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11. How Syria, Ukraine and Gaza are transforming power dynamics in the Caucasus

Author:
Ilya Roubanis
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In 2017, Iran, Turkey and Russia met in Astana in a bid to determine the future of the Syrian Arab Republic without Western participation. As a byproduct of this episode, they started to develop a strategic policy understanding between themselves regarding the Levant: especially Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Since then, the war in Ukraine has broadened Iranian, Russian and Turkish cooperation to include the Caucasus. No longer able to ensure regional security but in need of effective sanction bypasses, Russia’s diminished profile created scope for a tighter web of economic partnerships between itself, Iran and Turkey. Using their 2017 Astana collaborative playbook, these three countries have now embarked on a process of creating new value chains, infrastructures, transport routes and regulatory arrangements in the Caucasus, which are no longer grafted onto the global liberal market economy but intend to form a subsystem of their own. The aim is to turn the Caucasus into an economic hub that ties the three partners together. This requires the establishment of stable security relations. The unresolved issue of control over southern Armenia’s Syunik region, a tense relationship between Iran and Azerbaijan and the war in Gaza are important tests for the nascent economic arrangements between Russia, Turkey and Iran. The brief intends to help Western policymakers understand the impact of sanctions on Russia/Iran, and of their support for the Israeli destruction of Gaza, on the prospects for stability and growth in the Caucasus.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Regional Politics, and Power Dynamics
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Caucasus, Middle East, Gaza, and Syria

12. The Impact and Limits of Sanctions on Russia’s Telecoms Industry

Author:
Maria Kolomychenko
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The West responded to Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine with unprecedented sanctions targeting its entire tech industry. While the sanctions on the telecoms sector have not had the intended destructive effect on Russia’s war machine, they have created significant negative side effects for its populace. Russian propaganda is using them to reinforce its narrative that “the West is fighting Russian citizens, and Vladimir Putin is protecting them.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sanctions, Economy, Telecommunications, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia

13. US Perspectives on Sino-Russian Cooperation in the Arctic and Roles for Partners

Author:
Rebecca Pincus
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Dr. Rebecca Pincus, Director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center, explains that "The development of Russia’s Arctic hydrocarbons is dependent on foreign investment and advanced technologies; as the West has withdrawn from Russia, China is an important, if imperfect, substitute..."
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and Hydrocarbons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

14. The Evolution and Ethics of Accountability Sanctions

Author:
Mark Ferullo
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Institution:
Brown Journal of World Affairs
Abstract:
When Yahya Jammeh seized power in The Gambia in 1994 in a bloodless coup d’état, the young army colonel’s promise to eliminate corruption seemed disin- genuous. At the time, few Gambians could have anticipated how corrupt and cruel his rule would be. His Excellency Sheikh Professor Al-haji Dr. Yahya A.J.J. Jammeh Babili Mansa, as he titled himself, brutalized his country for over two decades. In 2022, The Gambia’s Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Com- mission exposed the extent of his violence, revealing that he commanded a hit squad that crushed dissent through murder, torture, and rape. His claim that he could cure AIDS with herbs might have been dismissed as the delusions of an out-of-touch autocrat were it not for the loss of life this lie caused during the medical trials.1 When the United States placed economic sanctions on Jammeh in 2017, most Gambians had little sympathy for their former leader, and few denied he deserved punishment.2 By then, Jammeh had fled the country, but the United States sanctioned him anyway. Jammeh joined 12 other individuals—including an organ-trafficking surgeon from Pakistan, a Guatemalan Congressman who ordered the killing of a journalist, and a Ukrainian police commander who oversaw the shooting of peaceful protestors in Kyiv during the Revolution of Dignity three years prior—as the first designations under the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. “There is a steep price to pay for their mis- deeds,” said Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin at the time.3
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

15. What if? The Effects of a Hard Decoupling from China on the German Economy

Author:
Julian Baqaee, Julian Hinz, Benjamin Moll, Moritz Schularick, Feodora A. Teti, Joschka Wanner, and Sihwan Yang
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
How would the German economy cope with a hard economic decoupling from China? The authors study a scenario where the global economy fragments into three distinct blocs: the G7 economies and their allies, China and her allies, as well as neutral countries. German trade with China would have to be entirely rerouted to countries within the "Western" block and neutral countries. The authors quantify the costs of such a worst-case hard decoupling using the (Baqaee and Farhi 2021) multi-sector model of the world economy. The key finding is that a total cut-off of trade relations with China would have severe but not devastating effects on the German economy. The welfare loss for Germany (relative to a no-cut-off baseline) would be around 5 percent of Gross National Expenditure (GNE) over the first few months and around 4 percent over the first year, plus additional short run costs due to business-cycle amplification effects. In the medium and long run, the costs would fall to a permanent loss in the 1–2 percent range. Less extreme decoupling or gradual de-risking scenarios (“small yard, high fence") would incur smaller costs. The single most influential assumption relates to the “trade elasticity,", i.e., the ease and speed with which trade can be reorganized away from China to neutral countries and within the “Western” block. The authors´ findings, in particular the critical dependence of economic costs on the time horizon over which adjustments take place, provide some rationale for embarking on a gradual de-risking trajectory to avoid a costly and politically contentious hard decoupling dictated by geopolitical events.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Geoeconomics, Decoupling, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Germany

16. 2014-2024: A Decade of Sanctions and the Strengthening of Russia’s Financial Sovereignty

Author:
Alexander Turov
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The summer of 2024 has been extraordinarily hot. Climatologists say the average temperature may exceed median values for the entire history of observations. But it is already clear that the political barometer has reached its peak this year, which is certainly having a direct impact on international relations and the global economy as a whole. The past months following the triumphant conclusion of the 27th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which marked the beginning of the collapse of the neocolonial system of global economic relations, and subsequent significant events in international affairs have confirmed Russia’s clear course toward financial sovereignty. For more than a decade now, that course has been pursued by the West, which has become unfriendly in a fairly short historical period. Yet in previous periods of our country’s history – the building of socialism, communism, advanced socialism, perestroika, and finally liberalism – the West actively used at an affordable price our fuel and raw material resources, which formed the basis of the Western economy and consumer society. The scientific achievements of our scholars also contributed to common global progress, as evidenced by the numerous Nobel Prizes they were awarded. So why, after three decades of euphoria based on the development of the market economy and the liberalization of everything, both necessary and unnecessary, has Russia once again been fenced off by NATO’s walls and subjected to economic sanctions, which essentially amount to an economic blockade? This happened before, during the early days of the young Soviet Republic, but the blockade lasted less than a hundred days – from October 1919 to January 1920 – because the level of understanding of global economic ties that formed the basis of politics and diplomacy among the old Western leaders was far higher than it is among today’s leaders, who seem more inclined to discuss issues concerning minority orientations than to concern themselves with the well-being and pressing needs of the majority.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Sanctions, Economy, and Financial Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Russia and Global Focus

17. La evolución de Rusia tras la Guerra en Ucrania

Author:
Albert Priego Moreno
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
En febrero de 2022 las tropas rusas entraron en el territorio de Ucrania. Desde entonces Europa en general y Ucrania en particular vive sumida en una situación de gran incertidumbre. Son muchas las previsiones que se han hecho para tratar de encontrar certezas en un mundo que tiene más dudas que certidumbres. Buena parte del futuro de Europa pasa por Ucrania y sobre todo por como acabe la guerra con Rusia. Por ello este trabajo tratará de dibujar tres escenarios del futuro de Rusia partiendo de los siguientes cinco factores: la guerra en Ucrania, la situación de Putin, la economía rusa, las sanciones y la paz social en Rusia. Se utilizará una metodología prospectiva partiendo de un análisis previo de la participación de Rusia en las guerras en las que ha tomado partido. Estos escenarios servirán para ver las consecuencias que puede tener una derrota de Rusia en el frente ucraniano, consecuencias que no solo serían para Rusia y Ucrania sino también para el resto del mundo.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Vladimir Putin, Future, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

19. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

20. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine