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181. Türkiye, Russia, and their Rules-Based Competition

Author:
Daria Isachenko
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
At its summit in Madrid in June 2022, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept, identifying Russia as “the greatest and most immediate threat to the security of the Allies and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.” All NATO member states agreed to this, including Türkiye. Yet Ankara is still keen to maintain dialogue with Moscow, while at the same time continuing to obstruct NATO’s northern expansion—despite the West’s need to demonstrate a consolidated front against Russia. This has earned Türkiye’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the title of “double agent” or even “Trojan horse” in the Western media. Even before the outbreak of Russia’s war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022, Erdogan’s close relationship with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin were a source of irritation for the West. The most notable result of their friendship is Erdogan’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 anti-aircraft missile system in 2017, which raised doubts in the West about Ankara’s loyalty to NATO and led to Türkiye’s exclusion from the co-production of F-35 fighter jets with Ankara’s Western allies. Neither the Kremlin nor the Western capitals concealed their respective (and opposed) preferences for the presidential candidates in Türkiye’s elections in May 2023. Erdogan is a foreign leader whom Putin praises most. Working with Erdogan, as Putin once mentioned during a Valdai Discussion Club meeting in October 2020, is “not only pleasant but also safe.” During the inauguration of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, built by Rosatom, on 27 April 2023, Putin highlighted the personal engagement of Erdogan that made the realization of this “flagship project” between Russia and Türkiye possible. Putin’s appreciation of the Turkish president is not limited to words, as the Erdogan government expects the p o s t p o n e m e n t of gas payments to Gazprom— amounting to $20 billion—to 2024 and a 25 percent discount on the gas price. The West’s hope, on the other hand, was that with opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu coming to power in Ankara, the era of personal chemistry between Erdogan and Putin would come to its end and that Türkiye would revert to being a disciplined NATO member state, as it was during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. After all, the widespread perception of Russian-Turkish relations is that this partnership is underpinned by the personal relations between their respective presidents as well as their anti-Westernism.
Topic:
NATO, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Competition, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia and Turkey

182. Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine

Author:
Eric Ciaramella
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The moment has arrived for Western leaders to offer a practical vision for Ukraine’s long-term security. This paper lays out a detailed proposal for a sustainable multilateral security arrangement in which Ukraine has a strong military that is backed by legally codified pledges of support—training, equipping, and defense industrial cooperation—from the United States and Europe. The model outlined in this paper draws on official Ukrainian government proposals and lessons from the United States’ security relationships with close partners that are not treaty allies, notably Israel. It prioritizes a strategy of deterrence by denial: by fielding a robust, modernized, and well-trained military, Ukraine can raise the cost of future aggression to such a point that Russia would lose confidence in its ability to achieve its objectives there through force.1 Independent of battlefield developments, Ukraine and its partners must negotiate a long-term security arrangement now. Reaching a consensus sooner rather than later on a framework makes more sense than putting off controversial decisions until large-scale hostilities end. A security arrangement has the potential to undermine President Vladimir Putin’s conviction that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. It can also assure Ukraine that it will be able to defend its sovereignty even if it does not liberate its entire territory this year. Many of the elements contained in this proposal can be implemented during wartime—indeed, some of them are already in place—and strengthened after the war. The proposed security model is not necessarily an alternative to NATO membership, which enjoys strong support from Ukraine’s leaders and public. The allies have promised the country an eventual place in NATO, but they have made clear that this will not be on the agenda while the war is ongoing. Even once the war ends, they are unlikely to move swiftly to admit Ukraine. Therefore, the proposal here seeks to enhance the country’s ability to defend itself as it remains outside of NATO for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it emphasizes the critical role Ukraine’s EU accession will play in its long-term security. The United States must lead the conversation on a future security arrangement. Not only does its unparalleled capacity for security assistance and multinational coordination make it vital to the success of the arrangement, but a clear long-term U.S. pledge to Ukraine would also prompt Europe to increase its commitments, thereby ensuring proper burden-sharing. The proposed arrangement would be flexible enough to encompass commitments from the EU as a collective, from individual member states, and from other countries. To make the U.S. commitment to Ukraine credible and durable, the Biden administration must work with Congress to secure broad bipartisan support. This study identifies five elements that are critical to a future security arrangement: Strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe A predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression Support for Ukraine’s defense industry, as well as targeted defense industrial investments in the United States and Europe to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution Mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine’s military needs are met in a timely fashion Clear linkage to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction Much of the public debate to date has focused on Ukraine’s request for security “guarantees” in response to the failure of the previous “assurances” encapsulated in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. To avoid confusion, and in light of the historical baggage these terms carry, this paper uses “arrangement” or “commitment” to refer to the future legal and political framework in question.2
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

183. Analysis of Sweden's Attempt to Join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization After the Earthquake in Turkey

Author:
Rista Herjani, Indriyanti Alghina Habiba, and Surwandono Surwandono
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
After Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan asked Sweden to hand over the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan, PKK) in order to secure Turkey's approval to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), tensions between the two countries exploded once again. Several weeks after the tension heated up, Turkey was abruptly hit by a catastrophic earthquake on February 6, 2023, leaving the country instantly, just a few weeks after the incendiary incident. The Turkish government then proclaimed a level 4 emergency and promptly requested assistance from other countries. The aim of the article is to shed light on how Sweden used the Turkish earthquake to ratify its NATO membership. To answer the problems raised by this scientific literature, this research employs qualitative descriptive methodologies, keeping in mind the idea of disaster diplomacy. This study includes information from various literary sources, including journal publications, government websites and news items from various online media. The results revealed that Sweden used systematic disaster diplomacy to its advantage, offering various aids to the victims of the earthquake in the hope that Turkey would postpone the ratification of its NATO membership.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Natural Disasters, and Earthquake
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Sweden

184. Challenges for Feminist-Informed Foreign Policy: Militarisation and Australia’s engagements via AUKUS and NATO

Author:
Christine Agius, Annika Bergman Rosamond, Toni Haastrup, and Katharine A.M. Wright
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
Abstract:
In recent years, Australia has assessed the global and regional security environment as increasingly unstable.i The rising economic and military power of China and broader challenges to the ‘rules based international order’ seemingly signal a period of instability, prompting a reconsideration of Australia’s defence capacity and role in the region. Meanwhile, new forms of cooperation with like-minded states have emerged, most notably the AUKUS agreement, announced in 2021 by then Prime Minister Scott Morison with bipartisan support, which binds Australia more closely with the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) militarily. Australia has also strengthened its relations with NATO, aspiring to play a central role in the Indo-Pacific region as a NATO partner, alongside Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand. In this AFFPC Issues Paper, we explore the contradictions and tensions that emerge in the framing of national security threats and whether there are opportunities for more inclusive peace and security as promoted by the principles of feminist-informed foreign policy. For example, amidst this focus on militarisation, when the Australian Labor Party (led by Prime Minister Albanese) assumed power in 2022, Foreign Minister Penny Wong articulated a new foreign policy direction, which seemed to leverage broader attention towards feminist-informed acts and commitments. Wong promised that Australia would focus more attention on listening to its regional Pacific partners and committed to enacting a First Nations foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Feminism, Militarization, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Indo-Pacific

185. Who controls the past controls the future * How Russia uses history for cognitive warfare

Author:
Daniel Shultz
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia views controlling perceptions about history as a strategic priority, for domestic regime security and external influence. Kinetic military operations, including the invasion of Ukraine, are designed to support this cognitive objective. Understanding adversary cognitive objectives provides strategic indicators and warnings of intent, and identifies critical cognitive vulnerabilities for allied joint targeting.
Topic:
NATO, History, Vulnerability, Russia-Ukraine War, and Cognitive Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

186. Anyplace, anywhere, anytime: NATO and multi-domain operations

Author:
Christopher M. Schnaubelt
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO is adopting a multi-domain approach to its operations, but faces unresolved challenges that include the following: • Reaching a common understanding of multi-domain operations (MDO). • Developing and staffi ng organizational structures that will enable the eff ective integration of the military instrument of power with non-military instruments. • Achieving consensus on how to reconcile the global nature of the space and cyber domains with NATO’s Trans-Atlantic geographic focus. These challenges could be mitigated if NATO takes a broad view of its role in a comprehensive approach, and serves as the connective tissue among all of the instruments of power.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

