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181. Building Infrastructure in Real Time: Avoiding Regulatory Paralysis

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
The physical infrastructure base of the US economy, once an advantage in global competition, has become a liability. This problem has multiple causes, several of which CED has addressed in recent policy statements, and our nation’s elected policymakers are now taking up the need for additional funding. But the nation needs not only adequate funding but also a more-efficient regulatory process for our infrastructure investment—choosing the right projects, with the minimum delay, and executing them at the least possible cost. Regulatory paralysis is one of the causes of our infrastructure shortfall. It needs attention if we are going to spend our tax dollars on infrastructure wisely and efficiently so that the US economy remains globally competitive. Streamlining regulatory procedures, promoting competition, and cutting red tape across federal, state, and local governments are key to increasing investment, decreasing cost, and maximizing efficiency. Business as usual will not suffice. It takes too long and costs too much to deliver infrastructure projects, preventing us from achieving the advancements and improvements that a future-focused, competitive economy requires. CED has consistently advocated “smart regulation,” subjecting new regulations to rigorous cost-benefit analysis and reviewing existing regulations for continuing cost effectiveness to enhance efficiency and achieve quicker execution, greater benefits, and lower costs. With long delays between project conception and execution, and often multiple layers of jurisdiction and review, a smart regulation approach could ensure that the rules governing review and permitting of projects address all important concerns and ensure that net benefits are maximized over time at all levels of government on a comprehensive and timely basis.
Topic:
Economics, Infrastructure, Governance, Regulation, Business, Economic Policy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

182. Public Policy: An Amorphous Concept in the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

Author:
Akousa Serwaah Akoto
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs
Institution:
Institute for Research and European Studies (IRES)
Abstract:
Public policy permeates the legal principles of a state and its ruling government. The justification of public policy is topical to the ethics and canons acknowledged by that state. These values are determined by the applicable political, social, economic, religious, and legal systems, which differ among states. As public policy usually best illuminates the broad area of government laws, regulations, provincial ordinances, and court decisions, the standards creating public policy alter as states develop. The motif of public policy is critical when the question of enforcement of arbitral awards suffice. There is no definite meaning of the term in the famous Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Arbitration Convention) to enforce foreign arbitral awards. Hence, this paper explores and traces some contemporary trends in defense of public policy as an exception to the enforcement of arbitral awards worldwide.
Topic:
Governance, Law, Regulation, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

183. The Soft Touch of International Financial Regulation: Status, Flaws and Future

Author:
Niall O'Shaughnessy
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Institution:
The Goettingen Journal of International Law
Abstract:
The 2008 global financial crisis focused attention on the relationship between the behaviour of international financial institutions and the rules they follow. Many banks in the US and Europe failed, in part, due to their inability to absorb the fallout of the US mortgage market collapse. If international financial institutions could not protect themselves from the cycles of the market, how come regulators were unable to do so either? The most relevant instrument of international financial regulation for understanding the 2008 crisis is the Basel Accords, the rules that specify how much capital a bank should always hold in reserve. However, these rules are ‘soft law’ and so, non-binding. It is a myth of course that soft law is the only way to regulate international finance, as many scholars argue. Despite numerous rounds of reform, the Basel Accords have always been inadequate. The purpose of this paper is to account for the flaws of the Basel Accords and the role that soft law plays in creating those flaws. This paper also analyses the competing theories behind the rise of soft law within financial regulation and the ‘political economy’ explanation is endorsed. The final section of the paper discusses the future of financial regulation and soft law, as well as highlighting innovations from outside the hard/soft law dichotomy and outside the Global North. This paper concludes by stating that the theory behind soft law does not play out in practice within finance and that it remains in place because it suits the interests of large institutions and powerful states. At the same time, a return to Bretton Woods or a new World Financial Organization is problematic and, as such, we must look beyond the hard/soft law debate and embrace the work of the Global South and East.
Topic:
Markets, Financial Crisis, Regulation, Capital, and Banking
Political Geography:
Global Focus

184. Regulated Market, Trapped Workers: The Impacts of the "Tolerant and Prudent" Policy on Labour Precarity in China’s Online Ridehailing Sector

Author:
Wei Zhang, Hao Qi, and Zhongjin Li
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
Since 2017, China has adopted the "tolerant and prudent" policy in regulating emerging digital platform industries. The impacts of this policy on labour precarity have been rarely studied. Drawing on an original survey of over 600 ridehailing drivers in two Chinese cities, Nanjing and Beijing, we conduct a political economy analysis for a three-party framework involving the municipal government, capital, and labour. We find that, in accordance with the "tolerant and prudent" principle, municipal governments stipulated regulations regarding the qualifications of ridehailing vehicles and drivers. These regulations, although they can help reduce labour precarity in the marketplace for licensed drivers, have exacerbated precarity in the workplace. Specifically, in response to the regulations, the ridehailing platforms aligned with thirdparty rental companies that provided licensed vehicles. This arrangement has effectively trapped many ridehailing drivers in the industry: our quantitative analysis shows that drivers bounded by a rental or rent-toown agreement worked significantly longer hours than counterparts who steered their own vehicles.
Topic:
Markets, Labor Issues, Regulation, Digital Economy, and Precarity
Political Geography:
China and Asia

185. Predicting Chinese Banking Policy Incidence

Author:
Sara Hsu
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
In this exploratory research, we examine the effect of economic and noneconomic indicators on the creation of Chinese Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission policies using a VAR model. We find that CBIRC policies are predicted by State Council construction policies and policies set by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. This indicates that the CBIRC is inward-looking, observing what other regulators are doing rather than responding to changes in the real and financial economy. This may be a product of market distortions due to China’s unique blend of state-oriented and market-based institutions.
Topic:
Political Economy, Regulation, and Banking
Political Geography:
China and Asia

186. An assessment of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Author:
Busisipho Siyobi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Secretariat should take the lead in developing intervention mechanisms that ensure a strong civil society representation in the multi-stakeholder groups, to enable real public participation and obtain local legitimacy of the Initiative: This can be done through actively identifying and partnering with relevant grassroot civil society organisations that work directly with mining-affected communities. Implementing countries should work more collaboratively with the EITI to investigate any reported revenue discrepancies highlighted in the country-specific EITI reporting: This can be enforced by implementing countries in alignment with their guiding principles of regulatory bodies and the national EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group (MSG) in the effort to fight against corruption and ensure local ownership of the EITI process.
Topic:
Civil Society, Corruption, Natural Resources, Governance, Regulation, Mining, and Extractive Industries
Political Geography:
Africa

187. Do US firms have an incentive to comply with the FLSA and the NLRA?

Author:
Anna Stansbury
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
To what extent do US firms have an incentive to comply with the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)? Stansbury examines this question through a simple comparison of the expected costs of noncompliance (in terms of legal sanctions) to the profits firms can earn through noncompliance. In the case of the FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions, typical willful violators are required to pay back wages owed and in some cases additional penalties, if detected by the Department of Labor (DOL). Based on available data on the penalties levied, a typical firm would need to expect a chance of at least 78-88 percent that its violation would be detected in order to have an incentive to comply with the FLSA. In practice, the probability of detection many firms can expect to face is likely much lower than this. In the case of the NLRA, a firm that fires a worker illegally is required to reinstate the worker with back pay if the violation is detected. Based on empirical estimates of the effect of unionization on firm profits, a typical firm may have an incentive to fire a worker illegally for union activities if this illegal firing would reduce the likelihood of unionization at the firm by as little as 0.15-2 percent. These analyses illustrate that neither the FLSA nor the NLRA penalty and enforcement regimes create sufficient incentive to comply for many firms. In this context, the substantial evidence of minimum wage and overtime violations, and of illegal employer behavior toward unions, is not surprising.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Regulation, and Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

188. Uncertain prospects for sovereign wealth funds of Gulf countries

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Among the best-known sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—government-owned or controlled investment vehicles—are those funded by hydrocarbon revenues in the member economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which comprises all the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf except Iraq, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. This Policy Brief compares the GCC SWFs with each other and with other funds in terms of their transparency and accountability on the fifth SWF scoreboard, available here. Several factors, including the decline in oil prices in recent years, have slowed the growth of the GCC’s SWFs. This slower growth could further diminish their governance and transparency standards, which are already weaker than those of other SWFs. Efforts to improve their governance and accountability will be important to garner public support for these SWFs.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Government, Markets, Governance, Regulation, and Capital Flows
Political Geography:
Middle East and Gulf Nations

189. Sovereign wealth funds are growing more slowly, and governance issues remain

Author:
Julien Maire, Adnan Mazarei, and Edwin M. Truman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
In the last two decades, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs)—funds accumulated by a government that are invested in whole or in part abroad to benefit the country in the future—have faced increased public scrutiny over their investment patterns, financial results, and governance. This Policy Brief updates and expands a prototype scoreboard rating the transparency and accountability of SWFs, which Truman established in 2007. This fifth edition of the scoreboard shows that the average scores continued to improve for the 64 SWFs examined, but governance issues remain. New funds have emerged—many of them government holding companies or strategic investment funds—but the growth of assets under management by SWFs has slowed, in some cases partly because of withdrawals to help finance expenses related to the COVID-19 pandemic, raising questions about their future role.
Topic:
Government, Markets, Sovereign Wealth Funds, Governance, Regulation, and Capital
Political Geography:
Global Focus

190. Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed?

Author:
Gary Clyde Hufbauer
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Open Sub-navigation BackOpen Sub-navigation Publications Back Policy Briefs Working Papers Books PIIE Briefings Open Sub-navigation Commentary Back Op-Eds Testimonies Speeches and Papers Topics & Regions PIIE Charts What Is Globalization? Educational Resources Open Sub-navigation Back Senior Research Staff Research Analysts Trade Talks Open Sub-navigation Back RealTime Economic Issues Watch Trade & Investment Policy Watch China Economic Watch North Korea: Witness to Transformation 中文 Open Sub-navigation Back All Events Financial Statements Global Connections Global Economic Prospects Stavros Niarchos Foundation Lectures Trade Winds Open Sub-navigation Back News Releases Multimedia Media Center Open Sub-navigation Back Board of Directors Staff Employment Contact Annual Report Transparency Policy POLICY BRIEF VIEW SHARING OPTIONS Will industrial and agricultural subsidies ever be reformed? Gary Clyde Hufbauer (PIIE) Policy Brief21-5 March 2021 Photo Credit: REUTERS/Denis Balibouse One economic argument for government subsidies is that they are necessary to compensate firms and industries for benefits they provide to society at large but cannot capture in the prices they charge for goods or services. For example, subsidies to renewable energy are defended because renewable energy limits carbon emissions. When a major economy subsidizes extensively, however, its trading partners are drawn into the game, with losses all around. As the prisoner’s dilemma suggests, a better outcome would entail mutual restraint. But the goal of mutual restraint is no less difficult in international trade than it is in international arms control. Both the European Union and the US federal system try, in different ways, to regulate industrial subsidies. Hufbauer examines efforts to contain unjustifiable subsidies and proposes modest improvements, bearing in mind that as countries struggle to overcome the global economic downturn resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, there is little appetite for restoring a free market economy—one in which firms compete with minimum government assistance or regulation. Selective upgrading of the rulebook may nevertheless be possible.
Topic:
Agriculture, Government, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Manufacturing, Industry, COVID-19, and Subsidies
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America