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1831. Macedonia: Still Sliding

Publication Date:
07-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Despite the ceasefire announced on 26 July 2001, and the promised resumption of political talks in Tetovo on 27 July, Macedonia is still locked in crisis and threatened by war. Neither ethnic Macedonian nor ethnic Albanian leaders have been converted to belief in a 'civic' settlement that would strengthen democracy by improving minority conditions, without weakening the integrity of the state. Ethnic Macedonians fear that civic reforms will transform the country exclusively to its, and their, detriment, while ethnic Albanians are sceptical that any reforms can really be made to work in their favour. Nor have separatists from both sides, within the country and in the diaspora, given up their conviction that security for their communities can only be achieved by demarcating – and hence competing for – ethnically “pure” territory.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Ethnic Conflict, and Politics
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Macedonia, and Albania

1832. The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion

Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In late February, violence flared in Albanian-inhabited villages in northern Macedonia close to the border with Kosovo. In mid March, the violence spread to Macedonia's second largest city, Tetovo. The rebels claimed to be defending themselves against Macedonian security forces, i.e. their own government, and to be fighting for Albanian national rights in Macedonia. The coalition government in Skopje promptly raised the alarm, blaming Kosovo Albanian elements for exporting rebellion to Macedonia, and calling for the NATO-led forces in Kosovo (KFOR) to seal the border. The rebels claimed they were local Albanians, numbering 2,000 and recruiting dozens of volunteers from the surrounding area every day.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania

1833. Montenegro: Time to Decide. A Pre-election Briefing

Publication Date:
04-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The extraordinary parliamentary election to be held in Montenegro on 22 April 2001 is focused on the single issue of the republics future status, whether in a continued federal union with Serbia, or as an independent state. The election was called following the break-up of Montenegros ruling coalition at the end of December 2000 over this very question. Following the ouster of Slobodan Miloević as president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in October 2000, Montenegrin President Milo Djukanović opted to formalise the republics break with the FRY, which in practice had already ceased to function in any meaningful sense. On 28 December 2000 two of the parties in the ruling .For a Better Life. (D.B) coalition, Djukanovićs Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) and the Social Democratic party (SDP), adopted a new Platform on relations with Serbia, which envisaged a loose association of fully independent states. The anti independence Peoples Party (NS) promptly left the DŽB coalition, thus precipitating the forthcoming election.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and Serbia

1834. A Russian Reporter in Chechnya: One Experience (Event Summary)

Author:
Anna Politkovskaya
Publication Date:
11-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Anna Politkovskaya, special correspondent for Novaya Gazeta, covers the war in Chechnya, having spent two years on the ground there. In October 2001, she relocated to Vienna due to death threats she had received. Politkovskaya is presently being provided working space by the Institute of Human Sciences in Vienna.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

1835. Caspian Energy (event summary)

Author:
Nurlan Kapparov
Publication Date:
09-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
As a part of its Director's Lunch Series, the Belfer Center invited Nurlan Kapparov, former president of the National Oil Company of the Republic of Kazakhstan (KazakhOil) and former Kazak vice-minister of energy and mineral resources, to give a talk entitled "Caspian Energy." Mr. Kapparov previously represented state interests in TengizChevrOil (a Kazakh-American joint venture) and the Offshore Kazakhstan International Oil Consortium (OKIOC). He was the chairman of the board of directors of National Atomic Company KazAtomProm, as well as the head of Kazakhstan's delegation on delimitation of the Caspian Sea with the Russian Federation. Instead of dealing with the Caspian energy situation as a whole, Mr. Kapparov's talk focused primarily on the oil resources of Kazakhstan. Prior to starting his presentation, Kapparov took the time to stress that Kazakhstan was the first ex-Soviet state to promise practical support for the United States' war on terrorism, offering the country's "strategically vital aerodromes and bases for a potential strike on Afghanistan." Kapparov echoed the words of Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev and said that "Kazakhstan is ready to support an action against terrorism with all the means it has at its disposal." Beginning with basic background information on Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea, Kapparov provided projected extraction figures (both in barrels per day and billions of dollars per year) and potential transportation routes for Kazakh oil. Using the most recent data gathered for Kazakhstan's five major offshore fields (Kashagan, Aktote, Kairan, Kashagan SW, and Kalamkas A), Kapparov indicated that if these fields will be developed with primary depletion recoverable reserves would be approximately 24 billion barrels of oil. If Kazakhstan is able to successfully re-inject gas into the fields — a process that yields more oil — the country's potential recoverable reserves could climb as high as 42 billion barrels from the fields that are included in the OKIOC consortium alone. Kapparov noted that by the year 2020, this oil could bring up to $35 billion per year in income to OKIOC. The total potential oil income could increase Kazakhstan's budget to more than twenty times its current level. Kapparov also showed on the map that Kazakhstan has many other petroleum structures in its sector of the Caspian Sea. He emphasized that Kazakhstan has not yet started the licensing round on other blocks that might have the same reserves as OKIOC. Kapparov acknowledged that the shallow waters that predominate the Kazakh portion of the Caspian Sea place certain constraints on the oil extraction process. The first constraint involves environmental factors, as shallow-water extraction is more complicated than deep-water extraction. Kapparov stressed Kazakhstan's concern for the environment, describing the Caspian as "a unique ecosystem which is the habitat for hundreds of kinds of plants and animals." The second constraint has to do the weather — the Caspian freezes over for four months a year, preventing work during that time. Kapparov subsequently tried to place the importance of Caspian petroleum resources within the overall international context. He described Caspian oil as geopolitically significant, based on the assumption that more active oil production in the region would help to lessen the importance of Persian Gulf producers. This trend would enable countries such as the United States to diversify their sources of oil, providing security in an otherwise unstable field. Kapparov noted that the region's most persistent problem remains the legal status of the Caspian Sea itself. Since the countries surrounding the Caspian have not agreed on each country's jurisdiction over the seabed and its oil and gas reserves, there is still strong regional tension. Iran's recent actions against Azerbaijani-based BP ships working in the southern Caspian are only the most recent examples of this tension. Kapparov articulated the hope that the United States, which is already exerting a strong mediating influence in the region, would play a role in resolving this issue. Kapparov supports demarcation of the Caspian between Iran and former Soviet countries according to the old agreements that were signed between Iran and the USSR. Kapparov is also hoping that Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan will work together to solve this problem among themselves as soon as possible. Kapparov then talked about the challenges involved in bringing Caspian oil to market. He described the transportation of hydrocarbons as "difficult, geopolitically sensitive, and expensive," which has led to some degree of intrigue regarding the current and proposed routes for transporting oil from the Caspian Sea. From Kazakhstan's perspective, the current pipeline capacity is sufficient, since it is only exporting 2 million barrels of oil a day. However, the country will eventually be exporting up to 7 million barrels a day. Consequently, a strategy of pursuing multiple transportation solutions makes not only sound commercial and strategic sense (since reliance on a single production route or a small group of options leaves a producer such as Kazakhstan open to too many potential constraints). It is, in fact, necessitated by the sheer quantity of the country's remaining reserves. As Kapparov candidly noted, "In Kazakhstan we say 'happiness is multiple pipelines.'" In his conclusion, Kapparov reemphasized the importance of the Caspian region to the world's energy market. Acknowledging that Kazakhstan's fate does depend on the actions of the United States and the other G7 countries, he underscored the fact that Kazakhstan is committed to "developing and implementing domestic policies to continue both our economic growth and the social welfare of our population." During the subsequent question and answer session, Michael Lelyveld of RFE/RL asked why the government of Kazakhstan insisted upon maintaining a monopoly system over the routing of oil. Kapparov replied that this system reduced paperwork, facilitated the transport of oil, and actually increased the overall amount of oil being shipped. Professor Francis Bator of the Kennedy School asked what percentage of the Kazakh national budget is derived solely from oil. Kapparov estimated the current figure to be 40 percent of the budget, but also noted that by 2020 — when oil production should be at full capacity — this number could be as high as 80 to 90 percent if other industries are not developed more extensively. However, Kapparov underscored that Kazakhstan does not want to depend solely on the oil industry. In response to a question about Kazakhstan's plan for dealing with the excess funds derived from its vast petroleum resources, Kapparov said that the country had established a separate oil fund according to the "Norway model" — whereby excess money would be placed in this fund so as not to interfere with the national economy.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

1836. Internal and External Dimensions of the Ethnic Conflict in the Caucasus (transcript)

Author:
Kazim Azimov
Publication Date:
06-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Melissa Carr: Many of you have met Kazim Azimov. He has been here since the end of April. He is in the United States on a program called the Junior Faculty Development Program, which brings faculty members from universities in countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to the United States to train, study, develop curriculum materials, and teach. We at Harvard are fortunate that part way through Kazim's year at the University of Hawaii, we were able to arrange for him to come join us here, in part because the University of Hawaii went on strike.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

1837. Putin's Plans for Russia: How Realistic Are They? (Event Summary)

Author:
Emil Pain
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Implications of Putin's policies remain vague. While analysts and politicians note alarming trends in politics, the economy and human rights, it is difficult to identify details and determine the feasibility of Putin's long-term strategy. Dr. Emil Pain, the Galina Starovoitova Fellow on Human Rights and Conflict Resolution at the Kennan Institute/Woodrow Wilson Center and a former advisor to President Yeltsin, was invited to present his views on policies of the Putin administration.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, Energy Policy, and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

1838. Putin's First Year: How Good, How Bad? (Event Summary)

Author:
Vladimir Boxer, Timothy Colton, Sarah Mendelson, and John Reppert
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Timothy Colton began his remarks with a discussion of the 1999 parliamentary elections and 2000 presidential elections in Russia. He suggested two alternative views of the elections: they can be seen as part of a succession process or as truly democratic elections. Professor Colton claimed that although President Yeltsin named Vladimir Putin his "successor" in the fall of 1999, the formal transfer of power still included a competitive election in 2000. The parliamentary elections, he argued, were highly contested and the outcome was not pre-ordained.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

1839. Fishing in Troubled Waters: Putin's Caspian Policy (Event Summary)

Author:
Doug Blum and Carol Saivetz
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Carol Saivetz and Doug Blum spoke about Russia's policies toward the Caspian under President Putin at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs on May 2, 2001 in an event sponsored by the Caspian Studies Program. Carol Saivetz, Research Associate at the Davis Center for Russian Studies at Harvard and Executive Director of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, noted a trend toward more coherence in Russia's foreign policy, although she said it is occurring despite a split within the foreign policy establishment. Doug Blum, who spoke second, focused on the bilateral relationships between Russia and other Caspian Basin countries, and on those countries' responses to Russian policy, singling out Kazakhstan's relations with Russia as the most cooperative. Melissa Carr, Caspian Studies Program Director, chaired the event. Carol Saivetz opened by arguing that President Putin has being working to correct the foreign policy "freelancing" rampant in the late Yeltsin years, bringing more coherence to Russian foreign policy in general. However, at the same time, she said, the Putin Administration seems to be split into two different camps. Moscow analysts, when describing this trend to Saivetz, used the terms "integrationists" and "isolationists." The "integrationists" are those interested in reforming the Russian economy and linking it to the outside world (through WTO membership, for example) and who welcome globalization. The "isolationists" are in Saivetz's opinion the "derzhavniks," those who long for Russia's superpower status and for increasing Russia's power in the CIS. Putin has decided, Saivetz argued, that the Caspian is one of Russia's vital interests and therefore a region to concentrate on. Shortly after he was elected President, a Security Council meeting took place in which the two items on the agenda were the new military doctrine and Caspian issues. After this meeting, Putin declared that Russia must be "competitive" in the region and to this end he created a new department for Caspian policy, appointing Viktor Kalyuzhny as Caspian envoy. The Russian President also talked about the need to balance state interests with the interests of the oil companies. Following that statement (and probably with Kremlin backing), Yukos, LUKoil and Gazprom joined in a new consortium called the Caspian Oil Company to start developing reserves in the Russian sector. Next Saivetz discussed Putin's January trip to Azerbaijan and the agreements that emerged from his meetings with Aliyev. There was compromise on the division of the Caspian Sea, and in parallel the signing of an oil deal between LUKoil and SOCAR during the visit. On the other hand, at that time Russia was still trying to block the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (since then they have withdrawn overt opposition but continued to waver), and could not find agreement with Azerbaijan about Nagorno-Karabagh. Saivetz also briefly discussed Khatami's trip to Moscow, which ended up being about arms deals and not the Caspian, precisely because of the lack of agreement on a legal regime. The final resolution of the Caspian demarcation remains one of the key issues in the region, she noted. Saivetz made several broader conclusions: 1) Putin has made the Caspian a priority; 2) Putin's policy blends economic and geopolitical calculations; he has shifted the emphasis in foreign policy from macro ties (state-to-state relations) to a combination of macro and micro (i.e. trade and economic) ties. 3) There is a notable militarization of Russian pressures on other littoral states, particularly Azerbaijan and Georgia; many analysts explain Russia's intention to keep the waters of the Caspian common as a way to ensure Moscow the right to project its naval power. 4) Increased attention to the Caspian reflects a larger Russian policy towards what Russians have called the "Near Abroad," and particularly the Caucasus (Chechnya, Georgia, Armenia). Returning to the idea of integrationists and isolationists, Saivetz remarked that there is a debate in the U.S. about which of these two tendencies is driving Russian policy. It seems that Putin has not made a choice: the Russian government is pressuring Georgia and Azerbaijan at the same time as Viktor Kalyuzhny has backed off from opposing BTC. It seems that Russia's ideal model for pipeline development is reflected in the CPC: outside investment went into a pipeline that traverses Russian territory (where Russia gets transit fees). This pipeline reflects a policy that is simultaneously both integrationist (bringing in Western investment) and isolationist (forcing North-South routes). Doug Blum began by registering his agreement with Saivetz's presentation. He structured his talk by focusing on Russia's bilateral relationships with Caspian littoral states one by one, in "declining order of [Russia's] success": Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Georgia. He pointed out that Russia's place is extremely important in all the significant issue areas that concern the Caspian countries. "This is not simply a matter of Russia being effectively able to exert leverage on these countries," he remarked, "there are shared and overlapping interests." Russia is an important transit route for Central Asian goods, and these countries also share an interest in combating terror, drugs, crime, and "Islamic fundamentalism." Russia has the logistical and military resources to help in these areas, and is unparalleled by all other countries in the region. Russia's successes in Kazakhstan include the achievement of increased energy transit through Russian territory with the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line and also with added volumes from on the Aktau-Samara route. Also, Russia and Kazakhstan have concluded formal accords on trade and the possible implementation of a Eurasian Economic Union. In security, there is cooperation on an air defense system. Also, Russia has retained access to the Baikonur Space Facility. In sum, Russia has succeeded in fulfilling its goals in Kazakhstan, but this is largely due to overlapping interests. On the other hand, Kazakhstan is and has for the past decade been interested in balancing its orientation between Russia, China, and the West. This balancing act has resulted in strains with Russia, for example over the possible Kazakh commitment to BTC. Kazakhstan also disagrees with Russia about the ownership of some offshore oil islands, and about Russia's naval presence in the Caspian Sea. Azerbaijan, according to Blum, presents a "much more complex picture of balancing and bandwagoning," being limited to some extent by Nagorno-Karabagh and, relatedly, the U.S. Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which limits direct government assistance from the U.S. to Azerbaijan. He noted that Azerbaijan of necessity has been searching for a modus vivendi with Russia, a pursuit that has been made easier given the new Russian flexibility towards Azerbaijan under Putin. Azerbaijan and Russia have started to form agreements on trade and investment, and also humanitarian relief and treatment of migrants. The two countries are cooperating on combating terrorism, organized crime, and drug smuggling. Also, Azerbaijan is increasing imports of Russian gas as a trade-off for exporting more oil through Novorossiisk. Total trade between Azerbaijan and Russia remains low, however. Azerbaijan is trying to attract Western investment and balance against Russia through membership in groups such as GUUAM. Blum emphasized that both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan are attempting to accommodate to geopolitical reality. In addition, he pointed out that both countries are "very sensitive and very angry about repeated Western, and especially American, criticisms of human rights and the lack of political progress"; and this motivates compromise with Russia. Iran's relationship with Russia involves both conflict and cooperation. There is disagreement over Russia's naval presence in the Caspian and about the ownership of the Sea. On the other hand, there is significant military cooperation. Turkmenistan's relationship with Russia is "quite strained," according to Blum, especially over the Caspian legal regime, where Turkmenistan has sided with Iran. Turkmenistan has, however, negotiated a favorable deal for gas transit through the ITERA system. However, on the whole Turkmenistan remains "a very isolated and extraordinary backwards, removed country." Blum termed Georgia's relationship with Russia "extremely strained." Russian policymakers see it in zero-sum terms, especially over energy transit issues (what goes through Georgia is a Russian loss) and over the pending loss of military bases in the region. Georgia has shown some willingness to form a working relationship with Russia, but still the Shevardnadze regime is understandably very reluctant (given how the Russian security apparatus relates to him, as a wishful target for assassination). Blum closed by reiterating that the cornerstone of current Russian policy is international integration. Russia is pushing a north-south route that would bring trade from Iran and India up through Russia's Caspian port of Astrakhan then up the Volga. The Caspian States also want to enter into the international economy, with the help of multiple trading routes, north south and also the east west.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

1840. Fishing in Troubled Waters: Putin's Caspian Policy (Transcript)

Author:
Doug Blum and Carol Saivetz
Publication Date:
05-2001
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Melissa Carr: On behalf of the Caspian Studies Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School, let me welcome all of you today to our seminar. Lest anyone be misled by the title, Doug and Carol are going to speak today about more than fishing — in fact they may not even speak about sturgeon or caviar at all, although those are important considerations in thinking about the Caspian Sea.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Democratization, and Energy Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia