2,500 soldiers and 140 civilian crisis management experts. During this period, Finland’s development cooperation funds and humanitarian assistance allocated to Afghanistan amounted to around EUR 398 million. When Finland made the decision to join the operations in Afghanistan at the turn of 2001 and 2002, the country was living in uncertain yet optimistic times. The Taliban regime had collapsed quickly after the US-led military intervention, and the international community was broadly committed to supporting the interim administration in changing the country’s course. Finland sent a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and support the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. It also began to channel development cooperation funds to Afghanistan, notably through UN and World Bank programmes, and soon allocated most of its civilian crisis management resources to the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan. In the second half of the 2000s, however, Afghanistan slid further into a devastating civil war. A decade into the international intervention, the early optimism had given way to Afghans’ growing distrust of their government and the international actors. The Finnish troops, now comprising around 200 soldiers, repeatedly engaged in combat as part of the military operation that was now led by NATO and had become a party in the conflict. While the security arrangements for the international actors required increasing resources, their room for manoeuvre became significantly more limited. After the ISAF mission ended, Finland continued to participate in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which supported the Afghan security forces until the summer of 2021. Finland also remained one of the most important actors to support EUPOL until the end of the mission and took responsibility for co-hosting the 2020 Afghanistan pledging conference to support the country. Afghanistan was the biggest recipient of Finland’s development cooperation funds throughout the second half of the 2010s. In August 2021, Finland suspended its extensive activities in Afghanistan in chaotic circumstances as the international community left the country following the US decision to withdraw its forces and the Taliban’s seize of power. This research examines Finland’s activities in Afghanistan by focusing on why Finland decided to engage in Afghanistan, on what its activities were based, and what can be learned from them for future crises and conflicts. The research is based on the analysis of a broad set of qualitative data consisting of interviews with 64 people who were involved in the intervention in Afghanistan or employed in related activities. Workshop discussions were also held to hear the views of the Afghan diaspora in Finland and experts. In addition, the researchers analysed public documents and previous research literature and held background discussions with experts. This research report broadly examines the consequences of Finland’s objectives, the logic behind its activities and the key challenges from the perspectives of military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Our research findings suggest that Finland’s activities in Afghanistan were motivated by multiple objectives that were partly unclear and at times conflicting. Based on government reports and other public documents, Finland’s primary aim was to stabilize and support Afghanistan to enhance international peace and security. The proclaimed objectives highlighted Finland’s responsibility as part of the UN-led international community and its efforts to support the development of good governance and the rule of law and promote the rights of women and girls in particular. In our research, these objectives comprise a framework we call “Finland as a benefactor”. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that alongside – and over – these proclaimed objectives, Finland’s participation was primarily guided by its desire to maintain and strengthen its foreign and security policy relations with the US and other international partners, as well as its effort to deepen its collaboration with NATO. Within the limits of this “Finland as a partner” framework, Finland sought to position itself as a reliable benefactor but also to gain advantage by improving its national capacities. Finland’s multiple objectives in Afghanistan might not necessarily have posed a problem in terms of the appropriateness of Finland’s involvement. Indeed, at the beginning they worked in harmony as the operating environment allowed Finland to show solidarity with the US and support it in the fight against terrorism while also appearing as a humanitarian actor that promoted stability and development in Afghanistan. However, tensions emerged between the different rationales when the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, and the nature and outcomes of the intervention became more conflicted. In the absence of clearly and transparently set objectives, it was challenging to build an action plan and assess the activities. One particular factor that made the planning and monitoring of Finland’s participation difficult was the effort to disguise the fact that it was motivated by a desire to foster transatlantic relations and partnerships. From the perspective of the international partnerships, it was enough that Finland participated in the intervention. In terms of Afghanistan and its development, the objectives of the various activities remained vague, unrealistic and unclear, and they received insufficient attention. Instead of critical analysis and strategic monitoring, both international and Finnish actors attempted to meet the stated objectives by highlighting the progress made in Afghanistan and keeping silent about the combats and difficulties. It is almost impossible to assess to what extent Finland achieved its objectives in Afghanistan, because no clear and transparent objectives had been set. Based on our interviews, Finland’s involvement benefitted its transatlantic relations, Nordic cooperation and position in the international community. Besides defence cooperation, Finland developed its national capacities and raised its profile within the EU’s civilian crisis management framework. It is however difficult to assess in retrospect how the different forms of participation deepened Finland’s relations with the US, for example, and whether Finland’s activities were cost-efficient in terms of its partnership goals and national capacities, because no expectations had been explicitly stated. While temporary successes were achieved in improving security and the conditions for education in some areas, for example, issues such as a lack of understanding of the context of the conflict, challenges related to local ownership and the absence of a coherent long-term strategy became stumbling blocks in the international intervention in Afghanistan. Previous research has already called attention to the negative impacts of the intervention: the civilian victims of the military operations, the changes in local power structures, the displacement of local activities and increased corruption are only some of the examples of the impacts for which Finland has also been partly responsible. During, and partly as a result of, the intervention in Afghanistan, Finland’s policy came to be underpinned by a comprehensive crisis management strategy. In Afghanistan, this meant that Finland participated in multiple sectors and placed emphasis on the interdependence between the development and civilian crisis management efforts and military crisis management. Overall, our interviewees assessed that the activities of Finland and Finnish actors in Afghanistan were of high quality and appreciated. Our research suggests that the comprehensive strategy adopted by Finland served to justify its participation in different areas of the intervention and especially its military participation. However, Finland failed to fulfil the strategy in terms of coordinating its various activities in Afghanistan. Finland’s experiences in Afghanistan