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211. US Export Control of Emerging Technologies

Author:
Yoshiaki Takayama
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
Competition among great powers is accelerating moves to review international interdependence from the perspectives of foreign policy and national security. Since 2019, the US Department of Commerce has introduced export control of emerging technologies, in essence managing international interdependence based on foreign policy and security logic. With the above in mind, this report examines the US government's export control of emerging technologies and its implications.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Power Politics, and Exports
Political Geography:
United States of America

212. Manufactured Crisis: “Deindustrialization,” Free Markets, and National Security

Author:
Scott Lincicome
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Both the American left and right often use “national security” to justify sweeping proposals for new U.S. protectionism and industrial policy. “Free markets” and a lack of government support for the manufacturing sector are alleged to have crippled the U.S. defense industrial base’s ability to supply “essential” goods during war or other emergencies, thus imperiling national security and demanding a fundamental rethink of U.S. trade and manufacturing policy. The COVID-19 crisis and U.S.-China tensions have amplified these claims. This resurgent “security nationalism,” however, extends far beyond the limited theoretical scenarios in which national security might justify government action, and it suffers from several flaws. First, reports of the demise of the U.S. manufacturing sector are exaggerated. Although U.S. manufacturing sector employment and share of national economic output (gross domestic product) have declined, these data are mostly irrelevant to national security and reflect macroeconomic trends affecting many other countries. By contrast, the most relevant data—on the U.S. manufacturing sector’s output, exports, financial performance, and investment—show that the nation’s total productive capacity and most of the industries typically associated with “national security” are still expanding. Second, “security nationalism” assumes a need for broad and novel U.S. government interventions while ignoring the targeted federal policies intended to support the defense industrial base. In fact, many U.S. laws already authorize the federal government to support or protect discrete U.S. industries on national security grounds. Third, several of these laws and policies provide a cautionary tale regarding the inefficacy of certain core “security nationalist” priorities. Case studies of past government support for steel, shipbuilding, semiconductors, and machine tools show that security‐​related protectionism and industrial policy in the United States often undermines national security. Fourth, although the United States is not nearly as open (and thus allegedly “vulnerable”) to external shocks as claimed, global integration and trade openness often bolster U.S. national security by encouraging peace among trading nations or mitigating the impact of domestic shocks. Together, these points rebut the most common claims in support of “security nationalism” and show why skepticism of such initiatives is necessary when national security is involved. They also reveal market‐​oriented trade, immigration, tax, and regulatory policies that would generally benefit the U.S. economy while also supporting the defense industrial base and national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, COVID-19, Free Market, and Deindustrialization
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

213. Protectionism or National Security? The Use and Abuse of Section 232

Author:
Scott Lincicome and Inu Manak
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
With several Section 232 tariffs still in place, and the status of other investigations unclear, the law presents an early test for the Biden administration and a signal about its future trade policy plans. President Biden took office at the height of modern American protectionism. The trade policy legacy he inherited from the Trump administration puts the United States at a crossroads. Will Biden go down the problematic path of executive overreach like his predecessor, or will he forge a new path? We may not need to wait long to find out. In his first trade action, President Biden reinstated tariffs on aluminum from the United Arab Emirates under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which authorizes the president to impose tariffs when a certain product is “being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair national security.” Though infrequently used in the past, Section 232 was a favored trade tool of the Trump administration, which was responsible for nearly a quarter of all Section 232 investigations initiated since 1962. While Congress has constitutional authority over trade policy, Section 232 gives the president broad discretion to enact protectionist measures in the name of national security. Why is this law a problem? First, the statute’s lack of an objective definition of “national security” permits essentially anything to be considered a threat, regardless of the merits. Second, the law’s lack of detailed procedural requirements encouraged the Trump administration to cut corners in applying the law, thus breeding cronyism and confusion. Third, President Trump took advantage of the law’s ambiguity to shield key Section 232 findings from Congress and the public, undermining both transparency and accountability. The Trump administration’s abuse of the rarely used Section 232 has allowed the statute to become an excuse for blatant commercial protectionism, harming American companies and consumers and our security interests. It’s unclear whether the Biden administration will continue this troubling trend or seek reform. The best course of action would be the latter: Biden should avoid using Section 232 and support congressional efforts to rein in presidential power, thus ensuring an end to the calamitous episodes that were common during the Trump era.
Topic:
National Security, Trade Policy, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

214. Policy Papers by Women of Color: A New Normal: Redefining National Security Beyond 2020

Author:
Maritza T. Adonis, Heather Ashby, Amber A. Demery, Heather Yang Hwalek, and Pratima T. Narayan
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:
It is with great pleasure that I bring you the latest edition of the Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS) Policy Papers. Looking back to when we began the WCAPS publications, the original goal was to highlight the expertise and the viewpoints of women of color on issues of peace, security, conflict transformation, and foreign policy. It was also to open the door to an opportunity for women of color to be published. What I have observed during my many years in Washington is that it is often challenging for women of color to be published. Many times, I have been asked “how do I get published,” in a space that has left out many women of color. One of the goals of WCAPS is to open doors for women of color that have been closed before. I wanted to ensure we are represented in all the different forums of policy change that exist. I was happy when we began to work on our first publications in 2019 that led to three simultaneous publications in February 2020. Since that time, we not only published the Policy Papers by Women of Color as an ongoing policy journal, but reports, op-ed, statements, and many other articles by WCAPS members. I am happy to see our members now being sought for writing and publications in the fields of peace, security, conflict transformation, and foreign policy. In so many ways, WCAPS is becoming an organization increasingly relied upon to provide authors, as well as experts, panelists, mentors, speakers, and more. WCAPS is also sought after for its members to join other organizations, and WCAPS members are increasingly in positions and roles that were not previously open to young girls and women of color. Once again, WCAPS and women of color are leading the way. We will continue to do so.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Women, Feminism, Peace, WPS, Girls, and Women of Color
Political Geography:
Global Focus

215. Mitigating the risk of a China–India conflict

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
More than a year has passed since Chinese troops began to occupy previously Indian-controlled territory on their disputed border in Ladakh. The crisis has cooled and settled into a stalemate. This report warns that it could escalate again, and flare into a conflict with region-wide implications. The report assesses the risk of conflict by analysing its likelihood and consequences. A possible war would be costly for both India and China. But a possible war could also risk stirring Indian distrust of its new partners, especially in the Quad – Australia, Japan, and the United States. The report outlines some conditions under which a war would disrupt or dampen those developing partnerships. The report concludes by offering a framework for policymakers to shape India’s expectations and the strategic environment before and during a possible war.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China, India, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

216. Exfiltrate, encrypt, extort

Author:
Rachael Falk and Anne-Louise Brown
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As the Covid-19 pandemic has swept across the world, another less visible epidemic has occurred concurrently—a tsunami of cybercrime producing global losses totalling more than US$1 trillion. While cybercrime is huge in scale and diverse in form, there’s one type that presents a unique threat to businesses and governments the world over: ransomware. Some of the most spectacular ransomware attacks have occurred offshore, but Australia hasn’t been immune. Over the past 18 months, major logistics company Toll Holdings Ltd has been hit twice; Nine Entertainment was brought to its knees by an attack that left the company struggling to televise news bulletins and produce newspapers; multiple health and aged-care providers across the country have been hit; and global meat supplies were affected after the Australian and international operations of the world’s largest meat producer, JBS Foods, were brought to a standstill. It’s likely that other organisations have also been hit but have kept it out of the public spotlight. A current policy vacuum makes Australia an attractive market for these attacks, and ransomware is a problem that will only get worse unless a concerted and strategic domestic effort to thwart the attacks is developed. Developing a strategy now is essential. Not only are Australian organisations viewed as lucrative targets due to their often low cybersecurity posture, but they’re also seen as soft targets. The number of attacks will continue to grow unless urgent action is taken to reduce the incentives to target Australian companies and other entities.
Topic:
Crime, National Security, Cybersecurity, Internet, Information Technology, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

217. An Australian DARPA to turbocharge universities’ national security research: securely managed Defence-funded research partnerships in Five-Eyes universities

Author:
Robert Clark and Peter Jennings
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
More than at any time since World War II, science and technology (S&T) breakthroughs are dramatically redesigning the global security outlook. Australia’s university sector now has a vital role to play in strengthening Australia’s defence. In this paper, we propose establishing a formal partnership between the Defence Department, defence industry and Australian universities. There’s a significant opportunity to boost international defence S&T research cooperation with our Five-Eyes partners: the US, UK, Canada and New Zealand. We outline how this can be done. Central to this partnership proposal is the need to restructure current arrangements for Defence funding of Australian universities via the creation of an Australian Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)— based on the highly successful American model, which the UK plans to emulate in 2022. In Australia, implementing these initiatives will contribute significantly to a vital restructuring of the university sector’s research funding model. An Australian DARPA, with robustly managed security, will enhance research ‘cut-through’ in the defence sector and the wider economy. We think it’s also vital that this work, underpinned by a DARPA-like culture of urgency and innovation and with potential to affect several portfolios beyond Defence, needs to be championed at the government level. In the modern Australian system of government, that means the Prime Minister needs to be directly involved. Urgent means urgent. At least for the first few years of its life, an Australian DARPA should, in our view, report through Defence to the Prime Minister and the National Security Committee of Cabinet.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Partnerships, Research, and Academia
Political Geography:
Australia

218. Digital government services. Building for peak demand.

Author:
Tom Uren
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Early in the Covid-19 pandemic, the myGov website was overwhelmed by a demand surge from citizens seeking to rapidly access digital services. In 2016, the online Census (eCensus) suffered a series of relatively small distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. While they didn’t overwhelm the platform, the attacks ultimately resulted in the eCensus being taken offline. What do these two examples have in common, and what lessons should we learn to ensure more robust digital government services? To answer those questions, this paper will examine five points: The nature of the DDoS attacks The CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) triad model for digital security How to predict demand How to respond to unpredictable demand The structure of reliable data systems
Topic:
Government, National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

219. 'Lead me to the harbour!': Plotting Darwin Harbour's future course

Author:
John Coyne and Teagan Westendorf
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In this report, authors Dr John Coyne and Dr Teagan Westendorf seek to move Australia’s public policy discourse on the future of Darwin Port beyond a binary choice. In doing so, they consider the Harbour’s history, the nature of its strategic importance to Australia and our allies, and opportunities for its future development. The report explores four potential options for the future development of the Port and Harbour. Rather than providing a specific policy treatment on the current leasing arrangements, this work focuses on promoting policy discourse on a unifying vision for the future of Darwin Harbour. A key insight from this analysis is that this moment is an opportunity for the federal government to work with the Northern Territory Government to harness the existing plans for the Port’s future, including those proposed by Defence, the US and the NT Government, and embed those plans within the broader strategic vision for Australia moving forward. While each of these worthy plans undoubtedly has merit, the question is whether, by carefully harnessing them together, they could produce a greater economic and national security whole.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Infrastructure, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Australia

220. Losing our agnosticism. How to make Australia’s foreign influence laws work

Author:
Daniel Ward
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Country agnosticism, under which Australia’s laws treat all foreign influence efforts in the same way, regardless of their source country, is the key failing of Australia’s statutory response to foreign governments’ influence activities. It has imposed sweeping, unnecessary regulatory costs. It has caused waste of taxpayer-funded enforcement resources. It has diverted those resources from the issues that really matter. And it has brought unnecessary legal complexity. Yet for all that, nobody believes that the laws are truly country agnostic. Not the Australian media, which routinely describe them as ‘aimed at’ China. Nor, presumably, the media’s audience. Nor, certainly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which regards itself as the target, explicitly citing the laws as a key grievance. Perhaps the greatest cost of country agnosticism is that the current statutory framework isn’t as effective as it needs to be. Why? In adopting a country-agnostic stance, we blinded ourselves to the very factor that matters most in evaluating and responding to foreign influence—its source country. It’s time to remove the blindfold. We should recognise this basic truth: foreign influence transparency requirements must be more stringent in relation to some source countries than others.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Asia-Pacific