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41. Avoiding a Post-INF Missile Race

Author:
Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
On November 7, 2019, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Center for Energy and Security Studies held a forum titled “US-Russia Dialogue on Nuclear Issues: Does Arms Control Have a Future?” Dr. Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, prepared the briefing paper, “Avoiding a Post-INF Missile Race,” to address the concerns about a new arms race in Europe arising after the end of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Though comparisons to the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s are inevitable, the present situation is different in one important respect: neither Russia nor NATO want a new arms race, and both have demonstrated a degree of restraint. “Nevertheless,” Dr. Sokov argues in the paper, “the situation is fragile, and it is difficult to predict how long mutual restraint can hold.” Furthermore, the military balance today includes additional, complicating features, including the replacement of nuclear weapons’ missions with high-precision long-range conventional weapons, the enlargement of NATO and the collapse of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the risk of escalation presented by increased dual-capable delivery systems, as well as the role of Asia in the global strategic balance. The window of opportunity for addressing these rising concerns is relatively narrow. Since “full-scope arms-control negotiations aiming at legally binding and verifiable treaties are hardly feasible in the current and projected political and security environment,” this CNS brief suggests a “more modest” approach to expanding and securing the restraint that exists, before it disappears altogether.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Arms Race
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North America

42. On the Struggle for Peace

Author:
Sergei Karaganov
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The U.S.’S wiThdrawal from the Treaty on the elimination of intermediate- and Shorter-range Missiles (iNF) may prove useful – however, only if it gets normal people throughout the world and, most importantly, many of us russians to come out of years-long hibernation. This hibernation could be described as strategic parasitism. There has not been a large-scale war in the world for more than 70 years now. Over the past three decades, relative peace has been accom- panied by a rapid increase in living standards for billions of people. People have begun to think that this state of peace is not only normal but will also stay with us forever. Meanwhile, 95% of it is the result not of our responsibility and peacefulness, but the fear of a nuclear apocalypse and hope for mutual nuclear deterrence. however, reliance on it is becoming increasingly fragile. in recent years, strategic stability (this term usually refers to the level of the threat of nuclear war) is rapidly deteriorating. i will venture to say that the current level of threat is comparable to the time right after the Cuban missile crisis that almost led to a global catastrophe. Prior to it, in the 1950s, the situation was perhaps even worse than it is now: an uncontrolled arms race and bitter hostility. Nevertheless, the vector of development is toward the 1950s. russia’s policy needs reviewing. The struggle to avert war should become the most important vector of this policy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. World table: Monitoring arms control and disarmament agreements 2018

Author:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
GCSP's Senior Programme Advisor and Arms Proliferation Cluster Leader, Marc Finaud, together with the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament and the University of London (SOAS), are working on a joint project that aims to provide parliamentarians from around the world with documents and material about arms control and disarmament agreements to help them monitor the actions of their governments.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, and Data
Political Geography:
Global Focus

44. Avoiding a Nuclear Wild, Wild West in the Middle East

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
With the recent visit of Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, there is keen interest in finalizing a civil nuclear cooperative agreement. Trump officials have also said they intend to renew or strike additional civil nuclear deals with Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey. How necessary and economically competitive is nuclear power in the Middle East for desalination and producing electricity compared to non-nuclear alternatives? In the Saudi case, is a Russian, Chinese, or French reactor sale likely? What are the nonproliferation implications of allowing Riyadh to enrich and reprocess, either now or in the future? Speaker: Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Cheney Pentagon.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

45. Alternative East Asian Nuclear Futures, Volume I: Military Scenarios

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The 13 chapters contained in this book’s two volumes were prompt-ed by a single inquiry in 2012 from the MacArthur Foundation. Was there any way, I was asked, to further clarify the economic and nonproliferation downsides if further production of civilian pluto-nium proceeded in East Asia? My initial reply was no. So much already had been done.But the more I thought about it, two things that had yet to be at-tempted emerged. The first was any serious analysis of just how bad things could get militarily if Japan and South Korea acquired nuclear weapons and North Korea and Mainland China ramped up their own production of such arms. Such nuclear proliferation had long been assumed to be undesirable but nobody had specified how such proliferation might play out militarily. Second, no serious consideration had yet been given to how East Asia might be able to prosper economically without a massive buildup of civilian nucle-ar power. Since each of the key nations in East Asia—China, the Koreas, and Japan—all would likely exploit their civilian nuclear energy infrastructure to acquire their first bombs or to make more, such inattention seemed odd.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Global Focus

