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951. Language Change in Progress: Chinese Internet Lexicon and the Symbolic Meaning in the Harmonious Society

Author:
Ting-Yu Lee
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Globalization and communication on the internet poses challenges to sociolinguistics. China is one of the engines of economic in the world. Since the Internet service started in 1994, it has been developing rapidly. The rapid development of Internet communication in China has created huge impact on the Chinese language and society. According to Yates (1996), a new medium of communication such as the Internet not only draws upon existing linguistic practices, but also generates new forms of Chinese Internet lexicon. The rapid diffusion of the Internet has prompted developments in the variety and creativity of language use. Internet users often create new words or appropriate the meanings of existing words. The resultant “Internet language” has unique lexical and discourse features. Li (2002) and Ma (2002) confirmed that Internet lexicon has brought the tremendous impact and spread to everyday usage in Chinese society. In 2006 National Language Resources Monitoring and Research Graphic Media Center has released the first time an annual report of Inventory of Chinese Language (汉语盘点 Hanyu pandian). Since 2011 ten most popular Internet hot words have been released annually by National Language Resources Monitoring and Research Graphic Media Center. This research is aimed to discusses the emergence and use of most popular Chinese Internet vocabularies in the recent 10 years. Based on the data from National Language Resources Monitoring and Research Graphic Media Center, the most popular Chinese Internet words and phrases(2011–2019) are analyzed and summarized into twelve categories. The implication and findings of the symbolic meaning embedded in the Chinese internet lexicon are analyzed. This study sets out to examine the transformation of internet lexicon in China and to argue the equivalent relation between symbols, language and popular culture.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, Language, and Society
Political Geography:
China and Asia

952. How the United States marched the semiconductor industry into its trade war with China

Author:
Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The US-China trade war forced a reluctant semiconductor industry into someone else’s fight, a very different position from its leading role in the 1980s trade conflict with Japan. This paper describes how the political economy of the global semiconductor industry has evolved since the 1980s. That includes both a shift in the business model behind how semiconductors go from conception to a finished product as well as the geographic reorientation toward Asia of demand and manufactured supply. It uses that lens to explain how, during the modern conflict with China, US policymakers turned to a legally complex set of export restrictions targeting the semiconductor supply chain in the attempt to safeguard critical infrastructure in the telecommunications sector. The potentially far-reaching tactics included weaponization of exports by relatively small but highly specialized American software service and equipment providers in order to constrain Huawei, a Fortune Global 500 company. It describes potential costs of such policies, some of their unintended consequences, and whether policymakers might push them further in the attempt to constrain other Chinese firms.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Trade Wars, Industry, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

953. Impact of COVID-19 lockdowns on individual mobility and the importance of socioeconomic factors

Author:
Julien Maire
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
In March 2020, most countries implemented stringent measures—closing schools and workplaces, limiting public gatherings, and curbing travel—to reduce the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which causes COVID-19. Using the Oxford Stringency Index and smartphone data from Google, Maire examines the effects of the stringent measures implemented in March–May 2020 on individual mobility. The results suggest that stringent measures were more effective at reducing individual mobility in higher-income countries than in lower-income countries and that the differences reflect factors such as extreme poverty, perception of risk, the share of vulnerable employment, number of hospital beds, age distribution of the population, and population density. Understanding how the effects of lockdown measures on individual mobility differed across countries is important to determine the effectiveness of such measures on health outcomes and their impact on economic activity.
Topic:
Health, Science and Technology, Governance, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

954. The Pandemic as an Impulse for the Development of New Technologies in Sub-Saharan Africa

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
A deep recession is projected for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2020 as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the market for new technologies providing solutions helpful during the health crisis, is developing dynamically. In the medium term, the research and development sector will gain importance and become attractive for investments, also for Polish companies.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Research, Business, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Poland, and Sub-Saharan Africa

955. Is China’s Innovation a Threat to the South Korea-China Economic Relationship?

Author:
Wonho Yeon
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper reviews China’s technological rise and assesses whether it poses a threat to the South Korean economy. In terms of comparative advantage between the two countries, many experts have long believed that China’s strength is low-cost labor and Korea’s is technology and capital. However, this has changed as China’s economy grows. Now China has enough capital to invest in its economy. Some scholars even argue that China has the potential to meet its “innovation imperative” and emerge as a driving force in innovation on a global level.1 This paper examines the Korea-China economic relationship from the innovation productivity perspective, organized into sections: briefly introducing the Korea- China economic relationship; describing the technological rise of China, based on recent data; developing the model to analyze the innovation productivity of China and report the estimation results; evaluating the concern of the South Korean semiconductor industry; and presenting conclusions.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Science and Technology, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

956. Stress Test: People, Technology, and the Safety Net In Response To Covid-19

Author:
Justin King and Financial Security Program
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
COVID-19 jolted the American economy — and it caused at least 30 million Americans to lose their jobs or have their working hours curtailed by April. The speed and volume of those suddenly un- and under-employed has been unprecedented, and it has resulted in a remarkable amount of stress on the nation’s social safety net. SNAP and other safety net supports administered by state governments struggle to meet the needs of millions of people. Some state online applications systems are so poorly designed that applicants remain stuck trying to access support weeks and months after beginning the application process. What can state human service administrators and policymakers do to build accessible intake and application systems? How should we re-design the safety net? Read the brief to better understand how to create a safety net that is people-centered, tech-enabled, and aligned with private benefit systems.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Welfare, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Safety Net
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

957. A Guide to Investigating Outbreak Origins

Author:
Richard Pilch, Miles A. Pomper, Jill Luster, and Filippa Lentzos
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
COVID-19 has exposed key gaps in the global community’s ability to assess infectious disease outbreaks of international concern, in particular the ability to differentiate between natural and laboratory sources of infection. The risk of natural outbreaks is increasing as unchecked population growth, industrial expansion, and corresponding ecological disruption increases the likelihood that novel disease agents will come into contact with naïve human populations. Likewise, the risk of laboratory accidents is increasing as more high-containment laboratories are built and higher risk experiments are conducted around the world. Meanwhile, a deliberate biological attack may resemble an outbreak of natural or accidental origin, and a natural or accidental outbreak may be misattributed as an attack. The purpose of this Occasional Paper is to outline a readily adoptable, stepwise methodology to guide the investigation of corresponding outbreak origins, building upon traditional epidemiological principles. We have sought to remain minimally intrusive at all times; however, an increasing level of need-to-know information, site, and personnel access becomes necessary as attention shifts toward potential laboratory sources. Accordingly, we include recommendations to ensure such access under existing international regimes, primarily the World Health Organization (WHO)’s International Health Regulations.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, World Health Organization, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

958. Strong Yet Brittle: The Risks of Digital Authoritarianism

Author:
Katherine Mansted
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Authoritarian governments increasingly adopt technology-centric national strategies and methods of internal governance. They control their societies through digital censorship, propaganda, and surveillance, and use these same tools to manipulate foreign societies. Their leaders prioritize the development of cutting-edge technologies in pursuit of government efficiency and military and economic advantage. Some analysts view this turn to “digital authoritarianism” as an approach designed to make authoritarians more durable at home and powerful abroad. However, authoritarians adopt technology-centric strategies primarily due to their own insecurity. Digital authoritarianism is not so much a strategic choice, as it is a strategic necessity. In a globalized world, ideas and communications technologies are inherently threatening to authoritarian regimes, which must control both to ensure their survival. Authoritarians also increasingly depend on information technologies for economic growth and to build state capacity in areas where they have traditionally been at a comparative disadvantage to democracies. Ultimately, digital authoritarianism creates systemic risks for domestic governance and national security. In this sense, while digital authoritarianism has strengths, it will also become a regime’s Achilles’ Heel.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

959. Competitive Strategies for Democracy in the Age of AI

Author:
Andrew Imbrie
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In a 1972 paper for the United States Air Force Project at RAND, the late Andrew Marshall defined what he called a more “efficient, effective U.S. competitive role.”1 His theory of the case was straightforward: The United States needed to sustain a long-term, strategic competition with the Soviet Union; the nature of that competition was poorly specified, but could be shaped in ways favorable to enduring U.S. advantages; and the United States should therefore assess the balance of strategic forces, clarify its goals, and develop competitive strategies to match its strengths against Soviet weaknesses. The competition between the United States and China today is different from and far more complex than the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, notably in the levels of economic interdependence and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI-enabled capabilities and systems.2 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion.3 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. The novel coronavirus pandemic will accelerate these trends. Increased U.S.-China tensions, cascading economic crises, and renewed debates over the resilience of supply chains and the future of digital surveillance are all characteristics of a world that demands global cooperation but sorely lacks it. The fault lines between liberal democracies and illiberal, authoritarian regimes are widening at a time of growing turbulence in the international system. Even before the virus, U.S.-China relations faced a heightened risk of conflict. The years ahead are likely to bring greater turmoil, with AI and other emerging technologies at the center of an extended, continuing strategic competition among the major powers. In the long-term contest between the forces of democracy and autocracy, the United States should apply Marshall’s counsel and develop more competitive strategies that play to its strengths. The right U.S. approach starts with its broad network of allies and partners. America has formed security guarantees with 52 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, compared with Russia’s five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and China’s one (North Korea).4 The United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce strategic resources in AI, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant, and trend-setting; large and diverse pools data on which to train algorithms; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices internationally. In a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains, an alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. A competitive strategy in AI will require the United States and its allies to assess their comparative advantages; identify anomalies and patterns in the strategic choices of authoritarian competitors that are deeply rooted; and match relative strengths against specific areas of weakness.5 This paper focuses on the dynamics between the United States and China in AI. Based on an initial assessment of recent advances and long-term potential, it recommends that democratic nations sharpen their edge in five key areas: Hardware edge: exploit hardware chokepoints, leveraging the advantages that democratic nations have in the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced AI chips. Data edge: develop common standards to share, pool, and store non-sensitive data sets around discrete projects, such as health intelligence and biosecurity, predictive maintenance, and maritime domain awareness; invest in privacy-preserving machine learning; and support research into new techniques for making personal data less relevant to AI systems, such as one-shot learning and advanced simulations. Talent edge: develop inter-allied human capital in AI, share best practices, and cultivate democratic networks of AI researchers through exchange programs, joint scholarships, and conference support, while ensuring research security among allies and partners. Innovation edge: harness the estimated two-thirds of global R&D that is conducted by democratic nations to foster collaboration in specific areas of promise, such as human-machine teaming methods and verification techniques for complex controls systems and AI-enabled, safety-critical infrastructure. Rule-setting edge: shape global norms and standards for AI, reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal values; create the conditions for a common AI market among democratic nations; and extend the benefits of AI to fragile democracies by establishing a multilateral digital infrastructure network.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

960. Looking Back to Go Forward: Strategic Mismanagement of Platform Technologies and the Race for the Future

Author:
Christopher Kirchhoff
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
One morning in 2016, staffers from the National Security Council and the Office of the U.S. Chief Technology Officer boarded a black van outside the West Wing. They were on a field trip to the State Department led by U.S. CTO Megan Smith. Smith, a technology visionary and former Google vice president, once worked at General Magic, the Silicon Valley firm that in the early 1990s first brought together the component technologies of the smartphone. Apple later productized General Magic’s innovations in the 2007 release of the iPhone, which brought the power of computing and reach of the Internet into the palm of our hand, revolutionizing how we live and work and laying the foundation for industries of the future, including today’s “Internet of Things,” which by 2020 comprised 31 billion devices worldwide. The White House staffers Smith led on their field trip were on their way to visit the Global Engagement Center, or GEC, in State Department parlance, a new unit created to help fight the influence war against the Islamic State. While smartphones powered the American economy to new heights as the introduction of 4G became widespread, this same set of technologies was being used by ISIS to establish a modern-day caliphate across Syria and Iraq. Slick ISIS social media posts drew thousands of recruits into its ranks, leading the State Department to counterattack with its own campaign of online messaging. It was a digital war that was a part of a physical war, with the GEC as the nerve center of the United States’ response in the virtual domain. The GEC’s mission was to monitor social media worldwide and organize a U.S. information counter-offensive to push back against ISIS’s outlandish claims post by post, tweet by tweet, person by person, depriving the terrorist group of the myths it used to draw new adherents. It took all of ten minutes for the NSC-CTO group to realize the GEC would not be joining the pantheon of U.S. government technology success stories. Megan Smith quickly identified flaws in metrics the GEC used to track its social media engagement and was astonished to learn GEC’s central monitoring dashboard was not updated in real time, a core practice of any U.S. social media or internet firm. The State Department had broadcast its ambitions to bring the skill of Google, Facebook, and Twitter to bear in the fight against ISIS. Yet it never resourced the GEC on anything of the scale that would have been needed to achieve this mission. Then there were outdated privacy laws that did not permit the State Department to track public social media handles of U.S. citizens, the inability of the Department to contract with top vendors in technology, and an overall lack of relevant expertise on the GEC’s staff. The nation that invented the Internet, the smartphone, and social media seemed powerless in 2016 to mobilize these same tools within its own government against a barbaric adversary that had hijacked them for violent ends. Fifteen years after 9/11 kicked off a transformation of homeland and national security agencies to defeat Islamic terrorists, the State department was unable to leverage a U.S. platform technology to advance a top foreign policy objective. It was ultimately the U.S. bombing campaign and Kurdish paramilitaries that brought ISIS to heel, with GEC counter-narratives barely denting ISIS’s social media mobilization. As the GEC worked its way into a historical footnote, a far more consequential battle for platform technology was underway in the global adoption of 5G technology. By 2020, China had deployed 15 times the number of 5G base stations as the United States. Unlike the GEC, which was merely an illustration of the U.S. government’s inability to use a key platform technology for its own ends, the contest over 5G involved billions of dollars in a worldwide race for the future of the global telecommunications market. Though U.S. firms pioneered the development and deployment of 4G technologies, China is on track to capture dominant global market share in 5G hardware and applications. As former Google CEO Eric Schmidt notes, 5G stands to be the first “platform technology” race the United States will lose to China, creating a structural deficit in U.S. economic competitive- ness that in a worst-case scenario could tip overall innovation leadership globally in the set of future industries 5G will enable. While the causes of the 5G failure are many, the original sin is how the U.S. government allocates spectrum be- tween civilian and military uses. With few incentives to optimize allocation across the civilian spectrum managed by the Federal Communication Commission and the federal spectrum managed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), U.S. technology companies were relegated to developing 5G on an inferior band in which signal travels a shorter distance. China and the rest of the world did not make this same mistake. As a result, both U.S. telcos and the U.S. military are on track to be left behind by the global adoption of mid-band spectrum as the dominant 5G wavelength. It was as if the government mandated Betamax in the VCR wars of the 1980s even as its experts knew VHS was the superior technology—an error of strategy that locked U.S. firms into second place before competition began in global markets.
Topic:
Science and Technology, 5G, and Mismanagement
Political Geography:
United States of America