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961. A Future Internet for Democracies: Contesting China’s Push for Dominance in 5G, 6G, and the Internet of Everything

Author:
Lindsay Gorman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States and its democratic allies are engaged in a contest for the soul of the Future Internet. Conceived as a beacon of free expression with the power to tear down communication barriers across free and unfree societies alike, the Internet today faces significant challenges to its status as the world’s ultimate connector. In creating connectivity and space for democratic speech, it has also enabled new means of authoritarian control and the suppression of human rights through censorship and surveillance. As tensions between democracies and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) heat up over Internet technologies, the prospect of a dichotomous Internet comes more sharply into focus: a democratic Internet where information flows freely and an authoritarian Internet where it is tightly controlled—separated not by an Iron Curtain, but a Silicon one. The Future Internet is deeply enmeshed in the dawning information contest between autocracies and democracies. It is the base layer—the foundation—on which communication takes place and the entry point into narrative and societal influence. How the next generation of Internet technologies are created, defined, governed, and ultimately used will have an outsized impact on this information contest—and the larger geopolitical contest—between democracy and authoritarianism. China’s growing presence in the global telecommunications market—and the threat that reality poses to the United States and its allies—has catalyzed both national security and economic policy interest in fifth-generation cellular network infrastructure (5G). Like 2G, 3G, and 4G before it, the next generation of mobile connectivity promises a step-change in Internet capability and a societal transformation—through the explosion of connected devices across cities, vehicles, factories, and homes. The nascent data-fueled economy 5G Internet will spawn represents a new playing field for nation-state competition in both commercial innovation and systems of governance alike. In this new economy, United States leadership is not assured. China has made a targeted push to lead the world in the emerging technologies of the future—built on future networks and extending to the applications their data will enable: from artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous cars to smart grids and advanced manufacturing. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has by some measures provided the most technical contributions to the 5G standard and last year filed more patents in Europe than any other company. Heavy state subsidies provided by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have increased the competitiveness of Chinese firms in critical technology industries abroad. As the Pentagon’s Innovation Board bluntly put it: “The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world … That country is currently not likely to be the United States.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China and Asia

962. 5G Security: The New Energy Security

Author:
Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

963. Technology in Conflict: how COVID-19 contact tracing apps can exacerbate violent conflicts

Author:
Jennifer Easterday
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this Strategic Update, Jennifer Easterday explores how a human security approach to COVID-19 tech tools would prompt tech companies, governments, and other actors to work with communities in ways that enhance their agency in the face of the pandemic to both reduce the risk of exacerbating conflict while maximizing the benefits of technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Conflict, Violence, Human Security, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

964. Making Sense of Technological Spheres of Influence

Author:
Valentin Weber
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The deterioration of Sino-American relations and the rise of novel forms of statecraft have given way to a worrying new feature of the international system: technological spheres of influence. In this Strategic Update, Valentin Weber explains how we have arrived at this novel geopolitical arrangement, where in the world the greatest contestation lies, and what the future of technospheres may hold.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and International System
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

965. DIPLOMATIC NARRATIVES ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION: POWER, COOPERATION AND PERSPECTIVES FROM BRAZIL AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY

Author:
Iara Costa Leite, Júlia Mascarello, and Nicole Aguilar Gayard
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:
This article adopts a different stance towards materials on science diplomacy produced by its practitioners, broadly understood here as those individuals or organizations involved in the practice of science diplomacy (including, for instance, scientists and diplomats): it sees such materials as composed by narratives, rather than scientific categories that describe and analyze social phenomena.6 Our focus is on frames and causal perceptions related to STI and international relations as elaborated by diplomats in Brazil, where the authors are based. Together with China, India, Russia and the United States, Brazil has become a central stage for competition between developed countries' science diplomacy initiatives (FLINK; SCHREITERER, 2010). Our aim is to map and systematize narratives on STI authored by Brazilian diplomats and their connections with international relations. We understand narratives broadly, related to how diplomats perceive STI and associate it with power, development, competition and cooperation in multiple geometries (bilateral, multilateral, North-South, South-South) and sectors (nuclear, economic, environmental etc.).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Power, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

966. FROM SCIENCE DIPLOMACY TO EDUCATION DIPLOMACY: THE BRAZILIAN CASE

Author:
Gabriela Gomes Coelho Ferreira and Amacio Jorge Silva Nunes de Oliveira
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Institution:
Conjuntura Austral: Journal of the Global South
Abstract:
Actions of science diplomacy are typically described in literature as related to developed countries. This is due to a perspective in which science is a hard power resource or, even when it is perceived as a soft power resource, it is an extension of a country’s hard power. Because of that, science diplomacy has been normally related with developed countries, especially during the last century. Therefore, it seems quite unusual to picture a developing country like Brazil pursuing such an elaborate strategy. Nevertheless, Brazil has been signing Cultural Agreements since 1930’s, using science as a diplomatic tool to overcome regional frictions. We also briefly show its development into a complex education diplomacy strategy that lasts until today. We intend to demonstrate the smart strategy deployed by Brazil, a developing country, in using the soft power of science since the 1930’s not only despite its lack of hard power, but as an alternative to it. The Brazilian diplomatic body used the legitimacy given by science to establish important dialogues with key countries, starting from those in Latin America—therefore, using science diplomacy to overcome regional frictions since the beginning of the last century.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Education, Science and Technology, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America