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22. Can You Hear Me? Taking Mediation Online: Reflections from Practice
- Author:
- Florence Mandelik and Ayat Mohamed
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
- Abstract:
- In mediation, where trust-building and confidentiality are vital, the current shift towards virtual and online interactions brings a set of new challenges for practitioners. The authors summarise early takeaways from online engagements with and between civil actors in the context of mediation projects, focusing on the opportunities and challenges that virtual tools and online engagements bring to process design and implementation. In online settings the convener should use several tools from the IT tool box in tandem, carefully selecting them to match the objective of the engagement with the overall context. Process design has to ensure that all the requirements of virtual interaction, including a code of conduct and rules of procedure, are met in order to achieve the desired result. The brief discusses this in detail, including the selection of appropriate IT applications and dealing with participants’ computer literacy and internet access challenges. In particular, it emphasises how active steps should be taken to foster the inclusion of traditionally marginalised groups, including women.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Mediation, and Information Technology
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
23. The role of Politics in Attempts to Resolve the Manya-Yilo Conflict in Ghana
- Author:
- John Narh
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- African Journal on Conflict Resolution
- Institution:
- The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
- Abstract:
- Conflict over a natural resource deposit is commonplace in many resource-rich African countries. Such is the case at Odugblase in the Eastern Region of Ghana where the Manya Krobo and the Yilo Krobo traditional councils are in a protracted conflict pertaining to their claims of sovereignty over land-sites where limestone is mined – each vying for a greater portion of the mineral royalties set aside for local authorities. This article studies the attempts by the government and the mining company (Ghana Cement Limited) to resolve the Manya-Yilo conflict, in order to understand why none of them was successful. This study finds that the government’s committee of enquiry to resolve the Manya-Yilo conflict was unsuccessful as the investigation process did not adequately involve the traditional councils and there is no political will to enforce the recommendation of the committee. Similarly, a mediation attempt by Ghana Cement Limited was unsuccessful due to the limited involvement of the opponents. The complex political structure, the inadequate regulations for distributing mineral royalties, and weak municipal assemblies are major factors protracting the Manya-Yilo conflict. The traditional councils need to negotiate with each other so that they and their respective municipal assemblies receive the limestone royalties and use the funds to develop the mining community.
- Topic:
- Politics, Natural Resources, Conflict, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Ghana
24. Digital Inclusion in Mediated Peace Processes: How Technology Can Enhance Participation
- Author:
- Andreas T. Hirblinger
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- Inclusion in peace processes is conventionally understood in “offline” terms, such as being physically present at the negotiation table. However, digital technology can support a mediator’s efforts to integrate a broad variety of perspectives, interests, and needs into a peace process. This report explores the current and future practice of digital inclusion, giving a framework for understanding the possibilities and risks, and providing examples of practical ways digital technologies can contribute to mediated peace processes.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Negotiation, Peace, Participation, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
25. Constitutional Issues in the Afghan Peace Negotiations: Process and Substance
- Author:
- Barnett R. Rubin
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- The peace negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the Taliban that began in September in Doha, Qatar, will almost certainly include revisiting the country’s constitution. Both sides claim to abide by Islamic law, but they interpret it in very different ways. This report examines some of the constitutional issues that divide the two sides, placing them within the context of decades of turmoil in Afghanistan and suggesting ideas for how the peace process might begin to resolve them.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Negotiation, Peace, Mediation, and Sharia
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and South Asia
26. Built for Trust, Not for Conflict: ASEAN Faces the Future
- Author:
- Drew Thompson and Byron Chong
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- United States Institute of Peace
- Abstract:
- In the more than five decades since the founding of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, relations among its member states have remained generally peaceful, and major interstate conflict has been all but eliminated. Yet, ASEAN now faces significant challenges, not least from competition between the United States and China that threatens to draw individual ASEAN countries into taking sides. This report discusses ASEAN’s role in maintaining peace and stability in Southeast Asia and how it can adapt to a rapidly evolving geopolitical climate to meet future challenges.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Negotiation, ASEAN, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- China, Southeast Asia, and United States of America
