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341. Towards a deeper NATO-Japan cooperation

Author:
Marc Ozawa
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
While NATO and Japan have a long history of cooperation dating back to the 1990s, changes in their respective regional and global security environment are creating converging interests. This, in turn, presents new areas of potential cooperation. The developments driving convergence are Russia’s war with Ukraine and possible spill over effects in the Indo-Pacific, China’s growing global assertiveness and military posturing in the South China Sea, and a deepening security partnership between Russia and China. At the same time, NATO’s view is increasingly global, and Japan has signalled both a willingness and interest to deepen cooperation with NATO, exemplified by Prime Minister Kishida’s participation in the Madrid Summit last summer. While NATO’s short-term focus will be deterring and defending the Eastern flank, the current timing is right to consider deeper cooperation in the future. This could entail expanding cooperation beyond the ‘soft’ areas of humanitarian assistance and non-proliferation into defence through interoperability, cyber, and intelligence. There are already lessons from the Russia-Ukraine war that can assist in laying the groundwork for practical steps to NATO-Japan cooperation including a focused expansion of interoperability of forces, joint exercises in the maritime domain, political support, countering disinformation, and developing contingency plans for logistics and intelligence cooperation in the event of military conflict. Of all NATO’s partners in the Indo-Pacific, Japan spends the most on defence and represents the largest economy, about three times the size of the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Australia. Japan is the only non-NATO member of the G7, and as the longest-standing NATO partner beyond Europe, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg described Japan as a “natural partner” with shared values and challenges.1 These factors alone warrant revisiting NATO-Japan relations in light of recent events.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

342. Finland and Sweden in NATO: the potential of new security providers

Author:
Hanna Ojanen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is occurring at an accelerated pace. In January 2022, neither government was considering NATO membership; in May 2022, they moved decisively into the application process. In response, NATO member states have rush processed their membership, with most NATO countries ratifying Accession Protocols. In November 2022, they are a mere two ratifications short of membership. Both Finland and Sweden are sending a strong message to Allies and Russia by joining NATO without preconditions as already active contributors and security providers within the Alliance. For its part, NATO would not only gain two new member states but also a new regional subgroup of Nordic countries that have their own perspectives and strategic cultures. Moreover, Finland and Sweden will bring a model for bilateral defence cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

343. Drone warfare: an evolution in military affairs

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Over the past three decades, remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) – also known as drones – have acquired increasing importance in modern warfare. Originally designed to perform surveillance missions during the Cold War, drones gained prominence during the post-Cold War era through their ability to gather real-time intelligence over conflict-prone areas, particularly in support of humanitarian interventions. Following the onset of the global war on terror, drones acquired a further, arguably more significant function: armed with precision-guided munitions, they enabled Western armed forces to identify, track, and accurately strike targets from afar, reducing the need for troops on the ground.1 Simultaneously, drones’ allegedly low costs, limited technological sophistication, and ease of employment also enabled their rapid proliferation to dozens of countries around the world.2 According to some, the major implications are yet to come: drones’ unique capabilities promise in fact to revolutionize warfare. Consequently, militaries could eschew complex and expensive force structures to wage war: they would just need drones. As countries face stronger incentives and fewer constraints for using force, the growing availability of drones coupled with their capabilities deserve attention because this trend risks ushering in a new era of global instability and conflict.3
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Drones
Political Geography:
Global Focus

344. Russia’s military after Ukraine: down but not out

Author:
Łukasz Kulesa(ed.)
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The June 2022 Madrid Summit decided on the next steps in enhancing the Alliance’s deterrence posture, describing Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area”.1 The poor performance of the Russian forces in the first months of their war against Ukraine and the scale of casualties and material losses they suffered should however prompt further reflection about Russia’s ability to recover and challenge NATO militarily. If the Russian military seems unable to prevail over Ukrainian forces (supported by a number of NATO countries), it may reasonably be asked whether unrolling “the biggest overhaul of our collective defence and deterrence since the end of the Cold War”2 is justified. This Policy Brief argues that NATO’s goals to shore up the Eastern flank are indeed warranted for three reasons – Russia’s political will to claim a victory, evidence of learning from past mistakes, and the existing Russian industrial capacity. In fact, the Russian military will probably experience a relatively speedy recovery. With the caveat that much is contingent on day-to-day developments and the ultimate outcome of the war, it is also plausible that Russia will “build back better” rather than simply rebuild a military which has proven to be ill-prepared for the operation against Ukraine.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Madrid Summit
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

345. WEER 2022 | Still Without Peace (Full Issue)

Author:
Mykola Riabchuk, Olga Brusylovska, Iryna Bohinska, Julien Théron, and Anna Menshenina
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
“Still without Peace” was the title and the motto of the annual Warsaw East European conferences held in July 1-2, 2022 at the University of Warsaw under the auspices of the Center for East European Studies and with the support of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian war in Ukraine has largely determined the topics of that conference as well as the content of this issue of the Warsaw East European Review, partly though not exclusively based on the conference presentations. From the scholarly point of view, Ukraine has been always a bit of puzzle – partly because it was chronically understudied for years if not centuries insofar as it did not exist on the most of the mental and geographic maps, but also because many processes and phenomena in the ‘newborn’ country did not fit the established analytical paradigms, let alone the dogmas of the Russian ‘Imperial knowledge’ adopted uncritically in the West. This is why so many Westerners, including scholars and politicians, were so stunned by the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union (that had never been seen and named as ‘empire’), and probably even more surprised lately at Ukraine’s spectacular resilience under Russian all-out military invasion. In spite of the gloomy predictions and expectations, the country that had been broadly described as corrupt, dysfunctional, and internally deeply divided, appeared quite strong, institutionally robust and consolidated by civic patriotism. Ten months of the bloody, horrendous war have not brought any signs of breakdown of Ukrainian state or society. On the contrary, Ukrainians of all social brands seem to rally around the flag, united as never before. And all the state institutions, despite the persistent stress, duly provide all the services, probably even better than before the war. Why did this happen (rather than the opposite) is a big question that requires the study of many interrelated factors in their synergic interaction. The papers presented at the Warsaw East European Conference and partly collected in this volume, shed some light at the problem, in particular Anna Menshenina’s study of “Transformation of socio-political values in Ukraine: from gaining its independence till the outbreak of full-scale war”. But the problem remains too broad, multifaceted and complicated, and definitely requires further examination. Four articles of this volume examine various aspects of the ongoing war – starting from the origins of Putin’s obsession with the ‘Ukrainian question’ explored in Mykola Riabchuk’s essay, and from the early attempts to impose a disastrous implementation of Minsk agreements upon the Ukrainian government, scrutinized by Iryna Bohinska, – to the remarkable peculiarities of the Russian hybrid warfare against Ukraine, featured by Julien Théron, and to the venomous propagandistic campaigns staged by Russia against Ukraine on a global scale, as presented in a detailed case study by Oksana Nesterenko. Global ramifications of the Russian war in Ukraine and some scenarios for the future are considered in Olga Brusylovska’s article; and the cultural and political activity of displaced Belarusians in the post-war West Germany is attentively discussed by Anastasiya Ilyina. It may slightly fall out of the main topic of this volume, but it may resonate with today’s problems of Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons and keep, in a broader sense, all the East European nations on our radar. The Russian war in Ukraine is most likely to dominate in both the WEEC panels and the WEER pages next year but we encourage our international colleagues to explore Eastern Europe as alive and dynamic body, where various parts are interconnected and interdependent.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, History, Displacement, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, Invasion, Arms Sales, and Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

346. ‘Now or Never’: The Immediate Origins of Putin’s Preventative War on Ukraine

Author:
Geoffrey Roberts
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
President’s Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was a classic case of preventative war decision-making. The public record shows that Putin went to war to prevent Ukraine becoming such a powerful NATO bridgehead on Russia’s borders that Kyiv would seek to forcibly regain control of Crimea and the Donbass. Putin foresaw a future war not just with Ukraine but with NATO and the assessed the risks to Russia of an immediate conflict were lower than the medium and long-term threat. The danger of Ukraine becoming a nuclear-armed state also had an important bearing on his final decision for war, as did his perception of the ultra-nationalist Kyiv government as an implacably ‘anti-Russia’ regime.
Topic:
NATO, Vladimir Putin, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

347. The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future

Author:
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Despite the Biden administration’s push to revitalize U.S. alliances, U.S. relations with NATO are due for a reset. The United States should incentivize European members of NATO to take on additional responsibilities for their defense. Encouraging the European allies to take initiative will help the United States focus on its other domestic and international priorities and may facilitate improving relations with Russia. This approach will also prove attractive to European states concerned about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. Recalibrating the U.S. role in Europe would conform with the United States’ post–World War II efforts to stabilize European security — and stand as the fruit of Washington’s success in this regard.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Global Focus

348. Deterrence by Detection: Using Surveillance to pre-Empt Opportunistic Aggression

Author:
Thomas G. Mahnken and Grace B. Kim
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On NATO’s entire Eastern and South-Eastern flank, the Allies face a major, pressing and subtle challenge. Using sub-conventional grey zone tactics, Moscow has repeatedly tried, and at times succeeded, in expanding its influence, eroding international norms, undermining the rules-based in- ternational order, and shifting the balance of power in its favour. Preventing Russia from launching such op- portunistic acts of aggression is particularly import- ant because its armed forces are developing the ability to attack quickly – under the cover of increasingly capable defences – countries on their periphery in a clear effort to impose a fait accompli.1 NATO countries are at a particular disadvantage in this type of compe- tition. Their force structures consist of expensive and technologically complex information-gathering platforms, such as satellites and manned aircraft, which due to their high costs are also scarce and employed with reluctance by states who generally hesitate to put them in harm’s way. Additionally, the prohibitively high cost of these platforms deters some countries from investing in these types of capabilities. As debates within NATO about cash, capabilities and contributions continue to hold the stage, highlighting Allies’ needs for different types of capabilities – less expensive, more resilient, and relatively more disposable – is important.2 Equal- ly critical is the need for Allies to develop new concepts of operations as well as new organi-zations to employ them effectively. The solution may not involve fielding exotic new capabilities so much as employing existing ones in innovative ways. It will also benefit greatly from approaches that allow Allies and partners to participate fully. If we do not adapt, we risk being surprised by potentially catastrophic events in a future conflict.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Southern Europe

