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91. Conference on the Future of Europe: the complex implementation of high ambitions

Author:
Eric Maurice
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
On 9 May after a year's work the Conference on the future of Europe delivered its conclusions to chart the way for a "new, effective and more democratic Europe (...) sovereign and capable of acting", to quote one of its co-chairs, Guy Verhofstadt (BE, Renew). The Conference, which was an unprecedented exercise in participatory democracy at EU level, involving citizens, experts, representatives of the institutions and politicians, will only have achieved its objective if Europe, and in particular its Member States, follow and appropriate at least part of its recommendations. A first discussion is taking place at the European Council on 23 and 24 June, whilst the Parliament has already expressed its position and expectations. While a debate on the timeliness of revising the treaties was quickly launched around a few strong measures such as the abolition of unanimity when taking certain decisions, the questions raised by the Conference mainly concern the content and purpose of European policies and the participation of citizens in the definition and development of these policies. Initiated before the Covid-19 pandemic, launched and conducted between different phases of health restrictions, and concluded in the midst of the war in Ukraine, the Conference is both a review of the European project at a time of profound change as well as a call for its renewal. It is therefore fitting to examine its proposals and the possibilities of their implementation. The Conference on the Future of Europe was suggested in March 2019 by French President Emmanuel Macron in his letter to Europeans, to "to propose all the changes our political project needs, with an open mind, even to amending the treaties". The idea was taken up by the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, with the support of the Parliament. Delayed by lengthy discussions between institutions on its functioning, and then by the pandemic, the Conference opened on 9 May 2021 under the joint presidency of the Parliament, the Commission and the Council. In a joint declaration, the presidents of the three institutions stressed that this was a "citizens-focused, bottom-up exercise" exercise and pledged to "listen to Europeans and follow up the recommendations made during the Conference". By including citizens in a broad institutional debate, the European Union has aimed to strengthen its democratic legitimacy and reinforce the link between the institutions and citizens. The Conference was based on the principles of inclusion, openness and transparency, and on the respect for European values. This complex mechanism was designed to cross perspectives by multiplying scales and actors. A total of 6,465 events were organised in the 27 Member States, with 652,532 participants. An online platform in all official languages registered five million visitors, with 52 346 active participants sharing 17,671 ideas and leaving 21,877 comments. National citizens' panels were held in six countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania and the Netherlands. Four thematic panels, comprising 200 randomly selected Europeans, were organised and produced 178 recommendations. These were assessed and synthesised by the Conference plenary assembly, which was made up equally of representatives of the three institutions and representatives of national parliaments, as well as citizens and representatives of the social partners and civil society. This final report was drafted by an Executive Board of nine representatives from the Parliament, the Commission and the Council, in collaboration with the Conference plenary. In total, the Conference conclusions contain more than 320 measures divided into 49 proposals on nine main topics.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Democracy, Institutions, and Conference
Political Geography:
Europe

92. Thailand: The New Monarchy Under King Vajiralongkorn?

Author:
Pavin Chachavalpongpun and Ann Marie Murphy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
King Vajiralongkorn was crowned on 1 December 2016, although the official ceremony was not until 4 May 2019 (note that the official coronation was a three-day celebration from 4-6 May 2019). During this interval, Vajiralongkorn made known of his political ambition. For example, he intervened in the constitutional drafting process, requesting provisions related to the monarchy be amended. He restructured the Privy Council, removing some old councillors and filled the positions with military men. He also reformed the Crown Property Bureau. Assets previously registered to the CPB, from June 2018, would be held “in the name of His Majesty”. In other words, Vajiralongkorn took sole control of the CPB, erasing any ambiguity about the owner of this superrich organisation. A scholar argues, “The monarchy now holds more formal power than any king since 1932. The king and the military have an accommodation built around the military’s capacity for repression”. Under Bhumibol, political stability was key to the flourishing reign. Politics was predictable. Benefits were shared among major stakeholders. Underpinning Bhumibol’s strength was his unsurpassed ability to accumulate moral authority through the invigoration of the neo-royalist ideology. Under Vajiralongkorn, the palace has striven for a new management style. This talk discusses the beginning of the new reign under King Vajiralongkorn. In particular, it seeks to discuss his relationship with other key institutions, including the democratic forces.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Institutions, Monarchy, and Military
Political Geography:
Thailand and Southeast Asia

