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661. The Election Matrix

Author:
Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
11-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The selection of the next president will be important for U.S. policy on nuclear weapons, but not as decisive as some might think. If the Senate stays Republican, as expected, a great deal depends on which party controls the House of Representatives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Government
Political Geography:
United States

662. START II Nears Ratification, Implementation Still at Risk

Author:
Jon Wolfsthal and Joseph Cirincione
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Seven years after President's George Bush and Boris Yelstin signed it, the Russian Duma is on the verge of ratifying the START II arms reduction treaty. The agreement, ratified by the United States Senate on January 26, 1996, would cut the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 3,000-3,500.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

663. The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material

Author:
Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Nothing could be more central to U.S. and world security than ensuring that nuclear warheads and their essential ingredients—plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—do not fall into the hands of terrorists or proliferating states. If plutonium and HEU become regularly available on a nuclear black market, nothing else we do to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons will succeed. Similarly, unless stockpiles of nuclear warheads and fissile materials can be secured, monitored, and verifiably reduced, it will be impossible to achieve deep, transparent, and irreversible reductions in nuclear arms. Measures to control warheads and fissile materials, therefore, are central to the entire global effort to reduce nuclear arms and stem their spread. The tens of thousands of nuclear weapons and hundreds of tons of plutonium and HEU that remain in the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles represent a deadly legacy of the Cold War, and managing them securely must be a top U.S. security policy priority.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

664. Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the Biological Weapons Convention

Author:
Ronald D. Rotunda
Publication Date:
09-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
The 1972 Biological Toxins and Weapons Convention—often called the Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC—requires the signatories to renounce the development, employment, transfer, acquisition, production, and possession of all biological weapons listed in the convention.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Government
Political Geography:
United States

665. Arms Control and Missile Defense: Not Mutually Exclusive

Author:
Charles V. Peña
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Traditionally, strategic offensive arms control and ballistic missile defense have been viewed as mutually exclusive. During the Cold War, the general belief was that anti–ballistic missile (ABM) systems would call into question the ability of the superpowers to successfully survive a first nuclear strike and inflict sufficient damage with a second strike. That is, missile defense could allow one superpower to launch a first strike and then use its defenses to intercept a second strike with the other superpower's surviving warheads—thereby undermining deterrence and stability. Furthermore, the thinking was that this situation would result in a dangerous offensive arms race as each side sought to counter the effects of the other's defenses.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

666. China, Nuclear Weapons, and Arms Control: A Preliminary Assessment

Author:
Robert A. Manning, Ronald Montaperto, and Brad Roberts
Publication Date:
04-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Historically, U.S. nuclear strategists and arms control experts have paid little attention to the People's Republic of China (PRC). China has not been a major factor in the U.S. nuclear calculus, which has remained centered on U.S.-Russian nuclear arsenals as the principal framework for arms control and arms reductions. Yet today China is the only one of the five de jure nuclear weapons states qualitatively and quantitatively expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, and Asia

667. Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China

Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Abstract:
China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is embarked on an ambitious, long-term military modernization effort to develop capabilities to fight and win short-duration, high- intensity conflicts along its periphery. China's defense modernization is broad reaching, encompassing the transformation of virtually all aspects of the military establishment, to include weapon systems, operational doctrine, institution building, and personnel reforms. China values military power to defend economic interests, secure territorial claims, and build political influence commensurate with its status as a regional power with global aspirations. In recent years, the PLA has accelerated reform and modernization in response to the central leadership's concerns that developments across the Taiwan Strait could put at risk Beijing's objectives for Taiwan unification.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Taiwan, and Beijing

668. China Rising: New Challenges to the U.S. Security Posture

Author:
Todd M. Koca and Jason D. Ellis
Publication Date:
10-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The nature, scope, and viability of the strategic relationship between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the United States have emerged as leading security policy issues. Among the many reasons for this are: China's evidently growing defense budget and its military modernization campaign; its often threatening rhetoric over Taiwan; its reputed espionage activities; and disputes over collateral security issues, such as China's continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, Beijing's lack of transparency concerning its strategic capabilities and modernization programs, and the intentions that undergird each, make it difficult to confidently forecast China's future direction; yet significant strategic decisions undertaken today will have far-reaching and long-term implications. There is a growing sense among defense analysts and specialists that the future disposition of Chinese strategic forces may only modestly resemble that of the past. Looking ahead, U.S. policy- makers must address three central questions: (1) the likely extent of China's strategic modernization; (2) the degree of complementarity of U.S. and PRC regional and strategic interests over time; and (3) the implications of each for U.S. foreign and defense policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Taiwan

669. Progress on the Korean Peninsula?

Author:
John Feffer
Publication Date:
12-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy In Focus
Abstract:
It was a striking juxtaposition, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il sitting side by side at a display of mass gymnastics in Pyongyang this last October. “Spectacular and amazing,” Albright called the coordinated movements of the 100,000 performers. When a picture of the August 1998 Taepodong rocket launch was displayed, Kim Jong Il confided that it would be his country's first and last such launch. The North Korean leader was a man with whom she could do business, Albright concluded at the end of her visit. The U.S. and North Korea, technically at war for over fifty years, had never before been on quite such cordial speaking terms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
United States, Israel, North Korea, Korean Peninsula, and Pyongyang

670. Defending Against New Dangers: Arms Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction in A Globalized World

Author:
Major John A. Nagl
Publication Date:
03-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Studies Association
Abstract:
Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, in their classic book Strategy and Arms Control, first published in 1961, use the term "arms control" to include "all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it." This paper updates their definition of arms control and refocuses it for the post-Cold War world, arguing that arms control in the twenty-first century can remain an important component of U.S. national security policy if defined broadly and applied innovatively. Traditionally an element of nation-to-nation relations and usually conducted bilaterally, in the next century arms control will be an increasingly multilateral affair. Threats to U.S. national security in the next century will increasingly shift from other states to individuals and small groups–sub-and trans-national threats. Defending against these threats in the conventional sense will be difficult, and the focus of arms control will shift to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to these groups. It is conceivable that both the parties to arms control agreements and provisions for their enforcement will similarly shift to non-state actors, including multinational corporations.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Globalization, and International Cooperation