349. Operation Althea and the Virtues of the Berlin Plus Agreement

Author:
Olivier Rittimann
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
What is commonly known as the “Ber- lin Plus” arrangements, signed in March 2003, provides for the European Union (EU) to draw upon NATO’s assets and capabilities for operations in which the Alliance would not be militarily involved. Following lengthy delays incurred by the Cyprus question, it was only as of 2003 that the agreement was successfully implemented with the transfer of operations from NATO to the EU in both the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (2003) and then in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2004). The Berlin Plus agreement guarantees EU access to NATO planning capabilities, which contribute to EU- led military operations through the identification of command options, procedures for release and recall of NATO assets and capabilities, and the exchange of classified intelligence under reciprocal security protection rules. At the end of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1999), the EU had no defence staff fit to plan nor conduct an operation, and it is only fifteen years ago that member states established national Operation Headquarters (OHQ), which nations make available for EU operations, as was done in 2006 in the Demo- cratic Republic of Congo and in 2007 in Chad. At the end of the 1990s, the Berlin Plus proposal made em- inent sense: it prevented any duplication (by the EU) of assets and fostered the emergence of a European operational culture. But is the Arrangement still fit for purpose almost 20 years later?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

350. Russia in NATO's South Expansionist Strategy or Defensive Posture?

Author:
Chloe Berger and Cynthia Salloum
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a significant component of contemporary Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow’s approach to NATO’s South1 has undoubtedly undergone considerable change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it had built a set of alliances with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, among others, which gave Moscow important leverage throughout the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred resistance and opposition in the Muslim world, marking a major turning point in its Middle Eastern foreign policy. With the demise of its empire, in addition to its economic and military weaknesses, Russia faced a series of new challenges: a further disintegration of its own south, notably in the South Caucasus, the rise of radical extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan and a NATO programme of partnerships and cooperation that threatened its influence. All of these constrained Moscow’s foreign policy at large, including its Middle Eastern arrangements. In pursuing interests above values, Russia, in the last twenty years, developed channels of dialogue and cooperation with several Sunni Arab states traditionally close to the US, including Saudi Arabia, while deepening diplomatic and military ties with Iran and the Syrian regime. Russia maintained relations with Fatah and recognized Hamas after it won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, while successfully engaging pragmatically with Israel.2 Keeping contacts open with all relevant parties marks continuity between Soviet and Russian foreign policies. Moreover, in the last decade, the increasing instability across the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring, from which Moscow kept its distance, offered new opportunities for influence and power projection, most notably in Syria and Libya. Putin is tracking two main objectives there: one is building status as a regional actor; the other is enhancing his prestige domestically.3 From the Libyan power vacuum to the US retreat from Afghanistan, the Kremlin is making the most of strategic opportunities and may continue to do so. However, it remains to be seen whether its regained confidence will lead to a more permanent Russian presence and influence. In the South, Moscow has today a relative free rein. But an increasingly mature European Union and most importantly a powerful and more strategically oriented US under President Biden may seriously constrain Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Several drivers, ranging from domestic and economic politics to regional and global geopolitics, could explain Russian involvement in the MENA. Firstly, Russia is building a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its front line against Western encroachment and Islamist terrorist attacks. Secondly, it is displaying an expansionist drive, aimed at controlling at least parts of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean by consolidating old alliances and building new coalitions including with business and arms traders. Thirdly, Russia’s presence in the MENA can be seen as a classic zero-sum game of power politics with the US whereby Moscow is trying to fill the void left by Washington. Last, but certainly not least, it is also driven by domestic considerations that strengthen Putin’s grip on power, and Russia’s regional influence and international prestige. While all these factors play a role, this edited volume shows that opportunism and contingency remain key variables to explain Russian behaviour in the MENA. All of these drivers were somehow on display in Syria, which became an ideal case-study to explain Russian policy in the South. Yet, beyond the specific rationale, some questions still remain about Russia’s future role and influence in the region. Is the MENA region significant enough to help Russia recover a status of global power beyond regional leadership? Do status and prestige suffice, and if so, at what cost? What are Russia’s current and future investments in the region and what are their consequences on trade, energy, and its military posture? What would the real benefits of a Russian return to the MENA region be for its economy and power? Most importantly, what would be the consequences of an assertive Russia for NATO and its partners in the South?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America