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51. Introduction: The Militarization of Space

Author:
Eliahu H. Niewood and Matthew Jones
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
From a national security perspective, the space domain today is fundamentally different than it was 10 years ago. It is also likely to be very different 10 years from now than it is today. The role of the commercial sector, the nature of development of space capabilities, the ways satellites are gaining access to space, the uses of space capabilities, the organization of the U.S. Department of Defense when it comes to space, and the likelihood of conflict in space all look very different today than they did in the past. This issue of the Journal of Advanced Military Studies considers a variety of these shifts in detail. To provide context and background for the individual articles, this introduction describes some of the connections between the changes and gives an overview of each one.
Topic:
National Security, Militarization, and Satellites
Political Geography:
Global Focus and Space

52. Erdoğan’s New Front: Exploiting Israel for Regional and Domestic Leverage

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
By framing Israel as a national security threat, the Turkish President deflects attention from the country’s internal challenges while addressing evolving regional power dynamics, including concerns about Iran, Hezbollah, and the Kurdish presence in northern Syria.
Topic:
National Security, Hezbollah, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Turkey, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Middle East and Africa

53. Israel, Europe, and the Russia-Iran Axis

Author:
Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
With the world divided between a U.S.-led order of democracies on the one hand, and a cartel of aggressive autocracies – China, Russia, Iran and North Korea – on the other, that is challenging America and its allies, Europe has an important role to play in Israel’s war against Iran and its proxies.
Topic:
National Security, Autocracy, Proxy Groups, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

54. Violation of territorial integrity as a tool for waging long-term hybrid warfare (against the backdrop of power games in the South Caucasus region)

Author:
Khayal Iskandarov, Piotr Gawliczek, and Andrzej Soboń
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper seeks to examine the violation of territorial integrity as a stage of hybrid warfare. Grounded in the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, this study analyses nations’ foreign policy strategies considering both global and domestic factors. Employing primarily qualitative research, this study concentrates on a case study of the South Caucasus region. Against the backdrop of the war which broke out in the early 2022 between Russia and Ukraine, the preservation of territorial integrity emerges as an imperative aspect of national security policy. Despite the longstanding recognition of territorial integrity as a fundamental tenet of international law over the centuries, this war has galvanised all nations with regard to the violation of territorial integrity. The paper delineates the principles of territorial integrity vis-à-vis the national security of the South Caucasus countries, substantiating the assertion that violation of the territorial integrity of the particular countries in this region serves the interests of external actors, either directly or indirectly, and is employed as a strategic tool in the pursuit of protracted hybrid warfare.
Topic:
National Security, International Security, Hybrid Warfare, Russia-Ukraine War, and Territorial Integrity
Political Geography:
South Caucasus

55. Role of the private sector within Latvia’s strategic defence documents: Dimensions of psychological resilience and strategic communication

Author:
Lita Juberte Krūmiņa
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The comprehensive defence framework introduced in 2019 in Latvia has the potential to accelerate the implementation of national defence priorities, thus strengthening Latvia as one of NATO’s external border states. In a time of geopolitical turbulence and increasing hybrid threats, a whole-of-society approach is required and work in ever-new directions. As dimensions of psychological resilience and strategic communication are becoming an important part of the defence studies debate, the study focuses on the role of the private sector within Latvia’s strategic defence documents and aims to investigate where these dimensions are situated and how they have evolved in the strategic landscape. To study the role and evolution of the private sector within Latvia’s strategic defence documents, quantitative content analysis and qualitative text analysis were used for in-depth analysis of the documents. The study finds that the role of the private sector in the strategic defence documents has generally increased over the years and there has not been a significant change regarding private sector involvement in dimensions of psychological resilience and strategic communication. The long-term pattern indicates that dimensions of psychological resilience and strategic communication appear rare in strategic documents, suggesting that the private sector is not seen as a significant actor in achieving defence goals. Meanwhile, in more practical dimensions,an upward trend towards strengthening ties and sharing responsibilities is identified. The study therefore opens up a discussion regarding the need for a more institutionalised framework for psychological and strategic communication dimensions in order to achieve the strategic goals of comprehensive defence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Private Sector, Resilience, and Strategic Communication
Political Geography:
Europe and Latvia

56. The Accountability Surface of Militaries Using Automated Technologies

Author:
Arthur Holland Michel
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
There are many people, decisions and technologies involved in the process leading to the use of force in military operations. Each of these touch points is a locus for applying — or failing to apply — accountability when things go wrong. The “accountability surface” is a new term of art to characterize the degree to which humans involved in the use of force can be held accountable for undue harm in warfare. As a metaphor, the accountability surface insists upon a crucial question regarding the use of military autonomous and automating technologies: Will the use of this technology expand or contract the degree to which anyone in the organization will be held accountable for any harms resulting from any process in which it plays a role? Automating technologies have the potential to significantly diminish the accountability surface of militaries that use them.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

57. International Norms Development and AI in the Military Domain

Author:
Tim Sweijs and Sofia Romansky
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) in military applications has changed the way countries engage in war and in times of peace. With so many potential effects of military AI applications, both positive and negative, there is growing demand for international norms to govern their responsible use based on ethical and legal principles. While some argue that current international and human rights laws are sufficient, this paper makes the case for expanding norms to encompass the rapid growth of military AI use while looking at the challenges facing international norms development, current initiatives, and strengths and weaknesses in the normative landscape.
Topic:
Human Rights, National Security, Artificial Intelligence, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

58. Stress-Testing State Power: When Governors and Presidents Diverge on Matters of National Security

Author:
Carrie Cordero
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
As the end of the first quarter of the 21st century approaches, the United States’ unique federalist system of government is increasingly relevant as it relates to national security and foreign affairs. The activities of federal, state, and local governments are increasingly intertwined with national security issues, which in modern history have been reserved for federal government leadership and responsibility. This trend is observable through the assertion of existing legal authorities by governors, legislative action taken by state legislators, and litigation driven by state attorneys general. There are two main ways that states are increasingly engaging in issues touching national security or foreign affairs. The first is by taking action that does or could potentially impact U.S. national security. This includes actions such as litigating against federal government border security and immigration policy implementation, more assertively exercising National Guard authorities to effectuate homeland security policies or conduct law enforcement activities, or engaging in international trade directly with foreign countries, for example during a global pandemic.1 A second method is by taking action in response to an actual or perceived national security threat. This includes actions such as banning state government employees’ access to TikTok, strengthening election security based on threats as reported by the intelligence community (IC), or limiting foreign investment in a state based on national security concerns.2 In short, the interplay between states and the federal government as it relates to national security is undergoing a shift. As Columbia law professor Matthew Waxman has observed, “The federalist macrostructure of our national security system has changed dramatically during the course of our history, and it will continue to evolve.”3 This trend of increasing federalism contrasts with developments during the second half of the 20th century through the early 21st century, a period characterized by tremendous growth in the federal government’s national security enterprise. Milestones from that era include the 1947 National Security Act, which established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the accompanying growth of the military and intelligence community enterprise. The post-9/11 era saw additional development, growth, and maturation of federal institutions engaged in national security. This era ushered in a new body of federal law and associated institutions created by those laws. These include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which concentrated the operations and activities of 22 agencies into one. It also led to the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which provides strategic direction, policy development, and management oversight to the other 17 elements of the intelligence community. Meanwhile, throughout this period, the courts afforded substantial deference to the federal government on national security issues and legal authorities.4 The activities of federal, state, and local governments are increasingly intertwined with national security issues, which in modern history have been reserved for federal government leadership and responsibility. This year, the Securing U.S. Democracy Initiative at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) began analyzing the impact of increasing federalism on national security with the aim of developing recommendations that address certain practical aspects of this trend. Although there are a variety of areas where potential tensions lie at the intersection of state action and national security policymaking, this initial research report from the first year of work focuses on two specific aspects: (1) the assertion of National Guard authorities in a domestic protest scenario, and (2) the potential impact of a social media ban related to foreign malign influence on elections. A common thread through both subject areas includes a current and evolving national security threat of malign foreign influence. To examine these issues, the CNAS Securing U.S. Democracy Initiative developed and ran two scenario exercises in May 2024 to explore how a clash of legal authorities between the federal government and state governments might play out.5 Participants in the scenario exercises included former senior government officials who previously held roles such as agency heads and general counsels, a former member of Congress, former congressional chief counsels, former senior National Guard leadership and operational-level Guard personnel, a state-level former deputy secretary of state, and national and homeland security experts and practitioners. Many of the participants have held more than one professional position relevant to the issues explored in the exercises. The participants were charged with examining fictional scenarios set in October 2024, one month before the U.S. presidential election. The scenarios roughly assumed the real-world American political landscape as it existed in May 2024, which at that time included a president who was also the presumptive Democratic nominee seeking reelection in November. The governors represented in each exercise matched the political party governing that state in the real world. Accordingly, the Texas governor in Scenario 1 is a Republican; the California governor in Scenario 2 is a Democrat. This report provides background and analysis on potential tensions that can emerge between state action and national security decision-making in the context of two separate scenario exercises. The goal of the exercises was to better understand the dynamics and decision-making that might occur when state and federal officials disagree about a matter of national security.6 Participants were advised to consider constitutional, legal, and policy factors relevant to each scenario, and to make decisions based on the role to which they were assigned. This report summarizes these tailored exercises and provides insights that emerged from them. The report then provides policy recommendations intended to mitigate the tensions that the exercises suggest can arise when federal and state authorities diverge on issues of national security that were the subject of the scenarios.
Topic:
Government, National Security, Domestic Politics, Federalism, and State Power
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

59. AI and the Evolution of Biological National Security Risks: Capabilities, Thresholds, and Interventions

Author:
Bill Drexel and Caleb Withers
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Not long after COVID-19 gave the world a glimpse of the catastrophic potential of biological events, experts began warning that rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) could augur a world of bioterrorism, unprecedented superviruses, and novel targeted bioweapons. These dire warnings have risen to the highest levels of industry and government, from the CEOs of the world's leading AI labs raising alarms about new technical capabilities for would-be bioterrorists, to Vice President Kamala Harris’s concern that AI-enabled bioweapons “could endanger the very existence of humanity.”1 If true, such developments would expose the United States to unprecedented catastrophic threats well beyond COVID-19’s scope of destruction. But assessing the degree to which these concerns are warranted—and what to do about them—requires weighing a range of complex factors, including: The history and current state of American biosecurity The diverse ways in which AI could alter existing biosecurity risks Which emerging technical AI capabilities would impact these risks Where interventions today are needed This report considers these factors to provide policymakers with a broad understanding of the evolving intersection of AI and biotechnology, along with actionable recommendations to curb the worst risks to national security from biological threats. The sources of catastrophic biological risks are varied. Historically, policymakers have underappreciated the risks posed by the routine activities of well-intentioned scientists, even as the number of high-risk biosecurity labs and the frequency of dangerous incidents—perhaps including COVID-19 itself—continue to grow. State actors have traditionally been a source of considerable biosecurity risk, not least the Soviet Union’s shockingly large bioweapons program. But the unwieldiness and imprecision of bioweapons has meant that states remain unlikely to field large-scale biological attacks in the near term, even though the U.S. State Department expresses concerns about the potential bioweapons capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Russia, and China. On the other hand, nonstate actors—including lone wolves, terrorists, and apocalyptic groups—have an unnerving track record of attempting biological attacks, but with limited success due to the intrinsic complexity of building and wielding such delicate capabilities. Today, fast-moving advancements in biotechnology—independent of AI developments—are changing many of these risks. A combination of new gene editing techniques, gene sequencing methods, and DNA synthesis tools is opening a new world of possibilities in synthetic biology for greater precision in genetic manipulation and, with it, a new world of risks from the development of powerful bioweapons and biological accidents alike. Cloud labs, which conduct experiments on others’ behalf, could enable nonstate actors by allowing them to outsource some of the experimental expertise that has historically acted as a barrier to dangerous uses. Though most cloud labs screen orders for malicious activity, not all do, and the constellation of existing bioweapons norms, conventions, and safeguards leaves open a range of pathways for bad actors to make significant progress in acquiring viable bioweapons. But experts’ opinions on the overall state of U.S. biosecurity range widely, especially with regard to fears of nonstate actors fielding bioweapons. Those less concerned contend that even if viable paths to building bioweapons exist, the practicalities of constructing, storing, and disseminating them are far more complex than most realize, with numerous potential points of failure that concerned parties either fail to recognize or underemphasize. They also point to a lack of a major bioattacks in recent decades, despite chronic warnings. A more pessimistic camp points to experiments that have demonstrated the seeming ease of successfully constructing powerful viruses using commercially available inputs, and seemingly diminishing barriers to the knowledge and technical capabilities needed to create bioweapons. Less controversial is the insufficiency of U.S. biodefenses to adequately address large-scale biological threats, whether naturally occurring, accidental, or deliberate. Despite COVID-19’s demonstration of the U.S. government’s inability to contain the effects of a major outbreak, the nation has made limited progress in mitigating the likelihood and potential harm of another, more dangerous biological catastrophe. New AI capabilities may reshape the risk landscape for biothreats in several ways. AI is enabling new capabilities that might, in theory, allow advanced actors to optimize bioweapons for more precise effects, such as targeting specific genetic groups or geographies. Though such capabilities remain speculative, if realized they would dramatically alter states’ incentives to use bioweapons for strategic ends. Instead of risking their own militaries’ or populations’ health with the unwieldy weapons, states could sabotage other nations’ food security or incapacitate enemies with public health crises from which they would be unlikely to rebound. Relatedly, the same techniques could create superviruses optimized for transmissibility and lethality, which may considerably expand the destructive potential of bioweapons. Tempering these fears, however, are several technical challenges that scientists would need to overcome—if they can be solved at all. The most pressing concern for biological risks related to AI stems from tools that may soon be able to accelerate the procurement of biological agents by nonstate actors. Recent studies have suggested that foundation models may soon be able to help accelerate bad actors’ ability to acquire weaponizable biological agents, even if the degree to which these AI tools can currently help them remains marginal.2 Of particular concern are AI systems’ budding abilities to help troubleshoot where experiments have gone wrong, speeding the design-build-test-learn feedback loop that is essential to developing working biological agents. If made more effective, emerging AI tools could provide a boon to would-be bioweapons creators by more dynamically providing some of the knowledge needed to produce and use bioweapons, though such actors would still face other significant hurdles to bioweapons development that are often underappreciated. AI could also impact biological risks in other ways. Technical faults in AI tools could fail to constrain foundation models from relaying hazardous biological information to potential bad actors, or inadvertently encourage researchers to pursue promising medicinal agents with unexpected negative side effects. Using AI to create more advanced automated labs could expose these labs to many of the risks of automation that have historically plagued other complex automated systems, and make it easier for nonspecialists to concoct biological agents (depending upon the safety mechanisms that automated labs institute). Finally, heavy investment in companies and nations seeking to capitalize on AI’s potential for biotechnology could be creating competition dynamics that prioritize speed over safety. These risks are particularly acute in relation to China, where a variety of other factors shaping the country’s biotech ecosystem also further escalate risks of costly accidents.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Biosecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

60. The Rise of US Economic Sanctions on China: Analysis of a New PIIE Dataset

Author:
Martin Chorzempa, Mary Lovely, and Christine Wan
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Concerns over China’s national security and human rights activities have led the United States to rely increasingly on financial sanctions and export controls to curb Beijing’s behavior. But the tools are so complex it is difficult to assess their effectiveness. A new PIIE dataset sheds light on this economic statecraft. The first Trump administration added three times as many Chinese entities to export control and other sanctions lists than the previous four administrations; the Biden administration added even more to these lists. Most sanctions and controls target high-tech sectors, especially electronics, military and defense entities, aviation, space, and aerospace; targets are chosen under a veil of secrecy, raising questions over accountability and transparency. The benefits of isolating Chinese firms come with potential costs, hobbling innovation for US and allied business, encouraging circumvention of sanctions, and accelerating Chinese innovation.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, National Security, Sanctions, and Exports
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America