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271. Obtaining Construction Permits In Cameroon: Dealing With The Law

Author:
Dinga Tambi and Henri Kouam
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Infrastructure is a prerequisite for economic development. It forms the backdrop of sustained economic progress, creates employment opportunities and improves citizens’ quality of life. To this end, the World Bank created the “Doing Business Index” to measure the performance of countries. Admittedly, construction permits comprise a sub-category of the overall index where Cameroon ranks from 166th in 2019 to 167th in 2020. This article looks at current legislation for obtaining construction permits, the various parties involved and the implications for Cameroon’s economic development.
Topic:
Infrastructure, World Bank, Business, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

272. Assessing The Mechanism Of The Issuance Of Construction Permits In Cameroon

Author:
Jean-Cedric Kouam
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The building permit is a preliminary declaration that allows for the verification of a construction initiative in a given locality, in line with the respect of town planning and architectural rules in force. In Cameroon, this document issued by the local council authority is mandatory for any possible new construction or modification of an existing construction. Therefore, any construction without an official permit is liable to a penalty of 30% of the estimated cost of the building. According to Law No.2004/003 of April 21, 2004 governing the Cameroonian Urban Planning Code and the decree of 23 April 2008; the process of obtaining this document has been considerably shortened. Yet, it remains quite complex. This complexity is evident in the plurality of procedures, requirements, norms, offices, conditions, actors, documents, and stakeholders involved in the process. All these are accompanied by the heavy financial burden, time-consuming processes, boycotts, administrative bottlenecks and corruption; all of which lead to unorganized and slow urban development. Moreover, within this complexity, is the reality that such mechanisms differ from one place to another across the national territory; thereby creating some sought of uncertainty, non-uniformity, and lack of trust in the system. The improvement in the issuance mechanism of Construction Permits in Cameroon is very vital for a country that has the ambition to achieve its economic emergence by 2035.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Regulation, Business, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

273. Understanding Quality Energy-Related Infrastructure Development in the Mekong Subregion: Key Drivers and Policy Implications

Author:
Han Phoumin, Sopheak Meas, and Hatda Pich An
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Many players have supported infrastructure development in the Mekong Subregion, bridging the missing links in Southeast Asia. While the influx of energy-related infrastructure development investments to the region has improved the livelihoods of millions of people on the one hand, it has brought about a myriad of challenges to the wider region in guiding investments for quality infrastructure and for promoting a low-carbon economy, and energy access and affordability, on the other hand. Besides reviewing key regional initiatives for infrastructure investment and development, this paper examines energy demand and supply, and forecasts energy consumption in the subregion during 2017–2050 using energy modelling scenario analysis. The study found that to satisfy growing energy demand in the subregion, huge power generation infrastructure investment, estimated at around $190 billion–$220 billion, is necessary between 2017 and 2050 and that such an investment will need to be guided by appropriate policy. We argue that without redesigning energy policy towards high-quality energy infrastructure, it is very likely that the increasing use of coal upon which the region greatly depends will lead to the widespread construction of coal-fired power plants, which could result in increased greenhouse gas and carbon dioxide emissions.
Topic:
Development, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Renewable Energy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, Southeast Asia, Laos, and Myanmar

274. Building Back Better: A National Jobs Strategy

Author:
Mary Alive McCarthy, Carl Van Horn, and Michael Prebil
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
The United States has a jobs problem. When the COVID-19 pandemic plunged the economy back into recession in early 2020, it laid bare a fragile and profoundly inequitable labor market. In the absence of a robust and coordinated recovery strategy focused on increasing the supply of good jobs, the same labor market pathologies that plagued the last recovery will re-emerge: the long-term unemployed will struggle to land jobs and many will give up; private sector job growth will be slow and uneven; many new jobs will be worse than those they replace; unemployment among Black and Latinx workers will remain elevated; and income and wealth gaps will widen. This recovery must be different. The Biden-Harris administration has an historic opportunity to lay the foundation for an economy built on good jobs, one that ensures the benefits of economic growth are broadly and fairly shared This publication provides a set of concrete recommendations to help guide an all-of-government jobs strategy, including three goals to guide a national jobs agenda, a suite of distinct but reinforcing strategies to achieve them, and a framework for coordinating activities across government.
Topic:
Security, National Security, Infrastructure, Governance, Job Creation, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

275. Cybersecurity Capacity Building and Donor Coordination in the Western Balkans

Author:
Fabio Barbero and Nils Berglund
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
As the interwoven threats and opportunities of cybersecurity and digital development grow more complex, and geopolitical tensions rise, both donors and recipients should look towards a more holistic understanding of capacity building in the Western Balkans, while embracing an approach which enables meaningful international engagement on the peace and security of cyberspace. Continued interest and investment in cybersecurity capacity building in the region clearly indicates that the Western Balkans remain strategically important for a number of international actors. Systematic coordination-by-design methodologies and best practices among donors that utilise whole-of-society and multi-stakeholder approaches can improve the legitimacy, ownership and sustainability of outcomes in the context of persistent challenges to human capacity, political will, and resource scarcity. Furthermore, to better define the roles of different capacity building actors, help identify opportunities for strategic partnerships, and clarify donor-recipient relationships, donors should seek to strengthen the links between policy objectives and strategies for capacity building interventions. This discussion paper explores how cyber capacity building actors and initiatives in the Western Balkans could be better coordinated, while considering the barriers to reaching cyber maturity in the region. Firstly, the paper offers a brief overview of projects, donors, and implementing organisations active in the Western Balkans, based on desk research and a series of interviews with relevant stakeholders. Secondly, the paper explores best practices on coordination through the framework implemented by Operational Guidance for the EU’s International Cooperation on Cyber Capacity Building. Based on the above findings, practical insights and recommendations are proposed, with an eye towards enhancing future cybersecurity capacity building investment
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, and Donors
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

276. What Is Drawing Xi’s China and Lukashenko’s Belarus Closer?

Author:
Solomiya Kharchuk
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
What are the primary drivers of the relationship between Xi’s China and Lukashenko’s Belarus? The present research paper uses the historical process-tracing method to provide an answer to this question. Furthermore, it uses quantitative data analysis regarding the economic intercourse between Belarus and China. It examines whether China’s opposition regarding the unipolar American-led world order and Belarus’s security concerns are the primary drivers of the relationship between Minsk and Beijing. The present article concludes that the congruence of beliefs and Minsk’s desire to ensure survival are drawing the two countries closer together. China’s new strategy encompasses Beijing’s increasing participation in world affairs. China opposes the world order led by a single hegemon, the United States of America. In the interim, Belarus, a relatively weak state insignificant in the global balance of power, shares Beijing’s beliefs about the desired nature of the contemporary world order. However, the Belarusian economy’s condition, which relies heavily on external funding, does not allow the economic cooperation between Minsk and Beijing to thrive. China gradually increases its engagement with Belarus, yet it obscures its ambitions, for Minsk lies in Moscow’s sphere of influence.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

277. Defending 2020: What Worked, What Didn’t, and What’s Next

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Bradley Hanlon
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2016 presidential election served as a wakeup call to the threat of authoritarian interference, and in the years since, many segments of American society—from the federal government to private companies and civil society groups—have taken valuable steps to prepare for and counter it. Congress and the Executive Branch stood up a new government agency and multiple coordinating bodies to protect election infrastructure, while social media platforms have instituted policies to restrict the manipulation of advertisements, label misleading and false content, and slow the spread of disinformation. Working together, civil society instituted new cross-sector coordination mechanisms for election security. Yet longstanding vulnerabilities—including crippling political polarization and underfunded election jurisdictions—persist. A series of high-profile failures to prosecute the solicitation of foreign interference in U.S. elections further threaten to solidify a dangerous new norm. Meanwhile, the threat landscape is growing more dynamic. New actors, including China and Iran, have taken an interest in adopting elements of Russia’s information manipulation playbook. And that playbook is itself evolving. In 2020, Russia and Iran took active steps to influence U.S. voters, engaging in information operations—at times augmented by cyberattacks—to denigrate candidates, sow chaos and division, and reduce trust in democratic institutions.1 New players, including Cuba, Venezuela, and other, non-state actors also took steps to influence voters and attack election infrastructure.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Elections, Disinformation, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and United States of America

278. How To Retain Election Officials To Secure Future Elections

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The 2020 presidential election was called the most secure in U.S. history, largely due to efforts to protect the nation’s different physical and cyber infrastructure. This was a triumph considering the physical, cyber, and even human assets that make up the election infrastructure have been and continue to be susceptible to threats. In 2020, many states adopted measures to mitigate threats to physical and cyber election assets like voting equipment, ballots, and facilities, as well as computer services and databases that store voter information. For example, states with close results in the 2020 presidential race had paper records of each vote, which gave them the ability to go back and count each ballot if necessary. Other measures such as pre-election testing, state and federal certification of voting equipment, and increased collaboration between election officials and their security partners helped provide additional assurance that the 2020 election results were legitimate. Unfortunately, analogous measures were not in place to protect many of the people—from state and local election administrators to poll workers and vendor staff—who administered the elections. Due in large part to the incendiary rhetoric from former President Donald Trump and his followers, many election officials were threatened and harassed, and such behavior shows no signs of abating. Instead of taking steps to address this problem, many states have passed or are considering passing laws that could make this problem worse. Georgia’s new law removed the Georgia’s secretary of state—who rejected Donald Trump’s effort’s to overturn the state’s 2020 results—from decision-making power on the state election board and turned control of the board over to a politicized, less knowledgeable body: the state legislature. Iowa’s new law threatens election officials with criminal prosecution for failing to follow new voting rules. And Florida recently adopted a rule that subjects its local election officials to a civil penalty of $25,000 if a drop box at an early voting site is left accessible for the return of ballots outside of early voting hours. The unrelenting targeting of administrators—along with unfunded election mandates, threats, burn out, and fatigue—has pushed many election officials to leave or consider leaving their positions. According to a recent Democracy Fund/Reed College Survey of Local Election Officials, approximately one-third of chief local election officials will be eligible to retire before the 2024 election, including more than half of those in the largest jurisdictions, which each serve more than 250,000 registered voters. Considering what many of these election officials and their staffs endured during the 2020 election cycle, and continue to experience, it would be unwise to simply wait and hope that they decide to hang on. Instead, every effort should be made to create an environment that is as conducive as possible for retaining these unsung heroes of the 2020 elections. The ability of the United States to conduct future secure elections may well depend on it. This paper focuses on measures state and local governments can take in concert with their election offices to help retain as many of their high-performing election officials as possible. State and local governments should have support from the federal government and Congress to help address this national security issue, but if the fight over funding the 2020 election is any indication, they should begin taking steps to address this problem now. Below are ten suggestions for how state and local governments can retain their high-performing election officials. None is a “silver bullet,” not all of them will be relevant for each state and local government unit, and some governments have already taken many of these steps. But in addressing election official retention solutions, these suggestions provide remedies for some of the thorniest problems that election officials encounter.
Topic:
Politics, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

279. Responding to COVID: a Mobility Based Surge Capacity Framework

Author:
Shamindra Nath Roy, Partha Mukhopadhyay, Jishnu Das, and Yamini Aiyar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
It would appear, based on the experience over the past year, that at a given point in time, CoVID-19 affects a part of the country and not the whole nation. What does this imply for the sharing of resources between more affected areas and less affected areas? What does it imply for where reserves of resources need to be maintained to meet sudden surges in caseload? This note looks at these questions, by examining the spatial pattern of the epidemic over time and the nature of the resources, i.e., the extent to which their supply can be increased, the ease with which they can be moved, etc., including, where possible and necessary, the movement of patients in addition to mobile resources. Our analysis based on current transmission dynamics, points out that there are a small set of areas permanently at risk for repeat surges. These are areas where health infrastructure may need to be augmented locally. For other areas, while increases in health infrastructure would be needed, inter-district and interstate coordination can ensure that additional critical services can be made available through resource sharing. However, such a mobility-based surge capacity framework, as we have proposed, requires enabling governance structures that builds trust and facilitates coordination across district and state administrations, based on real time data analysis as well as formal institutional structures.
Topic:
Health, Infrastructure, Governance, Institutions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

280. Foucauldian Panopticon: A Model for U.S. Cyber Surveillance

Author:
Nida Sheikh and Muhammad Usman Askari
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Political Studies
Institution:
Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab
Abstract:
Unlike the conventional means of surveillance in the past, cyber surveillance has become a great security tactic due to being technologically advanced, ungoverned and holistic in scope. In context of contemporary international relations, China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are using the components of information warfare to serve their strategic interests. The internationally competitive trends of information technology and surveillance make U.S. more concerned about its national security and defeating the information warfare threat. Being a global leader, U.S. is constantly developing its cyber capabilities to contain the rise of China.On account of persistent threat perception of cyber intrusions from China, U.S. has been using cyber surveillance as a counter measure. U.S has integrated its cyber capabilities with military operations in the form of aerial, land and naval surveillance to ensure its national security. The present research aims to explore that how cyber surveillance has become an indispensable component of U.S. defense strategy? Michel Foucault’s surveillance theory has been used as a foundation of the study to analyze the implication of surveillance and power in context of U.S. defense policy. The study used qualitative content analysis and furthermore, directed approach has been used. The research is mainly bifold; initially it endeavors to analyze U.S. national strategies within the timeframe of 2015-2020 and subsequently discusses U.S. cyber surveillance capabilities, using the lens of Foucauldian panopticon.
Topic:
National Security, Infrastructure, Surveillance, Cyberspace, Michel Foucault, Power, Panopticon, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America