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51. Generational Dynamics of Economic Crisis and Recovery: Prospects for Younger and Older Persons

Author:
Nicole Goldin
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Economic shocks affect young and older age groups disproportionately and highlight the insecurity of the youth labor market and volatility of older people’s savings. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated youth labor market challenges and caused young people to either lose jobs or work fewer hours. It also undermined the financial security of older people who tend to own small businesses given that half of the small businesses either closed down or lost significant revenue during lockdowns. Furthermore, COVID-19 exacerbated the digital divide between generations. While younger people are more likely to be technologically savvy, older generations often lack digital literacy to adapt to online work or virtual communications platforms. Dr. Goldin argues that to alleviate the disproportionate suffering experienced by young and elderly age groups during the pandemic, policymakers should increase targeting of social-protection measures, facilitate private-sector investment in education and training, invest in improving digital services and infrastructure, ensure access to financial services, and collect age-disaggregated data on economic and COVID-related indicators.
Topic:
Women, Internet, Economic Growth, Youth, Resilience, COVID-19, Digital Policy, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America

52. Market power and artificial intelligence work on online labour markets

Author:
Néstor Duch-Brown, Estrella Gomez-Herrera, Frank Mueller-Langer, and Songül Tolan
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The views are those of the authors and should not be regarded as stating an official position of the European Commission. Frank Mueller-Langer gratefully acknowledges financial support from a research grant of the University of the Bundeswehr Munich. We investigate three alternative but complementary indicators of market power on one of the largest online labour markets (OLMs) in Europe: (1) the elasticity of labour demand, (2) the elasticity of labour supply, and (3) the concentration of market shares. We explore how these indicators relate to an exogenous change in platform policy. In the middle of the observation period, the platform made it mandatory for employers to signal the rates they were willing to pay, as given by the level of experience required to perform a project: entry, intermediate or expert level. We find a positive labour supply elasticity ranging between 0.06 and 0.15, which is higher for expert-level projects. We also find that the labour demand elasticity increased while the labour supply elasticity decreased after the policy change. Based on this, we argue that market-designing platform providers can influence the labour demand and supply elasticities on OLMs with the terms and conditions they set for the platform. We also explore the demand for and supply of AI-related labour on the OLM under study. We provide evidence of a significantly higher demand for AI-related labour (ranging from +1.4 percent to +4.1 percent) and a significantly lower supply of AI-related labour (ranging from -6.8 percent to -1.6 percent) than for other types of labour. We also find that workers on AI projects receive 3.0 percent to 3.2 percent higher wages than workers on non-AI projects.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, Internet, Artificial Intelligence, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Global Focus

53. A Rising "Cyber China"

Author:
Jonathan Sullivan, Sarah Jeu, and Weixiang Wang
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Turkish Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Institution:
Transatlantic Policy Quarterly (TPQ)
Abstract:
As Xi Jinping prepares to secure an unprecedented third term as party leader, observers will find that the PRC has become increasingly assertive in its regulation of the internet and its infrastructure. The techniques honed in the treatment of China’s domestic cybersphere are increasing in presence in international cyberspace, as domestic propaganda effectively suppresses dissenting voices and nurtures cyber nationalism. The CPC’s promotion of “cyber sovereignty” and “self-reliance” in technological innovation and manufacturing further demonstrate a concerted effort to carve out a “Chinese cyberspace” different from the current free and open model. Understanding both domestic and international aspects of China’s internet is the key to addressing a more proactive and confident “Cyber China.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Regulation, Internet, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
China and Asia

54. Buying and selling extremism: New funding opportunities in the right-wing extremist online ecosystem

Author:
Ariel Bogle
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As mainstream social media companies have increased their scrutiny and moderation of right-wing extremist (RWE) content and groups, there’s been a move to alternative online content platforms. There’s also growing concern about right-wing extremism in Australia, and about how this shift has diversified the mechanisms used to fundraise by RWE entities. This phenomenon isn’t well understood in Australia, despite the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) advising in March 2021 that ‘ideological extremism’ now makes up around 40% of its priority counterterrorism caseload. Research by ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre (ICPC) has found that nine Australian Telegram channels that share RWE content used at least 22 different funding platforms, including online monetisation tools and cryptocurrencies, to solicit, process and earn funds between 1 January 2021 and 15 July 2021. Due to the opaque nature of many online financial platforms, it’s difficult to obtain a complete picture of online fundraising, so this sample is necessarily limited. However, in this report we aim to provide a preliminary map of the online financial platforms and services that may both support and incentivise an RWE content ecosystem in Australia. Most funding platforms found in our sample have policies that explicitly prohibit the use of their services for hate speech, but we found that those policies were often unclear and not uniformly enforced. Of course, there’s debate about how to balance civil liberties with the risks posed by online communities that promote RWE ideology (and much of that activity isn’t illegal), but a better understanding of online funding mechanisms is necessary, given the growing concern about the role online propaganda may play in inspiring acts of violence as well as the risk that, like other social divisions, such channels and movements could be exploited by adversaries. The fundraising facilitated by these platforms not only has the potential to grow the resources of groups and individuals linked to right-wing extremism, but it’s also likely to be a means of building the RWE community both within Australia and with overseas groups and a vector for spreading RWE propaganda through the engagement inherent in fundraising efforts. The funding platforms mirror those used by RWE figures overseas, and funding requests were boosted by foreign actors, continuing Australian RWEs’ history of ‘meaningful international exchange’ with overseas counterparts.
Topic:
Internet, Social Media, Far Right, and Political Extremism
Political Geography:
Australia and Global Focus

55. China’s cyber vision: How the Cyberspace Administration of China is building a new consensus on global internet governance

Author:
Nathan Attrill and Audrey Fritz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report provides a primer on the roots of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) within China’s policy system, and sheds light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions to use cyberspace as a tool for shaping discourse domestically and internationally. The report details the position of the Cyberspace Administration of China in China’s propaganda system. Considering its origins in the former Party Office of External Propaganda, the authors argue that ‘countries that lack comprehensive cyber regulations should err on the side of caution when engaging with the CCP on ideas for establishing an international cyber co-governance strategy.’ By assessing the CCP’s strategy of becoming a ‘cyber superpower’, its principle of ‘internet sovereignty’, and its concept of ‘community of common destiny for cyberspace’, this report seeks to address how the CCP is working to build a consensus on the future of who will set the rules, norms and values of the internet. The report also examines the World Internet Conference - a ‘platform through which the CCP promotes its ideas on internet sovereignty and global governance’ – and its links to the CAC.
Topic:
Governance, Cybersecurity, Internet, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
China and Asia

56. Broadband Access - Connecting America

Author:
Committee for Economic Development of the Conference Board
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Conference Board
Abstract:
With most Americans dependent on reliable, high-quality, high-speed internet services to work, train, consult with doctors, or attend school from home, the COVID-19 pandemic vividly demonstrates that affordability and access barriers leave too many families behind. As America’s leaders in business and policy work toward a postpandemic economic recovery that delivers increasing prosperity for American families and preserves our nation’s economic leadership, they must also build toward a vision of a fully wired nation that meets the internet needs of all its citizens. Innovation and competition in information technology have been essential to delivering a higher quality of life and modern commerce, and they will be integral to lasting solutions that close two stubborn gaps that leave a minority of Americans behind. First, millions of Americans—particularly in the least densely populated areas—lack access to reliable high-quality internet services that could connect them to essential educational, employment, and entrepreneurial opportunities. Second, large numbers of low-income Americans with physical access to such services cannot afford them at current market prices, leaving them “underserved,” with less economic opportunity than their higher-income peers. In too many areas, a lack of competition among providers contributes to underservice. As needed internet speeds and associated hardware and technologies have advanced, closing these high-speed internet service gaps—increasing economic opportunity and strengthening businesses and communities—is essential. Policymakers must leverage the dynamism and innovation of the private market, increase competition in the provision of services, and invest wisely to close the gaps, boost deployment and affordability, and meet the universal service and critical technologies goals that have motivated nearly a century of federal telecommunications law.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Internet, Economy, and Business
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

57. New Media, Same Libya?

Author:
Biancamaria Vallortigara
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this issue of Beehive, Biancamaria Vallortigara investigates the impact of social media on Libyan society and the role of disinformation in the current crisis. Just a little over 10 years ago, when a wave of mass protests started to spread through the Middle East, the world observed intrigued the role played by the modern information and communication technologies (ICT): the “Arab Spring” has shown how social media networks facilitated the development of popular protests within a region, and the spread of revolutionary ideas from one country to another.
Topic:
Media, Internet, Social Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Libya and North Africa

58. The Egyptian TikTok Girls

Author:
Nir Boms
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In August issue of Beehive, Nir Boms analyses the Egypt’s recent restrictive policy on social media and its impact on young bloggers. Amidst a new wave of authoritarianism and repression in Egypt, the Internet remains one of the only platforms of alternative expression, although perhaps, not for long. Aside from Covid-19, the water crisis of the Rival Nile Dam, and the ongoing economic challenge, Egyptian news also dealt with the visible arrest of two young “TikTok stars.” Haneen Hossam, aged 20, was sentenced in absentia by a Cairo court to ten years in prison while Mawada al-Adham, aged 23, who appeared before the court, was sentenced to six.
Topic:
Politics, Authoritarianism, Internet, and Social Media
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

59. Journal of Advanced Military Studies: Political Warfare and Propaganda

Author:
James J. F. Forest, Daniel De Wit, Kyleanne Hunter, Emma Jouenne, Glen Segell, Lev Topor, Alexander Tabachnik, Donald M. Bishop, Phil Zeman, Michael Cserkits, and Anthony Patrick
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Advanced Military Studies
Institution:
Marine Corps University Press, National Defense University
Abstract:
The digital age has greatly expanded the terrain and opportunities for a range of foreign influence efforts. A growing number of countries have invested significantly in their capabilities to disseminate online propaganda and disinformation worldwide, while simultaneously establishing information dominance at home. Each of the contributions to this issue addresses the central theme of influencing perceptions and behavior. First, Daniel de Wit draws lessons from a historical analysis of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), America’s intelligence and special operations organization in World War II. In addition to its efforts to collect intelligence on the Axis powers and to arm and train resistance groups behind enemy lines, the OSS also served as America’s primary psychological warfare agency, using a variety of “black propaganda” methods to sow dissension and confusion in enemy ranks.82 As noted earlier, psychological warfare plays a significant role in the conduct of today’s military operations, so de Wit’s research offers important historical lessons for contemporary campaign planners. Next, Kyleanne Hunter and Emma Jouenne examine the uniquely troubling effects of spreading misogynistic views online. Their analysis of three diverse case studies—the U.S. military, the incel movement, and ISIS— reveals how unchecked online misogyny can result in physical behavior that can threaten human and national security. Glen Segell then explores how perceptions about cybersecurity operations can have positive or negative impacts on civil-military relations, drawing on a case study of the Israeli experience. Lev Topor and Alexander Tabachnik follow with a study of how Russia uses the strategies and tactics of digital influence warfare against other countries, while continually seeking to strengthen its information dominance over Russian citizens. And Donald M. Bishop reveals how other countries do this as well, including China, North Korea, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. Each is engaged in these same kinds of efforts to control the information that circulates within their respective societies, while using various forms of propaganda against other countries to strengthen their influence and national power. Phil Zeman’s contribution to this issue looks at how China and Russia are trying to fracture American and Western societies through information, disinformation, economic coercion, and the creation of economic dependencies— in many cases capitalizing on specific attributes and vulnerabilities of a target nation to achieve their strategic objectives. Through these efforts, he concludes, China and Russia hope to prevent the will or ability of American or Western states to respond to an aggressive act. Next, Michael Cserkits explains how a society’s perceptions about armed forces can be influenced by cinematic productions and anime, drawing on a case study comparison of Japan and the United States. And finally, Anthony Patrick examines how social media penetration and internet connectivity could impact the likelihood that parties within a conventional intrastate conflict will enter negotiations. As a collection, these articles make a significant contribution to the scholarly research literature on political warfare and propaganda. The authors shed light on the need for research-based strategies and policies that can improve our ability to identify, defend against, and mitigate the consequences of influence efforts. However, when reflecting on the compound security threats described at the beginning of this introduction—involving both cyberattacks and influence attacks—a startling contrast is revealed: we have committed serious resources toward cybersecurity but not toward addressing the influence issues examined in this issue. We routinely install firewalls and other security measures around our computer network systems, track potential intrusion attempts, test and report network vulnerabilities, hold training seminars for new employees, and take many other measures to try and mitigate cybersecurity threats. In contrast, there are no firewalls or intrusion detection efforts defending us against digital influence attacks of either foreign or domestic origin. Government sanctions and social media deplatforming efforts respond to influence attackers once they have been identified as such, but these efforts take place after attacks have already occurred, sometimes over the course of several years. The articles of this issue reflect an array of efforts to influence the perceptions, emotions, and behavior of human beings at both individual and societal levels. In the absence of comprehensive strategies to more effectively defend against these efforts, the United States risks losing much more than military advantage; we are placing at risk the perceived legitimacy of our systems and institutions of governance, as well as our economic security, our ability to resolve social disagreements peacefully, and much more.83 Further, many other nations are also facing the challenges of defending against foreign influence efforts. As such, the transnational nature of influence opportunities and capabilities in the digital age may require a multinational, coordinated response. In the years ahead, further research will be needed to uncover strategies for responding to the threat of digital influence warfare with greater sophistication and success.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Politics, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Women, Radicalization, Cybersecurity, Internet, History, World War II, Propaganda, Deterrence, Disinformation, Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Digital Policy, Psychological Warfare, and Misogyny
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Israel, Global Focus, and United States of America

60. Cybersecurity in Brazil: an analysis of the national strategy

Author:
Louise Marie Hurel
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Igarapé Institute
Abstract:
n February 2020, the Decree 10.222 established Brazil’s National Cybersecurity Strategy (E-Ciber) — the first official document to provide an overview regarding Brazil’s role in cybersecurity, as well as objectives and guiding principles for its development between 2020 and 2023. With the Covid-19 pandemic, thousands of people, governmental agencies, and businesses have rapidly adapted their activities to a largely virtual environment. This sudden migration led to new threats and attack surfaces for exploiting vulnerabilities. More than ever, different sectors must be prepared and trained to respond to and resist these threats. However, this was precisely the period in which Brazil suffered the worst cyber attack in its history – highlighting, yet again, that many challenges remain for ensuring that concerns with security turn into action across different sectors. This strategic paper identifies the main gaps and challenges for cybersecurity governance in Brazil. We unpack the main elements of E-Ciber in order to understand and place the country’s strategic vision historically as well as in relation to other international experiences. We adopt a principles-based approach that seeks to strengthen and inform the implementation of strategic cybersecurity objectives in Brazil, which include: national and international coordination and cooperation; knowledge integration; sustainability of efforts; and cybersecurity-related training.
Topic:
National Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Digital Policy, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Brazil and Latin America