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251. From Plan to Action: Operationalizing a U.S. National Technology Strategy

Author:
John Costello, Martijn Rasser, and Megan Lamberth
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Ideas abound for actions the United States should take to better position itself for the unfolding global technology competition. Concerning topics as diverse as raw materials to semiconductors to STEM education, a nonstop cavalcade of presidential directives, congressional bills, industry proposals, think tank reports, and pronouncements by big-name luminaries have been issued as measures to address American economic competitiveness and national security challenges. Almost all make their case in the context of dealing with a rising China. Some of these recommendations are excellent and quite a few are good; too many get lost in the noise. It’s not just the sheer volume that presents a challenge to identifying and executing the most promising recommendations. The U.S. government lacks a strategic construct to merge these ideas—for research and development spending, public-private partnerships, tax policy and subsidies, immigration reform, and education—into a coherent whole. The goal of CNAS’ National Technology Strategy project is to create the framework for a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach for the United States to navigate the global technology competition. The first report in this initiative, “Taking the Helm,” makes the case for a national technology strategy and lays out what such a modern-day strategy should be.1 Its chief argument is that the United States is in a long-term, multifaceted geostrategic competition with China, one that has technology at its core. Technological leadership is more important than ever, yet current U.S. government policies fall well short of what is needed to maintain it. Crafting an affirmative technology policy agenda is not just about competing with China; it comprises the guiding principles for the nation’s technology policy goals and priorities to pursue economic prosperity, protect national security interests and democratic values, and advance society. How the U.S. government should structure itself organizationally and bureaucratically to execute such a strategy is the focus of the second report, “Trust the Process.”2 Today, key institutions such as the National Security Council, National Economic Council, and Office of Science and Technology Policy are not optimized to craft, run, and maintain this effort. “Trust the Process” explains what talent, resources, infrastructure, and processes are needed for strategy development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. This third report in the series focuses on concrete and pragmatic measures that U.S. policymakers should take to operationalize a national technology strategy. There are four premises to the security and technology competition that guide these findings: the utility of industrial policies, the convergence of national and economic security, gaps in knowledge, and the need for international partnerships. The report offers recommendations for specific changes to U.S. government departmental and agency authorities, regulatory updates, policy initiatives, and diplomatic efforts that will bolster the U.S. government's ability to craft, execute, and maintain this strategy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

252. The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands

Author:
Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak, and Ripley Hunter
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
How could Taiwan and the United States respond if China seized one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, such as Pratas/Dongsha (hereafter Dongsha) in the South China Sea? Whereas the U.S. national security community has focused on defending Taiwan against Chinese invasion, China’s recent military activities suggest that this kind of coercion and limited aggression might be an equally urgent question. More worryingly, such a scenario could be a prelude or pathway to war involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. To explore potential policy and strategy options to prevent such a calamity, the Gaming Lab at CNAS wargamed this scenario with Taiwanese, American, and regional experts. Worryingly, the game found few credible options for pushing China to abandon Dongsha and return to the status quo. However, the game found numerous areas where preparation and multilateral coordination—particularly in concert with Japan—could deter limited Chinese aggression against Taiwan. During the game, the teams representing the United States and Taiwan struggled to compel a Chinese withdrawal from Dongsha without escalating the crisis. The team representing China avoided further escalation given its first-mover advantage, constrained territorial gains, and geographic proximity. In contrast, the U.S. team had to push its forces far forward in ways that were risky and would be difficult to sustain.1 Punitive non-military options, such as economic sanctions or information campaigns, took too long to produce effects and appeared too weak to compel China to abandon its gains.2 More aggressive military responses risked escalation to war, which both the U.S. and Taiwan teams wished to avoid. With few viable coercive options and the onus of escalation falling on the U.S. and Taiwan teams, the game reaffirmed the difficulty of rolling back territorial aggression of this kind. Indeed, discouraging China from seizing Taiwanese territory before it happens is the most salient lesson of the game. The United States and Taiwan must begin coordinating today to build a credible deterrent against limited Chinese aggression or coercion toward Taiwan.3 Doing so will help identify ways to make a territorial fait accompli by China—such as the seizure of Dongsha—too unpalatable to consider, while also communicating the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan. This strategy will require advance planning and communication of joint responses and defenses against coercion and territorial aggression. Rather than scrambling to respond to a fait accompli, as occurred in this game, the United States and Taiwan should prepare to implement coordinated, whole-of-government deterrent measures quickly and ensure immediate consequences for Chinese coercion or aggression short of war. Japan’s cooperation is essential in this type of scenario because it could change China’s calculations of the military and diplomatic risks of coercion or aggression. A joint statement from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joseph R. Biden in April 2021 referenced “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”4 The United States would rely heavily on Japan for basing infrastructure to conduct military operations to support Taiwan.5 And, although the statement did not elaborate further, unambiguous Japanese support will be necessary to create a regional, as opposed to bilateral U.S.-Taiwan, response to Chinese coercion or aggression. Specifically, Japan’s involvement could enable coordination with India and Australia via the Quad relationships.6 It could also create opportunities to work with other states facing Chinese coercion and territorial aggression, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Wargames are not predictive, but they are useful tools for exploring decision-making and identifying vulnerabilities. As China’s assertiveness rises, failure to prepare for the threat of an incursion against Taiwanese territory presents grave risks to Indo-Pacific security. The United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and partners can better understand how to build an effective deterrence strategy to discourage Chinese aggression or coercion through multilateral gaming, to include crisis simulations and exercises.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Strategy, and War Games
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and United States of America

253. When Less Is More: Rethinking U.S. Military Strategy and Posture in the Middle East

Author:
Ilan Goldenberg, Becca Wasser, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Lilly Blumenthal
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the past 20 years, the U.S. military has invested heavily in the Middle East. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump both attempted to shift assets out of the region and put a greater focus on the Indo-Pacific, but both were drawn back into the Middle East. Now, President Joe Biden again has put an emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has emphasized the importance of China as the Department of Defense’s “pacing challenge.” Effectively realizing the new administration’s shift in priority—and avoiding the cycle of drawing forces out of the Middle East only to have new crises pull them back in—requires an assessment of how the United States can continue to protect its core interests in the Middle East with a smaller and smarter footprint. This paper is the beginning of an effort to answer this question. It methodically outlines what key U.S. interests and objectives should be in the Middle East to develop the appropriate U.S. force posture to meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow. It then describes the key military activities necessary to protect those interests and achieve those objectives, in some cases breaking old assumptions and identifying areas where the United States can afford to accept more risk. Finally, it begins to outline the associated military assets necessary to pursue those activities and ends by identifying areas where the United States can look to alter its presence and activities in the region. The conclusion of this analysis is that the United States still has vital interests in the Middle East that require a level of military investment in the region. However, those interests are more limited, and the United States must be willing to accept more risk in the Middle East while also prioritizing non-military tools. Given challenges and strategic interests elsewhere in the world and at home, it is time to consider how the United States might approach force posture in the region differently than in the past.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

254. Trust the Process: National Technology Strategy Development, Implementation, and Monitoring and Evaluation

Author:
Loren DeLonge Schulman and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is navigating a new paradigm of competition, one that centers not merely on traditional measures of military might, but on technology innovation and its contributions to comprehensive national power. Technology and innovation are critical enablers of American military, political, and economic power. To succeed in great-power competition, the United States should adopt a national technology strategy. This report does not offer the content of a strategy—that is outlined in another report in this series, “Taking the Helm: A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge”—but it offers a framework for the bureaucratic connective tissue necessary to bring a strategy to life. To effectively execute a national technology strategy, the U.S. government will need to create new processes to develop, implement, and monitor and evaluate the strategy. It will also need to optimize existing processes in new ways, as bureaucratic foundations in this space have so far been uncoordinated, under resourced, and undervalued. Institutions such as the National Security Council (NSC), National Economic Council (NEC), and Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) are, in their current structure and partitions, not fully equipped to meet the challenge of creating and executing a coherent response to this challenge. To support a strategy, this report offers key ingredients for designing processes but does not prescribe detailed action plans; the best design is not the one that is most “right” but the one that leadership will use. It does offer sample tactics for policy interventions, using the promote-protect-partner-plan framework proposed in the CNAS report “Taking the Helm” as a foundation. This report divides recommendations into stages of strategy development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Themes that cut across these stages include ensuring executive attention, facilitating buy-in among internal and external stakeholders, exercising convening powers, inventorying and coordinating policy tools, acquiring talent and expertise, building pipelines for tailored information and analysis, and establishing a means for reviewing and revising the process and strategy. Overall, designing transparency, clarity, and accountability into the process will create one that leadership can both trust and verify.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Accountability, and Transparency
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

255. Risking Apocalypse? Quantum Computers and the US Power Grid

Author:
Arthur Herman and Alexander Butler
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Millions without power; stores and banks shut down; vital services running on emergency generators, if at all; lines of hapless people awaiting food and water. The experience that the state of Texas underwent during February 2021 is only a preview of what we would all face should the United States’ ever-vulnerable energy grid be subject to a major cyberattack. For years, experts have been warning us of the national power grid’s vulnerability to attacks by such malicious actors as Russia, China, and Iran. A major task force within the US Department of Energy—the North American Energy Resiliency Model (NAERM)—has been tasked with determining how best to protect our energy grid from damage caused by not only natural disasters but also terrorism and cyber assaults. NAERM’s purview, however, encompasses only existing, conventional cyber threats and does not extend to quantum computer attacks, whose effects would be far more protracted and far worse than those of a conventional cyberattack. Indeed, the “smarter” a grid is, that is, the greater the extent to which it relies on computer supervision and control, the more vulnerable it would be to such an attack. The shutdown resulting from an attack by a future quantum computer, with its unprecedented power to easily decrypt existing encryption systems, could be the most catastrophic disaster our country has ever experienced. Using data supplied by global econometrics firm Oxford Economics, researchers at Hudson Institute’s Quantum Alliance Initiative are conducting a quantitative study designed to model the impact of a hypothetical future quantum cyberattack on the US power grid, and preliminary results indicate that protection of our power networks needs to be an urgent national priority. The study’s preliminary results offer important clues as to the areas on which policymakers should focus, not only to secure our power and energy grid from a large-scale quantum computer attack but also, in the event this were to be unsuccessful, to mitigate such an attack’s impact on our infrastructure, both in terms of economic and national security. As Hudson Institute founder Herman Kahn wrote in his 1962 book Thinking About the Unthinkable, “Even the most utopian of today’s visionaries will have to concede that the mere existence of modern technology involves a risk to civilization that would have been unthinkable twenty-five years ago.” Today, we must once again consider the unthinkable, not the nuclear apocalypse that haunted Kahn and his generation in the 1950s and 1960s but a quantum apocalypse that, if not as physically and permanently destructive as a nuclear attack, could cause catastrophic harm to our economy and society unless proper steps are taken now to mitigate such an attack’s attendant risk.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Electricity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

256. Understanding the Encryption Debate in India

Author:
Anirudh Burman and Prateek Jha
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Encryption has become a contentious instrument for protecting the security and confidentiality of online communication. Rapid digitalization in the past decade has led to the proliferation of domestic and foreign online communication services that use encryption and, consequently, pose challenges to national security bodies and law enforcement agencies (LEAs). To address these challenges, the Indian government introduced new regulations in February 2021. These regulations require large social media platforms to enable traceability, or the ability to provide information concerning the originator of online communications. Technology companies and privacy activists have opposed such a move on the grounds that traceability would require the breaking of the end-to-end encryption used by many online communication platforms like WhatsApp and therefore would compromise the security of online communications on such platforms. This traceability requirement, however, is only the latest development in a drawn-out, contentious debate over the use of encryption. The contestation between maintaining higher degrees of online security and issuing new rules to grant technological exceptions for security agencies and LEAs is not specific to India. One of the first serious discussions on the issue took place in the United States in the 1990s, when public opposition warded off an early government attempt to sidestep encryption protections with a court order. In the past decade, the use of encryption has only grown more pronounced. The revelations that the United States’ National Security Agency was collecting vast amounts of communications data led to the introduction and increased adoption of end-to-end encryption for online communications. End-to-end encryption is now used widely by online communication platforms like WhatsApp, Signal, and Threema. Its use presents law enforcement and national security agencies with new challenges. Even though these agencies today have greater and easier access to more information than ever before, the absolute confidentiality provided by encrypted online communication platforms makes it harder for these agencies to engage in real-time surveillance to investigate crimes and identity wrongdoers. While some policymakers from India and other countries argue that encryption must only be weakened to solve specific problems, most experts agree that, as of today, there is no technological solution that would weaken encryption for specific law enforcement and national security purposes, while managing to maintain preexisting levels of security and confidentiality for general use. The introduction of any mechanism for specific access would, it is claimed, introduce both known and unknown vulnerabilities into these communications platforms. Such a mechanism would have a systemic effect on all online communication dependent on encryption for ensuring security and confidentiality. In India, these developments create challenges in specific ways. For example, India reports the highest number of child pornography cases worldwide, and encrypted communications makes it difficult to identify culpable parties. Similarly, as India has digitized rapidly, there has been a surfeit of fake and offensive online news that has, in some cases, led to mob lynchings. In addition, terrorist networks have been found to be using encrypted communication channels while planning and carrying out terrorist attacks in India. Over the years, the Indian government’s approach to encryption has responded to these concerns in a variety of ways. Indian financial regulators mandated the use of encryption for banking and financial services as they realized the security of such transactions was best protected through encryption. At the same time, the Indian government prohibited telecom operators from implementing bulk or mass encryption in telecommunication services. Starting in 2015, the government introduced different regulatory proposals requiring that messaging platforms and other communication service providers provide plaintext copies of communications to Indian government agencies on request. These proposals, however, faced significant opposition and were withdrawn. Earlier in 2021, the Indian government’s new rules requiring traceability have been officially notified. The mechanisms through which they will be implemented are not yet clear. It is also unclear if these rules are the last demands the Indian government will make to weaken encryption, or whether further demands will arise in the future. To weigh the relative benefits and drawbacks of the Indian government’s proposal, analysts should consider relevant factors such as (but not limited to) whether such changes will offer law enforcement officials the access they desire, how the security of encrypted communications will be affected, and how citizens’ civil liberties will be impacted, among others.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Science and Technology, Law Enforcement, Digitalization, and Encryption
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

257. Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy

Author:
Aaron Shull and Wesley Wark
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
This CIGI special report is a "cri de cœur" arguing for a new approach to national security strategy and honest, transparent engagement with the reality of the threats we face as a country. It outlines the key threats that we now confront: a vastly altered geopolitical environment with the rising power of China at its core, ongoing and future pandemic threats, climate change security impacts, uncontrolled technological change and the undermining of economic security. Meeting these threats requires a sovereign, made-in-Canada response that protects Canada’s democracy and national interest and that operates within an environment of informed public understanding. Canada must pivot to face looming global threats and can and must do so from a position of knowledge and strength. This special report is the culmination of a project unprecedented in scale and scope in Canada. Beginning in the fall of 2020, CIGI set out to mobilize a large and diverse set of Canadian and international experts to examine Canada’s national security landscape. The CIGI project, Reimagining a Canadian National Security Strategy, features the publication of this capstone report, authored by the project’s co-directors, alongside 10 thematic reports allowing for deeper dives into critical, present-day national security issues. This report makes a series of key policy recommendations to assist the Government of Canada in addressing the challenges of a new security environment.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

258. Taiwan’s Shifting Role in the Global Supply Chain in the U.S.- China Trade War

Author:
Jinji Chen, Hong-yu Lin, and Yi-ting Lien
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The U.S.-China trade war and the pandemic have had a profound impact on cross-border supply chains. In the past few years of U.S.-China tensions, China has been accused of engaging in unfair competition by abusing its national power, from trade and technology to COVID-19 responses. Amid such accusations, some countries have been stepping back from cooperating with China due to national security concerns. As the lockdowns have further disrupted value chains and highlighted the vulnerability of global supply chains, enhancing supply chain resilience has now become a national imperative for the U.S., Japan, and other countries, with an emphasis on strengthening their production capabilities in the semiconductor and medical care industries.
Topic:
Economics, National Security, Trade Wars, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

259. The Future of U.S. Supply Chains: National Security and the Pandemic

Author:
Troy Stangarone
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has been the most significant economic disruption to the international economy since the Great Depression. The IMF estimates that the global economy contracted by 3.5 percent last year, while the WTO has projected a 5.3 percent decline in global trade. The economic impact on the United States has been significant as well. Early in the pandemic the United States experienced shortages of critical medical supplies and products, while the need to social distance has continued to place restrictions on the overall economy. For 2020, the pandemic saw GDP decline by 2.3 percent, while exports fell by 12.9 percent and imports by 6.4 percent. All of this has resulted an increased focus on supply chains and their vulnerabilities.
Topic:
Economics, National Security, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

260. Trusted connectivity: A framework for a free, open, and connected world

Author:
Kaush Arha
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Global affairs are increasingly shaped by three important and overlapping trends: 1) the unprecedented and growing demand for trillions of dollars’ worth of global digital and physical infrastructure; 2) the ideological battle between democracy and autocracy for the best path forward to achieve peace and prosperity; and 3) the world’s response to changing climate. As democracies address the global demand for a free, open, and connected world while ensuring that local and global emissions targets are met, they need an organizing framework: the concept of “trusted connectivity.” Democratic governments and institutions function with intricate checks and balances to ensure public trust. Unchallenged aggregation of power is antithetical to democracies and instinctively distrusted by their citizens. While holding unimaginable promise, today’s advancements in digital and physical infrastructure also embody new opportunities for malign actors in general, and authoritarian governments in particular, to accumulate and wield this power. Malign influence or control over data, communications, trade routes, energy, and transportation, all of which becomes possible when countries accept infrastructure investments from authoritarian states, could open potential vectors for coercion, disruption, or attack in times of crisis or conflict. In order to deny malign actors this influence over other countries’ infrastructure, democracies need to work together to ensure that the benefits and terms for the host country in building a bridge, port, rail, road, or telecommunications network are equitable and transparent, thereby leading to greater trust and security in addition to economic prosperity. US President Joseph R. Biden, Jr., rallied the world’s leading democracies behind this cause at the Group of Seven (G7) summit in June 2021 in Cornwall, England. The G7 nations, comprising the world’s leading free economies and free societies, proclaimed that, as they aim to meet global infrastructure demand, among other goals, their efforts will be guided by shared democratic values. For China, the standard-bearer of an alternate, illiberal model, infrastructure investment serves a different purpose: to increase China’s global economic leverage for its political gain. To prevail in this competition, advance their values, and develop much-needed digital and physical infrastructure, the world’s leading democracies should adopt the principle of trusted connectivity.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America