provide lessons learned that can be used to guide its activities in future crisis and conflict situations. First, it is necessary to set clearer and more transparent objectives to enable the effective planning and strategic monitoring of activities. In the context of partnership and capacity goals, clear objectives would help to develop the resourcing and targeting of activities. As regards supporting peace and stability, clearer, context-specific objectives would make it possible to monitor the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of activities. However, adopting a comprehensive approach does not mean that Finland should engage in all activities or areas of assistance in the target country; rather, its activities should be targeted to support the overall international aid effort. It is also important to develop Finland’s advocacy and impact efforts in multilateral interventions, in particular in situations in which Finland contributes significant resources. While Finland is in principle a small player, playing an active role in issues such as drawing attention to the possible negative impacts of interventions is consistent with its value-based foreign policy. By collaborating with like-minded actors, Finland has the opportunity to promote its interests through interventions (as far as these interests have been identified). However, sufficient resources are required for effective outcomes: development cooperation funds and inputs from seconded experts will be wasted if the human resources allocated to the comprehensive planning, implementation and monitoring of Finland’s participation are insufficient. The setting and implementation of realistic objectives appropriate to the context require a continuously updated conflict analysis, which in the case of small players such as Finland must also include an analysis of the context of international aid and operations. After interventions, it is also important to effectively put to use the expertise of the people who return to Finland after working in crisis areas so as not to waste the cultural and linguistic knowledge they have acquired. The lessons identified in this research are also relevant for the future of Afghanistan and Afghan people. The international community, including Finland, has been involved in shaping the structures of Afghan society, as well as its conflict dynamics, for nearly 20 years. This means that it also continues to assume its responsibility after withdrawing from the country – all the more so because the decisions to start and terminate the intervention were primarily driven by interests other than those of Afghans themselves. In terms of Finland’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it is particularly important that it continues to abide by its long-standing commitment to promote the rights of women and girls. In the present difficult circumstances, the cooperation and assistance efforts should be based on placing the needs and priorities of Afghans at the centre. This can be achieved by conducting a careful conflict analysis, listening to and discussing with Afghans, and promoting a strategically coordinated approach to setting the objectives and framework conditions of the cooperation at the level of the international community.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Crisis Management, and Stabilization
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, and Finland
158. Despite Headwinds, Truce Flies On – The Yemen Review, May 2022
- Author:
- Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- Despite reports of violations from both the Yemeni government and Houthi forces, May saw the truce hold for a second month, leading to an agreement brokered by the UN special envoy’s office to extend it for another two months from June 2. In addition to the continued absence of air strikes around the country, commercial flights finally resumed between Amman and Sana’a on May 16 and between Cairo and Sana’a on June 1, after delays caused by a dispute over Houthi-issued passports. The main areas of ongoing tension are Marib and Taiz. UN-backed talks between the warring parties in Amman failed to reach agreement on reopening roads to the besieged city of Taiz, whose government-held areas continued to come under occasional Houthi attack. Marib governorate, whose capital is the last northern city still under full government control, saw occasional clashes. Political tension in the south threatened to undermine the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC)’s message of unity. Forces loyal to PLC members Aiderous al-Zubaidi of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and Tareq Saleh, head of the National Resistance Forces, faced off over an attempt by Saleh’s supporters to raise the national flag over Maashiq Palace on the anniversary of the 1990 unification of Yemen. On the economic front, renewed warnings that Yemen’s food insecurity crisis could see pockets of famine emerging in the coming months, in part because of plummeting wheat imports from Ukraine and Russia.
- Topic:
- Food Security, Crisis Management, Houthis, and Armed Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Yemen and Gulf Nations
159. Ukraine–Russia Conflict: India’s Energy Security
- Author:
- Shebonti Ray Dadwal
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- India International Centre (IIC)
- Abstract:
- Any major upheaval or crisis in any part of the world, particularly one that involves an energy-producing country, has an immediate impact on the energy markets. But, barring the first ‘oil shock’ in 1973, which caused an initial spike in prices, the markets have settled down, particularly once it is established that the energy supplies will not be affected. However, since February 2022, following the onset of the Russian–Ukraine conflict, energy security has returned to the forefront of national security concerns. Oil and other energy prices are climbing to record levels, hovering around US$100 a barrel. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the Ukraine war will severely set back global economic recovery from the COVID–19 pandemic, increase inflation, cause grave risks to the financial system, and even potentially fragment the world economy into geopolitical blocs (Gourinchas, 2022: 10–11). What makes the current conflict different from earlier crises? After all, the canvas of the conflict is essentially restricted to the European theatre and should, therefore, have limited fallout. Even when Russia attacked and annexed Crimea in 2014, the energy markets did not witness the kind of reaction and response the current Russia–Ukraine conflict is experiencing.
- Topic:
- Security, Markets, Oil, Crisis Management, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Security
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, South Asia, Ukraine, and India
160. “Open for Summer:” The Political Failure of Alberta’s COVID-19 Response
- Author:
- Duane Bratt
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
- Institution:
- Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper assesses the response by the Alberta government. This case was chosen because Alberta, outside of the first wave, has been hit harder from a per capita basis (and sometimes in absolute terms) by COVID-19 than other provinces. Alberta, despite a good performance in the first wave, has been harder hit in terms of cases, hospitalizations, those in intensive care, and deaths than other provinces (especially the disastrous fourth wave). This paper argues that this performance can be traced to two inter-related factors: 1) the ideology of Premier Jason Kenney (and many of his UCP MLAs, cabinet ministers, and political staffers) and 2) the desire of Kenney to keep the UCP united and himself as leader. Ultimately then, it is politics that best explains why Alberta, despite its wealth and education levels, has done worse responding to the health aspects of COVID-19.
- Topic:
- Crisis Management, Public Health, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- Canada, North America, and Alberta