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31. The War of Jihadists Against Jihadists in Syria

Author:
Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
ON FEBRUARY 2, 2014, al-Qa`ida released a statement declaring that "it has no connection" with the "group" called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The statement further highlighted that al-Qa`ida was not responsible for founding the ISIL and was not privy to the deliberations that led to its establishment. That is why, the statement continued, "The ISIL is not a branch of al-Qa`ida, the latter is not bound by organizational ties to it and is not responsible for the ISIL's actions."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil War, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Syria

32. A Difficult Balancing Act: Backing the Kurds in the fight against IS in Iraq and Syria

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The Kurdish forces now provide the necessary boots on the ground in the framework of Operation Inherent Resolve. However, the strong backing of the Kurds presents a number of challenges and difficult balancing acts for Western and regional actors.
Topic:
Political Violence, Defense Policy, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

33. Managing a Transnational Insurgency: The Islamic State of Iraqʹs “Paper Trail,” 2005‐2010

Author:
Jon Wallace, Jacob N. Shapiro, Pat Ryan, and Danielle F. Jung
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Empirical Studies of Conflict Project (ESOC)
Abstract:
A cornerstone of strategic thinking is a clear understanding of one’s opponent. Developing such an understanding in dealing with the Islamic State (IS) is challenging. Constraints on access to the frontlines in Iraq and Syria make it unusually hard for researchers to ground assessments in evidence‐based approaches. This occasional paper contributes to the development of an empirically grounded understanding of the IS by analyzing the finances and management of the group’s predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April 2013 and then the Islamic State in June 2014. There is a direct line of descent from Al‐Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) through the Islamic State of Iraq to today’s Islamic State, despite changes in the group’s territorial holdings and the announced scale of its ambitions. Using historical documents to understand how AQI and the ISI were run can therefore help us better understand the current incarnation of the group, as well as the strengths and weaknesses it may have inherited.
Topic:
Terrorism, Counterinsurgency, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, and War on Terror
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

34. Getting it right: US national security policy and al Qaeda since 2011

Author:
Mary Habeck
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
Current national security policy is failing to stop the advancement of al Qaeda and its affiliates throughout the Muslim-majority world. While there are many reasons for this failure, three key issues stand out: a poor definition of the enemy, an incorrect view of its objectives, and the adoption of a strategy that will not defeat the latest evolution of this adaptive organization. If the US understood al Qaeda as it is: the leadership and field army of an insurgency with worldwide linkages that hopes to impose its extremist version of shari'a , govern territory, and overthrow the leaders of every Muslim- majority country, the current national strategy for combating al Qaeda would not be confined to counter - terrorism and attrition, but would instead make counterinsurgency-without large numbers of American ground forces-its main technique for confronting and defeating the organization.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Islam, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States and America

35. Rigged Cars and Barrel Bombs: Aleppo and the State of the Syrian War

Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As Aleppo goes, so goes Syria's rebellion. The city is crucial to the mainstream opposition's military viability as well as its morale, thus to halting the advance of the Islamic State (IS). After an alliance of armed rebel factions seized its eastern half in July 2012, Aleppo for a time symbolised the opposition's optimism and momentum; in the following months, it exposed the rebels' limits, as their progress slowed, and they struggled to win over the local population. Today, locked in a two-front war against the regime and IS, their position is more precarious than at any time since the fighting began. Urgent action is required to prevent the mainstream opposition's defeat: either for Iran and Russia to press the regime for de-escalation, to showcase their willingness to confront IS instead of exploiting its presence to further strengthen Damascus; or, more realistically, for the U.S., Europe and regional allies to qualitatively and quantitatively improve support to local, non-jihadi rebel factions in Aleppo. Any eventual possibility of a negotiated resolution of the war depends on one course or the other being followed.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Arabia and Syria

36. Full Text Issue

Author:
Arabinda Acharya
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
ISIS is fighting an insurgency deeply influenced by the principles of Maoist protracted political warfare and moreover informed by the successes and failures of previous Al Qaeda movements in Iraq from 2006-2008, and of other jihadist groups attempting to seize and hold territory in countries like Somalia, Yemen and Mali. This analysis argues that, whether it survives or not, ISIS has set a political separatist precedent, the effects of which are yet to be fully understood and addressed by the international community.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Iraq, Arabia, and Southeast Asia

37. TSG IntelBrief: Foreign Fighters in Syria: A Growing Threat

Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
The number of foreign fighters is high, 12,000 and counting, and the spread of countries they come from covers much of the globe. Two recent events involving foreign fighters show the radicalizing influence of the war. With the support to bolster Syria's more secular rebel forces at times inconsistent and tepid, the lack of an alternative has accelerated a natural gravitation towards extremist elements. It will be hard to know which returnees pose a threat, and harder still to deal with them. Given that the number of foreign fighters already exceeds those that went to Afghanistan, government resources will be severely strained to monitor all returnees and will have to rely on the help of local communities.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United Kingdom, Middle East, and Syria

38. TSG IntelBrief: Boko Haram Takes, Holds Territory

Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
Like its putative Islamic State counterparts in Iraq and Syria, the Nigerian terror group Boko Haram has in recent weeks accomplished an alarming expansion of its territorial control The downing of a Nigerian fighter jet-and the videotaped beheading of its pilot-also suggest a quantum leap in the group's offensive and propaganda capabilities The Nigerian state's attempts to counter the Boko Haram narrative through positive public relations have yet to yield positive results The government's latest claim of killing the militants' leader, Abubakar Shekau, remains unsubstantiated, thus creating another public relations challenge for Nigerian security officials.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Africa

39. TSG IntelBrief: : Foreign Fighters from North Africa in Syria and Iraq

Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
No region has seen more of its people travel to fight in Syria than North Africa; more than 3,000 Tunisians have traveled there as of last April, and more than 1,500 Moroccans This is a repeat of a decade ago when large numbers of North Africans traveled to Iraq to fight there as well, in proportions far above those of neighboring countries A significant number of recent North African fighters have conducted suicide bombings in both Iraq and Syria, highlighting that the deadly ideological message of the so-called Islamic State (IS) and other extremist groups is finding purchase in North Africa The reasons for this export of extremists include incomplete political reforms that have failed to redress serious societal issues, persistent high youth unemployment, and a failure to cope with the apparent high levels of disaffection, despair, and anger that drive people to choose violent extremism.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Arabia, North Africa, and Syria

40. TSG IntelBrief:: The Bomb-Proof Finances of the Islamic State

Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
Attacking the finances of the so-called Islamic State (IS) with limited collateral damage will be orders of magnitude more difficult than attacking its military factions The group has thoroughly embedded itself into local and regional economies in Syria and Iraq, and damaging its finances while not devastating civilian populations will be as difficult as it is necessary IS oil revenues might be the easiest to disrupt but such action comes with significant collateral economic damage, while taxes, tolls, extortion, and food sales generate more income while remaining highly resistant to external forces In the areas under its control, IS has been providing social services as well as delivering levels of fuel, electricity, and food to populations utterly without recourse, meaning the group needs to be replaced and not simply removed.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Middle East and Arabia