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441. Germany and the World of Yesterday

Author:
Leon Mangasarian
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the past six decades, the four pillars of Germany’s post-World War II security model were built and expanded: NATO, the European Union, trans-Atlanticism and free trade. This gave Germans their longest period of peace, making them fantastically rich as the world’s fourth biggest economy. Can Germany’s view of itself as a ‘big Switzerland’ be sustained? Leon Mangasarian argues not. The Biden presidency is providing Germans with a false sense of security, one which means that Germany will fail to build the appropriate policies and NATO alliances Germany desperately needs in order to build a grand strategy of its place in Europe. If that debate is not led by the chancellery then it needs to come from the Bundestag, from the country’s expanding think tank community, the universities and citizen fora.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, Economy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

442. NATO and the Future Character of Warfare

Author:
Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in June 2021 on ‘Warfare in the 21st Century: Views from NATO Members on the Future Character of Warfare’. Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Colonel John Andreas Olsen, James Sherr, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, Karsten Friis, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, Professor Rolf Tamnes, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
Topic:
NATO, Science and Technology, War, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Global Focus

443. Renewing the U.S.-European Partnership in the Post-Trump Era

Author:
Renee M. Earle
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
In June, European leaders rolled out a plush (some have said “gush”) welcome mat for President Biden when he arrived for G7, NATO, and U.S.-EU meetings with his message that America was back to strengthen alliances. Broad smiles among participating leaders trumpeted similar world views and were in sharp contrast with the sour notes of unpredictable meetings with President Trump. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen conveyed the general warm embrace for the U.S. prodigal son: “Well, Mr. President, dear Joe, we are so pleased to welcome you in Brussels,” von der Leyen said. “You are back in Brussels and America is back on the global scene. It’s great news. It’s great news for our alliance. It’s also great news for the world. And we are really delighted to work with you to tackle together some global challenges.” Upbeat communiqués following the meetings with NATO and the EU outlined a staggering number of areas of transatlantic cooperation, from geopolitical engagement to trade, climate, and cybersecurity. Even the European Parliament expressed optimism in an opinion indicating great expectations for U.S.-EU cooperation with a detailed list of tasks, not least deliverables for the upcoming WTO ministerial meeting at the end of the year, such as “the green and digital transition; a fisheries agreement; a declaration on trade and health; work programmes for the reform of the Dispute Settlement Body for industrial subsidies and state-owned enterprises; and negotiations on electronic commerce.”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, European Union, Partnerships, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

444. Russian New and Experimental Nuclear-Capable Missiles: A Short Primer

Author:
Christopher Mihal
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Russia has tested a wide variety of new weapon systems in an effort to modernize and upgrade its nuclear forces. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not been shy about publicly discussing these new weapon systems or the capabilities of several of them, though a few are not currently feasible for any sort of deployment. More of a threat, however, are the two weapons that Putin did not boast about: the SSC8 and SSC-X-31, both of which were almost certainly in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. While these missiles represent a threat in and of themselves, a far greater threat is the indication that Russia does not feel bound by international agreements. These missiles have already had their first successful casualty in the death of the INF Treaty, and they may have also dealt a mortal blow to the New START Treaty. To adequately understand Russia’s new nuclear arsenal, one must simultaneously look at the weapon systems themselves as well as the context in which they are being developed. Russia continues to view both the U.S. and NATO as supreme existential threats. Unfortunately for Russia, both the U.S. and NATO have greater military, political, and economic power, and so Russia has long sought avenues to achieve its national objectives without conventional military confrontation.386 Russia has turned to two primary means of ensuring supremacy: enhancing its nuclear arsenal, which it views as a powerful deterrent that is cheaper to maintain than a large conventional military, as well as ‘hybrid’ war, which encompasses a number of techniques just shy of war including cyber warfare, informatsionaya voyna (information warfare) and a large amount of maskirovka (deception) in both military and non-military realms.387 Putin has emphasized information control and manipulation since coming to power, ranging from direct methods such as election interference and masking the identity of irregular forces in Ukraine, to more subtle methods of dezinformatsiya (disinformation), of which the exaggerated capabilities of Russia’s new nuclear weapons are prime examples. Dezinformatsiya is using false or misleading information and disseminating it to credible news outlets. This causes opponents to either act upon the incorrect information, thus wasting time and resources, or it undermines the credibility of the news outlet when it is proven false.388 Both of these goals of dezinformatsiya are being met with the current furor regarding Russia’s new nuclear weapons. This primer aims to dispel some of the false or misleading claims regarding these weapons and present a factual foundation from which to react to Russia’s new weapon developments and how they fit into Russia’s strategic vision.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

445. European Security Seminar EU – NATO Cooperation: Seminar Report

Author:
Sebastian von Münchow and Matthew Rhodes
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
From January 11-15,2021, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies conducted for the first time a European Security Seminar (ESS) on EU-NATO cooperation. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the seminar took place virtually. Fifty-eight participants from twenty-seven countries attended the event via online seminars. The participants represented EU and NATO member states, countries that are solely NATO or EU members, non-aligned states, as well as befriended countries, and countries along Europe’s southeast and eastern flanks. A little more than two-thirds of the attendees were civilian officials; approximately one-third of the participants were female. The major goals of the ESS were to understand the new impetus and substance of EU-NATO strategic partnership, to explore selected areas where cooperation between EU and NATO organizations should be enhanced, and to identify how NATO, the EU, Germany, and U.S. can strengthen the capacity and capability of its neighbors, potential EU and NATO partners, while being mindful of constant hostile interferences by revisionist powers and the multi-faceted challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic presents to societies. To this end, the Marshall Center organized seven units of panels and lectures with experts and senior officials from the Brussels-based institutions as well as national governments, followed by outcome-oriented seminars for smaller groups. The Chatham House Rule (i.e. non-attribution of any statements made) was respected throughout the course.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

