The American Physical Society's July 16 study on boost-phase intercept missile defense programs provides an exhaustive and objective analysis of the science and technology behind the programs. However, it lacks one key element: the cost of boost-phase intercept.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Science and Technology
North Korea's military threat and somewhat peculiar approaches to international relations have been a central difficulty in dealing with the isolated regime during the past decade. In the early 1990s, North Korea, formally known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), was expected by many observers to collapse, just as communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union did.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Soviet Union
The strategic condition of the world is characterised by the fact that pre-emptive military action may be necessary. This condition is based on the realisation that legitimate national governments have lost their monopoly on the use of force while determined individuals and groups of individuals can lay their hands on weapons with which they can inflict huge, even irreversible damage to entire societies. Assuming that preemptive military action is here to stay and we should be determined not to let it escape democratic control. This paper seeks the procedures and checks that should be in place if pre-emptive military action is to be firmly embedded in democratic practices and institutions. To that end, it reviews the application of the precautionary principle in the environmental and food safety domains and assesses whether the procedural checks and practices used there can also have their utility in the international security domain.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Government, and War
Borders communities are more than just entry and exit points to a country. In the world of porous borders and transborder crime, these communities take on various aspects of the activities pursued in their environs. Some of these activities are clearly evident, such as the increase in youth appearing to be drug users. Other signs are more difficult to pinpoint, as one person's businessman becomes another's smuggler. These characteristics are exacerbated by the context of a post-conflict situation where tensions and isolation cause greater conspiracy theories rather than greater cooperation and coordination.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and International Trade and Finance
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is not a law enforcement agency. We do not manage informants, undertake surveillance or analyze criminal intelligence but we do coordinate and deliver technical assistance to countries to develop and strengthen these skills. This is our role in the war against drugs. To help us in South Eastern Europe we employ law enforcement officers in the field.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Democratization, Human Rights, and Terrorism
The availability and misuse of small arms and light weapons is like a disease – a symptom and an outcome of human insecurity. Investments in improving security – a precondition of development – are strongly correlated with reductions in violence and poverty. But the development community has yet to fully wake-up to the wide-ranging effects of small arms. The issue is often treated as somebody else's problem, as too big and complex and therefore not amenable to a developmental response. But the effects are preventable. A concerted effort on the part of the development community to prevent and treat this veritable epidemic could yield substantial developmental dividends.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Development
The North Korean problem is composed of two inter-related issues, namely nuclear weapons and missiles. The current quasi-crisis on the Korean peninsula has resulted mainly from disputes over North Korea's nuclear weapons development that involves three dimensions. The first dimension is the suspicion on its past possession of nuclear warheads (one or two) before the signing of the Geneva Agreed Framework (Agreed Framework) in 1994. The second one centers on present nuclear issues related to reprocessing of 8,000 spent fuel rods stored in water pond and manufacturing and exports of plutonium as well as production of additional nuclear warheads, which were previously frozen by the 1994 Agreed Framework. The third dimension is the future nuclear problem associated with the development of highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. The United States claims that North Korea admitted its existence during its special envoy, James Kelly's visit to Pyongyang in October 2002.
The central question before us is whether it is appropriate for South Asians to learn from the US-Soviet experience of the Cold War. This raises other questions: Are the two sets of relationships comparable? Is there in South Asia a "cold war" essentially similar to the Cold War? Should the theoretical lenses we use for both sets be the same? Can we learn from the one about the other? Is the thinking and practice relating to nuclear weapons in the two sets comparable?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
While states are responsible for honouring any commitments to one another that they make, it has become obvious that they are not always capable of doing so. Where the failure to implement agreed undertakings reflects a lack of financial or technical capacity rather than a deliberate effort to undermine the terms of an agreement it is preferable for all parties to offer assistance rather than criticism and punishment. During the period after the end of the cold war a new type of international cooperation has appeared as states have been willing to render practical assistance to one another in order to reduce common threats. In broad terms military activities have been of three types: facilitating the dismantlement and destruction of weapons; the establishment of a safe and secure chain of custody over weapons or other items; and demilitarization and conversion projects.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, and International Cooperation
This is the first in a series of Discussion and Policy Papers - published by ISIS Europe and Saferworld - that will trace, analyse and contribute towards developments in the European Union's emerging strategy against the proliferation of weapons and materials of mass destruction (WMD). This first paper has been written for circulation at the EU's Inter - Parliamentary Conference on the 'Non - proliferation and Disarmament Co - operation Initiative' within the framework of the G8 'Global Partnership against Materials and Weapons of Mass Destruction', launched in Kananaskis, Canada in July 2002. The authors welcome the initiative by the European Commission to promote Parliamentary interest in this important area of non - proliferation.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Weapons of Mass Destruction