Search

Begin New Search Topic Sanctions Publication Year within 5 Years

201. Reconsidering US Sanctions Policy Amid the Coronavirus Crisis and the Oil Market Crash

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
For energy markets, the profound economic disruptions caused by the coronavirus have broken the arrangements of the OPEC+ oil exporters to limit production, as Russia and Saudi Arabia failed to agree on production caps. Oil prices plunged as producers ramped up output, made worse by the demand shock created by the spread of Covid-19 and resulting plunging global economic activity as countries have sought to cope with the widespread infection and mortality. The global economic shocks and humanitarian crises have left US sanctions policy in a deeply uncomfortable spot. The United States has prioritized using sanctions as a means of creating leverage for resolving myriad foreign policy crises, arguing in part that using sanctions is a more humane option than the alternatives. The United States has long argued that without sanctions, some problems would either get far worse, with their own unpleasant consequences (such as human rights violations, regional aggression, and acts of terrorism), or would be met by US military force instead. Though some would disagree with the notion that sanctions are ever moral or just, it is on this basis—taken in combination with the presence of humanitarian exceptions to sanctions—that US policymakers across the political spectrum have asserted that their approach is appropriate and consistent with humanitarian values.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Sanctions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

202. The Impact of Covid-19 on Global Supply Chains and Sanctions

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The coronavirus outbreak has once again placed a spotlight on global supply chains, particularly those that are involved in the fabrication of medicines, medical equipment, and vaccines. Right now, much of the discussion around these supply chains is in the arena of high-level politics. Observers and officials of a protectionist bent—such as Peter Navarro, a trade adviser to Donald Trump—have used the occasion to emphasize that “if we learn anything from this crisis, [it is that] never again should we have to depend on the rest of the world for our essential medicines and counter-measures.” Others have argued instead that this is why protectionism is inherently counterproductive and dangerous. Global supply chains are likely to leave the realm of elite debate if and when the effects are felt more directly by consumers and in visible ways, such as the shortage of fresh fruits or vegetables. The result will be political pressure on leaders around the world to reduce national exposure to international trade, perhaps not just in areas associated with coronavirus response and mitigation. Underscoring this point, on 1 May, the Trump Administration issued an Executive Order that restricts the procurement of components and equipment for the U.S. “bulk-power system,” arguing that “unrestricted” trade in these goods “augments the ability of foreign adversaries to create and exploit vulnerabilities in bulk-power system electric equipment, with potentially catastrophic effects.” Setting aside completely whether investing the effort in deglobalizing supply chains is sound or sensible, moves to do so will have important effects on global economic statecraft. States that presently have an outsized advantage in the use of such tools—the United States in particular—may find that shifts away from global supply chains are damaging to their ability to use economic leverage, especially sanctions. States that are more vulnerable to these tools, on the other hand, may find their exposure to sanctions reduced, alongside lost advantages from international trade and business; in essence, less reliance on international supply chains could do the work of sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Global Focus

203. Evaluating the Trump Administration’s Approach to Sanctions: Venezuela

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Since taking power in January 2017, the Trump administration has overseen a dramatic escalation of sanctions[1] to pressure and punish US adversaries, including high-profile cases against Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. Against this background, the Center on Global Energy Policy is publishing a short series of critiques of the Trump administration’s sanctions in the four cases mentioned. The series utilizes findings from the author’s book The Art of Sanctions, which recommends policy makers evaluate their sanctions decisions regularly to assess whether they are using sanctions effectively. It counsels that policy makers should have alternative strategies under development for use if they determine sanctions have or will likely fail to achieve their objectives. Further, the author enjoins those intent on using sanctions to recall that, like all foreign policy instruments, sanctions are only as good as the underlying strategy being pursued. This commentary, the fourth and last in the series, examines the effectiveness of the sanctions put in place against Venezuela. It assesses the sanctions approach within the parameters of the framework outlined in The Art of Sanctions and concludes with recommendations for the Trump administration. The Trump administration began with a conundrum: how to exert leverage on a country that is not only hostile to the United States but also an economic mess. Diplomatic engagement appeared an implausible path toward resolving US concerns with the country—not least of which centered on its potential to be disruptive to the region as a whole—but these concerns did not reach the level that would merit the use of military force. Such situations are usually tailor-made for the application of sanctions pressure, but, in Venezuela’s case, the country was already suffering under considerable economic strain that was entirely self-administered. Sensibly, the Trump administration declined to undertake major new sanctions initiatives for over a year. But upon doing so, the administration found itself in a wholly new and arguably more difficult situation: imposing sanctions on a country in the midst of a contested political transition. To date, the sanctions approach selected has been largely reasonable in this context, but impatience over the slow pace of the aforementioned transition could prompt error, especially if the administration loses sight of the desired end goal and begins to see sanctions pressure as an end unto itself.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
South America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

204. Fighting Against Imperialism: The Latin American Approach to International Sanctions

Author:
Jose Ignacio Hernandez
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The Latin American experience with international sanctions has been mostly as sanctioned states rather than targeting states. This is not merely because Latin American countries have lacked the interest in using sanctions tools but also because of more complex factors, including the historical evolution of Latin American nationhood, a set of cultural values rooted in the defense of national sovereignty, and opposition to any foreign intervention. Although those values were embraced as a result of defending the independence of Latin American nations against European dominance, the values were also applied in intraregional relations in Latin America. As a result, there is not a strong culture of international sanctions imposed by Latin American countries. With few exceptions—such as Cuba—Latin American countries tend to rely on diplomatic negotiations conducted under the nonintervention principle. The unparalleled crisis in Venezuela has produced a change in perspective. While the main actions adopted regarding this crisis were undertaken to facilitate diplomatic negotiations with the Venezuelan government, Latin America—particularly within the framework of the Organization of American States (OAS)—has started to implement international sanctions as a tool to promote a transition in Venezuelan governance. This shift has not been without controversy in Latin America. Consequently, the principle of nonintervention as relates to the use of sanctions is under stress in Latin America and merits re-examination. This paper, part of the International Security Initiative at the Center on Global Energy Policy, reviews the history of international sanctions in Latin America in the context of broader diplomatic developments.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Imperialism, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
South America, Latin America, and North America

205. The Implications of an Iran Sanctions Snapback

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
For several months, it has seemed likely that the Trump administration would elect to pursue the reimposition, or snapback, of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against Iran. For those less steeped in the terminology, the concept of sanctions “snapback” is one developed as part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It refers to the ability of the United States and other partners to quickly reimpose the sanctions that were suspended as part of the quid pro quo that saw Iran accept significant restrictions and transparency requirements for its nuclear program. Conceptually, this was necessary because Iran had the ability to restart its nuclear program if the United States or others were seen as cheating on the deal. The United States and its partners needed some assurance that, if Iran were found to be cheating, they could react just as swiftly. On August 20, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo finally submitted the notification that, according to the US government, would trigger a 30-day timeline for the reimposition of these sanctions. In the US view there is now no stopping the return of the UNSC’s original Iran sanctions regime, though there may be some procedural wrangling over how and when the measures will be reimposed. It is not clear, however, whether this will be the case. A fair amount of analysis has gone into the fundamental question of whether the United States has the standing to trigger snapback, which is an issue I explored in 2019.[1] European, Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and other observers argue that the United States has no such standing, because, under the terms of the UN Security Council resolution that created the snapback mechanism (UNSCR 2231), it is no longer a “participant” of the JCPOA following its withdrawal in 2018. Even former National Security Advisor John Bolton—who was in large part responsible for the US withdrawal from the JCPOA—tends to agree with this reading.[2] The Trump administration obviously disagrees. It is an important question, and one that speaks to the underlying credibility and integrity of the US snapback decision as well as its results. But, ultimately, there is no way of finding a conclusive answer. International law being what it is, there are no authoritative arbiters available to determine whether the United States or its many critics are right. Snapback is happening and will have consequences, we now need to shift to considering what comes next. I see four main outcomes that are directly relevant to this decision and the future of US sanctions policy and negotiations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

206. Shifts in Global Sanctions Policy, and What They Mean for the Future

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The last four years have borne witness to a range of new sanctions, policies, and approaches around the world. Some of these were predicted in November 2016, as Donald Trump took to sanctions far more than his predecessors, using them to tackle virtually every foreign policy problem he encountered. In fact, Trump’s use of sanctions transcended their typical usage in both form and content, as he employed tariffs and other more traditional “trade” tools to try to manage a bevy of nontrade problems. The long-term effects of this decision have yet to be felt or properly understood. It may be that Trump was ahead of the curve in seeing the fracturing of the global liberal economic order and employed the US economy for strategic advantage while it was still ahead. It may also be that Trump undermined the US position in the global economy through his policies, if not actually hastened the demise of this system of managing global economics. Time and the evolution of policy in other global power centers will eventually tell. The shifting approach to sanctions policy by a variety of other states is a manifestation of the potential effects of Trump’s policy choices in using US economic power. From the EU to Russia to China, other countries have changed long-standing policy approaches as they relate to sanctions, either to respond to or perhaps to take advantage of the new paths forged by the United States. The actions that they have taken are not “unprecedented” per se, as each of these countries or organizations has—at times—embraced policies that are consistent with some of these current actions. But, in aggregate, they describe an overall shift in how the world treats sanctions and trade policy, particularly that as practiced by the United States.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

207. The Qatari Sanctions Episode

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, and Bahrain announced that they were cutting diplomatic ties with and imposing sanctions on Qatar. The most formidable of these sanctions was a comprehensive blockade of Qatar, which involved the closure of the land border between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as banning Qatari planes from entering these countries’airspace. The coalition then embarked on a limited program of sanctions advocacy, seeking US, European, East Asian, and other regional support for their efforts. Nearly three years after the crisis began, Qatar’s economic indicators all point to the positive and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has broadly concluded that the Qatari economy is structurally sound. Qatar faces some of the same issues and tensions that other hydrocarbon-dependent economies experience, but is in a comparatively strong position, particularly as relates to its future sanctions resilience as will be described below. This paper, part of the broader sanctions work from the Energy Security program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, sets aside whether the cause of the Qatari dispute with its neighbors justified the use of sanctions and examines the significance of the execution of those sanctions. Qatar’s experience is not replicable in many contexts, given its sizable advantages in available resources. Nonetheless, how the country responded to and—in this paper’s assessment—effectively defeated the sanctions campaign mounted against it points to several lessons about the design and implementation of sanctions.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Sanctions, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Gulf Nations, and UAE

208. U.S.-China Technological Rivalry and Its Implications for Korea

Author:
Wonho Yeon
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Recent developments in advanced technology are changing the concept of hegemonic competition. The key feature of technologies in the 4th Industrial Revolution is dual-use. Emerging technologies such as 5G, AI, big data, robotics, aerospace, supercomputers, and quantum computer-related technologies can be used for both civilian and military purposes. The more you invest in the development of advanced technologies, the closer you will be to economic and military hegemony. Therefore, it is no wonder that the U.S. harbors great concerns facing the rise of China in these advanced technologies. To estimate and compare the innovation productivity of the U.S. and that of China, this study constructs a structural estimation model in which each country produces international patents using R&D expenditures and R&D researchers. Empirical results have presented novel findings indicating that China’s innovation productivity has surpassed that of the U.S. since 2015. At the same time we can observe that the U.S. has the world’s largest intellectual property surplus and keeps expanding it, while China’s intellectual property deficit has been growing every year. Given the two contradictory facts - China’s high innovation productivity and low intellectual property balance - we can conclude that China is strong at “innovation” but weak at “invention.” Knowing this, the U.S. eventually began to target this vulnerability. This is the U.S.’ Tech-Decoupling strategy. To achieve U.S.-China tech decoupling, the U.S. has been strengthening trade and investment sanctions against China. In specific, the U.S. has been utilizing the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authority Act, and the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). In return, China is responding to the U.S. sanctions with the new “Long March” strategy rather than a tit-for-tat strategy. In other words, China has been setting long-term aims and responding to the U.S. sanctions by improving institutional arrangements, refining industrial policies, and developing its own technologies such as “Dual-circulation strategy” and “New Infrastructure Plan.” Ironically, increasing pressure from the U.S. is expected to further strengthen China’s R&D capabilities in advanced technology and accelerate its competitiveness in emerging industries. With the onset of the 4th Industrial Revolution, China is rapidly closing the quality gap and technology gap in major industries where Korea has a comparative advantage. If Korea does not adequately respond to changes, it may be difficult to maintain a comparative advantage over China. Thus, now that U.S.-China tensions are intensifying, Korea is facing a pivotal moment in determining the future path of its economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Investment, Innovation, Trade, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, Korea, and United States of America

209. After Qassem Soleimani: The Islamic Republic’s Strategy for the Arab World

Author:
Tarek Osman, Ariane Tabatabai, Morad Vaisibiame, and Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The January assassination of Qassem Soleimani shocked the leadership in Tehran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei had not expected the United States to escalate tensions between the two countries in such a manner. The assassination of Soleimani was an effort to change Tehran’s strategic calculations and policies for the Middle East. With continued sanctions imposed by the United States, regional tension, and the loss of a key decision maker, Iran is facing intensified challenges to achieve its goals at home and in the region. The Middle East Institute (MEI) is pleased to welcome a group of experts to assess Iranian policy towards the Arab world following the death of Soleimani and to discuss how Arab states are reacting to Iran’s actions. How has Iran’s strategy in the Arab world performed following Soleimani’s death? In what ways have proxy forces in the Middle East that operate under Tehran’s command been affected? Who is left to make key decisions about the Islamic Republic’s involvement in the Arab states, and are we faced with a weaker IRGC Quds force after Soleimani? Finally, what do Arabs think of Iranian policies aimed at them?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Qassem Soleimani, Assassination, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Arab Countries, and United States of America

210. Economic shocks of COVID-19: What next for the Caspian Basin and South Caucasus?

Author:
Suzanne Maloney, Alex Vatanka, Aleksi Aleksishvili, and Rauf Mammadov
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The economic toll of COVID-19 around the world has been significant and the impact of this crisis will reverberate for the next few years. Iran is among the hardest hit economies but the fallout is also already felt among Iran’s immediate neighboring states, including the countries of South Caucasus and the Caspian Basin. With US sanctions severely limiting its international trade, Tehran has in recent years banked on trade with immediate neighbors as a stopgap remedy to its economic needs. This policy of prioritizing trade and other economic ties with immediate neighbors is now under even more pressure due to COVID-19. While Iran is expected to experience a sharp economic contraction in 2020, economic growth forecasts have also been cut in neighboring Caucasus states, requiring swift and decisive action from leaders and international partners. The Middle East Institute (MEI) will bring together a panel of experts to explore the economic impacts of COVID-19 on Iran, the South Caucasus and the question of regional economic cooperation and integration. Besides looking at what has driven Iran’s neighborhood policy in recent years, and how it is in danger of crumbling due to COVID-19 restrictions, the panel will focus on the specific case of the energy sector where regional integration was moving ahead, albeit slowly. Meanwhile, the role played by third-parties – including Russia and the US - will also be tackled by the panelists as they reflect on Iran-South Caucasus economic connections.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Trade, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Iran, Caucasus, and Caspian Sea