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41. UK-EU Divergence Tracker Q4 2023

Author:
Joël Reland
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This edition of UK in a Changing Europe’s UK-EU Regulatory Divergence Tracker, covers developments from October 2023 to January 2024. The Regulatory Divergence Trackers provide an overview of where and how the UK has used its regulatory freedoms to diverge from EU regulation. It identifies and analyses the most significant cases of divergence between the UK and EU which have taken place since Brexit. It explains what the changes are, what impact they are having, and likely further consequences. In the Q4 2023 edition, the tracker finds nine cases of active divergence (where the UK, or some part of it, changes its rules); ten of passive divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK, or some part of it, does not follow); two of procedural divergence (where policy does not diverge but the processes for managing it do); and four of active alignment (where the UK takes steps to align more closely with EU rules, systems or programmes). Key developments on the UK-side include bills to ban the export of live animals and amend the UK’s GDPR regime; a new financial services agreement with Switzerland; and the use of secondary legislation to amend the EU-derived working time regulations and cap on bankers’ bonuses. The EU has brought forward some notable measures to increase the burden on businesses in the name of upholding labour and environmental protections.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Regulation, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

42. UK-EU Divergence Tracker Q2-Q3 2024

Author:
Joël Reland
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This is the twelfth edition of UK in a Changing Europe’s Regulatory Divergence Tracker, outlining how UK and EU regulations have diverged from one another in the period April-October 2024. Unusually, this tracker covers two quarters, accounting for the fact that UK and EU legislative activity was paused over the summer during their respective election periods. This tracker is therefore the first since the new Labour government took office, and there are already signs of a markedly changed approach to managing divergence. The pursuit of active divergence (where the UK moves away from the EU rulebook) has all but dried up, with just one case of active divergence in this tracker having been first initiated by the Labour government. Instead, the new government’s focus has been on delaying existing divergence (five cases) and laying the groundwork for active alignment with EU rules (two cases). The centrepiece of this new alignment agenda is the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill. It would allow the government to mirror a wide range of EU regulations, related to the environmental impacts of products, in UK law. These powers could be used to avoid new GB-EU and GB-NI trade frictions, and to stop Britain becoming a home for goods (e.g. toys, textiles or cars) no longer considered safe enough for the EU market. The tracker also finds twelve cases of ‘passive’ divergence (where the EU changes its rules and the UK does not follow), as the EU continues to regulate very actively on product and environmental standards, with new standards on vehicle emissions and safety; a new regulation on product safety; new restrictions on PFAS chemicals; and new requirements for airlines to monitor non-CO2 emissions.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, and Divergence
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

43. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

44. The value added of central bank digital currencies: a view from the euro area

Author:
Maria Demertzis and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Different jurisdictions have set out different reasons for creating central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Some countries, particularly those with already-operational CBDCs for retail purposes, aim to to promote financial inclusion. But in countries where most citizens have access to financial services, central banks are interested in CBDCs as an aspect of the increasing digitalisation of finance. Central banks could also choose to use CBDCs to guarantee in full citizen’s holdings (currently, deposits in commercial bank are only partially guaranteed), but this would trigger major changes in the financial system in terms of the role of commercial banks in intermediation and the role of fiat money. So far, central banks have not opted to go this way. In the euro area, consumers have multiple payment options and a very efficient retail payments system. The currency enjoys high levels of trust and is not challenged by the emergence of private currencies, such as Bitcoin, or by the risk that cash, a monetary system’s anchor, will disappear. Therefore, creating a CBDC for retail purposes in the euro area offers little obvious value added, at least for the foreseeable future. However, there is a strong case for building a CBDC that banks could use for cross-border wholesale purposes (ie with other currencies). Wholesale CBDCs could revolutionise the way that cross-border, cross-currency payments are made for two reasons. Cross-border payments are currently slow and inefficient. Pilot projects have shown that wholesale payments with CBDCs can generate substantial time and cost savings. Any two central banks that have operational wholesale CBDCs could settle transactions between themselves. This would be very different from the current system, as most settlements today are done via the dollar (and then the euro) infrastructure and use correspondent banks. The euro area and the United States would have to consider carefully from a geopolitical perspective how wholesale CBDCs might affect their global economic standing. By developing a CBDC for wholesale purposes, the European Union would be able to contribute to developing the global standard.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Governance, Regulation, Central Bank, Digital Currency, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe

45. Decentralised finance: good technology, bad finance

Author:
Maria Demertzis and Catarina Martins
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The emergence of cryptocurrencies/crypto assets has allowed the provision of a new form of financial services, including payments and loans, known as decentralised finance (DeFi). Crypto assets currently represent only about 1 percent of total global financial assets and it is unlikely, in its current form, that DeFi will become a substitute for the traditional financial system, for three reasons. First, while decentralisation is very innovative, in practice the technology required to replace the role of intermediary is slow and costly in terms of energy use. This has led some crypto networks to adopt more centralised solutions to the problem of verification. Second, the automaticity behind the transactions does not allow for any legal recourse. If something goes wrong, there is no way to stop or reverse a transaction once it has been initiated. It is very difficult to imagine DeFi scaling up without the ability to challenge outcomes. Third, and perhaps most importantly, DeFi is for the most part self-referential. Crypto assets are exchanged for other crypto assets without being employed in activities that stimulate economic growth by creating jobs or facilitating investment. It is not likely for DeFi to grow enough to replace traditional finance unless it helps growth. Nevertheless, the technology that enables DeFi and crypto assets, distributed ledger technology (DLT), is very innovative and has managed to remove the intermediary without compromising the safety and finality of financial transactions. Hence, it is likely that the technology behind crypto assets and DeFi will feed into the mainstream and offer efficiency gains.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Regulation, Finance, Digitalization, and Digital Currency
Political Geography:
Global Focus

46. Will China’s new financial regulatory reform be enough to meet the challenges?

Author:
Martin Chorzempa and Nicolas Veron
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Effective financial supervision plays a crucial role in maintaining financial stability and a healthy financial system. China’s leadership has made financial risk a core priority, and in reforms approved in March 2023, it reassigned regulatory responsibilities, creating a new supervisory body that will take over some responsibilities from the central bank, the banking and insurance regulator, and the securities regulator. The aim is that a change to the financial supervisory architecture (who does what in financial supervision) will make China’s system more effective and stable. In this policy brief, we argue that this incremental reform will not solve the core issues China faces in financial supervisory effectiveness. We provide an overview of China’s large and complex financial system, including its largely state-owned banks (some of which are the largest in the world by assets), securities markets and other financial intermediaries. Traditional divisions between different types of activities and institutions have been blurred by the rise of large financial conglomerates, risk-transfer techniques and internet-based finance. Reforms in 2018 to China’s supervisory architecture did not eliminate perceived shortcomings, including failures to effectively regulate financial conglomerates, fintech and regional banks. We then survey global benchmarks against which China’s financial supervisory architecture can be compared, including the United States and European Union. China’s supervisory system is already more streamlined, at least on paper, than either of these most comparable global counterparts. Like them, China’s system does not correspond exactly to any of the three textbook archetypes of supervision: sectoral, twin-peaks or integrated supervision. Ultimately, the effectiveness of China’s financial supervisory architecture suffers from excessive state intervention in the financial system through other channels, including through the unique and pervasive influence of the communist party, which hampers supervisory independence and makes it difficult to establish accountability for regulatory failures. While the recently announced reform may improve coordination across supervisory bodies, coordination within the new quasi-integrated supervisor, across central departments, and between them and local branches, will remain a challenge.
Topic:
Reform, Regulation, Finance, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
China and Asia

47. A model for a participative approach to digital competition regulation

Author:
Christophe Carugati
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Digital competition regulations often put in place participative approaches to ensure competition in digital markets. The participative approach aims to involve regulated firms, stakeholders and regulators in the design of compliance measures. The approach is particularly relevant in complex and fast-evolving digital markets, where whole industries often depend on the behaviours of the regulated firms. The participative approach enables stakeholders and regulated firms to design compliance measures that are optimal for all because they ensure legal certainty for regulated firms, save time for regulators and take into account the views of stakeholders. However, the participative approach is subject to regulatory capture. The regulated firms and stakeholders might try to promote their interests to the regulator. This could result in endless discussions at best, and the adoption of inappropriate solutions following intense lobbying at worst. A governance model is necessary to ensure that the participative approach works without risks of regulatory capture. The model should define clearly each participant's role, duties and rights. There should be: 1) equal and transparent access of all stakeholders to the dialogue; 2) the presentation of tangible and evidence-based solutions from stakeholders and regulated firms; 3) public decisions from the regulator that contain assessments of the proposed solutions, with guidance to clarify rules; and 4) compliance measures proposed by the regulated firm in line with the guidance. The model should provide an assessment framework for the proposed solutions to identify the most effective. The assessment should rely on the principle of proportionality to assess whether the proposed compliance measure is proportionate, to ensure the effectiveness of the regulation. Finally, the model should safeguard against regulatory capture thanks to transparency rules and external monitoring.
Topic:
Regulation, Digital Economy, Innovation, Stakeholders, and Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

48. The Impact of Regulation on Innovation

Author:
Philippe Aghion, Antonin Bergeaud, and John Van Reenen
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
There is considerable research on the economic impacts of regulations but relatively few studies about their impact on technological innovation. Moreover, most analyses focus on the costs and benefits of regulation at a point in time, rather than on its effects over time. Yet potential effects on economic growth are likely to be much more pronounced in the long run. Many scholars have been concerned that slower growth in countries with heavy labor regulations could be due to firms’ reluctance to innovate given the burden of red tape. For example, the slower growth of Southern European countries and parts of Latin America have often been blamed on onerous labor laws.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Regulation, Economic Growth, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. Self‐​Service Bans and Gasoline Prices: The Effect of Allowing Consumers to Pump Their Own Gas

Author:
Vitor Melo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Billions of people live in countries that ban self‐​service fueling at gasoline stations, including some of the world’s largest countries by population, including China, India, and Brazil, among many others. The impact of these bans is largely understudied despite their prevalence presumably because this policy is often implemented at the national level and because there have been no policy changes in these countries that allow for an assessment of these bans on gasoline prices.
Topic:
Gas, Regulation, Economy, and Consumer Behavior
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

50. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:
Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia