Search

Begin New Search Topic Chemical Weapons

11. Safeguards and Verification in Inaccessible Territories

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The paper aims to assist the international community and international organizations (IOs), such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to better prepare for challenges related to verification and safeguards of nuclear materials, chemical weapons, and facilities in inaccessible territories. The paper identifies lessons from past and ongoing cases (Iraq, Libya, Syria, Fukushima/Japan, and Crimea/Ukraine) and presents policy, legal, and technical recommendations to the IAEA, OPCW, and their member states to overcome some of these challenges. The challenges in verifying and safeguarding nuclear materials in inaccessible sites have existed for decades. Past cases include Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and Serbia during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s. Nevertheless, the number of cases in which international organizations such as the IAEA and the OPCW had to verify the status of declared materials in territories they could not access increased significantly since 2010. This report discusses three categories of situations from which the IAEA and the OPCW have been barred from accessing sensitive materials or facilities. One category consists of locations that are insecure or unsafe and thus involve high risk to IO staff such as in Libya, Iraq, and Fukushima (Japan). The other two categories involve territory over which the state responsible for securing access does not have de facto control. This occurs when the site is controlled by either nonstate actors, such as some sites in Iraq and Syria, or by another state, as in Crimea, Ukraine. In many of these instances, securing access involves a range of political sensitivities, such as civil war, occupation, or natural disaster, which has broader implications and complexities beyond nuclear or chemical nonproliferation, further complicating an IO’s ability to gain access to the site or use other means to gather required information. Each of these situations poses different political, legal, and technical challenges and limitations, but they also offer potential novel solutions.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Chemical Weapons, Nuclear Safety, and Disaster Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

12. October 2017 Issue

Author:
Paul Cruickshank, Derek Henry Flood, John Mueller, Rajan Basra, Peter R. Neumann, Andrew Zammit, and Columb Strack
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our October cover article, Rajan Basra and Peter Neumman explore the strong nexus between crime and jihadism in Europe. With a significant proportion of European foreign fighters having criminal backgrounds, they outline how the Islamic State is going out of its way to depict crime as helpful to its cause and to recruit criminals for terrorist enterprises. Our interview this month is with Lisa Monaco, President Obama’s chief counterterrorism advisor during his second term. In July, police in Sydney, Australia, discovered alleged plots by two brothers to detonate a bomb on a passenger jet and release poison gas on a target such as public transportation. Andrew Zammit outlines why it set off alarm bells in counterterrorism agencies worldwide. An Islamic State cybercoach in Syria allegedly arranged for a partially constructed bomb with military-grade explosives to be air-mailed to the plotters from Turkey and provided sufficient instructions for them to build a fully functioning device. This ‘IKEA-style’ approach to terrorism could be a game-changer because untrained Western extremists have hitherto found it difficult to make high explosives. The Islamic State cybercoach also transmitted know-how on making a poison gas dispersal device to the Australian cell. Columb Strack looks at the evolution of the Islamic State’s chemical weapons efforts in Syria and Iraq and the possibility that the group could export chemical terror to the West. John Mueller examines the degree to which the cybercoaching of terrorists should be cause for concern, arguing that in many cases cybercoaches have little control over their amateurish charges. Finally, Derek Flood, recently back from the frontlines, outlines how the capture of Hawija, the Islamic State’s last remaining urban stronghold in northern Iraq, exposed faultlines between Baghdad and Erbil, which set the stage for the dramatic events unfolding in the Kirkuk area.
Topic:
Crime, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Homeland Security, Jihad, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Global Focus

13. Emerging Satellites for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Verification

Author:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
he project’s final report is now available for free release. The final report discusses these particular development trends in the commercial EO domain. This is followed by an examination of how such capabilities might apply to observing nuclear fuel cycle or weapon development facilities, using facilities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a case study. Treaty verification requirements are primarily examined in the contexts of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). New EO capabilities are also examined in the context of the United Nations Security Council nuclear-related sanctions implementation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts. The report identifies opportunities, obstacles and future considerations for the application of emerging types of commercial EO satellite data in various treaty verification domains.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, United Nations, Nonproliferation, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Mandating Food Insecurity: The Global Impacts of Rising Biofuel Mandates and Targets

Author:
Timothy A. Wise and Emily Cole
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Global Development and Environment Institute at Tufts University
Abstract:
Expanding demand for biofuels, fed significantly by government policies mandating rising levels of consumption in transportation fuel, has been strongly implicated in food price increases and food price volatility most recently seen in 2008 and 2011-2012. First-generation biofuels, made from agricultural crops, divert food directly to fuel markets and divert land, water and other food-producing resources from their current or potential uses for production of feed for animals and food for human consumption. A key policy driver of biofuel consumption is government mandates to increase or maintain rates or levels of biofuel blends in transportation fuel, the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard and the E.U. Renewable Energy Directive being the most prominent cases. In this paper we assess the spread of such mandates and targets, finding that at least 64 countries now have such policies. We estimate the consumption increases implied by full implementation of such mandates in the seven countries/regions with the highest biofuel consumption, suggesting a 43% increase in first-generation biofuel consumption in 2025 over current levels. We compare this to even higher estimates from international agencies. We assess the likelihood of implementation in key countries and regions, which suggests that with reform, particularly in OECD countries, consumption growth could be slowed. We conclude with policy recommendations to reduce the mandate-driven expansion of first-generation biofuels and mitigate their negative social and environmental impacts.
Topic:
Agriculture, Food, Biofuels, Europe Union, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America

15. Las armas biológicas. Perspectivas de futuro

Author:
Nieva Machín
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
La valoración de bajo riesgo de sufrir un ataque con armas biológicas realizada por la estrategia nacional de seguridad resulta errónea ya que España como miembro de la OTAN debería recoger en su estrategia nacional de seguridad del año 2013 esta amenaza ya considerada como tal por la OTAN en el año 2002. Para una valoración efectiva del nivel de esta amenaza resulta preciso considerar que esta ha trascendido el ámbito militar. En el presente artículo se presentará la vulnerabilidad de España derivaba de las políticas y protocolos de seguridad de carácter reactivo y no preventivo establecidas en España así como aspectos mutidimensionales que requieren un replanteamiento y mejoras acordes a una valoración de riesgo más precisa.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, Chemical Weapons, Pharmaceuticals, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Global Focus