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11. Jordan’s Escalating Border Threats Amid Regional Upheaval

Author:
Abdullah Hayek and Ahmad Sharawi
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
On January 8, the Royal Jordanian Air Force conducted strikes against suspected drug dealers and warehouses in Syria, their fourth such operation in recent months. The strikes occurred amid military reports of increased smuggling attempts—primarily involving drugs, but also weapons—across the kingdom’s northern border. Between January and August 2023 alone, a total of 194 smuggling and infiltration attempts were recorded, 88 of them involving drones. Some cross-border incidents have resulted in clashes with Jordanian security personnel, including three recent episodes: a December 12 clash in which one soldier was killed; a December 18 battle that lasted more than ten hours and marked the first seizure of antitank weaponry on the border; and a January 6 clash in which five smugglers were killed and fifteen arrested. Jordanian military officials attribute each of these attempts to pro-Iran proxy groups in Syria. Moreover, the increasingly advanced arms that smugglers are using—including rocket-propelled grenades, mines, and drones—have led Jordanian officials to conclude that these criminal endeavors pose a wider threat to national security. Greater U.S. assistance would reinforce the kingdom’s efforts to address this threat at a time of wider regional crisis.
Topic:
National Security, Border Control, Syrian War, Borders, Drug Trafficking, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Jordan

12. Factsheet: Operation Luxor

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Operation Luxor was a large-scale police operation involving 940 officers targeting dozens of individuals and businesses that took place on November 9, 2020, in Austria. The government claimed the action aimed to “cut off the roots of political Islam.” In 2021, an Austrian court ruled that the raids were unlawful. In the three years since the raids, not a single person has been arrested or convicted. This “textbook example of governing with crime and fear” was conducted under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, who was known for his anti-Muslim policies.
Topic:
National Security, Islamophobia, Police, and Operation Luxor
Political Geography:
Europe and Austria

13. The Evolving Landscape of U.S. Economic Security: The Confluence of Trade, Technology, and National Security

Author:
Andrea Viski
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the current evolution of U.S. economic security discourse to demonstrate the implications, challenges, and shortcomings of U.S. economic security tools and the catalyzing impact of technology. While component economic security considerations are broad and encompass issues from natural disaster planning to cybersecurity, this paper focuses specifically on the impact of trade and technology in the economic security context. It discusses the main influences and features of U.S. economic security policy as it relates to trade, technology, and the security of the supply chain. The paper includes sections on evolving notions of the dual-use concept; the need to manage and respond to technology flows with more effective strategies, and new foreign policy efforts and tools to strengthen economic security. The paper focuses on the trends forging the path for the United States to define economic security so closely with national security, and in exploring these trends, it delineates how the United States has implemented policies and adopted, reoriented, or created new policy tools designed to strengthen economic security. The paper also explores why the rapid evolution of emerging technologies has played such a defining role. Finally, the paper examines the effectiveness of the U.S. approach to economic security and its challenges and offers insights into how it can be strengthened in the future
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Is Economic Security National Security? Defining South Korea’s Economic Security for Future Industries

Author:
June Park
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper explores how South Korea defines “economic security.” Amidst geopolitical turbulence, the framing of this concept by governments and policy circles around the globe is reflective of the changes in the global economy post-pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine, two critical junctures that have revealed the geo-economic impact of weaponized interdependence. While the Biden administration has laid out U.S. policy intent to combine national security with economic security, specifically on future industries of dual-use nature ranging from chips to EVs, batteries, and generative AI, countries that are on the receiving end of policy implementation are formulating their response to the shifting geoeconomics. This paper unravels South Korea’s framing of economic security and policy response by analyzing legislation on future industries that is critical to the country’s economic growth and standing and the concerted efforts by the state bureaucracy and industry in shaping the concept. The paper draws specifically upon semiconductors in addition to other future industries that are central to the South Korean economy and related legislation in the South Korean National Assembly. It argues that South Korea’s policy response and framing of its economic security has more to do with the protection of industries for the future amid geopolitical turbulence and the reshuffling of global supply chains than traditional security issues related to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Moreover, public anxiety on the pressures toward U.S.-driven trilateral cooperation reveals concerns on a possible backlash from China and the lagging potential of Japan in future industries.
Topic:
National Security, Geopolitics, Industry, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

15. China’s Perspective on Economic Security

Author:
Audrye Wong
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines how Beijing views economic security as well as other countries’ actions in this realm. Economic security is not a new or foreign concept to Chinese thinkers and policymakers, but the emphases, concerns, and priorities have evolved, due in part to changes in the international environment as well as in China’s own economic and geopolitical situation. This paper examines how Chinese leaders and scholars have approached the definition and scope of economic security, as well as recent and proposed policy responses. It draws on a range of Chinese-language official documents and scholarly writings, as well as broader secondary source analyses. The paper explores that while Chinese discussions of economic security tend to be framed as ensuring economic development and stability, development is implicitly and explicitly linked to national security. Many writings emphasize that economics is the foundation for national strength (including military capabilities). As such, it is more than just economic survival and growth for the economy’s sake; it also has implications for China’s geopolitical position in the international order. In that respect, economic stability and national security may be hard to separate. Indeed, we see a resurgence in today’s rhetoric about the notions of development and security as inextricably linked, along with the need to coordinate the two—and in service of maintaining CCP rule and regime stability. Finally, the paper shows Beijing is taking concrete steps toward increased legalization and institutionalization of economic security measures. This represents a shift, at least in the domain of retaliatory countermeasures, from its usually more “informal” approach to economic coercion, which has afforded more flexibility and minimized political costs for the regime. At the same time, actual implementation has been relatively limited thus far.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, National Security, Trade Wars, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China and Asia

16. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment

Author:
Gregory Weaver and Amy Woolf
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
After decades of seeking to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, the United States is now grappling with a global landscape marked by intense strategic competition and the growing salience of nuclear weapons—problems that will likely persist for years to come. Over the past year, Russia compounded its aggression in Ukraine with nuclear saber-rattling, modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces over the past decade. Furthermore, Russia’s possession of a substantial inventory of theater nuclear weapons continues to threaten regional deterrence. Meanwhile, in Asia, Beijing is pursuing an unprecedented surge in its nuclear capabilities. If current trends persist, China is projected to possess about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035.1 While China was once viewed as a secondary nuclear power, its substantial investment in its nuclear arsenal—including the launch of a third ballistic missile early-warning satellite in 2022 and advancements in land-based ballistic missiles, aircraft, submarines, and hypersonic missiles—positions China to become a near-equal nuclear power in the coming decade. These trends mark a historic shift. For the first time in its history, the United States must face two near-peer nuclear competitors simultaneously. At the same time, Russia’s suspension of its compliance with the New START agreement in 2023 has significantly weakened the last strategic arms control framework established in the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. This move leaves scant provisions governing the future of nuclear capabilities among the United States and its adversaries. For over half a century, Washington and Moscow negotiated to establish treaties that imposed limits on their nuclear arsenals, aiming to manage their nuclear rivalry and mitigate the risk of nuclear conflict. This process served the national security interests of both sides by curbing weapons and activities that could jeopardize deterrence, safeguarding strategic stability, offering insights into nuclear capacities, and potentially steering military competition toward less perilous avenues. However, shifts in the global security landscape have altered this calculus. The Russian Federation, much like the Soviet Union before it, has insisted that future agreements factor in the nuclear capabilities of Britain and France. On the other hand, the United States now confronts a security environment featuring two nuclear-armed adversaries—Russia and China—whose forces will potentially pose significant threats to the United States and its allies. This evolving security landscape may prompt the United States to reevaluate its assessments of its deterrence and arms control requirements. But how should the United States approach this problem?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

17. Who’s a national security risk? The changing transatlantic geopolitics of data transfers

Author:
Kenneth Propp
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The geopolitics of transatlantic data transfers have been unvarying for the past decade. European governments criticize the US National Security Agency (NSA) for exploiting personal data moving from Europe to the United States for commercial reasons. The US government responds, through a series of arrangements with the European Union, by providing assurances that NSA collection is not disproportionate, and that Europeans have legal avenues if they believe their data has been illegally used. Although the arrangements have not proven legally stable, on the whole they have sufficed to keep data flowing via subsea cables under the Atlantic Ocean. Now the locus of national security concerns about international data transfers has shifted from Brussels to Washington. The Biden administration and the US Congress, in a series of bold measures, are moving aggressively to interrupt certain cross-border data flows, notably to China and Russia. The geopolitics of international data flows remain largely unchanged in Europe, however. European data protection authorities have been mostly noncommittal about the prospect of Russian state surveillance collecting Europeans’ personal data. Decisions on whether to transfer European data to Russia and China remain in the hands of individual companies. Will Washington’s new focus on data transfers to authoritarian states have an impact in Europe? Will Europe continue to pay more attention to the surveillance activities of its liberal democratic allies, especially the United States? Is there a prospect of Europe and the United States aligning on the national security risks of transfers to authoritarian countries?
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

18. Civilizational War: The Will to Win

Author:
Andrey Ilnitsky
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
The US National Security Strategy defines the US as a global hegemon that sees no dividing lines between domestic and foreign policies and treats the world as its sphere of interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, National Security, War, Hegemony, Ideology, Civilization, Deep State, and Generative Models
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

19. Tailored Deterrence Strategy on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Gary Samore
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the most significant change in the international strategic environment has been the reemergence of a great power rivalry between the U.S. and its European and Asian allies on one hand and Russia and China on the other. This trend began in the second term of President Obama, with the Russian invasion of Crimea in early 2014 and the Chinese construction of a network of military bases in the South China Sea beginning around 2013. Since then, the trend has sharpened. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has locked the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies against Russia in a long-term struggle for the survival of Ukraine and future of European security. In Asia, tensions between Beijing and Washington have become worse, as both the Trump and Biden admіnistrations pursued economic measures against China, and as China appears to be building military options to unify Taiwan and the mainland by force. The reemergence of great power rivalry has important nuclear dimensions, increasing concerns about “strategic stability” – the nuclear balance among the great powers – and the risk of nuclear conflict. The Ukraine war has lowered the nuclear threshold. Russia has deployed tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus and threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons to discourage NATO intervention or assistance to Ukraine. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) - the last remaining arms control treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals - expires in February 2026, and Russia has refused U.S. offers to negotiate a new treaty as long as the U.S. is assisting Ukraine. In the meantime, Russia continues to develop an array of exotic nuclear delivery systеms intended to overcome U.S. missile defenses, including hypersonic reentry vehicles, nuclear-armed submarine drones, and nuclear anti-satellite weapons. China is pursuing an unprecedented nuclear build-up, including new strategic bombers, more advanced nuclear-armed submarines, and three new missile bases with more than 300 silos for solid fuel ICBMs with multiple reentry vehicles. According to U.S. Department of Defense estimates, China has more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May 2023 and will “probably have over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030” (U.S. Department of Defense 2023a). Like Russia, China is also pursuing hypersonic reentry vehicles, anti-satellite weapons, and strategic cyber operations. Some analysts fear that China’s nuclear build-up will make it more confident that it can deter U.S. intervention in the face of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or increase the risk that a U.S.-China confrontation over Taiwan will escalate to nuclear use. To address the reemergence of great power threats, the U.S. has introduced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and “integrated deterrence” into its nuclear doctrine. According to the Trump admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review, released in February 2018, The United States will apply a tailored and flexible approach to effectively deter across a spectrum of adversaries, threats, and contexts. Tailored deterrence strategies communicate to different potential adversaries that their aggression would carry unacceptable risks and intolerable costs according to their particular calculations of risk and cost (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018). The tailored deterrence concept was also adopted by the Biden admіnistration in its October 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, saying, Central to U.S. deterrence strategy is the credibility of our nuclear forces to hold at risk what adversary leadership values most. Effectively deterring – and restoring deterrence if necessary – requires tailored strategies for potential adversaries that reflect our best understanding of their decision-making and perceptions (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2022). Building on the concept of tailored deterrence, the Biden admіnistration Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) also introduced the concept of “integrated deterrence,” which is based on the idea that traditional nuclear deterrence can be reinforced by non-nuclear capabilities. According to the NPR, The role of nuclear weapons is well established and embedded in strategic deterrence policy and plans. Non-nuclear capabilities may be able to complement nuclear forces in strategic deterrence plans and operations in ways that are suited to their attributes and consistent with policy on how they are to be employed. A pragmatic approach to integrated deterrence will seek to determine how the Joint Force can combine nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities in complementary ways that leverage the unique attributes of a multi-domain set of forces to enable a range of deterrence options backstopped by a credible nuclear deterrent (Ibid.).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

20. The trade routes vital to Australia’s economic security

Author:
David Uren
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Arecurrent theme in Australia’s defence strategy has been our reliance on and need to defend Australia’s trade routes in a globalised world. The vulnerability of Australia’s limited stockpiles of critical goods and its concentrated sources of supply have driven military capability and planning for decades and remain a justification for strategic investments. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review argued that the danger of any power threatening to invade the Australian continent was remote, but that an adversary could implement military coercion at a distance with threats against our trade and supply routes. With limited resources and finite defence capability, yet vast interests at sea, it’s important that Australian security and economic planning is trained on the most critical pain points in our sea lines of communication. Strategy and planning must derive from up-to-date and accurate data about what we trade, via which routes, and to and from which specific locations. We also need to understand the factors that contribute to our resilience. They include the depth of supply options, the availability of alternative routes and the sheer strength in numbers which our shipping enjoys when it enters the mighty flow of commerce through the waters of our Asian trading partners. This report explores our trading routes in peace-time. Any conflict would bring sharper focus on what shipping and what trade is truly necessary and on what can be done to secure it. However, the strengths and vulnerabilities of our linkages to the world are evident now and are the focus of this report. Concerns have been sharpened by the assaults by Houthi militias on commercial shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, disrupting the 12% of global trade that passes through those waters.2 In addition, drought has slashed the capacity of the Panama Canal, which in normal seasons handles a further 5% of world trade. Surprisingly, the course and operation (who is moving what) of Australia’s trade routes has received extraordinarily little analysis. The last significant public paper on the topic was conducted by the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics (now the Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics, BITRE) in 2007 and was based on data from 2001 to 2004. The profile of Australia’s trade has changed radically since then. This report makes five key policy recommendations and the first of these is that the government fund BITRE to update its 2007 study of trade routes so that Defence can make assessments of how best to secure Australia’s trade routes. A dangerous combination of complacency and tolerance could be born of a view that conflicts are in faraway locations. The reality is that few saw either of the current wars as imminent when they started, and we mustn’t make the same mistake in our region. A central finding in this report is that the greatest risk to the security of our trade routes lies relatively close to home, in the narrow channels through the Indonesian archipelago through which more than half Australia’s maritime trade must pass. Another strong conclusion is that trade has a surprising resilience in the face of conflict: it is important to understand the sources of that strength and develop plans to maximise it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Australia