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111. Planning Ahead: A Blueprint to a Middle East WMD Free Zone

Author:
Chen Kane
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Freeing the Middle East from all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and establishing a weapon-of-mass-destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) is a concept that originated many decades ago. Although this idea has existed for more than forty years, surprisingly little thought has been given to how it can be realistically implemented. Currently, there remain significant gaps regarding core concepts of the WMDFZ (the “Zone”) negotiations and implementation within the Middle East and internationally. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies offers a new report in an effort to address these gaps with regard to the planned WMDFZ Middle East Conference, negotiation process, and the subsequent establishment of such a Zone by identifying the legal, technical, and organizational elements required to support the Zone negotiations and implementation. Creating a WMDFZ is a very tall order; not only has one never been created before, but also all existing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) formalized an already existing situation—the absence of nuclear weapons in their region. The WMDFZ, by contrast, is aimed at reversing the status quo by dismantling existing WMD capabilities and programs in a region that is suspected of hosting all three categories of WMD. Moreover, the region suffers from deep-rooted conflicts and mistrust, and many areas are undergoing considerable social and political change. The increasing influence of non-state actors on states’ affairs in the region is another complicating factor. Additionally, while there are regional and international regimes and organizations charged with verifying the peaceful nature of nuclear energy programs and chemical industries (all of which could inform the WMDFZ negotiators), there are no comparable mechanisms to cover nuclear and biological weapons dismantlement, verify sensitive activities for biological programs, nor sufficiently regulate WMD delivery systems—all of which are mandated under the Middle East WMDFZ.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Middle East

112. The Case for Highly Enriched Uranium Free Zones

Author:
Andrew Bieniawski, Miles A. Pomper, and Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Highly enriched uranium (HEU)—one of the key ingredients for nuclear weapons—is one of the most dangerous materials on the planet. Significant progress has been made over the past several years to eliminate all HEU from 26 countries and Taiwan. The creation of regional HEU-Free Zones would help cement a global norm against civilian HEU use in much the same way that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones have strengthened global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. In many cases, only one or two countries in each proposed regional HEU-Free Zone have small amounts of remaining HEU, presenting an opportunity for countries to take action prior to the Nuclear Security Summit in 2016. This concept paper was developed by a working group on “The Elimination of Highly Enriched Uranium in Civilian Applications,” a project of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of eighty civil society organizations committed to improving fissile materials security. Initial work on the concept was also funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

113. Replacing High-Risk Radiological Materials

Author:
Miles A. Pomper and George M. Moore
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Permanent Risk Reduction of Radioactive Sources Illustration by Evelyn Helminen, MIIS There has been a marked increase in international and domestic attention to the need to replace high-risk radioactive sources with less risky and non-isotopic alternatives in order to forestall an act of radiological terrorism. In response to this need, the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey, with the support of the US and UK governments, hosted three, closed-door workshops with governmental and nongovernmental experts in Washington, London, and Vienna to propose appropriate policies. Through these workshops and additional research, CNS has developed the new occasional paper, “Permanent Risk Reduction: A Roadmap for Replacing High-Risk Radioactive Sources and Materials,” which offers a series of actions that governments could take to help expedite and encourage the substitution of high-risk sources with non-isotopic alternatives as an important contribution to the nuclear security framework.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Radiological Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

114. The Future Impact of North Korea’s Emerging Nuclear Deterrent

Author:
Leonard Spector
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The emergence of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent has been a grievous blow to international nonproliferation efforts and poses serious national security challenges for the United States and its Northeast Asian allies. It is by no means clear, however, that the precedent North Korea has set will significantly erode the nonproliferation regime or stimulate proliferation elsewhere. In a new paper (published by the US-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, on its website, 38north) CNS’s Leonard S. Spector examines the arenas in which North Korea’s new nuclear weapon status has significant negative consequences and assesses the damage that will likely be done. He concludes that the ripple effects of North Korea’s crossing the nuclear threshold may be more limited than they first appear.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

115. Nuclear Scholars Initiative: A Collection of Papers from the 2013 Nuclear Scholars Initiative

Author:
Sarah Weiner
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This paper will examine the pressures, incentives, and restraints that form the politics of multilateral nuclear export control arrangements by examining the evolution of nuclear supplier arrangements from the 1950s to the 1990s. Focusing on the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), this paper identifies six key pressures that shape the form and behavior of multilateral nuclear export control regimes. A deeper understanding of these pressures and how they resulted in the NSG offers a more nuanced backdrop against which to consider future policies for nuclear export control.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe and Washington

116. Japan's New Security Policy: Breaking Away from the Post–War Regime?

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China is challenging the regional balance of power in East Asia through a military buildup and an increasingly assertive foreign policy. The US is forced to find the right balance between cooperating with China while benefiting from its economic rise, and countering China's regional reach by carrying out its self-declared "pivot" to Asia in spite of domestic and budgetary constraints. With just over one year in office, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has received wide domestic support for his ambitious plans to revive Japan's economy through his threefold policy of Abenomics. At the same time, however, he has implemented a number of significant policies in the defence and security sphere. In response to China's military rise, the Abe administration increased and recalibrated the defence budget. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the alliance with the US, the government approved the creation of a US-style National Security Council, passed a Secrecy Bill, and aims to reverse Japan's self-imposed ban on exercising the right to collective self-defence. Under the banner of "proactive pacifism", the Abe cabinet is seizing the momentum caused by the changing regional power dynamics in order to edge closer towards "breaking away from the postwar regime". A proposed revision of Japan's constitution, unchanged since 1947, symbolizes the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) objective to bring about a more autonomous role for Japan both in the security alliance with the US and as an international actor.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

117. Japan's new approach to national security

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
December 2013 marked an important turning point in Japan's evolving security and defence policies. While the debate about Japan's so-called security 'normalisation' has been going on now for more than a decade, by releasing three national security-related documents the conservative government led by Shinzo Abe since 2012 has dissipated any doubts that may still linger regarding the 'why, what and how' of Japan's national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Japan and East Asia

118. Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past

Author:
Deedee Derksen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A piecemeal approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan, with four DDR programs since 2001 each targeting specific groups, has yielded limited results, mostly due to an extremely adverse political environment. Comprehensive DDR is unlikely to work without a settlement that includes all armed groups. The success of such a deal would in turn hinge on the successful reintegration of commanders and fighters. Sequencing DDR in the conventional way may not work; reintegration might better precede disarmament.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

119. Governing Uranium in the United States

Author:
Sharon Squassoni, Robert Kim, Stephanie Cooke, and Jacob Greenberg
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) participated in a global project on uranium governance led by the Danish Institute for International Studies that looks at uranium accountability and control in 17 uranium- producing countries. The project seeks to identify governance gaps and provide policy recommendations for improving front- end transparency, security, and regulation. The impetus for the project is the concern that monitoring activities at the front end—uranium mining, milling, and conversion—could be strengthened.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States

120. Handle with care: crowd-sourcing and non-proliferation

Author:
Christian Dietrich
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
States do not spread weapons of mass destruction - people do. It takes individual proliferators, collaborators, and the acquiescence of bystanders for sensitive materials to change hands illicitly. Yet, the rigid national and international means deployed to counter proliferation are juxtaposed with the limitless amounts of information people produce in our digitally connected world.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Terrorism