Search

Begin New Search Topic European Union Publication Year within 5 Years

1841. Why EU’s Multilateralism matters in Korea’s Peace Process?

Author:
Sunhee Park
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Despite South Korea’s expectations to gain the EU’s support during the 2018 momentum for peace on the Korean peninsula, the EU exhibited reluctance to lend its support. In light of this event, this study looks into why the positions of South Korea and the EU differ on the Korean peace process to gain a better understanding of the EU’s approach. Specifically, this study examines how, for the EU, the Korean Peninsula is a topic to be approached within the EU’s multilateral principle framework on external relations, unlike the approach taken by the United States. Through a review of the EU’s multilateral approach, this study suggests how South Korea may be able to request the EU to take a more active role, albeit a limited role due to the US’s powerful influence over the Korean peninsula, in supporting South Korea’s peacebuilding process such as the Northeast Asia Plus Community of Responsibility.
Topic:
European Union, Multilateralism, Negotiation, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

1842. A Post-Brexit Trade Policy for Development and a More Integrated Africa

Author:
Kimberly Ann Elliott
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
The United Kingdom will confirm its departure from the European Union on 31st January 2020. As part of its independent trade policy, the government has committed to improve access to UK mar- kets for the poorest countries. This note sets out three ways it can do so: expanding duty-free market access while avoiding piecemeal trade agreements that undermine Africa’s own trade integration ef- forts; using an alternative framework for those trade agreements it does negotiate with developing countries; and supporting a “back-to-basics” multilateral negotiation at the World Trade Organiza- tion that could help to rebuild confidence in that institution and thus protect the interests of small and vulnerable countries. After a brief review of the background and context, it sets out specific pro- posals in each of these areas.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, and Europe

1843. Measuring the Progress in Realizing the Strategy “Europe 2020” in 2010-2016 in 28 European Union Member States

Author:
Piotr Siemiatkowski
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The paper presents the results of the research over the measurement of the progress in the realization of the objectives specified in “Europe 2020 - a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” in 2016 in comparison with 2010. The analysis availed itself of the statistical data of Eurostat which describes the main indicators of the strategy for all member states of the European Union. The available empirical data allowed for constructing a synthetic measure reflecting the progress in realizing the objectives specified in the Strategy. The analysis of the values that the said measure assumed became a basis for creating a rating of EU member states for two distinct years that were subject to scrutiny. Also, there was specified the variation in the value of the said measure and the changes in the positions occupied by particular states in the mentioned rating. What was also conducted was a cluster analysis, which allowed for dividing the scrutinized countries into groups in case they are described by more than one property. Except for this and as compared to all the previous works on the subject, the method of the construction of the synthetic measure was considerably sharpened.
Topic:
International Cooperation, European Union, Economic Growth, and Tax Systems
Political Geography:
Europe

1844. Directions of Poland’s Energy Security Policy in the Natural Gas Sector

Author:
Malgorzata Kamola-Cieslik
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Poland has insufficient natural gas resources to satisfy its needs. That is why it has been dependent on the imports of that raw material. One of the challenges facing the Polish government is limiting Poland’s dependency on Russian gas. The objective of the paper is to present the directions of the Polish government’s energy security policy in terms of natural gas in the years of 2015-2018. Particular attention was paid to the assumptions and the implementation of the government’s gas policy in terms of the situation in the European Union gas market. An attempt was made to answer the question: To what extent have the assumptions of policy of the government of the Law and Justice party regarding Poland’s gas security been realized? In an attempt to answer the question so formulated, the following methods were used in the study: a decision-making method, formal-legal method, statistical and comparative methods. On the grounds of the conducted research, it needs to be concluded that after 2015, as a result of the government’s policy, the imports of natural gas from the east to Poland were reduced with a simultaneous diversification of the direction from which this raw material was delivered. The resignation from the deliveries of Russian gas to Poland after 2022 will be possible thanks to putting Baltic Pipe gas pipeline into operation and raising the flow capacity of Świnoujście LNG terminal. The implementation of these investments will have a positive impact on the improvement of Poland’s gas security. Failure to launch the investments and an increase of gas consumption in Poland will make it necessary to conclude a short-term Polish-Russian agreement for imports of that fuel to Poland.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Natural Resources, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

1845. Where Does the Buck Stop with the Backstop? The Irish-UK Border in Brexit Negotiations: June 2016-January 2019

Author:
Paul McNamara
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The abject failure of British Prime Minister Theresa May to get the United Kingdom’s (UK) Withdrawal Agreement from the European Union (EU) through Parliament on 15 January 2019, with MPs overwhelmingly rejecting it by 432 votes to 202, has been put down to a variety of reasons. Primary among them has been the question of the post-Brexit status of the land border between the Republic of Ireland and the UK’s province of Northern Ireland. Although an issue which was initially seen as of minor importance, the significance of the Irish border steadily grew over time until it became the main stumbling block in UKEU Brexit negotiations brought about by the decision of the British people to leave the EU in a referendum held on 23 June 2016. Indeed, the key term of the ensuing debate, namely ‘the Irish backstop’, produced such confusion among politicians, political pundits and the general public that the House of Commons, split between so-called Brexiteers and Remainers, decided to reject May’s deal out of hand. This article seeks to argue that, from June 2016 (the time of the referendum) up to January 2019 (the time of the first vote on May’s Brexit deal in Parliament), the issue of the Irish backstop was seriously underestimated before suddenly taking centre stage and ultimately sabotaging the Withdrawal Agreement from within.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, and Borders
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Ireland

1846. The Battle of Brexit. Analysis of the 2019 United Kingdom General Election Results

Author:
Bartłomiej H. Toszek
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The article presents the main parties (i.e. the Conservative Party, Labor Party, Liberal Democrats and Scottish National Party) results of the 2019 UK general election as well as an analysis of the most important issues (i.e. correct identification of voters’ expectations, simplicity and clarity of the messages, leaders’ personalities) which determined each party success or loss. The author proves that since Brexit was the primary focus of voters, the level of support for particular parties remained dependent on the solutions presented in this issue. This basis explains why the Conservatives in the whole UK and the SNP in Scotland won (and the Labor Party and the Liberal Democrats lost) the battle of Brexit.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Elections, European Union, Brexit, and Nativism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

1847. Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe

Author:
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe has been at the forefront of confronting asymmetric attacks from foreign adversaries. Disinformation campaigns have been used against the European public since the Soviet era, and with the advent of social media platforms, they have become a regular phenomenon across the continent. Cyber-attacks have become a frequent occurrence too, particularly since 2007, when Russia conducted a campaign of cyber-attacks on Estonia.1 Even so, it was the 2016 U.S. presidential election that accelerated European measures against interference in democracies. National governments across Europe have launched holistic efforts to counter interference. In 2018, France announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which calls for cooperation to “prevent malign interference by foreign actors.”2 Over one thousand national and local governments, civil society, and industry groups have signed on, and multi-stakeholder communities have formed to advance the principles laid out in the Paris Call. Sweden is applying the concept of “total defense” to educate and protect its population. Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a booklet to all households in 2018 with guidelines on how citizens should protect themselves from false information and cyber-attacks as well as many other threats.3 Finland and Latvia are applying the same “total defense” strategy in their own political systems. Increasingly, European Union institutions are also turning their attention to interference. The newly elected European Parliament passed a resolution in October denouncing foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes.4 And European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given her commissioners a mandate to protect democratic systems and institutions from “external interference.”5 Amid this burgeoning activity, however, one thing is missing. There is little consensus on what exactly “interference” is, and how the term “interference” is similar or different from other related concepts, such as “influence.” The lack of a common framing of “interference” across Europe can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes. Defining interference comes with risk. Policymakers can create a definition that is either too broad,6 which could inhibit the freedom of expression or put undue burdens on political participation, or one that is too narrow to cover certain forms of malign behavior in a quickly evolving field, inhibiting democracies from protecting themselves because an attack does not “fit” within said definition. Establishing a definition that merely catalogues commonly-used tactics (for example: cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and malign finance) would also prove inadequate because any definition of interference should be flexible enough to capture new technologies and approaches. Moreover, a list of tactics fails to explain the underlying factors driving interference activities. To contribute to the definition-setting debate, this paper addresses why a definition could be helpful for countering interference, lays out the state of play in the EU on defining interference, provides a review of existing government and academic definitions related to interference, and discusses the concept of legality and interference. Finally, this paper suggests two core criteria to assist in the determination of whether any given activity constitutes interference: (i) intent (including the factors of timing, coordination of behavior, and scale of effects), and (ii) transparency. An act does not need to match both criteria to constitute interference, but they are certainly mutually reinforcing.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

1848. 5G Security: The New Energy Security

Author:
Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

1849. Getting Brexit Started: prospects for a new EU-UK partnership into the 2020s

Author:
Andrew Hammond and Tim Oliver
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) on January 31 was a seminal moment in post-war history, and one that presents challenges and opportunities for both key parties. Yet far from being a single, isolated event, the departure derives from a much broader process of well over a dozen negotiations (a catch-all term used here for formal diplomatic discussions and wider debates about Brexit) between and within the UK and EU about their futures. With so many Brexit negotiations still underway, this paper underlines that the final form of the UK’s departure from the EU is not yet set in stone. Even with a withdrawal deal now ratified, there are multiple scenarios still possible: from a disorderly exit this year, through to the outside prospect of the transition being extended and a deep, comprehensive deal being concluded later in the 2020s. The stakes in play therefore remain huge and historic as both sides seek a new constructive partnership that can hopefully bring significant benefits for both at a time of global geopolitical turbulence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

1850. Europe in a Multipolar World

Author:
Benjamin Martill and Lisa ten Brinke
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Power is diffusing from West to East and non-democratic powers are among those rising fastest. These changes have been in the offing for decades, but their effects are now increasingly manifest. Where does Europe stand within this emerging multipolar order? Is there a European ‘pole’ in the international system, and — if so — what is its contribution to the emerging order? These are important questions at the forefront of policymakers’ minds. Benjamin Martill and Lisa ten Brinke examine in more detail the position of Europe — and the EU — in a multipolar world.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, and International System
Political Geography:
Europe