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52. The Role of the Army in Politics in Latin America and Turkey during the Cold War | Soğuk Savaş Döneminde Latin Amerika ve Türkiye’de Ordunun Siyasetteki Rolü
- Author:
- Tuğba Ergezen and Ceren Uysal Oğuz
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics & International Relations
- Institution:
- Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University
- Abstract:
- The armies as one of the proponents of the constant progress and transformation of humanity, continue to exist in parallel to the concept of security of which the meaning, the scope and the parameters evolve continuously. From conquests to independence wars and the protection of the states' territorial integrity, the armies have been functioning as guardians against external threats and internal ones stemming from political crises, social unrest, and economic instabilities. Moreover, during the Cold War, the United States used the armies of less developed and developing countries to overthrow elected leaders to establish anti-communist governments that would work in accordance with the US. This article aims to discuss the common and similar points between Turkey and Latin American countries that have experienced coups and military interventions during the Cold War period. In this respect, the similar political, economic and military reasons that led to the armies’ involvement in politics through coups and interventions are argued even though these countries have historical, cultural, administrative and social differences. | İnsanlığın gelişim ve değişim sürecinin bileşenlerinden biri olan ordular, anlam, kapsam ve parametreleri sürekli dönüşen güvenlik kavramına paralel olarak varlıklarını sürdürmektedir. Fetihlerden bağımsızlık mücadelelerine ve ülke topraklarını korumaya kadar farklı görevler üstlenen orduların, dışarıdan gelen tehditlerin yanı sıra, çeşitli siyasi krizler, toplumsal hareketler ve ekonomik istikrarsızlıklar gibi “iç tehditlere” karşı bir mekanizma olarak da kullanılması söz konusu olmuştur. Öte yandan özellikle Soğuk Savaş döneminde az gelişmiş ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerde orduların, seçilmiş yönetimleri devirerek ABD’nin istediği anti-komünist yönetimlerin işbaşına gelmesini sağlamakta kullanılması da oldukça sık görülen bir olgu haline gelmiştir. Kendilerine özgü tarihsel, kültürel, idari ve toplumsal birtakım farklılıklara sahip olmakla birlikte, Soğuk Savaş döneminde ABD’nin de etkisiyle benzer ekonomik, siyasi ve askeri süreçlerden geçen Latin Amerika ülkeleri ve Türkiye arasında orduların siyasetteki rolü, darbelerin arkasında yatan temel faktörler gibi ortak bazı unsurlar bulunmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, Soğuk Savaş döneminde çok sayıda askeri müdahalenin yaşandığı Latin Amerika ülkeleri ve Türkiye’nin coğrafi uzaklıklarına karşın ortak deneyimlerine yön veren benzer faktörlerin tartışılmasıdır.
- Topic:
- Cold War, History, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, and Army
- Political Geography:
- Turkey, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America
53. U.S. War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Counterinsurgency
- Author:
- Shahid Ahmed Afridi and Marium Fatima
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Journal of Political Studies
- Institution:
- Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
- Abstract:
- US military intervention in Afghanistan was decisive and forceful, however, the Taliban’s insurgency inevitably transformed U.S. military doctrine and strategy from conventional military intervention into Counterinsurgency’s kinetic and non-kinetic operations. U.S. strategic and operational methodology despite exhausting all possibilities; troops’ surge, air dominance/surveillance, non-kinetic peace building operations, failed to dislodge the threat of Taliban violence. An effort is made to identify the underlying factors contributory to the failure of the U.S. strategy, tactics and other challenges faced despite having unparalleled military superiority. This paper further probes the U.S. military strategic repositioning, social structure with the warlords and critically examines how the conflict drifted from intervention into Counterinsurgency irregular warfare.
- Topic:
- Counterinsurgency, Humanitarian Intervention, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America
54. Ending the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Realigning Our Engagement with Our Interests in Somalia
- Author:
- Elizabeth Shackelford
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Research Paper
- Institution:
- Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
- Abstract:
- In U.S. foreign policy circles today, the bar to justify ending a military intervention is higher than it is to keep one going. Small wars have become routine foreign policy tools, executed with minimal oversight or scrutiny. Somalia offers a clear example of how this approach leads to high accumulated costs for the American people with little to show in gains for the U.S. national interest. The current military-led strategy promises no end to lethal interventions, and the costs and risks associated with it exceed the threats it is meant to address. Expanding U.S. military activity over the past five years has done little to impede the Somali terrorist insurgency group al–Shabaab, but it has continued to overshadow and undermine diplomatic and development efforts to address Somalia’s political and governance problems. At the same time, military intervention has propped up an ineffective government, disincentivizing Somali political leaders from taking the hard steps necessary to reach a sustainable peace and build a functioning state. The U.S. military cannot be expected to stay indefinitely in Somalia to maintain a messy stalemate. Rather than reflexively increase U.S. military activity when it falls short of stated objectives, the United States should reassess its overall strategy in Somalia by returning to basic questions: Why is the U.S. military fighting a war there? What U.S. national interest is the war serving? And are America’s actions in Somalia and the region furthering that national interest?
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Governance, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- United States and Somalia
55. Reflecting on the Role of Regional and International Interventions in Resolving the Post-coup Crisis in Sudan
- Author:
- Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Conflict Trends
- Institution:
- The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
- Abstract:
- The overthrow of Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir from the presidency of Sudan by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) on 11 April 2019, following several months of protests and civil uprisings by Sudanese citizens, resulted in a prolonged governance and political crisis. Al-Bashir, who was a SAF lieutenant general, came to power in June 1989, through a military coup d’état staged against Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was the then-prime minister of Sudan. Al-Bashir had been in power for almost 30 years, making him one of the longest-serving presidents on the continent. Following his ousting on 11 April 2019, internal political players and stakeholders – mainly the ruling Transitional Military Council (TMC) and a coalition of protesters and opposition groups, led by the Alliance for Freedom and Change/Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) in Sudan – failed to speedily agree and settle on an effective transitional governance authority.
- Topic:
- Governance, Social Movement, Military Intervention, Protests, Coup, and Transition
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Sudan
56. A Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan: Pipedream or Path to Stability?
- Author:
- Ryan Van Wie
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
- Abstract:
- This article analyzes how an international peacekeeping operation (PKO) can support an intra-Afghan peace settlement by mitigating information and commitment problems and fostering compliance during the settlement’s implementation phase. To frame the information and commitment problems currently hindering an intra-Afghan settlement, I briefly review noncooperative bargaining theory, its application to civil conflicts, and how PKOs can lessen mutual uncertainty and foster stability. Anchoring this research on Afghanistan, I analyze the first peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, the 1988–1990 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP). UNGOMAP’s eventual failure to foster peace highlights Afghanistan’s complexities and the dangers of an insufficiently resourced PKO operating in a state without a viable, incentive-compatible settlement. I apply these lessons to policy analysis, where I explore possible PKO options and their potential for incentivizing compliance with a future intra-Afghan deal. Though a viable PKO currently seems improbable given Afghanistan’s ongoing violence and the Taliban’s insistence on the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, future conditions may change, and I highlight necessary prerequisites where a PKO may become possible. If designed properly, an Afghanistan PKO can fill a critical monitoring and verification capacity and bolster Afghanistan’s prospects for long-term stability.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Intervention, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
57. Russian Aerial Operations
- Author:
- Anton Lavrov
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Before the start of the military intervention in Syria in 2015, even top Russian generals were uncertain what the result would be. Shortly before the start of the intervention, the Russian Aerospace Forces (RuAF) received hundreds of new airplanes and helicopters and new “smart” precision weapons. Almost all of them had never been tested in real combat. The pilots and commanders also did not have combat experience and were trained by textbooks filled with outdated concepts and tactics. The five years of war in Syria have been the most intense period of transformation for the RuAF since the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Russian military not only gained an unprecedented amount of experience, but also made substantial improvements in tactics and strategy.
- Topic:
- Military Affairs, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, and Air Force
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria
58. The Russian Ground-Based Contingent in Syria
- Author:
- Charles Bartles and Lester Grau
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- The Syrian Civil War produces a new set of problems involving extended urban combat, intense fights for key resources (oil fields, water, and lines of communication and supply), conventional combat among irregular units, ethnic and religious cleansing, a large number of foreign combatants with varying motivations, and contending outside powers fighting a proxy engagement. The Russian Federation is not an expeditionary power, and its entry into Syria on the side of the regime has strained its logistical resources. From the beginning of the Syrian campaign, it was clear that Russian involvement was initially envisaged to be through the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS). Although the Syrian government was on the verge of collapse, and the Syrian military was on its hind legs and a shell of its former self, there was a sufficient number of Syrian ground units that were mission capable. With this understanding, the VKS was to be the principal supplier of Russian combat power aimed at disruption of the command and control and leadership of the groups fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime through the provision of reconnaissance and target destruction. In particular, Russia’s priority was the destruction of the Western-backed, moderate opposition groups, since it saw these as the greatest immediate threat to Assad. The Islamic State (ISIS) and other Sunni extremist groups were targeted, but sat lower on Russia’s priority list. As with other such operations, «mission creep” soon resulted in Russia’s involvement quickly expanding past the provision of aerospace support to planning, and, in some cases, conducting ground operations. General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, confirmed this expansion of Russian involvement in a December 2017 interview. Russia’s ground-based contingent in the Syrian campaign involves a diverse set of forces and capabilities. Some of the key features of this expanded ground force mission included a Russian model of military advisors, integrated and modernized fires, mobility and countermobility operations, a featured role for military police, use of coastal defense, spetznaz, and private military company (PMC) forces. Russian ground forces have benefitted from the opportunity to provide combat experience to a large number of professional soldiers, conduct battlefield testing of new systems and observe the impact of different terrain on tactics. The forces opposing the Syrian government provide a different opponent than the “enemy” encountered in normal Russian peacetime training and much of the “Syrian experience” is discussed and dissected in Russian professional military journals.
- Topic:
- Armed Forces, Military Intervention, and Syrian War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Syria
59. Narrowing Interests in the Middle East: Planning for Great Power Competition
- Author:
- Aaron Stein
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- The United States dramatically increased the commitment of troops and military equipment to a string of permanent bases in the Middle East after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the defeat of the Iraqi army after its 1991 invasion of Kuwait. In the nearly two decades since the Al Qaeda-linked attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has deepened its military and political commitment to the region, following the decisions to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, and then to intervene militarily in Syria. The Barack Obama and Donald Trump administrations have sought to focus more on Asia, but have failed to disentangle the United States from conflicts in the Middle East. This report assumes that the United States will retain an overwhelming interest in ensuring close alliances and partnerships with America’s transatlantic allies (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and close partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific even if President Trump is re-elected in 2020. It also assumes that the United States will begin to focus primarily on Asia, with the Russian Federation being considered of secondary importance to the rise of the People’s Republic of China. Given these twin assumptions, the role of American forces and Washington’s policy priorities in the Middle East require new thinking about how to wind down wars that are draining American resources and to re-allocate finite, high-demand assets that could be leveraged for operations in Europe or the Indo-Pacific. This report proposes an interlinked political and military policy that would allow for the United States to retain a robust presence in the Middle East, but in a way that would de-escalate tensions with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and alter how U.S. forces are deployed around the world.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Power Politics, and Military Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America
60. What To Do about Idlib
- Author:
- Adam Garfinkle
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- Sadness and tragedy come in many forms. One form consists in knowing how to solve a problem in theory, but realizing at the same time that what that would take in practice is not available. That is the case now with the tragedy unfolding in Idlib. There is a way to turn the crisis into an opportunity, but it would take wise and bold leaderships simultaneously in Washington, Jerusalem, Riyadh, Ankara, and the capitals of Europe. And that is precisely what we lack. What should be done? The U.S. government should privately propose, organize as necessary, and backstop as required a joint Israeli-Saudi intervention, coordinated with an on-going Turkish intervention, to save the million-plus refugees now facing imminent annihilation in Idlib Province, in Syria.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Intervention, Conflict, Syrian War, and Humanitarian Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Syria, and Idlib