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31. Turkey’s Kurds: Kingmakers in the upcoming elections?

Author:
Evangelos Areteos and Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Surveys show profound changes in the social attitudes of Kurds in Turkey. Younger Kurds are more liberal socially and more flexible politically. The years 2015–2016 marked a turning point for Kurdish society and brought different attitudes to light among both impoverished and middle-class Kurds. The AKP has been losing Kurdish support because of their alliance with the nationalist MHP and policies perceived as being anti-Kurdish. The CHP, while starting very low, has been gaining Kurdish support. The CHP’s strategy of reconciliation and talking about crimes committed against the Kurds in the past has been paying off. While the “Table of Six” does not offer much in the way of concrete benefits for the Kurds, some parties in the People’s Alliance (e.g. Deva, Gelecek) are more progressive vis-a-vis Kurdish demands.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Kurds, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

32. Dersimli Kemal for President?

Author:
Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
As of 6 March 2023, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, chairman of the CHP, is the joint candidate of the largest Opposition alliance. As such, for the first time, an Alevi has the chance of occupying one of the highest positions in Turkey. Since he is also Kurdish, he represents the two largest ethnic and confessional minorities in Turkey. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu (74) was born in a small village in Dersim/Tunceli province. He managed to become the director of a state institution and has been the chairman of the CHP since 2010. The Alevi are by far the largest non-Sunni religious group in Turkey, representing roughly 15–20 percent of the population. There are huge differences in the definition of what an Alevi is, ranging from Anatolian Muslims to a branch of Shia Islam and from a religion in its own right to a culture. In both the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, Alevis have been subject to persecution, discrimination and exclusion. In 1937/38, the state committed large-scale atrocities against the population of Dersim. The burning of a hotel in 1993 during an Alevi festival proved to be a turning point for Alevi awareness and civil society organization. The AKP launched an ‘Alevi opening’ in 2008 to address issues including recognition for Alevi places of worship and religious instruction; although the initiative continued until 2011, nothing concrete was achieved. Prejudices, discrimination and the othering of Alevis continue to this day. Since 2018, Kılıçdaroğlu has been the architect of the National Alliance; consisting of six diverse parties since 2022, the opposition group has been dubbed the ‘Table of Six’. In the summer of 2022, Alevi Cem Houses were attacked. President Erdoğan subsequently visited a Cem House for the first time in 15 years; in fall 2022, he announced the creation of a Directorate to deal with Alevi issues. On 14 May 2023, in the Republic’s centenary year, an Alevi could become president of Turkey. After many years of polarization, this could send out a message of unity, of differences bridged and differences accepted.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

33. Entre la pradera, la frontera y el puerto. Cambios y continuidades de la política exterior uruguaya

Author:
Castellar Granados
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
En este artículo se analizan los lineamientos de la política exterior uruguaya hasta la última alternancia política en el Gobierno nacional poniendo especial énfasis en las relaciones con China y Estados Unidos. Para ello se parte de la hipótesis planteada en trabajos previos que apunta a ideología partidaria variable explicativa de los planteamientos en política exterior en Uruguay. Así, en primer lugar, se expone una revisión histórica de los antecedentes de la política exterior uruguaya y de las principales tradiciones intelectuales que ayudaron a formular el pensamiento internacional. En segundo lugar, se explica el marco institucional, los principales ejes en política exterior y los planteamientos del Gobierno de Lacalle Pou en materia internacional. Posteriormente, se analizan las preferencias de las élites políticas en materia de política exterior. Y, por último, el artículo aporta algunas reflexiones finales a modo de conclusión y líneas de actuación para futuros trabajos.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Uruguay and Latin America

34. Democracy under Threat: How the Personalization of Political Parties Undermines Democracy

Author:
Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, Jia Li, Carisa Nietsche, Nicholas Lokker, and Nicolas Rice
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In 1998, Viktor Orbán was elected the prime minister of Hungary in free and fair elections. He was supported by the Fidesz party—a movement he founded in 1988 that became a political party in 1990. After losing reelection in 2002, Orbán returned to the prime ministership in 2010 having internalized the lesson that surviving in Hungarian politics “requires strong leadership and absolute control over the party.”1 From 2002 to 2010, Orbán increased his influence within Fidesz, including by changing the party constitution to give himself control of the selection of local party leaders, all parliamentary candidates, and the leader of the party’s parliamentary group. Orbán’s increasing influence within the party paved the way for his efforts over the next decade to remove checks on his power. His control over the party, along with Fidesz’s constitutional majority, enabled Orbán to change Hungary’s constitution in ways that weakened executive constraints, including from the Constitutional Court, the election commission, independent media, and civil society. Orbán’s disproportionate power within the political system allowed him to dismantle democracy in the years that followed, pushing Hungary into authoritarianism. This pattern of democratic decay is not unique to Hungary. Freedom House reports that democracy has been in decline for the last 16 consecutive years, with much of the deterioration occurring in countries classified as democracies.2 In some instances these declines left democracy compromised but intact (as in Poland). In other cases, the declines gave way to the onset of authoritarianism (as in Serbia). Importantly, along with the decline in democracy, there has been a clear change in the way that democracies are breaking down.3 Before 2000, coups were the primary way that democracies failed. Since 2000, however, incumbent takeovers—or the ability of democratically elected leaders to dismantle democracy from within—have grown more prevalent. In the 2010s, 64 percent of the democracies that broke down did so due to incumbent power grabs, while only 36 percent of those that collapsed did so because of a coup.4 Simply put, the greatest threat to democracy now comes from democratically elected leaders.
Topic:
Democracy, Political Parties, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

35. Millet Partisi'nin Doğuş Teorileri ve Parti Tipolojileri Bağlamında Değerlendirilmesi

Author:
Muttaki Ünlü
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Bilgi
Institution:
Sakarya University (SAU)
Abstract:
Türkiye'nin çok partili hayata geçmesiyle Türk siyasi hayatında sahneye çıkan partilerden biri olan Millet Partisi (MP) kısa ömrüne ve sönük geçen siyasi macerasına rağmen incelenmeye değer önemli yönlere sahiptir. II. Dünya Savaşı'nın ardından oluşan uluslararası atmosfer ülkeleri yeni dünya düzeninde kendi yerlerini alma çabasına itmiştir. Bu bakımdan Türkiye'de çok partili hayata geçilmesi dikkat çekicidir. Çok partili hayatın yeni başladığı yıllarda Demokrat Parti (DP) ile birlikte mecliste muhalefet sıralarını işgal eden MP Cumhuriyet’in ilk siyasi partilerinden olmasının yanında kısa ömrüne rağmen, kapatıldıktan sonra da etkisi devam eden bir parti olmaklığıyla önemli bir yere sahiptir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı MP'yi siyasi partiler hakkında ileri sürülen doğuş teorileri ve parti tipolojileri bağlamında analiz etmektir. Çalışmada esasen "MP doğuş teorileri çerçevesinde nasıl açıklanabilir? Parti tipolojileri bakımından hangi tipe uymakta yahut yakın düşmektedir?" sorularına cevap aranmaktadır. Elde edilen başlıca sonuç olarak MP'nin doğuş teorileri bakımından parlamento içi parti kategorisine dâhil edilebileceği, katılma krizi ve modernleşme teorisi ile de ortaya çıkışının açıklanabileceği hususları gösterilecektir. Tipolojik değerlendirmesi yapıldığında da MP'nin bir yaklaşıma göre kadro partisi özellikleri gösterirken bir başka yaklaşıma göre bireysel temsil partisi özellikleri taşıdığı anlaşılmıştır.
Topic:
History, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Nation Party (NP)
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

36. CCP Ideological Indoctrination, Part 1: The PRC’s New “Patriotic Education Law”

Author:
John Dotson
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On October 24, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National People’s Congress (NPC) Standing Committee (全国人民代表大会常务委) officially codified the country’s existing initiatives for “patriotic education (PE; 爱国主义教育)” by promulgating the People’s Republic of China Patriotic Education Law (中华人民共和国爱国主义教育法). This mandates indoctrination in state-directed ideological content throughout all sectors of society (PRC Government, October 25). While CCP policy documents are always more important than formal PRC law, the Party-state does use formal laws passed by the National People’s Congress (全国人民代表大会) to codify and emphasize Party policies. This law appears to be no exception. [1] The unveiling of the new Patriotic Education Law has been accompanied by a campaign of predictably laudatory coverage in PRC state media. For example, the CCP mouthpiece People’s Daily ran a flowery editorial that quoted a professor from the China University of Political Science and Law as stating that “implementing the patriotic education law will enhance the daily practice of patriotic spirit” among the Chinese people. The editorial itself opined that the NPC had, “on the basis of the rule of law, promoted and guaranteed New Era patriotic education, inspiring the nation’s spirit, concentrating the people’s strength, advancing the building of a strong country [and] national revival with extremely significant and profound meaning” (People’s Daily, November 23). Such coverage has appeared alongside other official messaging emphasizing the need for enhanced focus on ideological instruction. For example, the mid-October issue of the CCP’s official journal Qiushi (求实) was a themed issue focused on ideology. It featured a lead article under Xi’s name titled “Open New Frontiers for the Sinicization and Modernization of Marxism.” It also included a list of articles on supporting themes, such as a Central Party School article titled “In the New Era and New Journey, Unceasingly Advance the Party’s Innovations in Theory” (Qiushi, October 16).
Topic:
Education, Law, Ideology, Political Parties, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and Indoctrination
Political Geography:
China and Asia

37. Party Ties: Vietnam, Cuba and China’s Relations with Other Marxist-Leninist States

Author:
John S. Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Last month, on the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the China-Vietnam comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership (中越全面战略合作伙伴关系), Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping met with Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Politburo Member and Head of the Central Committee Organization Commission Truong Thi Mai and asked her to convey his greetings to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], April 26). [1] The visit to Beijing by Mai, who has headed the VCP’s powerful organization commission since 2021 and was appointed to the Secretariat in March, occurred days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Vietnam (NhanDan, April 15; VN Express, March 6). As the maritime dispute between China and Vietnam in the South China Sea has intensified over the past fifteen years, Washington has deepened its ties with Hanoi based on overlapping geostrategic interests. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s ability to achieve its goal of upgrading the U.S. relationship with Vietnam to a “strategic partnership” this year to mark the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the U.S.-Vietnam “comprehensive partnership” remains in question (Fulcrum.sg, April 20). Vietnam undoubtedly perceives the PRC’s drive to consolidate control over the South China Sea as its main geopolitical challenge. Moreover, Vietnam’s relationship with its larger northern neighbor is colored by mistrust derived from historical memories of Chinese occupation and a long legacy of conflict, including the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and the subsequent series of border and naval clashes in the 1980s. However, the VCP, particularly the conservative faction, now views the U.S. as posing its primary ideological threat and is fearful that Washington aims to undermine its grip on power (Nikkei Asia, May 11, 2022). As two scholars at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences note in a recent analysis, Hanoi’s reluctance to upgrade ties with the U.S. stems not only from fear of angering China but also from concern with “Washington’s excessive focus on press freedom, religious freedom, and human rights as an internal intrusion and potential threat to Vietnam’s political security.” [2] Hence, Beijing is able to arrest Hanoi from drifting towards closer alignment with Washington by leveraging their shared Communist systems and mutual concerns about Western efforts to facilitate the “peaceful evolution” of communist states into liberal democracies. During his meeting with VCP General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong in Beijing last October, Xi spoke to both Party leaderships’ mutual concern with regime security. He stressed that each side “should stay committed to the socialist orientation” and called for increased party-party exchanges to facilitate “mutual learning in party governance and state administration, maintain high-level communication and strategic dialogue between the two militaries, achieve more outcomes in cooperation on law enforcement and security, and safeguard the political security and social stability of respective countries” (FMPRC, October 31). Party-to-party ties are a key element of the PRC’s relationships with the other three states with ruling Communist Parties: Vietnam, Cuba and Laos. [3] As with the CCP, the Vietnamese, Cuban and Laotian Communist Parties have each adapted and modified Marxist-Leninism to suit their national conditions, regional situations and elite political preferences. Despite their considerable differences, these states’ mutual Marxist-Leninist ideological orientations and systems foster shared interests, including maintaining regime security and “stability,” opposing perceived external attempts to define and impose Western conceptions of democracy and human rights, advancing a state-led model of economic development and promoting a more multipolar world.
Topic:
International Relations, Socialism/Marxism, Partnerships, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, and Cuba

38. Why Taiwan’s 2024 Presidential Election is Wide Open

Author:
Matthew Fulco
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Shortly after Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) suffered the worst loss in its 37-year history, Nikkei Asia Review published an article entitled “Taiwan’s KMT has a mountain to climb for 2024 presidential race” that cautioned not to read too much into the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party’s (KMT) success in the local elections last November (Nikkei Asia, November 29, 2022). The piece argued that voters still perceive the KMT as being too close to China, a liability in a national election focused on cross-Strait relations, and hamstrung by uncertainty about who should serve as its presidential candidate next year. Although the KMT confronts significant challenges heading into Taiwan’s 2024 elections, the difficulties the party faces should not be overestimated. Rather than a mountain, the KMT has a modest hill to climb. Over the past 22 years, Taiwan’s national politics have swung like a pendulum, favoring the DPP from 2000-2008, the KMT from 2008-2016 and the DPP again since 2016. Taiwanese voters, like their counterparts in other thriving democracies, sometimes vote for change even if they are not enamored with a particular candidate. Since Taiwan fully democratized in 1996, no political party has won three consecutive presidential terms, with DPP and KMT presidents alternating every eight years. President Tsai Ing-wen has avoided the kinds of issues, corruption scandals and major popular demonstrations against her policies that undid the presidencies of her predecessors, Chen Shui-bian and Ma Ying-jeou, leading to opposition wins in the 2008 and 2016 presidential elections, respectively. Nevertheless, Tsai has been dramatically weakened by the DPP’s crushing defeat in the November 2022 local elections (Jamestown Foundation, November 29, 2022). She stepped down as DPP party chair after the elections as the party has taken a hit for its many pandemic missteps, a flagging economy and a contentious cross-Strait policy (United Daily News, November 27, 2022). The DPP’s likely candidate in the 2024 election, current Vice President Lai Ching-te, while personally popular, would represent continuity with Tsai’s policies (China Brief, March 3). Together, these factors will likely make the 2024 race the closest since 2004, when the DPP’s Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu eked out a victory against the KMT’s Lien Chan and James Soong of the People First Party (PFP) by a margin of just 0.22 percent (Taipei Times, March 21, 2004).
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

39. Turning No Tides: Union Effects on Partisan Preferences and the Working-Class Metamorphosis

Author:
Sinisa Hadziabdic
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Relying on panel data for Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the paper examines the impact of union membership on partisan preferences. By leveraging panel data to control for time-invariant selection effects, we show that unions exert a small consistent left‑wing influence on the average wage earner who becomes affiliated, but they are no longer able to modify the preferences of working-class members. A longitudinal approach reveals that changes in partisan preferences can be linked to members’ preexisting predispositions and to the prevalent political views within unions. Unions mainly attract individuals who already share their political inclinations before joining. These preexisting left-wing convictions allow an additional left-wing shift to take place through a value congruence mechanism provoked by interactions with long-term union members who are even more left-wing oriented than the newcomers. Symmetrically, working-class joiners exhibit less pronounced left-wing inclinations before becoming affiliated, a gap that widens further after they join as a consequence of their unmet expectations.
Topic:
Politics, Class, Political Parties, Data, and Trade Unions
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

40. Giorgia Meloni’s Italy and Europe: Ambitions and Realities

Author:
Nathalie Tocci and Leo Goretti
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In autumn 2022, the electoral victory of the right-centre coalition led by Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI, Brothers of Italy) and the subsequent establishment of her government caused scepticism and apprehension among international commentators. Concerns stemmed not only from it being the first administration in the history of post-war Italy whose majority partner, FdI, is rooted in the post-fascist tradition; more concretely, the inclusion within the coalition of parties such as Matteo Salvini’s Lega (League) and Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (Come on Italy), which had entertained political and personal relations with Vladimir Putin’s Russia prior to the invasion of Ukraine, raised doubts about Italy’s continuing support for Kyiv and the Western coalition. In reality, unwavering Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine views were repeatedly voiced by Meloni during the election campaign already, and – apart from a few unfortunate remarks by single individuals – this stance has been unambiguously upheld by the new government since it took office, as sealed by the Prime Minister’s visit to Kyiv in February and to Washington in July 2023.[1] A more complex picture emerges regarding relations with the European Union and European partners. Historically, in the post-war period, European integration has been a crucial dimension of Italy’s foreign policy, along with Atlanticism and strong support for multilateralism. Rome was one of the founders of the European communities, and European integration was long seen by ruling and opposition parties alike as key to Italy’s economic, cultural and social modernisation. Since the 1990s, however, criticism of the European project began to emerge in Italy, especially among the new centre-right parties, which developed a so-called “Euro-realist” approach when in government, whereby Italy’s national interest would not necessarily coincide with deeper European integration.[2] Outright Euroscepticism became more apparent since the Eurozone and migration “crises” of the 2010s, leading to the emergence of so-called “sovereigntist” narratives depicting the EU as an “antagonist”, which found resonance especially among populist parties.[3] This narrative, however, lost momentum as a result of the unprecedented level of funding granted to Italy through the NextGenerationEU programme in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. In the aftermath of the 2022 election, managing relations with Europe was thus a crucial task for the newly elected Italian government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Political Parties, and Giorgia Meloni
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy