Search

Begin New Search Topic Propaganda Publication Year within 5 Years

21. Suppressing the truth and spreading lies: How the CCP is influencing Solomon Islands’ information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson, Miah Hammond-Errey, Daria Impiombato, Albert Zhang, and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to influence public discourse in Solomon Islands through coordinated information operations that seek to spread false narratives and suppress information on a range of topics. Following the November 2021 Honiara riots and the March 2022 leaking of the China – Solomon Islands security agreement, the CCP has used its propaganda and disinformation capabilities to push false narratives in an effort to shape the Solomon Islands public’s perception of security issues and foreign partners. In alignment with the CCP’s regional security objectives, those messages have a strong focus on undermining Solomon Islands’ existing partnerships with Australia and the US. Although some of the CCP’s messaging occurs through routine diplomatic engagement, there’s a coordinated effort to influence the population across a broad spectrum of information channels. That spectrum includes Chinese party-state media, CCP official-led statements and publications in local and social media, and the amplification of particular individual and pro-CCP content via targeted Facebook groups. There’s now growing evidence to suggest that CCP officials are also seeking to suppress information that doesn’t align with the party-state’s narratives across the Pacific islands through the coercion of local journalists and media institutions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Solomon Islands, and Asia-Pacific

22. Frontier influencers: the new face of China’s propaganda

Author:
Fergus Ryan, Daria Impiombato, and Hsi-Ting Pai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores how the Chinese party-state’s globally focused propaganda and disinformation capabilities are evolving and increasing in sophistication. Concerningly, this emerging approach by the Chinese party-state to influence international discourse on China, including obfuscating its record of human rights violations, is largely flying under the radar of US social media platforms and western policymakers. In the broader context of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to censor speech, promote disinformation and seed the internet with its preferred narratives, we focus on a small but increasingly popular set of YouTube accounts that feature mainly female China-based ethnic-minority influencers from the troubled frontier regions of Xinjiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, hereafter referred to as ‘frontier influencers’ or ‘frontier accounts’. Despite being blocked in China, YouTube is seen by the CCP as a key battlefield in its ideological contestation with the outside world, and YouTube’s use in foreign-facing propaganda efforts has intensified in recent years. Originally deployed on domestic video-sharing platforms to meet an internal propaganda need, frontier-influencer content has since been redirected towards global audiences on YouTube as part of the CCP’s evolving efforts to counter criticisms of China’s human rights problems and burnish the country’s image. Alongside party-state media and foreign vloggers, these carefully vetted domestic vloggers are increasingly seen as another key part of Beijing’s external propaganda arsenal. Their use of a more personal style of communication and softer presentation is expected to be more convincing than traditional party-state media content, which is often inclined towards the more rigid and didactic. For the CCP, frontier influencers represent, in the words of one Chinese propaganda expert, ‘guerrillas or militia’ fighting on the flanks in ‘the international arena of public opinion’, while party-state media or the ‘regular army’ ‘charge, kill and advance on the frontlines’. The frontier accounts we examine in this report were predominantly created in 2020–21 and feature content that closely hews to CCP narratives, but their less polished presentation has a more authentic feel that conveys a false sense of legitimacy and transparency about China’s frontier regions that party-state media struggle to achieve. For viewers, the video content appears to be the creation of the individual influencers, but is in fact what’s referred to in China as ‘professional user generated content’, or content that’s produced with the help of special influencer-management agencies known as multi-channel networks (MCNs). For the mostly young and female Uyghur, Tibetan and other ethnic-minority influencers we examine in this report, having such an active presence on a Western social media platform is highly unusual, and ordinarily would be fraught with danger. But, as we reveal, frontier influencers are carefully vetted and considered politically reliable. The content they create is tightly circumscribed via self-censorship and oversight from their MCNs and domestic video platforms before being published on YouTube. In one key case study, we show how frontier influencers’ content was directly commissioned by the Chinese party-state. Because YouTube is blocked in China, individual influencers based in the country aren’t able to receive advertising revenue through the platform’s Partner Program, which isn’t available there. But, through their arrangements with YouTube, MCNs have been able to monetise content for frontier influencers, as well as for hundreds of other China-based influencers on the platform. Given that many of the MCNs have publicly committed to promote CCP propaganda, this arrangement results in a troubling situation in which MCNs are able to monetise their activities, including the promotion of disinformation, via their access to YouTube’s platform. The use of professionally supported frontier influencers also appears to be aimed at ensuring that state-backed content ranks well in search results because search-engine algorithms tend to prioritise fresh content and channels that post regularly. From the CCP’s perspective, the continuous flooding of content by party-state media, foreign influencers and professionally supported frontier influencers onto YouTube is aimed at outperforming other more critical but stale content. This new phenomenon reflects a continued willingness, identified in previous ASPI ICPC reports,1 by the Chinese party-state to experiment in its approach to shaping online political discourse, particularly on those topics that have the potential to disrupt its strategic objectives. By targeting online audiences on YouTube through intermediary accounts managed by MCNs, the CCP can hide its affiliation with those influencers and create the appearance of ‘independent’ and ‘authoritative’ voices supporting its narratives, including disinformation that it’s seeking to propagate globally. This report (on page 42) makes a series of policy recommendations, including that social media platforms shouldn’t allow MCNs who are conducting propaganda and disinformation work on behalf of the Chinese party-state to monetise their activities or be recognised by the platforms as, for example, official partners or award winners. This report also recommends that social media platforms broaden their practice of labelling the accounts of state media, agencies and officials to include state-linked influencers from the People’s Republic of China.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Social Media, Propaganda, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

23. Russia's Wartime Censorship and Propaganda

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In connection with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Russian authorities have introduced wartime censorship, forbidding the publication of content that does not conform to the official message of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. This massive and unprecedented propaganda is leading to an increase in support for Vladimir Putin, and Russians protesting against the war are being brutally repressed and persecuted. The consequence is the strengthening of the totalitarian character of the Russian state and the emigration of Russians who do not support the war. The most significant element of the Russian war propaganda is that of “denazification”, a claim aimed also at Poland.
Topic:
War, Authoritarianism, Media, Propaganda, and Censorship
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. Assessing the impact of CCP information operations related to Xinjiang

Author:
Albert Zhang and Tilla Hoja
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is using technology to enforce transnational digital repression and influence unwitting audiences beyond China’s territory. This includes using increasingly sophisticated online tactics to deny, distract from and deter revelations or claims of human rights abuses, including the arbitrary detention, mass sterilisation and cultural degradation of minorities in Xinjiang. Instead of improving its treatment of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities, the CCP is responding to critiques of its current actions against human rights by coordinating its state propaganda apparatus, security agencies and public relations industry to silence and shape Xinjiang narratives at home and abroad. Central to the CCP’s efforts is the exploitation of US-based social media and content platforms. CCP online public diplomacy is bolstered by covert and coercive campaigns that impose costs and seek to constrain international entities—be they states, corporations or individuals—from offering evidence-based critiques of the party-state’s record on human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and other sensitive issues. This asymmetric access to US-based social media platforms allows the CCP to continue testing online tactics, measuring responses and improving its influence and interference capabilities, in both overt and covert ways, across a spectrum of topics. The impact of these operations isn’t widely understood, and the international community has failed to adequately respond to the global challenges posed by the CCP’s rapidly evolving propaganda and disinformation operations. This report seeks to increase awareness about this problem based on publicly available information.
Topic:
Human Rights, Propaganda, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Uyghurs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Xinjiang

25. The Revolution Will Be Televised in Arabic: Iran's Media Infrastructure Abroad

Author:
Hamdi Malik
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
An umbrella entity, the Islamic Radio and Television Union, encompasses more than two hundred media groups stretching from Oman to East Africa. The concept sodoure enqelab, or “export of the revolution,” is written into Iran’s constitution, and the country’s founding leaders wasted no time trying to make it a reality. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) launched its Arabic Service in 1980 and subsequently leveraged satellite television to intensify its outreach to Arabic-speaking nations—Shia audiences in particular. Today, IRIB World Service runs fourteen satellite TV channels, three internet TV channels, and thirty-two radio stations, a number of them broadcasting in Arabic. In this highly informative Policy Note, expert Hamdi Malik surveys Iran’s remarkable range of Arabic-language media, with a focus on those under the Islamic Radio and Television Union banner, which encompasses more than two hundred entities. Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria feature strongly in the inventory, but more surprising places such as Oman and East Africa also crop up. To combat Tehran’s media infiltration and secure U.S. interests, the author urges Washington to promote a true partnership between Western countries and the region’s many media actors who wish to challenge Iran’s propaganda machine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Media, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

26. The Rise and Fall of Military Strategic Communications at National Defence 2015-2021: A Cautionary Tale for Canada and NATO, and a Roadmap for Reform

Author:
Brett Boudreau
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
On November 2, 2020, the Ottawa Citizen ran the front-page headline “Canadian Military Wants to Establish New Organization to Use Propaganda and Other Techniques to Influence Canadians.” This seemed an unbelievable story, and one initially denied by a spokesperson for the minister of National Defence. Just three days later, though, then-chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Gen. Jonathan Vance shuttered the group in question, terminating an initiative more than five years in the making that called into question the Department of National Defence’s (DND) commitment to objective and appropriate public communication, at a time when truth decay, misinformation and disinformation have gained much traction around the world and in Canada. In June 2021, the day Parliament adjourned for the summer, DND acknowledged to select media that acting CDS Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre and then-deputy minister Jody Thomas had determined the initiative was “incompatible” with government communications policy and the vision, mission and principles of DND Public Affairs. In a surprising self-indictment, the leaders also admitted a lack of “institution-wide strategic level direction and guidance,” to build information-related capabilities that were “governed by appropriate authorities and oversight.” Deliberate influence campaigns by malign state, non-state and increasingly by domestic actors to disturb, disrupt and create disorder in democratic societies have become widespread and commonplace. The volume of vitriol is increasing. This is fast eroding citizen faith, trust and confidence in government and public institutions and may be the greatest contemporary threat liberal democracies face – arresting this trend and then restoring trust, the ultimate challenge. National Defence’s entire program – to be successful on operations; secure sufficient funding; recruit, train and retain; effect culture change; reconstitute the force post-pandemic and procure the equipment needed to contest, confront and defeat adversaries – will largely depend on whether the institution can modernize its approach to strategic communications to manoeuvre more agilely and to better effect in a complex, frenetic and hostile information environment.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Communications, Reform, Propaganda, and Military
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

27. The Dangers of Exaggerating the Impact of the Death of an Al Jazeera Propagandist

Author:
Hillel Frisch
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
An analysis of Google Trends demonstrates the dangers of exaggerating events easily and effectively manipulated by Palestinian propaganda.
Topic:
Media, Conflict, State Violence, Propaganda, and Narrative
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

28. Russia Steps up its Campaign for Influence in Africa

Author:
Rina Bassist
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Ifriqiya, Rina Bassist discusses Russian propaganda and paramilitary strategies used to gain influence in recent years in various countries in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Sahel, and Central African Republic

29. Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh’s Female Members Further Islamic State’s Recruitment and Propaganda

Author:
Animesh Roul
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Neo-Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (Neo-JMB), which was responsible for the deadly July 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery terrorist attack in Dhaka claimed by Islamic State (IS), has effectively nurtured and nourished a strong network of female jihadists in the country (refworld.org, November 15, 2016). These women members have proven to be a largely unseen, but potent force behind the group’s resilience. They have spearheaded recruitment and propaganda campaigns and even surprised security forces with a suicide bombing on December 26, 2016 in Ashkona area of the capital Dhaka (The Independent, December 26, 2016).
Topic:
Terrorism, Non State Actors, Women, Islamic State, and Propaganda
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

30. Russian and Belarusian Disinformation and Propaganda in the Context of the Polish-Belarusian Border Crisis

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka and Filip Bryjka
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia and Belarus are consistent in their narrative regarding the recent border crisis. They accuse EU and NATO members, mainly Poland and Lithuania, of failing to respect international law and lacking humanity. This is aimed at discrediting Euro-Atlantic structures and weakening Polish and Lithuanian influence on NATO and EU eastern policy. The Belarusian-Russian propaganda particularly invokes charges of hypocrisy and “double standards” on the part of the EU, which challenges the management and resolution of the border crisis.
Topic:
NATO, Migration, Borders, Propaganda, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Belarus