446. European defence: Specialisation by capability groups

Author:
Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In many professions specialisation is regarded as a virtue. In a hospital the surgeon, the anaesthetist and the nurse have specialised skills. Together they engage in teamwork to cure patients. Yet, when it comes to defence, specialisation has a negative connotation. Contrary to the hospital’s operating theatre, dependency on each other’s armed forces is regarded as a serious, if not unacceptable risk, as a country has to be able to defend itself without relying on capabilities to be provided by other states. In reality, however, interdependence is a fact: European countries have relied on the nuclear deterrent of the United States since the 1950s and with regard to conventional forces, no single European country can provide all necessary capabilities. The question is how European interdependence can be made more effective. The answer must partly lie in specialisation. This Policy Brief addresses specialisation in security and defence from the perspective of the ‘Team Europe’ approach of distributing tasks and operating with varying coalitions of European countries in order to make the EU (and in this case also NATO) more effective. It presents a model of structuring European armed forces in specialised groups – an idea that has been proposed in a Clingendael report published earlier this year. First, the Policy Brief lays out the playing field by explaining the model of European capability groups. Next, several options for European capability groups will be proposed. It concludes with listing the implications for the Netherlands.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Specialization
Political Geography:
Europe

447. Turkey's Nuclear Future

Author:
Assa Ophir
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope Dr. Assa Ophir discusses the implications of Turkish efforts to potentially become a state with an independent nuclear program.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

448. The Case for EU Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Siena Cicarelli, and James Lamond
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
U.S. opposition to EU defense efforts since the 1990s has been a strategic mistake that has undermined both the EU and NATO. It’s time for a new U.S. approach that encourages ambitious EU defense strategies.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

449. Agenda OTAN 2030 y Concepto Estratégico 2022

Author:
Carmen Romero
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El momento crítico que atraviesa la seguridad europea tras la agresión de Rusia contra Ucrania ha alterado el entorno estratégico y obliga a la Alianza Atlántica a repensar su posición. Sunuevo concepto estratégico a aprobar en 2022 está marcado por este hecho histórico. Si bien, esta nueva estrategia está guiada a su vez por la Agenda OTAN 2030, adoptada en 2019, que establece una serie de principios como guía: unidad, defensa colectiva, resiliencia, salvaguarda de las infraestructuras y superioridad tecnológica. Así, este ensayo estratégico quiere reflexionar sobre este proceso para que la Alianza y la OTAN sean claves en la defensa del orden de seguridad internacional. Con este fin,analiza las claves de dicho entorno y cómo la organización pretende responder a esos desafíos, lo que tiene evidentes y potenciales implicaciones para España.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

450. The Origins of Russian Conduct

Author:
Clint Reach
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
In 1947 George Kennan argued for a policy of U.S. containment of the Soviet Union based on his assessment of the origins of Soviet conduct. Because the Kremlin was ideologically bent on global domination through a zero-sum competition with the West, political accommodation was not an appropriate strategy. Fifty years after the “X” article appeared, Kennan saw in the Russian Federation a wholly different animal than its Soviet predecessor. Russia was in the early stages of democracy, and its development should be shepherded by a magnanimous West. Based on this updated view of Russia, Kennan asserted that the enlargement of NATO would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.”1 Implicit in Kennan’s argument was that the nature of the new Russian regime was not inherently antagonistic toward the United States and the West. There was not an underlying ideology or feature of the new political and economic system that led him to conclude that confrontation with Russia was unavoidable or that cooperation was impossible. This assumption turned out to be one of the critical dividing lines in the debate on how to deal with the Russians after the Cold War, and it is implicitly found in discourse on Russia policy that continues to this day.2 What are the origins of Russian conduct? Has Russian domestic and foreign policy predominantly been the result of misguided U.S. and European actions? Would the Kremlin have behaved differently if these policies had been more accommodating to Russia as a separate but equal partner in European integration? As in 1947, the answers to these questions are directly tied to current and future U.S. policy toward Russia. Those who believe Russian conduct is largely a reaction to Western actions that threaten Russia’s core strategic interests are likely to promote policies guided by a sense of compromise.3 Those who believe Russia would have acted similarly even if NATO had been disbanded or if the West had been more sensitive to Russian interests likely support a tougher military and diplomatic line with Russia and will be less interested in engagement. Yet there is rarely a full examination of the underlying reasons for promoting a particular approach.4 It is often taken as a given that we can do business with Russia or we cannot. To develop an optimal strategy toward Russia, it is important to clearly articulate a reasoning for coming to one conclusion or the other. Kennan’s reasoning was that Russia in the 1990s was on a path toward becoming a member of the European project. Russian embrace of Western political norms would mitigate the potential for the reemergence of dividing lines and the need for American security guarantees in areas of historical Russian influence. The United States, however, was considering actions that would derail this process by fomenting nationalist and militaristic sentiments within Russia that might otherwise be marginalized due to the lack of a legitimate Western threat. The extent to which this turned out to be the case is difficult to determine. Since the late 1990s, there have been a number of U.S. and Russian actions outside the NATO enlargement dispute that have muddied the analytical waters. But, as Kennan said, “The attempt must be made if [Russian] conduct is to be understood and effectively countered.”5
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, History, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America