27. Iraqi Kurdistan: Priority issues for international mediation
- Author:
- Michael Knights
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
- Abstract:
- In the last decade, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has seen many moments of crisis – budget cuts, Daesh’s assault on Erbil, the halving of oil prices (twice!) and armed conflict with the Iraqi government over Kirkuk. Today’s situation feels different and arguably worse than these episodes: there’s COVID, a deep oil recession in Baghdad and Kurdistan, intensifying tensions with Turkey and Iran, and an unpleasant undercurrent of resentment against the Kurds among many of the MPs in the Baghdad parliament. What makes this moment uniquely dangerous, however, is the near-breakdown of cooperation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Iraq’s Kurds have shown that they can weather any storm when they pull together as a people. The KRI’s international partners tend to support the Iraqi Kurds more effectively when the two parties work in harmony, but often back away when they cannot identify a cohesive counterparty to deal with in the KRI. International memories of the intra-Kurdish civil war in the 1990s undermined the Kurdish cause in Iraq in the 2000s, when the Kurds’ greatest opportunity for self-governance lay before them. Looking forward, it is clear that the futures of Iraq and the KRI are linked. If Baghdad’s economy and currency collapses, so does Kurdistan’s. If the Kurdish people starve, the blame will fall on Baghdad. If the Islamic State returns, it will emerge first in the strip of disputed territories between federal Iraq and the KRI. The success of U.S. policy in Iraq is the success of both the fifteen provinces of federal Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, not one or the other. The U.S.-Iraq strategic dialogue will continue in the late summer, hopefully including a visit of the Iraqi leadership to Washington DC. This presents an opportunity to re-energize the role of the U.S. and international partners in the issues facing the KRI. It is important to stress the importance of a multilateral mission to support intra-KRI cohesion and Baghdad-KRI relations because America does not have all the answers on Kurdistan, nor does it tend to focus enough attention there. U.S. power and leadership are most effective when combined with the perceptive insights and good instincts of many other partners on Kurdistan, such as the French, British, and Canadians, to name just a few. There is an argument that the U.S.-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement should either have a specific working group or committee on KRI issues (or on decentralization more generally), or a cross-cutting mechanism that ensures the KRI is worked into each of the security, political, economic and energy working groups. The list of topics that require persistent attention is quite long. Most important, the KDP and PUK need to be led towards a de-escalation that will allow the region to speak with one cohesive voice in Baghdad and with international partners. This is a foundational issue that affects all the other issues the KRI faces. An adversarial relationship between the two parties undermines everything that is attempted in the KRI and is deeply off-putting for international partners and potential investors. It can result in armed standoffs, affecting key industries like LPG trucking, or in security crises such as the Zina Warte armed confrontation between KDP and PUK Peshmerga in mid-March 2020. Almost nothing – from oil and gas investment to counter-terrorism to fighting COVID to negotiations with Baghdad – works as well as it should due to the KDP-PUK schism. It would be magical thinking to imagine that the two parties can easily reconcile. Even so, the U.S. and its various partners should prioritize efforts to get the powerful leaders in the same room to hammer out a minimal level of cooperation and start a dialogue, however stilted or tense at the outset. The U.S. and other internationals also need to help Baghdad and the KRI complete the promising steps that have been taken on political, security and economic cooperation. The Kurds worked well with former premier Adel Abdul-Mahdi’s government in Baghdad, and they have overcome their initial caution towards a change in Baghdad to support the new Prime Minister Mustapha al-Kadhimi, another old friend. For the Kurds, however, the relationship will be almost solely judged on what it delivers in terms of budget support. Having watched six Iraqi prime ministers negotiate and renegotiate budget deals with the Kurds every year for over a decade, the U.S. is intimately familiar with every possible configuration of give and take – more so than the Iraqi and Kurdish leaders themselves. What has always been clear is that politics trump economics in such discussions: typically, the solution is political and the numbers and formulas get fudged to fit the required compromise. This is why, for the remainder of 2020, Kurdistan will probably keep selling its oil and gathering customs revenue while Baghdad will provide a reduced top-up to the Kurdish exchequer each month, which is basically what has been happening for the last two years. A lot of discussion tends to end up right back where the parties began. This pattern of recurrent budget crises is not sustainable for two reasons. First, the annual showdown complicates an already fraught budgeting process and Iraqi MPs are becoming more hostile to the KRI economy every time the cycle is undertaken. Second, the KDP and PUK are increasingly fighting over the revenue-sharing mechanism, with Sulaymaniyah seeking more direct transfers from Baghdad or other guarantees of a fair share. The U.S. and its international partners need to back a multi-year arrangement that has buy-in at the highest levels: the Iraqi Prime Minister, speaking for a sizable bloc in Iraq’s body politic, and key leaders within the KDP and PUK. This is yet another reason why the two parties must be able to sit down together at the highest political levels. The sweet spot for a Baghdad-KRI budget deal would seem to be about $800mn per month, requiring the KDP and PUK to agree on a no-blame, non-politicized and permanent reduction of KRI obligations (salaries, social services and allowances) by about 30%. The U.S. and other internationals need to put strong and well-intentioned pressure on the KRI to appoint an empowered and dedicated Minister of Natural Resources to salvage investor confidence in the energy sector, which will serve as a signpost for the KRI’s future non-oil investors. A quick win for Baghdad-KDP-PUK cooperation may be possible in the realm of counter-terrorism. The Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, the KDP-led Counterterrorism Department (CTD) and the PUK-led Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) are three highly professional services that work closely with the international Coalition against Daesh. They have worked together before and can work in the disputed areas with relative ease now. The creation of joint counter-terrorism coordination centers should initially focus on these elite units and their related intelligence arms, not necessarily the “big military” units like the Iraqi Army, Federal Police and Peshmerga. One important symbol for Baghdad-KRI cooperation could be an investment in the deployment, for short periods, of some Iraqi Air Force F-16 aircraft to the airports in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah. These fighter-bombers were notoriously viewed as a stick that Baghdad might use against the Kurds, but today the F-16 fleet and its American technicians are struggling to stay in service as Iran-backed militias surround their operating base at Balad. Perhaps an out-of-the-box idea might be to cycle a fragment of the F-16 fleet through the safe operating environments of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, as the Italian Air Force did with a small complement of Eurofighters during the war against Daesh. The common thread in all these options is a desire to “go big” in the Baghdad-KDP-PUK relationship, and for international players to encourage and support new thinking. The Kurdistan Region is currently cycling downwards, with less stability and less attractiveness as an investment environment, largely because Kurdish leaders are allowing themselves to be divided by personality politics. The U.S. intervention in Iraq in 1991 helped to free the Iraqi Kurds and the intervention in 2003 saw the U.S. ask those same Kurds to rejoin Iraq on the basis of U.S. guarantees. It is time to begin to make good on those guarantees. U.S. intervention transformed Iraq from a dictatorship to a democracy (imperfect, like all democracies), but an equally great transformation would be to help create an Iraqi state at peace with all of its components, first and foremost its Kurdish population. That moment can and should start in earnest now.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Governance, Peace, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan
28. TIME TO STEP UP EU MEDIATION?
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- European Institute of Peace (EIP)
- Abstract:
- The need and scope for conflict resolution and mediation is going up. The numbers of people affected by violence and conflict is increasing. The world is disfigured by prolonged, internationalised civil wars and growing civil unrest. Great power politics are resurgent, the conventions regulating states’ behaviour are fraying, and international law and human rights are being eroded. Profound demographic and climatic changes, the emergence of new technologies and of threats are changing the global landscape in ways that should bring humanity together but too often are exploited for commercial and political gain, driving insecurity and a sense of injustice. The EU has an enormous role to play in this context. It is a powerful global actor pursuing multiple objectives on the world stage. It is committed to human rights, gender equity, sustainable development and a rules based global order, and to supporting others that are taking action, whether inter- governmental and regional bodies such as the UN and AU, or civil society including at the very local level. But the EU also recognises, as the High Representative has put it, the need to learn “to use the language of power”, to deploy its capabilities, whether political, security, economic or regulatory, more strategically to shape reality, address the agents and drivers of violence, and secure peace. So what should the EU’s role in mediation be in this context? The review of the EU’s concept on mediation provides an excellent opportunity to generate debate and to define the parameters of the future of EU mediation frameworks. This study provides a snapshot of the views within the Brussels diplomatic and policy community. Even within this relatively confined universe, there is a very broad diversity of opinions.
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Civil War, Human Rights, Peacekeeping, European Union, Sustainability, Mediation, and Civil Unrest
- Political Geography:
- Europe
29. Greece’s Resource Blessing Comes with Hurdles
- Author:
- Antonia Dimou
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Cairo Review of Global Affairs
- Institution:
- School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, American University in Cairo
- Abstract:
- Can international arbitration and mediation with its neighbors help Greece turn its energy challenges into opportunities in the Eastern Mediterranean?
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Mediation, and Arbitration
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Greece, and Mediterranean
30. ECOWAS Mediation in Togo's 2017/2018 Political Crisis: Feats, Deadlocks, and Lessons
- Author:
- Brown Odigie
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Social Science Research Council
- Abstract:
- On August 18, 2017, opposition1 figures in the Republic of Togo, a member-state of the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), took to the streets to protest the continued rule of Faure Gnassingbé, the incum- bent president of the country who has spent 14 years in power. They demand- ed constitutional reforms, and in particular, a return to the 1992 constitu- tion, which would, bring back a constitutional provision limiting presidential tenure to two-terms of five years only. Other reforms demanded included a demand for a two-round system2 for presidential elections, reform of elec- toral laws and the election management body, review of the voters’ register, as well as voting rights for Togolese nationals in the diaspora. In a quick progression of events, the protesters made additional demands including one for an immediate end3 to the regime of Faure Gnassingbé, whose family has been accused of institutionalizing dynastic rule starting with his father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who ruled the country from 1967 till his death in of- fice on February 5, 2005. For several months, on regular intervals, leaders of the opposition and civil society groups mobilized different social groups including youths and women to continue to make these demands on the government. occasionally in violent demonstrations that led to public disor- der, looting ofOccasionally these protests degenerated into violent demon- strations that led to public disorder, looting of private and public goods, and loss of lives. The initial reaction of the government was to crack down on the protesters, using state apparatuses of force to shut down the internet, which was crucial for mobilization, arresting4 a number of activists on the streets of Lomé, the country's capital. The protests, however, continued as protesters were undeterred,5 and soon spread to the country’s second larg- est city of Sokodé in the central region. Following persistent demonstra- tions and calls by the international community, notably, ECOWAS, France, the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), and the African Union Commission (AUC) for an immediate dialogue in resolving the impasses, Mr. Faure Gnassingbé finally accepted to dialogue and negotiate with the opposition. Leveraging on a preventive diplomacy conceptual framework of analysis, this paper highlights the nuances and the herculean task of mediating po- litical conflicts by regional organizations such as ECOWAS. It does so es- pecially in relation to preventing protests from escalating into violent con- flict, navigating deadlocks, and achieving concessions on important political and constitutional matters that might alter the existing power equation. It analyses the spate of criticism that trailed ECOWAS’ mediation of the cri- sis during a period the Togolese president, Mr. Faure Gnassingbé, was the Chair of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS (June 2017 to July 2018) as well as the efforts to maintain impartiality by the Fa- cilitators appointed by ECOWAS to assist the government and opposition stakeholders to negotiate a political settlement and implement constitu- tional reforms. The paper also raises questions about the rationality of the decision of the coalition of fourteen opposition parties (C14) to boycott the December 20, 2018 legislative elections, noting that the election boycott hardly achieved its intended purpose of delegitimizing the government. It, however, com- mends the ability of the opposition to learn key lessons from the boycott, and emphasizes the imperative for both the government and the opposition parties to continue exploring avenues for inclusive dialogue in addressing unresolved contentious issues, not only with respect to the immediate 2020 presidential elections, but more importantly, efforts at expanding the polit- ical and civic space and strengthening the role of civil society organizations in democratic processes in the country. The paper concludes by extolling the steadiness and the resilience of West African citizens in demanding for, and, or defending constitutional provisions that limit presidential tenures. It also notes that such vigilance and resilience are needed if democratic cul- ture and good governance are to be deepened in the region.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Diplomacy, Governance, Peace, Mediation, and Political Crisis
- Political Geography:
- Africa, West Africa, and Togo
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