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61. Can the Belt and Road Initiative Succeed in Afghanistan?

Author:
Sudha Ramachandran
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
At a trilateral meeting in Islamabad on May 9, the foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan agreed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and reaffirmed their support for multilateral infrastructure projects already underway, including the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA) power project and the Trans-Afghan Railways (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs [FMPRC], May 9). Earlier on January 5, the Taliban regime signed an agreement with the Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of the state-owned China National Petroleum Company (CNPC), for the extraction of oil from the Amu Darya basin, under which China will invest $150 million annually for three years and increase it thereafter to $540 million for the contract’s 25-year duration (Kabul Now, January 5). Then on April 13, Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum announced that the Chinese company Gochin had expressed interest in investing $10 billion in Afghanistan’s lithium reserves (Kabul Now, April 13). Meanwhile, China is reported to be in talks with the Taliban regime over renegotiating the terms of a 2008 contract to mine copper from the Mes Aynak reserves in Logar province (The Print, June 8, 2022). The agreements, including plans to extend CPEC—a key leg of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—into Afghanistan, are a significant development. The deal relating to oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin is the Taliban regime’s first major foreign investment deal. However, in the past, major Chinese projects have failed to take off. Will the recent deals remain in limbo as well? China’s growing role in Afghanistan faces formidable challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, and South Asia

62. Ten Years On, How is the Belt and Road Initiative Faring in Indonesia?

Author:
William Yuen Yee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
“It is not merely talk, but it is about actually building something. From airports to railways, these are industries we can see and touch. This is exactly the sort of courage and real action the world needs right now.” So said Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo about China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the inaugural Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) in 2017 (BRF, May 14, 2017; Jakarta Globe, May 16, 2017). This year marks the tenth anniversary of this ambitious, globe-spanning infrastructure development project. Today, 151 countries and 32 international organizations have joined the initiative, which Foreign Minister Qin Gang recently described as a “global enterprise to build a belt of prosperity and a road to happiness” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [PRC], January 20). A decade ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the BRI with a series of speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia calling for a “Silk Road Economic Belt” and a “Maritime Silk Road,” respectively (Consulate General of the PRC in Toronto, September 7, 2013; China Daily, October 4, 2013). The following year, China announced the creation of a $40 billion Silk Road fund at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Beijing and a $20 billion Maritime Silk Road fund in Indonesia (China Daily, November 9, 2014). From the BRI’s inception, it has been clear that Southeast Asia and its largest economy— Indonesia—are intended to serve as a centerpiece of the megaproject (Global Times, November 16, 2022). Roughly two-thirds of all people of ethnic Chinese ancestry outside of China are in Southeast Asia. [1] The 142-kilometer (88 mile) Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) is one of the BRI’s flagship projects (China Brief, December 22, 2022). Indonesia also hosts nearly half of the eight overseas industrial parks that China has established across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states: the China-Indonesia Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone, the China-Indonesia Morowali Industrial Park, and the China-Indonesia JuLong Agricultural Industry Cooperation Zone (China Development Institute, June 26, 2019). While Beijing has pulled back its overseas BRI lending—and Xi has exhibited some notable reticence toward hosting a third Belt and Road Forum—Indonesia challenges the broader narrative that the BRI is somehow fading away (Green Finance & Development Center, July 24, 2022). In the world’s fourth-most populous country, Chinese investment has continued apace, and both governments continue to champion the BRI’s ability to deliver “mutual benefit” and “win-win results.” Still, understanding Indonesia’s experience with the BRI requires closer examination of the history behind China-Indonesia infrastructure cooperation, major projects beyond the oft-discussed Jakarta-Bandung HSR and their impacts on the Indonesian public, and the extent of economic engagement between Jakarta and Beijing.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Economy, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

63. Climate Financing

Author:
Mohammed Mahmoud
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Director of MEI’s Climate and Water Program Mohammed Mahmoud speaks to energy and sustainable infrastructure expert Lucia Fuselli on the role of climate financing - a critical component of initiatives aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions and bolstering climate resilience.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Water, Infrastructure, Climate Finance, Sustainability, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Middle East and Global Focus

64. China and the Global South: Many Initiatives, One Narrative

Author:
Marina Rudyak
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Since its 2013 launch, the China-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has stirred heated debates. Despite Beijing framing it as win-win cooperation, concerns mounted over BRI’s risks for involved countries, especially in the Global South. China’s narrative merely signals a search for an effective communication strategy and international discourse power, while its understanding of development remains constant. Developing countries play a crucial role in China’s pursuit of global status. Firstly, it positions itself as the advocate for developing nations, promoting “diverse paths to modernisation” and “true multilateralism”. Secondly, China aims to redefine major power by prioritising development and security over liberal democracy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Infrastructure, Multilateralism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Modernization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global South

65. The Zangezur corridor as part of the global transport route (against the backdrop of power games in the South Caucasus region)

Author:
Piotr Gawliczek and Khayal Iskandarov
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The restoration of historical transport routes and the creation of new ones is a strategic objective of most states in modern times. Located at the intersection of the North–South and East–West transport routes, Azerbaijan is currently recognised as an important transport and logistics hub. Successful cooperation with European Union countries in this field is taking place. The East–West and North–South international transport routes passing through the territory of Azerbaijan are very convenient for cargo transportation in terms of distance and duration. This paper discusses the plausibility of the Zangezur corridor being used (which is mentioned in the tripartite agreement that dates back to 10 November 2020) and highlights its importance as an integral element of the global transit route. A comparative analysis of different transit routes was carried out, and the advantages of opening this corridor for all stakeholders was justified.
Topic:
International Security, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

66. THE LIMITS OF PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY IN UKRAINE AND BEYOND

Author:
Costantino Pischedda and Andrew Cheon
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
Drone strikes targeted Moscow last week. Though much remains unknown about it, the episode appears to be part of a series of unclaimed coercive attacks that US officials attributed to Ukrainian government personnel, including the killing of the daughter of a Russian nationalist, the sabotage of the North Stream pipelines, and drone attacks on the Kremlin. With unclaimed coercion, perpetrators impose costs on adversaries to signal their resolve to prevail in disputes while denying involvement or simply not making any claim about responsibility. Unclaimed coercion is not unique to the war in Ukraine. Russia launched cyber attacks in 2007 to extract concessions from Estonia, though Moscow denied responsibility, and in 2010 Seoul claimed North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship, Pyongyang’s denial notwithstanding. Unclaimed coercion may have strategic benefits. Without unmistakable evidence about the identity of the perpetrator, the absence of a claim of responsibility creates plausible deniability, which, some argue, allows coercers to send intelligible, credible messages to targets while containing escalation risks. It may also reduce the costs of being seen as a norm violator. For instance, Austin Carson observed that, though both Saudi Arabia and the United States viewed the 2019 attacks on Saudi oil facilities as part of an Iranian coercive campaign, the absence both of conclusive evidence and a claim of responsibility prevented Riyadh and Washington from carrying out a tough military response, which would have looked “illegitimate while jeopardizing allies’ support.”
Topic:
Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Armed Conflict, Coercion, Russia-Ukraine War, and Plausible Deniability
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, South Korea, North Korea, and Cuba

67. Provisions on Liability for Decommissioning Upstream Offshore Oil and Gas Infrastructure in Investor-State Contracts

Author:
Martin Dietrich Brauch, Juan Carlos Fernández-Rodríguez, and María José Roa
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
•Decommissioning upstream offshore oil and gas operations involves dismantling infrastructure and equipment and mitigating their environmental impacts when the oil or gas resource becomes depleted or economically unviable. Stricter climate policy and the energy transition away from fossil fuels are likely to accelerate decommissioning processes.  • Domestic statutes, decrees, and regulations that apply to the oil and gas industry are ideally suited for governing decommissioning liability. In principle, these instruments are not subject to negotiation with private entities, reducing their leverage in setting decommissioning obligations, in particular those related to environmental and financial matters. • Oil and gas contracts between the host state and private oil and gas companies may include decommissioning provisions, whether to govern the issue comprehensively where statutory or regulatory frameworks are silent on the issue or to complement them.  • Where statutory and regulatory frameworks are insufficient, contracts should include provisions governing decommissioning as an integral stage occurring at the end of the project (and not as a post-project activity), factoring in the health, environmental, safety, and financial risks it entails throughout the project’s life cycle. • As part of an analysis commissioned by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), this paper examines contractual provisions related to decommissioning or abandonment of offshore oil and gas extraction infrastructure from various jurisdictions for which contracts are available on ResourceContracts.org. • Not every contract includes decommissioning provisions or requires the oil and gas company to develop a decommissioning plan; across contracts that do, the scope of provisions varies significantly. Certain contracts refer to a standard to be applied in decommissioning activities, with varying stringency levels. While some contracts refer to industry best practices, not all of them define what they entail. Not all contracts contain environmental protection and rehabilitation obligations specific to decommissioning.  • Certain contracts require approval and oversight by a state agency to ensure that the oil and gas company prepares and submits an appropriate decommissioning plan and that the decommissioning process takes place as set out in the applicable statutes and regulations, the contract, and the plan itself. The effectiveness of these mechanisms depends on the rigor and regularity with which the government assesses and inspects decommissioning plans and processes.  Where feasible, climate concerns should be added to standard environmental warranties. Contracts could restate environmental and climate-related requirements as forward-looking warranties made by the company to remove any ambiguity about its obligations and the consequences of failing to meet them. • To avoid a scenario where the government must cover decommissioning costs in case of noncompliance by the oil and gas company with its decommissioning obligations, contracts should create a dedicated decommissioning fund, with sufficient money to cover all decommissioning (including expected post-decommissioning) costs, and:  o Require the oil and gas company to fully prefund the decommissioning fund as part of capital and operating expenditures, with contributions assured by the ultimate parent company and beginning before project construction. Determine that funds be set aside in an escrow account dedicated to decommissioning in an independent private banking institution and in the form of a specific financial instrument that guarantees decommissioning without freezing the oil and gas company’s funds to develop the project.  o Require the company to meet the full costs of decommissioning if the offshore extraction infrastructure is transferred to third parties or if the fund is insufficient, extending the liability to the ultimate parent company whenever possible. o Require the parties to renegotiate as needed to adjust decommissioning activities or increase or decrease their costs. o Provide for tax deductibility and cost recoverability of fund contributions, to promote companies’ compliance with their obligation to contribute to the fund.  • Contracts should outline objective conditions for the release of decommissioning liability, along with any subsisting obligations that the oil company and its ultimate parent company retain in perpetuity after decommissioning or after the sale or transfer of the upstream asset. • Contracts should not include non-fiscal stabilization provisions, to ensure that states can enforce any new or amended statutes or regulations governing decommissioning liability, without having to compensate oil and gas companies that are party to pre-existing contracts.
Topic:
Climate Change, Infrastructure, Investment, Sustainability, and Contracts
Political Geography:
Global Focus

68. Community Benefit Sharing and Renewable Energy and Green Hydrogen Projects: Policy Guidance for Governments

Author:
Perrine Toledano, Chris Albin-Lackey, Maria Diez Andres, and Martin Dietrich Brauch
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
This report offers high-level guidance to governments that want to mandate or encourage the use of benefit-sharing arrangements in connection with renewable energy projects, including power and hydrogen generation and grid infrastructure. In the right circumstances, and if appropriately designed and governed, benefit-sharing arrangements can be a useful mechanism to ensure that project-affected communities experience positive outcomes from those projects. Such direct community benefits can play an important role in ensuring communities are treated fairly, while also building local support that can expedite project development.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Renewable Energy, Sustainability, and Benefit Sharing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

69. COSCO in Piraeus: Investment Embeddedness and the Question of Chinese 'influence'

Author:
Konstantinos Tsimonis and Andrew J. Nathan
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
Professor Tsimonis will present his research around the landmark investment of China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) in the port of Piraeus and discuss its political, social, economic and environmental repercussions. The speaker will approach COSCO's investment as an embedded phenomenon and unpack the agency of local, regional and global actors in order to assess the question of 'Chinese influence'. This talk will introduce to the Weatherhead audience the context of Chinese activities and policies in Greece. The speaker will also discuss the challenge and the necessity for developing independent China expertise in countries with no China studies tradition, as a way to mitigate the political risks arising from the PRC's global economic outreach.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Economy, Investment, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
China, Greece, and Asia

70. Book Talk with Jessamyn Abel, Author of "Dream Super-Express"

Author:
Jessamyn Abel, Takuya Tsunoda, and Ariana King
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University
Abstract:
A symbol of the "new Japan" displayed at World's Fairs, depicted in travel posters, and celebrated as the product of a national spirit of innovation, the Tōkaidō Shinkansen—the first bullet train, dubbed the "dream super-express"—represents the bold aspirations of a nation rebranding itself after military defeat, but also the deep problems caused by the unbridled postwar drive for economic growth. At the dawn of the space age, how could a train become such an important symbol? In Dream Super-Express (Stanford University Press, 2022), Jessamyn Abel contends that understanding the various, often contradictory, images of the bullet train reveals how infrastructure operates beyond its intended use as a means of transportation to perform cultural and sociological functions.
Topic:
History, Infrastructure, Sociology, Culture, Economic Growth, and Book Talk
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia