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891. China and the New Geopolitics of Technical Standardization

Author:
John Seaman
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
From emerging technological fields such as 5G, artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart cities to traditional sectors including energy, health care, railways and agriculture, China is increasingly proactive in nearly every domain where technical standards remain to be developed and set. Technical standards are the definition of processes or technical specifications designed to improve the quality, security and compatibility of various goods and services, for instance GSM for telecommunications or WiFi for wireless Internet. They can be thought of as basic specifications or technologies on which other technologies or methods will evolve – creating lock-in effects and path-dependency for future products and technological trajectories. Defining standards can provide significant benefits for society at large, but can also carry significant implications for which technologies will dominate future markets and provide substantial advantages to those who master standardized technologies. Chinese policymakers have become keenly aware of the relationship between technical standard-setting and economic power. Indeed, a popular saying in China posits that third-tier companies make products, second-tier companies make technology, first-tier companies make standards. In 2015, the State Council highlighted China’s deficiencies in the field and set out to transform the country’s standardization system, seeking to harness the capacity of standard setting not only to improve the daily lives of its citizens, but to drive innovation, boost China’s economic transformation toward the industries of the future, and turn China into a premier purveyor of international technical standards.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Multilateralism, and Standardization
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

892. The Recycling of Lithium-Ion Batteries: A Strategic Pillar for the European Battery Alliance

Author:
Raphaël Danino-Perraud
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Although it is still marginal, the market for electric vehicles (EVs) is growing. According to the French Institute of Petroleum and Renewable Energies (IFPEN, Institut Français du Pétrole et des Énergies Renouvelables), EVs accounted for a little more than 2% of the light vehicle market in 2019. This was up by 54% compared to 2018, but EVs still only represent 0.8% of the global car fleet. That said, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates EVs could make up between 15% and 30% of vehicle sales in 2030. However, while European manufacturers have so far developed EVs such as the Renault Zoé or the BMW i3, they are highly dependent on Asian companies for the supply and manufacture of materials for cells and electric batteries, such as nickel, cobalt, lithium used to build precursors, or cathodes and their components. Asia provides more than 90% of world car battery output, half of which comes from China alone. European dependence is not only related to the manufacture of batteries, but occurs throughout much of their value chain, from extraction and processing of raw materials to the preparation of necessary treatment processes for recycling. The recycling market for batteries from small electronic objects (smartphones, computers, tablets, etc.) has also been led by Asian countries.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Business, and Recycling
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

893. African Jobs in the Digital Era: Export Options with a Focus on Online Labour

Author:
Elvis Melia
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
This study asks what impact the Fourth Industrial Revolution will have on job creation and catchup development in Sub-Saharan Africa over the coming decade. Can light manufacturing export sectors still serve African development the way they served East Asian development in the past? If factory floor automation reduces the need for low-cost labour in global value chains, can IT-enabled services exports become an alternative driver of African catch-up development? I present case study evidence from Kenya to show that online freelancing has become an interesting sector, both in terms of its growth trajectory, and in terms of worker upward mobility in the global knowledge economy. As life everywhere moves further into the digital realm, and global internet connectivity between Africa and the rest of the world grows, more and more young Africans who stream onto the labour market may find work in the world of global online freelancing. I discuss the building blocks needed to make online work a sustainable vehicle for African catch-up development in the years ahead.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Internet, Exports, Manufacturing, and Industry
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

894. Digitalisation and its Impact on SME Finance in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reviewing the Hype and Actual Developments

Author:
Sabrina Disse and Christoph Sommer
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The vast majority of enterprises worldwide can be categorized as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They play a crucial role in providing a livelihood and income for diverse segments of the labour force, in creating new jobs, fostering valued added and economic growth. In addition, SMEs are associated with innovation, productivity enhancement as well as economic diversification and inclusiveness. However, almost half of the formal enterprises in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) are financially constrained, meaning that SMEs’ financing needs are unserved or underserved. Digitalisation is often seen as game changer that overcomes the challenges of SME finance by capitalising on the reduced transaction costs, the broader access to more and alternative data and the new customer experience shaped by convenience and simplicity. This paper aims to answer the question what the role of digital financial instruments in SME finance in Sub-Saharan Africa is. It reviews and discusses the opportunities and challenges of digital advances for SME finance in general and of three specific financing instruments, namely mobile money (including digital credits), crowdfunding (including peer-to-peer lending) and public equity. It contrasts the hype around digital finance with actual market developments and trends in Africa. Main findings indicate that even though digital advances have led to impressive growth of certain digital finance instruments, it has not triggered a remake of the financial system. Digitalisation of the financial system is less disruptive than many expected, but does gradually change the financing landscapes. Some markets have added innovative and dynamic niches shaped by digital financial services, but new digital players have in general not replaced the incumbents. Furthermore, the contributions of digital instruments to finance in general and SME finance in particular are still very limited on the African continent compared to either the portfolio of outstanding SME finance by banks or the capital raised by similar innovative instruments elsewhere in the world. Many uncertainties remain, most importantly the response of regulators and responsible authorities. They need to provide a suitable legal framework to strike a balance between the innovation and growth aspiration of the digital finance industry and the integrity and stability of markets and the financial system at large. Also regulators have to safeguard data privacy and cybersecurity and prevent illicit financial flows, bad practices around excessive data collection, intransparency and poor reporting as well as exploitation of vulnerable groups with limited financial literacy. Governments also have to address the increasing gap towards those left behind by digital finance due to issues with ownership of a digital device, mobile network coverage and the internet connection or issues of basic digital and financial literacy.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Digital Economy, Business, Economic Growth, and Diversification
Political Geography:
Africa

895. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world

Author:
Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

896. Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Any discussion about the digitalisation of defence is hampered by the imprecision of associated terms and words. ‘Cyber’, ‘the cloud’, ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), ‘block chain’ and ‘quantum computing’ are widely used but their exact meaning or application can be quite fuzzy. The truth is that we may be intellectually ill-equipped to understand the full intricacies and implications of digitalisation, even if the economic rationale for digitalisation is clear. In fact, some estimates show that the digitalisation of products and services could add more than €110 billion to industrial revenue in Europe over a relatively short time frame of five years, so it is easy to see why the economic rationale for greater digitalisation is so powerful. Yet digitalisation is clearly not just about economics and the geopolitical ramifications of a proliferation of digital technologies is becoming a mainstay of international politics today. The assumption is that the competition to control new technologies (both hardware and associated software and algorithms), and the willingness to use them to gain an advantage over other states, underlines the growing importance of ‘digital power’. It is for this reason that the European Commission has stated that it is imperative for the EU to establish ‘technological sovereignty’ in areas of key strategic importance such as defence, space, mobile networks (5G and 6G) and quantum computing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
Europe

897. Towards Urban Decoupling? China’s smart city ambitions at the time of Covid-19

Author:
Alice Ekman and Cristina de Esperanza Picardo
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The term ‘smart city’ relates to the use of technology to improve urban infrastructure and services, from energy grids to systems for transport/mobility and parking, and includes water treatment, waste management and security aspects, among others. China has made the smart city part of its national development strategy: the concept was endorsed by President Xi Jinping at a national urbanisation convention in 2015, and later explicitly mentioned in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), adopted in March 2016. Since then, the central government has massively encouraged the development of smart cities across Chinese national territory – claiming in January 2019 to have a total of 500 “smart city pilot projects ready or under construction”. It has also urged technology companies to become leaders at a global level, and to reach out to foreign cities in support of their own smart city development. China often promotes its smart cities through existing bilateral and regional frameworks (such as the China-ASEAN Summit or the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum) and in particular under the banner of the ‘Belt & Road Initiative’ (BRI), as well as its derivative, the ‘Digital Silk Road’, which are attracting a significant number of countries. If China is today investing in the smart city industry in a comprehensive way, including mobility and ecological aspects, it first and foremost developed a strong focus on and expertise in the public security dimension. In fact, China’s definition of smart city was initially assimilated to ‘safe city’ and the development of surveillance networks for the state security authorities. It is mainly, but not exclusively, this ‘safe’ dimension of smart cities that a host of Chinese companies are offering to foreign countries and cities – and the one that will be analysed in this Brief. How is China adjusting its safe city ambitions domestically and internationally during the Covid-19 crisis? And what are the challenges raised by China’s recent safe city developments? This Brief identifies two main types: a normative challenge and a geopolitical one. Both of them will potentially lead to an ‘urban decoupling’, with the development of diverging types of cities and urban governance models in the future.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Geopolitics, Cities, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

898. Science, research, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540: the need of a “Wiesbaden process” for Academia

Author:
Ignacio Cartagena Núñez
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The necessary link between export controls/academia/technology transfers has lagged behind in policy agendas: while weapons and dual-use goods are being channeled through very detailed regulations and export control regimes, knowledge transfers within scientific collaborations are subject to disperse and heterogeneous rules. The normative vacuum concerning intangible technology transfers in academia is a clear proliferating risk. History proves that many big proliferation networks have started precisely within peaceful scientific research projects. In this context, dialogue with universities and research centers–on the basis of an increasing awareness of the sensitive nature of research and its proliferating risks- could pave the way for states’ further attention on the matter. This could be achieved through a structured dialogue between public actors –in particular export control authorities- and researchers. In order to preserve scientific freedom, a better understanding of each other’s needs, requirements and concerns should be in the basis of any regulation. This article sustains a three-fold idea: first, basic export controls concepts might not be always suitable for science and research, thus needing a constant adaptation exercise where the active role of researchers and scientists becomes irreplaceable; second: UNSCR 1540 resolution offers a good framework in order to steer cooperation between national regulatory authorities, export control regimes and academia; third, the suggested interaction could take a form similar to the “Wiesbaden process” which has already proven to be a successful platform for interaction between governments and industry representatives. The comprehensive review of UNSCR 1540, expected to take place in 2021, will contribute to shape the nonproliferation agenda for the years to come. It seems a good opportunity for setting up the grounds for this suggested dialogue between public authorities and scientists. This new process could be a tangible achievement of the Comprehensive Review.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Non State Actors, Nonproliferation, and Exports
Political Geography:
Global Focus

899. Brasil nuclear: dos interpretaciones opuestas sobre la orientación de su programa atómico (Nuclear Brazil: Two Opposed Interpretations about the Orientation of its Atomic Program)

Author:
Juan Francisco Morales Giraldo
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Al analizar el programa nuclear de Brasil desde dos enfoques teóricos distintos, su orientación y propósitos presentan también importantes diferencias. Las perspectivas más optimistas, de corte liberal, enfatizan que la política exterior de un país debería juzgarse desde aspectos favorables a los valores democráticos, el respeto por las normas internacionales y la autoevaluación de la legitimidad frente al escrutinio de la opinión pública. Pero al contrario de enfoques que se sostienen en argumentos normativos, una perspectiva basada en una política de poder incidiría en aspectos menos idealistas: la reconfiguración de la jerarquía del poder internacional y las aspiraciones de una potencia global emergente como motivaciones subyacentes para los desarrollos técnicos del programa atómico. Este trabajo sopesa la relativa utilidad de ambas perspectivas, enfocándose en situaciones, desarrollos y discursos del pasado reciente que permiten inferir la orientación política el programa nuclear del Brasil. El estudio procede contrastando las evidencias recogidas con elementos teóricos asociados a cada perspectiva. En una primera parte, se compara la política exterior del Brasil respecto al régimen de no proliferación con lo que las tesis liberales plantean acerca de la conducta estatal. En ese sentido, tendrían especial importancia explicativa el peso normativo de las instituciones internacionales, la democracia interna y la legitimidad que otorga el apego a estos principios. En el segundo apartado se adopta una perspectiva opuesta: las tesis liberales respecto a la problemática del programa nuclear del Brasil son vistas de manera crítica según una interpretación de su orientación basada en una política revisionista y pragmática en consonancia con objetivos mayores de estatus internacional y relaciones de poder con las grandes potencias. La evidencia más importante, la ambigüedad de un programa nuclear pacífico con fines militares, sugeriría que es la segunda perspectiva la que posee mayor capacidad explicativa de los propósitos del Brasil en esta materia. Las conclusiones del estudio se enfocan en tres distinciones esenciales entre ambos enfoques que responden a las interrogantes planteadas: la ausencia de un programa de armas nucleares en contraste con la militarización de la tecnología nuclear y sus aplicaciones; el apego a la institucionalidad internacional en contraste con el pragmatismo y la selectividad en el cumplimiento de ciertos principios; y, finalmente, las fronteras conceptuales poco claras que quedan expuestas por el programa nuclear del Brasil.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Science and Technology, Nonproliferation, Realism, and Liberalism
Political Geography:
Brazil and South America

900. Naturaleza de los conflictos e inteligencia artificial: ¿ruptura de una continuidad? (Nature of Conflicts and Artificial Intelligence: A Continuity Break?)

Author:
Jules Palayer
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Los ejércitos son permeables a cambios que ocurren en las sociedades en las que se insertan, de este modo, todo lo revolucionario que pueda ser la inteligencia artificial (IA) para las sociedades podrá serlo para los militares. Debido a la profundidad de los cambios en ciernes, cabe preguntarse, ¿de qué manera cambiará la naturaleza de los conflictos futuros? El objetivo del presente documento es responder a esta incógnita enmarcando los efectos de la IA en uno de sus tres posibles impactos en la naturaleza del conflicto: el impacto mínimo, el evolucionario y el revolucionario. Para determinar cuál de ellos se ajusta más a la realidad examinaremos la introducción de la IA en el mundo militar como una revolución en los asuntos militares (RMA) cuyo telón de fondo es la revolución socio militar (RSM) post-moderna. Veremos cuestiones tecnológicas, doctrinales y organizativas entorno a la IA para arrojar luz sobre su impacto en la naturaleza del conflicto futuro.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus