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1951. Republicans, Democrats Split on Increasing US Defense Budget

Author:
Craig Kafura
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
On December 8, the House voted to pass the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), authorizing a total of $740.5 billion in defense appropriations and continuing a trend of defense spending increases. The bill, passed by a margin large enough to override a threatened veto from President Trump, includes pay increases for US servicemembers, mandates the renaming of ten US military bases currently named after Confederates, and has a notable focus on competition with China. The 2020 Chicago Council Survey finds that the US public overall tends to prefer to maintain current levels of defense expenditures. But a plurality of Democrats, younger Americans and the college-educated favor cuts to the US defense budget, while a plurality of Republicans favor expanding it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, Budget, Political Parties, and Survey
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1952. Deciphering China in the Middle East

Author:
Erzsébet N. Rózsa
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It is commonly perceived that the engagement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Middle East is driven primarily by economic interests, and that it prefers to steer clear of the conflicts in the region as much as possible. Its landmark ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), launched in 2013 as a global infrastructure development strategy, contributes to this perception. This notion, however, overlooks the larger context of China’s engagement, both historical and contemporary. China’s new activism in the Middle East reflects the evolution of Chinese foreign policy thinking, in line with the country’s rise as an economic superpower. Its original choice of partners in the region was influenced by ideological considerations and a shared anti-colonial and anti-imperialist narrative. But its transformation into an economic powerhouse has inevitably altered its priorities and influence in the Middle East. Its economic penetration of the region is reflected in the set of cooperation agreements that it has concluded with the regional states as well as in subregional cooperation formats, e. g. the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum. The PRC’s increasing engagement in the Middle East may well be driven by its need for resources to fuel its economic growth; however, there is inevitably a political dimension too, due not only to the fact that China has a seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and seeks to project the image of a ‘responsible’ superpower but also because of the need to protect its investments and commercial interests in the region. China’s growing influence in the Middle East may generally be positively received, or even welcomed; however, the countries of the region have very different perspectives and often conflicting interests in the way they relate to the PRC. This Brief analyses these perspectives taking into account China’s recent initiatives in the region at a time of growing rivalry between the US and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

1953. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

1954. Unboxing the Future: Finding the futures hidden in plain sight

Author:
Joshua Polchar
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
To make policy is to think about the future – usually trying to shape it for the better. In policy, as much as any part of our lives, our thinking is strongly influenced by our perception of time, yet paradoxically this perception of time is usually unconscious and unquestioned.1 Policy experts and decision-makers are futures thinkers whether they realise it or not. Yet like all humans, they tend to rely largely on a set of familiar modes of thinking when it comes to preparing for the future – modes of thinking that are instinctive, intuitive or institutionalised. No one way of thinking about the future is necessarily better than another, but all of them are limited, and leave some things unchallenged or implicit. As a result, sticking to only one approach means missing potentially valuable insights that could be gained by using other perspectives. Of course there is no guarantee that learning these lessons will result in perfect preparedness for what lies ahead, but if there is great potential in ‘out-of-the-box thinking’, then it helps to better understand and challenge what is boxing our thinking in. This Brief, and the strategic foresight approaches it outlines, are therefore not intended to introduce thinking about the future where it was absent, but rather to challenge, discipline, and guide the futures thinking already taking place. It will take the reader through five of the ways in which relying only on conventional ways of thinking about the future may be keeping them from seeing a lot more. It will seek to answer the question: how can the discipline of strategic foresight make a positive contribution to the field of foreign policy? This Brief is not an instruction manual or how-to guide on methodologies of strategic foresight. Less still is it able to help the reader to better predict the future, or make the right call on what to prepare for. Instead it intends to show how thinking differently about the future can help to increase our awareness and knowledge in the present and what it means in terms of the decisions we make.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Planning, and Future
Political Geography:
Global Focus

1955. Russia's Forays into Sub-Saharan Africa: Do you want to be my friend, again?

Author:
Giovanni Faleg and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In 1977, the Soviet Union’s leadership was in a jubilant mood as Ethiopia had just switched sides to the socialist camp. By the time of this event, the Kremlin had been conducting a renewed offensive on the continent for several years, propping up socialist regimes and ‘liberation movements’ in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Yet contrary to warnings that the Soviets might eventually ‘swallow’ all of sub-Saharan Africa, by 1990 the offensive had fizzled out: ideologically and financially broken, Moscow cut military aid, suspended credit lines, wound down diplomatic representations, closed cultural centres and ultimately withdrew political support. When rebel forces advanced towards Addis Ababa in 1991, Moscow stood idly by as the Derg regime – its former poster child – disintegrated. Over the course of the next two decades, post-Soviet Russia showed little interest in the sub-continent and only in the late 2010s did the Kremlin once again display the ambition to play a greater geopolitical role: sub-Saharan Africa remerged in Russian political discourse and trade and diplomatic traffic picked up. Simultaneously, Moscow revived alumni associations of Africans who studied in the Soviet Union and launched initiatives to lure more students to Russia. The Wagner Group – a military enterprise connected to the Russian state – also expanded its radius of action south of the Sahara. But what is driving Moscow’s renewed activism? How different it is from its previous diplomatic thrusts? Can a coherent strategy be discerned behind this push? Finally, how is sub-Saharan Africa reacting to Russia’s overtures and what does it mean for the EU?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

1956. Beyond Yemen's Militiadoms: Restarting from local agency

Author:
Eleanore Ardemagni
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The crisis in Yemen epitomises the complexity of contemporary intra-state conflicts: rather than a simple, binary war, the situation is characterised by various layers of conflict with multiple state, hybrid, non-state actors and foreign state powers playing active roles. Analysts and policymakers need to be aware of this complexity in order to grasp the drivers and implications of this war, and identify possible avenues for conflict resolution. Yemen matters a lot for the strategic interests of the EU: its Western waters are the southern frontier of the Mediterranean Sea. But Yemen has also become an arena of strategic competition for the Gulf and Middle Eastern state powers, who have constructed or taken over control of ports, military bases and airports along its coasts and islands as a springboard for projection in the Western Indian Ocean. Finally, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), established in 2009 and based in Yemen, remains one of the most entrenched and resilient jihadi networks in terms of local ties and political adaptability. This Conflict Series Brief analyses the intertwined layers of conflict in Yemen and their implications for war resolution efforts. The local-foreign nexus between Yemini and external actors needs to be disentangled to separate domestic drivers and the regional and/or sectarian dimensions of the conflict. Competing ‘militiadoms’ are on the rise, thus transforming the traditional Yemeni pattern of hybrid security governance into a multiple security governance scenario. The Brief examines the Yemeni crisis in all its complexity, focusing on existing and emerging dynamics. Interference by foreign state powers is both a cause and a consequence of the protracted conflict, while the potential for peace must be sought at local level. This approach will help to identify strategies for mitigating and possibly resolving the crisis.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

1957. La brecha de ciberseguridad en América Latina frente al contexto global de ciberamenazas (The Cyber Security Gap in Latin America Against the Global Context of Cyber Threats)

Author:
Juan Manuel Aguilar Antonio
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
La presente investigación parte de la hipótesis de que los gobiernos de América Latina y el Caribe están rezagados en la construcción de ciber capacidades de defensa para enfrentar el contexto actual e internacional de ciber amenazas, respecto a los países miembros de la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), tanto en el plano de organización, como en el individual. Para probar este enunciado el texto se divide en seis secciones. En la primera se presenta el entorno global amenazas provenientes de ciberespacio, las pérdidas económicas que sufren gobiernos y empresas según informes de firmas de seguridad informática como Kaspersky, Microsoft, Verizon e International Business Machines Corporation (IBM). En la segunda parte, se aborda el proceso de securitización del internet, la inmersión de la ciberseguridad en los estudios de seguridad nacional, así como la definición de ciber capacidades y delimitación de amenazas al Estado-Nación desde el ciberespacio. En la tercera se aborda la trayectoria de la OTAN como organización en el desarrollo ciber capacidades en los últimos veinte años. En la cuarta parte, se analiza desde el nivel individual un conjunto de Estrategias Nacionales de Ciberseguridad (ENCS) de los países y aliados de la OTAN, de las cuales se extraen sus principales elementos y se esquematiza su anatomía general. En la sexta parte, se presenta una aproximación a diferentes entornos regionales o globales de ciberseguridad con base a mediciones del Global Cybersecurity Index (GCI), de la Unión Internacional de Telecomunicaciones (ITU por sus siglas en inglés), y el National Cyber Security Index (NSCI) de la E-Governance Academy de Estonia. En la quinta sección se presenta el contexto de la ciberseguridad en América Latina y el Caribe, según estudios realizados por el Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID) y la Organización de los Estados Americanos (OEA), así como firmas privadas de ciberseguridad. En la sexta, se presenta de manera breve dos estudios de caso de México, del bienio 2019-2020, que representan la falta de madurez de su ENCS y desarrollo de ciber capacidades, aspecto que comparte con la mayoría de los países de América Latina y el Caribe. Por último, se presentan unas breves conclusiones sobre los aspectos a fortalecer por la región.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Telecommunications
Political Geography:
Latin America

1958. President Joe Biden and the restoration of US global leadership: Turning the tide?

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Bart Gaens, and Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Te election of Joe Biden as president and Kamala Har- ris as vice president of the United States has generally been welcomed across the world. Allies and partners are relieved that they will again be treated with respect as common issues are addressed, while having been re- minded that they too must ‘step up’ and not only rely on the United States. Even adversaries and competitors acknowledge that it is preferable for the north star of US foreign policy to be something other than impul- sive unpredictability. Based on Joe Biden’s worldview, the world will see a return to more traditional foreign policy precepts. Tis is refected in Biden’s choice of individuals for senior security policy positions in his administration. While the United States is a global power, each ad- ministration addresses the more enduring national interests in diferent ways. In the coming years, key issues to address include, frst, global challenges such as climate change and pandemics; second, strength- ening the transatlantic relationship and global coop- eration between democratic states more broadly; and third, reinforcing the US relationship with various Asian allies and partners, and managing competition with China. From a Nordic perspective, the Biden ad- ministration is expected to continue the cooperative agenda regarding regional security (bolstering defence cooperation and deterring against Russian encroach- ment) carried over from the Obama and Trump admin- istrations, while more robustly addressing global issues such as climate change.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

1959. China’s policy towards Belarus and Ukraine: A limited challenge to Sino-Russian relations

Author:
Ryhor Nizhnikau and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign poli- cy in the post-Soviet region, which was never seen as a priority in Beijing. It primarily based its policies on economic engagement with the local elite, who sought sources of politically unconditional loans and invest- ment, as well as the possibility to hedge their foreign policies vis-à-vis other regional powers. A growing economic presence promoted Chinese core interests in the region without challenging Russia’s political pre-eminence in the region and jeopardizing Rus- sia-China relations. However, in recent years, two factors have afect- ed the status quo and have led to greater engagement in the region by China. First, the region became an important part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, and Belarus and/or Ukraine became a transport hub between China and the EU. Second, Russia’s policies turned more assertive towards its neighbourhood, whereas the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policies lost steam after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confict in 2014. Te new regional environment and domestic instabilities duly increased the importance of China for local elites. This Briefing Paper overviews the evolution of China’s cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine since 2013. One of the results has been a growing contrast in Chinese relations with Belarus and Ukraine. While China-Ukraine relations were driven by economic co- operation and a tremendous growth in bilateral trade, their political relations stagnated. China-Belarus rela- tions, on the other hand, have increasingly prioritized enhanced political and defence cooperation, despite consistent attempts by the Belarusian side to build up a Chinese economic presence in the country. Te paper argues that China deliberately opts to steer clear of power competition in the region and chooses to recognize both Russian special interests in the region and countries’ own foreign policy choices, be they integration with the EU or Russia. In Belarus and Ukraine, Beijing seems to exercise self-restraint in its policy, taking Russia’s interests into consider- ation. However, its growing presence in economic and cultural spheres as well as local elites’ increasing interest in engaging China in manoeuvring in the EU-Russia confict creates a window of opportunity for Beijing to apply its increasing economic and po- litical resources for political ends in the long-term perspective.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Belarus

1960. Russia’s relative resilience: Why Putin feels vindicated by the pandemic

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Covid-19 has damaged Russia’s economy and President Vladimir Putin’s political agenda. Yet the crisis has given the Kremlin some grim self-confidence that things might be bad, but others have it worse. Putin sees most countries’ behaviour in the pandemic as having validated his philosophy of international affairs: liberalism and universal rules are in retreat, while state-centrism is advancing. The pandemic has exposed many of Russia’s weaknesses, ranging from its healthcare system to a general lack of trust in state institutions. But none of these problems implies the imminent collapse of the country’s physical or political infrastructure. The fact that Russia’s economy is projected to contract less than those of most Western countries makes the Kremlin feel vindicated in its economic policies. Russia’s experience of covid-19 has fostered a ‘wait and see’ attitude towards foreign policy in the Kremlin – an expectation that time is on the country’s side.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Crisis Management, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe