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1. At the Brink of Nuclear War: Feasibility of Retaliation and the U.S. Policy Decisions During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis

Author:
Yang Gyu Kim and Félix E. Martín
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
Recent studies in nuclear deterrence show that nuclear punishment is infeasible in most cases due to the opponent’s second-strike capability, tactical redundancy, and the logic of self-deterrence. However, if the challenge against nuclear deterrence is expected to go unpunished, the deterrent policy is not credible and will likely fail. Can the defender violently punish the challenger possessing nuclear weapons? If it can, under what conditions? Thanks to President Kennedy’s tape recordings, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides researchers an exceptional laboratory for testing various theories on the defender’s policy choices after deterrence failure. This article derives a research hypothesis and its competing counterpart and examines their respective explanatory power via a process-tracing analysis of key members within the Executive Committee during the crisis. The study finds that the challenger’s feasibility of retaliating with atomic weapons is a crucial predictor for the defender’s policy choices.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, History, Deterrence, Credibility, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Feasibility
Political Geography:
Cuba and United States of America

2. Can Iran be Contained? Thoughts on the Possibility of Extended Deterrence in the Middle East

Author:
Carlo Masala
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace
Institution:
Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research
Abstract:
“Extended deterrence,” or “active deterrence,” as it is sometimes called, threatens a nuclearstrategic response in case of a nuclear attack on the territory or troops of one’s allies. This paper aims to explore the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East in light of an Iranian nuclear military capability. Two preliminary remarks are necessary in order to frame the line of reasoning on the issue. First, discussion of the possibilities and pitfalls of extended deterrence in the Middle East does not intend to insinuate that diplomatic efforts to stop the Iranian regime from constructing a nuclear device have failed or that a nuclear Iran is already a given. Exploring the possibilities of extended deterrence in the Middle East is, rather, an attempt to be intellectually honest and anticipate that all the efforts underway for almost a decade will fail because the Iranian regime is determined to produce nuclear warheads or reach the breakout point, in which it will become a “virtual nuclear power.” Either trajectory will have a decisive impact on the nuclear realm, but even more so, on the political balance of power in the region; each has the potential to reshuffle relations not only between Iran and Israel but also between Iran and the Arab states in the Middle East. If either development is perceived as detrimental to the already fragile security situation in the Middle East, academics and practitioners must start thinking about a “Plan B”. The second preliminary remark that must precede any analysis of extended deterrence and its applicability to the Middle East concerns the nature of the subject to be explored. Although for about six decades there has been a profusion of literature on the mechanisms of deterrence and extended deterrence (in conjunction with the same number of critical studies on why deterrence and extended deterrence might not work),1 we still don’t know much about these two concepts. This paradox can be explained by the simple fact that so far we have not experienced the failure of a deterrence relationship, i.e., resulting in a nuclear war between two powers. Proponents and opponents of deterrence believe – in the theological sense of the word – that deterrence either works or doesn’t, respectively, but neither camp knows for certain. The consequences of this highly unsatisfying state of the art is that neither the “more may be better” nor the “dead end of deterrence”2 approach provides any form of guidance for policymakers. If academics want to speak truth to power they need to be aware of, first, the limitations of their theories, and second, that the real world can’t be grasped with parsimonious concepts.
Topic:
International Relations, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East