46. Alternative East Asian Nuclear Futures, Volume II: Energy Scenarios

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The 13 chapters contained in this book’s two volumes were prompt- ed by a single inquiry in 2012 from the MacArthur Foundation. Was there any way, I was asked, to further clarify the economic and nonproliferation downsides if further production of civilian pluto- nium proceeded in East Asia? My initial reply was no. So much already had been done.But the more I thought about it, two things that had yet to be at- tempted emerged. The first was any serious analysis of just how bad things could get militarily if Japan and South Korea acquired nuclear weapons and North Korea and Mainland China ramped up their own production of such arms. Such nuclear proliferation had long been assumed to be undesirable but nobody had specified how such proliferation might play out militarily. Second, no serious consideration had yet been given to how East Asia might be able to prosper economically without a massive buildup of civilian nucle- ar power. Since each of the key nations in East Asia—China, the Koreas, and Japan—all would likely exploit their civilian nuclear energy infrastructure to acquire their first bombs or to make more, such inattention seemed odd.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, North Korea, and Global Focus

47. The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The instruments of cooperative security created during and since the Cold War to foster mutual confidence and reduce the risks of war, inadvertent escalation, and arms races, in and around Europe, have come under increasing strain. The European security architecture has been – and is being – weakened by renewed geopolitical competition, technological and military developments, and states violating or bypassing international law, or walking away from previous commitments. Against this backdrop, it is crucial to reassess the meaning and requirements of crisis and strategic stability in Europe. This report looks at some current and future sources of strategic instability, and focuses in particular on how the Russian way of waging modern conflict could, through the importance given to strategic ambiguity and operational opacity, fuel escalatory dynamics in Europe. It argues that strengthening strategic stability in Europe requires a two-pronged approach, combining a sustained effort to reinforce deterrence and defense in Europe with new confidence- and security-building and arms control measures to reduce reciprocal fears, incentives to escalate rapidly during a crisis, and risks of conventional and nuclear war in Europe.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

48. Arms Control as Uncertainty Management

Author:
Amy J. Nelson
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
For decades or longer, policy-makers have sought to use arms control to reduce the uncertainty endemic to the international security environment. Because uncertainty is pervasive in these situations, however, practitioners themselves are naturally vulnerable to its effects. This paper seeks to help policy-makers optimize arms control outcomes by providing improved theory and best practices for goal-setting and strategy selection using the judicious application of decision theoretic concepts. The paper first lays out a suitable role for decision theory in the study and analysis of arms control, arguing that “uncertainty” is a more appropriate concept for description and analysis here than is “risk.” Prior approaches that rely on “risk” have tended to drive the search for arms control best practices, but “risk” requires the use of probability estimates that are frequently not available or not a good indicator of potential outcomes. Second, the paper argues that decision-makers are vulnerable to the effects of missing information and the uncertainty it causes in the run-up to and during arms control negotiations. Consequently, they are subject to biases and resort to the use of security-specific heuristics, including worst-case scenario thinking, limited-theater-of-war thinking, and low-dimension (or non-complex) thinking when setting goals and employing strategies for negotiating arms control agreements. The paper discusses the origins of this uncertainty and the strategies that states could employ as a result of these security-specific heuristics, arguing that they can best be grouped into two types—risk reduction versus uncertainty management. Finally, the paper makes recommendations for optimizing outcomes—for getting efficient negotiations that result in robust, durable agreements, capable of managing uncertainty about security, despite the effects of missing information.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. Capital of Militias: Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State

Author:
Wolfram Lacher
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Since the arrival of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in March 2016, four large local militias have gradually divided up the capital between themselves. Though nominally loyal to the government, they now exert a degree of influence over state institutions and resources that is unprecedented in post-Qaddafi Libya. This Paper examines the rise of a militia cartel in Tripoli, and concludes that the situation is untenable, as it risks provoking a major new conflict over Tripoli fought by those who have been excluded from access to the state and impedes efforts to establish a meaningful unity government
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Libya

50. When Parallel Red Lines Meet: Recent Events in Syria in Various Contexts

Author:
Assaf Orion and Amos Yadlin
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
At the strategic level, the convergence in time and space of the events following the chemical weapons attack in Duma by the Syrian regime portend a dramatic development with substantial potential impact for Israel’s security environment. The attack on the T4 airbase, attributed to Israel, falls within the context of the last red line that Israel drew, whereby it cannot accept Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria. The attack in Duma reflects the Syrian regime’s considerable self-confidence at this time. As for Trump, the attack provides him with another opportunity to demonstrate his insistence on the red lines that he drew and take a determined stance opposite Putin. Thus, Israel’s enforcement of its red line and the United States’ enforcement of its red line have met, while Russia finds itself exerting efforts to deter both countries from taking further action that could undermine its achievements in Syria and its positioning as the dominant world power in the theater. However, the strategic convergence does not stop at Syria’s borders, and is unfolding against the backdrop of the crisis emerging around the Trump administration’s demands to improve the JCPOA, or run the risk of the re-imposition of sanctions and the US exiting the agreement. Indeed, the context is even wider, with preparations for Trump’s meeting with North Korean President Kim on the nuclear issue in the far background. Therefore, the clash between Israel and Iran in Syria on the eve of deliberations on the nuclear deal could potentially lead to a change from separate approaches to distinct issues to a broader and more comprehensive framework with interfaces and linkages between the issues.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North Korea, Syria, and North America