187. NATO's Strategic Concept from theory to practice: NATO Mission Iraq

Author:
Robert Dresen
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s security environment is changing rapidly, and so is the Alliance. Until a decade ago, out-of-area operations dominated the NATO agenda. That shifted in 2014 when Allies renewed their focus on territorial deterrence and defence in light of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its illegal annexation of Crimea. Two more recent events produced further shocks to NATO’s agenda. First, the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021 brought almost 20 years of NATO presence to an abrupt and traumatic end. Second, Russia launched an all-out invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which signaled the return of large-scale conventional war to the European continent. On the heels of these pivotal events, NATO adopted its eighth Strategic Concept at the Madrid Summit in June 2022.1 The document captures Allies’ shared assessment of the changing security environment and defines the key purpose and core tasks of the Alliance. It provides a renewed emphasis on deterrence and defence, yet it also reaffirms that effective deterrence and defence requires NATO to enhance its global awareness and reach. It also makes clear that the key purpose of NATO, the collective defence of Allied nations and populations, is supported by contributing to crisis prevention and management – its second core task. In light of the Afghanistan experience, the question arises how exactly NATO should seek to fulfil this role in practice. While assessing lessons learned from the Afghanistan experience, former NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations John Manza suggested that the NATO Mission Iraq (NMI) “provides a good proof of concept of how [the Alliance] might carry out these interventions with a lighter, more sustainable touch”.2 This Policy Brief aims to further explore this argument by analyzing the current practice of NMI set against the theoretical framework provided by the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept. It argues that the NMI is a litmus test for NATO’s evolving approach to crisis prevention. As such, the experience of NMI underscores the importance of a more holistic and flexible strategy, one that acknowledges the role of other external actors and plans for NATO’s contributions into a wider national and regional context.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, and Strategic Concept
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

188. Human security and energy transition in NATO's South

Author:
Eckart Woertz
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Energy lies at the heart of human security and development challenges facing the arid and energy rich Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. While risks such as water shortages, food insecurity, political instability and forced migration have received ample attention from analysts, energy transitions have comparatively received less scrutiny. Energy transitions present more development opportunities than risks for external actors, and these risks transcend borders by entangling the MENA within a broader geography that ultimately affects European security. Within this entanglement lie opportunities that could be harnessed to improve cooperation, sustainability and human security for NATO and Partners in the MENA. Framing energy and climate change as security threats has a long history in international cooperation with the MENA. As NATO responds to the war in Ukraine and rethinks its crisis management tools, raising awareness of new risks while grasping potential opportunities becomes all the more important given the return of strategic competition to the MENA. The implementation of the 2022 Strategic Concept and its focus on “resilience” requires Allies to go beyond traditional securitized views of development. This Policy Brief highlights two trends that will likely impact energy transitions in the MENA for the coming years: transnational critical infrastructure; and the development of new hydrocarbon and alternative energy resources. The first will influence regional geopolitics while the second will impact energy security in the MENA and Europe. Concerning energy resources, we examine two developments: growing supplies of natural gas and green hydrogen – a zero emissions * Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) and Professor of contemporary history and politics of the Middle East at the University of Hamburg. process of generating hydrogen from water. Cooperation with MENA countries on energy transitions can enhance European security by contributing to socio- economic development in MENA countries. To this end, NATO can play a
Topic:
NATO, Development, Human Security, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

189. NATO and strategic competition: Time for Allies to step up

Author:
Mark Webber
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
2022 was marked by the publication of a string of high-level strategy documents by the NATO allies: the National Defense Strategy (NDS) in the United States, the National Strategic Review in France, the Dutch Defense White Paper, and the Danish Foreign and Security Policy Strategy. In January 2023, Estonia updated its National Security Concept. A refresh of the UK’s 2021 Integrated Review is due in the spring of 2023. Germany’s first post-Cold War National Security Strategy is expected to be published around the same time. These documents all share a preoccupation with what NATO’s own 2022 Strategic Concept has referred to as “rising strategic competition” in a “contested and unpredictable” world.1 This strategic convergence indicates a strengthening of solidarity in view of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Chinese efforts to extend its global footprint. How NATO responds over the long haul will be shaped by American priorities. The United States, former German Defense Minister, Christine Lambrecht, noted in January 2023, “may not be able to guarantee the defense of Europe to the extent that it used to” as it turned its attention to the Indo-Pacific region. “[W]e Europeans”, would in consequence, need to do more to generate “military strength”.2 This is not a fringe opinion. German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, and French President, Emmanuel Macron, have argued essentially the same.3 Actions, of course, speak louder than words. This Policy Brief shows that European commitment is still lagging. In view of the urgency of the challenge, greater effort and prioritization are required.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

190. Ukraine, NATO and the Black Sea

Author:
Iulian Romanyshyn
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Since its occupation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has steadily expanded military capabilities and technical infrastructure on the peninsula, transforming the region into a springboard for offensive military operations in the Black Sea and beyond. Despite growing insecurity and Russian militarization of the region over the years, the transatlantic community has not put as high of a strategic premium on the Black Sea compared to the Baltic region. Russia’s renewed aggression against Ukraine, however, has reshaped the strategic landscape, giving momentum for NATO to remedy its Black Sea defence posture. Greater military support to Ukraine and strengthened forward presence in the area would be key components of a new approach to deterring and confronting Russian aggression.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Transatlantic Relations, Militarization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Black Sea