93. Democracy and Urban Political Culture in Spanish South America, 1810-1860

Author:
Paula Alonso and Marcela Ternavasio
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kellogg Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
“Democracy,” a word seldom used in public debate at the start of the nineteenth century and negatively associated with tumult, disorder, and direct rule, in a few decades became linked to representative government and increasingly employed with positive connotations. This paper argues that these conceptual changes should be explored in their political and social contexts, since the term “democracy” was invoked to (de)legitimate certain political practices and social sectors. Therefore, in exploring this non-linear process in Spanish America, these pages focus on the interactions between the emerging language of democracy and its varied meanings and uses in urban politics. These interactions were part of the factional disputes on how to implement the principle of popular sovereignty. Starting with an overview of selected emerging political practices during the Independence period, the paper then focuses on Lima and Buenos Aires, two regions with contrasting colonial pasts, responses to Spanish crises, and post-independence paths, showing how the concept of democracy could be put to varied uses according to different contexts and political objectives.
Topic:
Civil Society, Governance, Culture, Democracy, Citizenship, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, Latin America, and Peru

94. The state and the ‘legalization’ of illicit financial flows: Trading gold in Bolivia

Author:
Fritz Brugger, Joschka Proksik, and Felitas Fischer
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Most research on illicit financial flows (IFFs) has focused on illicit outflows from developing countries and the role of non-state actors in generating IFFs. Less attention has been paid to processes and interfaces through which IFFs enter formal value chains—in effect being ‘legalized’ before leaving the country—or the crucial role of state institutions as gatekeepers. We develop a novel explanatory approach to account for the enabling role of state institutions in the ‘legalization’ of IFFs. Building on political settlement theory, we explain the performance of institutions in the regulation of IFFs as a function of political settlements. Taking the case of the Bolivian gold-trading sector, we examine how the process of ‘legalizing’ illicit value flows works in practice and analyse the motives and underlying conditions that lead state institutions to permit the formal export of gold shipments that have been illicitly sourced or transferred. Evidence from Bolivia indicates that the ‘legalization’ of illicit flows cannot be sufficiently explained by reference to corruption, illicit rent-seeking, or a general lack of administrative capacity. Rather, the process accommodates the interests of the cooperatives dominating the gold-mining sector, which are critical to maintaining the political settlement on which the incumbent government’s power is based. By maintaining a status quo of non-enforcement, legal ambiguity, and pervasive informality, gold-mining cooperatives are permitted to reap higher benefits from resource extraction at the expense of domestic revenue mobilization.
Topic:
Institutions, Mining, Trade, Value Chains, Illicit Financial Flows, and Gold
Political Geography:
Global Focus

95. Does aid fragmentation affect tax revenue dynamics in developing countries? Observations with new tax data

Author:
Ali Compaoré and Abrams M. E. Tagem
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
There exists a burgeoning empirical literature on the impact of aid fragmentation on development outcomes in aid-receiving countries, with it being widely recognized that aid fragmentation is deleterious. This paper adds to the existing literature by estimating the impact of aid fragmentation on tax revenue mobilization in developing countries. Drawing on the popular system generalized method of moments technique to counter endogeneity issues, this study focuses on a sample of 90 developing countries covering the period from 2000 to 2020. We show that aid fragmentation, measured by the Herfindahl index, has a significant negative impact on recipient countries’ tax revenue ratios, an impact that is not mitigated by the level of institutional quality. The paper also explores the impact of aid fragmentation on tax structure and finds convincing evidence that direct taxes, particularly corporate income taxes, are the most affected. Value-added tax is the only indirect tax affected by aid fragmentation.
Topic:
Development, Tax Systems, Institutions, and Revenue
Political Geography:
Global Focus

96. When only China wants to play: Institutional turmoil and Chinese investment in Brazil

Author:
Niels Sondergaard, Ana Flavia Barros-Platiau, and Hyeyoon Park
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional (RBPI)
Institution:
Instituto Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (IBRI)
Abstract:
The political and institutional crisis in Brazil from 2015, fueled largely by corruption probes and lawfare, had severe repercussions within the Brazilian construction and energy sectors. While many international investors withdrew from Brazil in this period, Chinese investment surged. This article accounts for the particular characteristics of Chinese investments, such as sectorial complementarities, risk assessment, market size attraction, and state-drivenness, which may explain this development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Investment, and Institutions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

97. Chinese Mining Companies and Local Mobilization in Myanmar

Author:
Xue Gong
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the 2010s, China has invested enormous amounts of capital in major infrastructure construction projects in developing countries around the world, including in Southeast Asia. Many argue that China aims to export its development model to the world, but Chinese actors have also at times sought to address project concerns at least to some degree. The question is this: how are Chinese business actors adapting to the local contexts, legal and regulatory requirements, technical standards, and community norms in the places where they operate? To answer that question, it is important to focus on the interactive dynamics between Chinese players and local civic actors (such as local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations, community groups, government-owned NGOs, activists, associations, and other networks in exile) in Myanmar that can collectively be termed local societal actors. By tracing Chinese local engagement activities involving a major Chinese-backed resource-extraction project, the Letpadaung copper mine, this paper argues that the past few decades of China’s deep embeddedness and interests in Myanmar’s political economy forced Chinese businesses to adapt to Myanmarese societal demands, by way of a local community-based approach. Beijing knows that projects supported by Myanmar’s government today might not have the same traction tomorrow. Therefore, when pressure has built, Chinese actors have paid greater heed to demands from local residents in projects’ host countries, even at times integrating these demands to adjust existing Chinese strategies, choices, and behaviors. That said, these concessions have not caused these disputes to entirely disappear, and the staying power of these Chinese adaptations is open to question, particularly amid the political upheaval Myanmar has weathered since the 2021 coup. A key variable in these changes is the power of the local societal actors: when they are strong and supported by local institutions, Chinese business actors often are more adaptive to local demands and take greater steps, including with local partners, to win support from local societal actors. Because the interactions between local institutions and local societal actors vary by place and time, Chinese responses to local actors and practices also do vary in different periods. In sum, it is clear that Chinese actors are making progress at the local level by showing their adaptability not just in terms of the Letpadaung copper mine case but also on other shared development projects in Myanmar. Nonetheless, Chinese actors’ approach to local community engagement is subject to the local context and specifically to what extent local institutions have the capacity and will to support local societal demands.
Topic:
Civil Society, Infrastructure, Institutions, Coup, and Mining
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

98. How Inequality and Polarization Interact: America’s Challenges Through a South African Lens

Author:
Brian Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Over the past decade, toxic interactions between persistent inequality, racial tensions, and political polarization have undercut the promise of South Africa’s so-called rainbow miracle transition from apartheid to democracy. South Africa’s recent history sheds light on the United States’ recent political travails. It illustrates how interactions between inclusion and inequality on the one hand and political ideas and entrepreneurship on the other can fuel positive spirals of hope, economic dynamism, and political legitimacy—but can also trigger vicious, downward spirals of disillusion, anger, and political polarization. South Africa was able to transition from a society structured around racial oppression into a nonracial democracy whose new government promised “a better life for all.” Especially remarkable was the speed with which one set of national ideas appeared to give way to its polar opposite. From a society marked by racial dominance and oppression, there emerged the aspiration to build an inclusive, cooperative social order, underpinned by the principles of equal dignity and shared citizenship. In the initial glow of transition, South Africa’s citizens could hope for a better life for themselves and their children. In time, though, the promise wore thin. It became increasingly evident that the economic deck would continue to be stacked, and that the possibility of upward mobility would remain quite limited. Fueled by massive continuing inequities in wealth, income, and opportunity, South Africans increasingly turned from hope to anger. In the United States, a steady and equitably growing economy and a vibrant civil rights movement had fostered the hope of social and economic inclusion. But that hope turned to anger as the benefits of growth became increasingly skewed from the 1980s onward. In 2019, the U.S. economy was more unequal than it had been since the 1920s. Younger generations could no longer expect that their lives would be better than those of their parents. Such economic adversity and associated status anxiety can trigger a heightened propensity for us-versus-them ways of engaging the world. In both South Africa and the United States, polarization was fueled by divisive political entrepreneurs, and in both countries, these entrepreneurs leveraged inequality in ways that added fuel to the fire. In the 2010s, South Africa went through a new ideational reckoning, in part to correct the view that the transition to democracy had washed the country’s apartheid history clean. But opportunistic political entrepreneurs also pushed an increasingly polarized and re-racialized political discourse and pressure on public institutions, with predictable economic consequences. South Africa’s economy slid into sustained stagnation. Paralleling South Africa, America’s divisive political entrepreneurs also cultivated an us-versus-them divisiveness. However, unlike in South Africa, political entrepreneurs and economic elites in the United States also used divisive rhetoric as a way to persuade voters to embrace inequality-increasing policies that might otherwise not have won support. By the late 2010s, the risks were palpable in both South Africa and the United States of an accelerating breakdown of the norms and institutions that sustain inclusive political settlements. For South Africa, the reversals were not wholly unexpected, given the country’s difficult inheritance—though a recent turn away from angry populism suggests that, paradoxically, the rawness and recency of the anti-apartheid struggle and triumph might perhaps offer some immunization against a further-accelerating a downward spiral. But for the United States, the converse may be true. Increases in inequality since the 1980s, and their attendant social and political consequences, have been largely self-inflicted wounds. Complacency bred of long stability may, for decades, have been lulling the country into political recklessness at the inequality-ethnicity intersection, a recklessness that risks plunging the country into disaster. But this paper’s analysis is not all gloom and doom. South Africa’s escape from the shackles of apartheid teaches that, even in the most unlikely settings, downward spirals of despair and anger can transmute into virtuous spirals of hope. The country’s first fifteen years of democracy also show that, once a commitment to change has taken hold, making the shift to an inclusion-supporting economy is less daunting than it might seem. Reforms that foster “good enough inclusion” can be enough to provide initial momentum, with the changes themselves unfolding over time—and an initial round of change can bring in its wake a variety of positive knock-on effects. But lessons can be overlearned. Mass political mobilization was pivotal to South Africa’s shaking loose the shackles of apartheid—and new calls to the barricades might seem to be the obvious response to current political and governmental dysfunction. However, different times and different challenges call for different responses. In both contemporary South Africa and contemporary America, the frontier challenge is not to overthrow an unjust political order but to renew preexisting formal commitments to the idea that citizenship implies some shared purpose. Renewal of this kind might best be realized not by confrontation but rather by a social movement centered around a vision of shared citizenship, a movement that views cooperation in pursuit of win-win possibilities not as weakness but as the key to the sustainability of thriving, open, and inclusive societies.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, Inequality, Institutions, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

99. Corruption and crisis: do institutions matter?

Author:
Shrabani Saha and Kunal Sen
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
While the short-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on lives and livelihoods are well understood, we know little about the effect of the pandemic for longer-term outcomes such as corruption. We look at the historical data on political and economic crises to assess what we can learn from the long-term effects of past crises on corruption. We hypothesize that strong rule of law institutions may ameliorate the possible adverse effects of political and economic crises on corruption. We test our hypotheses using panel data for over 100 countries during the years 1800– 2020. The results suggest heterogeneous effects depending on the type of crisis and how we measure it. We find that rule of law institutions can control corruption in cases of political violence and economic slowdown, but the effect is not seen for democracy breakdowns, coups, armed conflict and civil war, and economic crisis such as currency and debt crisis.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Rule of Law, Institutions, Data, COVID-19, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

100. Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty during the euro’s lifetime

Author:
Monika Grzegorczyk and Francesco Papadia
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
It is a cliché in official economic institutions’ publications and their leaders’ speeches to lament exceptional uncertainty. The complaint does, however, ring true currently. A solid empirical basis should be given to this view by properly measuring macroeconomic uncertainty. To measure macroeconomic uncertainty, we start from observable forecasts of macroeconomic variables, which are transformations of underlying economic conditions. By observing how forecasts change over time, we measure the flow of macroeconomic surprises. The more intense the flow of surprises, the greater uncertainty can be said to be. Greater differences among forecasts are also evidence of uncertainty. We draw out four indicators of macroeconomic uncertainty, measured over the lifetime of the euro: How the macroeconomic forecasts of a given institution for the same time period change over time; How the macroeconomic forecasts of a given institution deviate from realised outcomes; How the macroeconomic forecasts of different institutions deviate from one other; How dispersed the forecasts of different professionals are. We also measure whether the ‘stag-‘ or the ‘-flationary’ component is stronger in the overall stagflationary shock caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Topic:
Economy, Institutions, Macroeconomics, Uncertainty, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus