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61. A Fresh Examination of the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors

Author:
Victor Gilinsky
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Even before the ink was dry on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in l968, officials in the U.S. State Policy Planning staff had privately warned their superiors that non-weapons member states to the treaty could come within weeks of acquiring a nuclear arsenal by amassing nuclear weapons useable fuels claiming that these were intended for peaceful purposes. The advice was quietly filed away. Six years later, with India’s “peaceful” nuclear explosion, the warning seemed more salient. Still, even after a series of studies pointing out the military risks associated with proliferating civilian nuclear technology, most policy makers believed that the danger was speculative and still, at worst, many years away.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

62. he Power of Restraint in the “Golden Age” of Arms Control: A Tribute to Thomas C. Schelling

Author:
David C. Atkinson
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Thomas Schelling’s passing last month represents a great loss to many in this community and beyond. He leaves a remarkably rich intellectual legacy. Among his many achievements, Schelling’s influence on the theory and practice of arms control cannot be overstated. He produced his seminal works on the subject—Strategy and Arms Control, published with Morton Halperin in 1961, and Arms and Influence, published in 1966—during his twelve years in residence at the Center for International Affairs (1959–1971). I had the pleasure of spending time with Professor Schelling at his home in Bethesda while researching my book on the history of the Center in 2005. Two things stood out from that conversation then, and perhaps even more so now in retrospect. First, Schelling was deeply committed to policy-relevant research, and his long life of work reflects that fact. Secondly—and relatedly—his work on the efficacy and control of nuclear weapons remains a singular benchmark for research in the field and a profoundly erudite and intelligent guide for today’s policy makers, just as it was for their predecessors some sixty years ago.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

63. “Stress Testing” the Draft Convention on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and Andrea Berger
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
On June 7, 2017, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey brought together thirteen experts for a one-day workshop “stress testing” the draft convention to ban nuclear weapons. The exercise was designed to examine key provisions of the draft, identify potential problems in terms of their implementation, compatibility with other existing instruments and practices, and reactions of states not participating in the negotiations, and seek possible solutions. The organizers did not seek to forge consensus among the participants but rather generate discussion and proposals on ways to address the issues raised by the experts. Participants were also asked to set aside their views on the desirability of a convention as a whole, and instead assume that a ban, as currently drafted, was concluded and opened for ratification. As a result, the views presented in this report are not intended to serve as arguments for or against a convention banning nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

64. Crowdsourcing Systems and Potential Applications in Nonproliferation

Author:
Bryan Lee
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of crowdsourcing systems and identifies the key elements in their successful operation. It also offers an examination of best practices for US government implementation of crowdsourcing projects. Finally, it describes four instances of crowdsourcing projects with applicability to arms control and nonproliferation. Crowdsourcing systems have been used to address a variety of problems, but government applications are typically restricted to one of four types
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Governance, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

65. Revisiting Compliance in the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
James Revill
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Since the collapse of negotiations around a protocol to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 2001, states parties have begun to discuss several novel issues linked to the broader implementation of the BWC as part of a series of intersessional meetings. While initially fruitful, this approach has generated diminishing returns in the last five years. Moreover, in addressing these broader issues of implementation, biological disarmament diplomacy has largely neglected the thorny issue of compliance. Compliance with the BWC is more than a simple binary choice to sign a commitment not to develop or produce biological weapons. It requires the adherence to all the obligations, both negative and positive, undertaken by BWC states parties in signing and ratifying the convention. In the BWC context, this is complicated by the ambiguity surrounding certain obligations, changes in science and security, and the limited resource capacity of some states to fulfill their obligations. Under such circumstances, without episodically revisiting compliance, there remains the risk that BWC will become ever more fragmented, outmoded and poorly implemented. Although many states insist strengthening the convention can only be achieved through a multilaterally negotiated, legally binding verification protocol, this is not politically feasible for the foreseeable future. Nor is this necessarily true; an incremental approach to strengthening the convention could be pursued, dealing with mutually reinforcing components of the regime in a balanced manner and laying the foundations for future work, if and when it becomes politically expedient to proceed. This Occasional Paper proposes a number of activities that could be pursued as part of an incremental approach to revisiting compliance with the BWC.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Biological Weapons, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

66. Taiwan’s Export Control System: Overview and Recommendations

Author:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
This report provides an overview and assessment of Taiwan’s export control program, with a focus on strategic high-tech commodities (SHTC). It highlights Taiwan’s global position as a major port for both shipping and dual-use exports, identifying the key legislation and organizations that address SHTC exports. It thoroughly examines the key organizations, legislation, licensing procedures, and challenges within Taiwan’s export control system. Overall, Taiwan has a strong, modern export control system, and any deficiencies are similar to other jurisdictions of the same size in terms of trade and shipping. Nonetheless, Taiwan’s isolation in the international community continues to make it a target for illicit trade, including financing of items related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Using open-source data, this report identifies twenty-five export-control cases involving Taiwanese persons and/or entities. All of these cases were prosecuted in Taiwan or abroad. In an attempt to identify unprosecuted cases, researchers incorporated publicly available data, including the Panama Papers. The report finds no evidence of unprosecuted illicit WMD-related trade. Despite its international isolation, Taiwan has an opportunity to become a leader in safe international trade. By fully embracing export control and proliferation finance laws and enforcement, Taiwan could become a natural hub for export controls
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

67. The Return of Geopolitics to Southeast Europe

Author:
Sandro Knezović
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
A few months ago, the newspapers in Southeast Europe reported extensively on an arms race in the region, sparked by Croatian attempts to acquire the US artillery system M270 MLRS and Serbia’s reaction to that event. Of�icials in Belgrade found the aforementioned move assertive and, by way of response, announced the procurement of Russian-made S-300 within the wider programme of rearming with Russian military equipment. Those who wanted to dig more deeply into trying to �ind evidence for a developing arms race cited the fact that Serbia, on the occasion of the visit of Russian President Putin, had organised a military parade to commemorate the liberation of Belgrade from Nazi occupation. That was followed by Croatia’s military parade on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the military-police operation ‘Storm’. The display of military strength, they concluded, was another sign of growing military rivalry between the two states which had the capacity to dramatically destabilise the fragile peace in the region. Those with more detailed knowledge of the region remind us that neither Croatia nor Serbia - especially the latter - had the political, economic or human capacity to engage in a military con�lict, especially given the existing international presence and strategic set-up in the region. Numerous experts rightfully pointed to the prevailing low level of cross-border political dialogue and the fact that political elites in the region had frequently used populist rhetoric to fuel the support of their electorate, focusing less on the real substance of the dispute with the neighbour. Lastly, but certainly not of least importance, was the fact that, both countries, together with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, had taken on international obligations to safeguard a stable military balance, thus preventing any potential escalations and destabilisation in the region. The so-called 1996 Florence Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control, derived from Article IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement, set the basic framework for negotiations on the limitation of arms. The Amendments to that agreement, signed at the 21st OSCE Ministerial Council in Basel (December 2014), imposed full responsibility on signatory states for regional stability and arms control.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Populism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

68. Strength and Consistency: A Key to North Korean Nuclear Sanctions

Author:
Kim Taewoo
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
Pyongyang's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, the February 2 test launch of the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite (which in fact was a longrange missile), and other provocative activities amply reminded the international community of the reasons for strong and consistent sanctions. Such activities again proved the Kim Family Regime (KFR) will not accept voluntary changes or engage in denuclearization dialogue. Instead, the regime declared de facto "Nuclear-First Politics," thus ruling out the possibility of denuclearization. If the KFR is allowed to continue unhampered nuclear weapons development, it will become a nuclear power with over 50 nuclear weapons within a decade. Its weapons will include atomic bombs, boosted fission bombs, and hydrogen bombs. The KFR will also possess increasingly formidable delivery vehicles, such as Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. This situation must be a nightmare particularly to South Korea. However, the current international sanctions headed by the UNSCR 2270, along with unilateral sanctions, are unlikely to bear fruit in the foreseeable future due to China’s conflicting policies. Beijing’s attitude towards North Korean nuclear program has alternated between ‘pressure and connivance;’ its military relationship with the United States determining China’s position on sanctions. China’s alternating position prevents effective sanctions against North Korea. While the international community should endeavor to make sanctions concerted, strong and consistent, South Korea and the U.S. should think about a Plan B that includes presenting China the threat of nuclear proliferation in East Asia.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Nonproliferation, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

69. North Korea’s Fourth Nuclear Test and the U.S.-ROK Alliance

Author:
Yonho Kim
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Journal of Korean Studies
Institution:
International Council on Korean Studies
Abstract:
North Korea’s nuclear tests in 2016 rekindled a stronger voice for independent nuclear armament among South Korean conservatives. It is noteworthy that the pro-nuclear view is mainly driven by feelings of profound frustration and helplessness over North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. To assuage concerns, Washington should start seeking new methods of reassuring its partner of its intention to honor its security commitments. The challenges to the U.S.-ROK alliance sparked by North Korea’s nuclear test also came from the liberals’ fierce criticism of the Park government’s decision to start talks with Washington on THAAD deployment. Opponents of THAAD emphasized potential “security anxiety” associated with THAAD deployment, which they argued would escalate regional tensions and introduce a new Cold War, endangering peace on the Korean Peninsula. The THAAD issue has become a political hot potato that could easily entrap major presidential candidates. To avoid any backlash, the candidates will refuse to choose between China and the U.S. while placing the alliance with the U.S. at the center of South Korea’s foreign policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

70. Aligning Unevenly: India and the United States

Author:
Dinshaw Mistry
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In the early and mid-2000s, US policymakers anticipated India becoming one of America's top global partners. Have New Delhi's policies on key strategic issues actually aligned strongly with US objectives, as would be typical of close partners? An analysis of twelve prominent issues in US-India relations indicates that New Delhi's policies mostly converged moderately, rather than to a high extent, with US objectives. Specifically, the alignment between New Delhi's policies and US objectives was high or moderate-to-high on three issues—UN peacekeeping, nonproliferation export controls, and arms sales. It was moderate or low-to-moderate on six issues—China, Iran, Afghanistan, Indian Ocean security, Pakistan, and bilateral defense cooperation. And it was low or negligible on three issues—nuclear reactor contracts for US firms, nuclear arms control, and the war in Iraq. To be sure, despite the low or negligible convergence, New Delhi did not take an anti-US position on these issues. Four factors explain why New Delhi's policies aligned unevenly with US objectives across the issues: India's strategic interests (that diverged from US interests on some issues); domestic political and economic barriers (that prevented greater convergence between India's policies and US objectives); incentives and disincentives (that induced New Delhi to better align with US objectives); and certain case-specific factors. This analysis suggests that, rather than expecting India to become a close ally, US policymakers should consider it a friendly strategic partner whose policies would align, on the average, moderately with US strategic interests.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Political Economy, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
India and Asia