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332. Bridging the Gap: Progress and Prospects for Accelerating South Korea's Move Towards a Carbon Neutral Scenario
- Author:
- Francesca Frassineti and Francesco Sassi
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- The Moon administration in South Korea has implemented rapid changes to accelerate the decarbonization of the energy sector. While seeking to embrace renewables, Seoul has been relying on the bridging capacity of natural gas—of which it is the world’s third largest importer. In this context, President Moon is also confronted with public discontent over weak emissions goals and inadequate policies to curb the negative effects of climate change. Besides, the socio-economic fallout from the pandemic could hinder the enforcement of environmental measures and loosen restrictions for the sake of an immediate recovery. As Seoul attempts to secure more environmentally-friendly and economically sustainable energy sources, this paper examines the advances and major drawbacks of this policy agenda. By shedding light on the dynamics within the gas sector, the analysis also assesses the viability of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as the pillar of this pro-environmental policy shift, including the potential of some LNG-related projects. The paper finds the feasibility of the current goals is challenged by the realities of energy supply stabilization, particularly due to the simultaneous phaseout of coal and nuclear power and the persistent capacity obstacles for renewables to fill this gap. In light of this, the paper advocates for integrated policy measures aimed at improving consistency in implementing national energy policy in tandem with climate change mitigation efforts.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Energy Policy, Gas, and Carbon Emissions
- Political Geography:
- Asia and South Korea
333. OPEC+ as a new governor in Global Energy Governance
- Author:
- Rafał Ulatowski
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
- Institution:
- Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
- Abstract:
- This article tries to evaluate the roots of the OPEC+ agreement, how it operates, and its prospects for the future. It argues that OPEC+ is a new governor in the Global Energy Governance (GEG) “regime complex”. It grew out of a convergence of the interests and capabilities of OPEC and non-OPEC exporters. The article shows that the emergence of OPEC+ is a consequence of over three decades of competition and occasional cooperation between exporters united in OPEC and those outside the organization. That cooperation was always a consequence of the price war and the demand of OPEC members for cooperation with non-OPEC exporters. Intensive consultations and three agreements on production cuts between both groups of countries in the years 2016-2019 made it possible to begin the institutionalization of cooperation among them. Cooperation within the OPEC+ agreement is nonformalized, based on government-to-government negotiations, and flexible. The signatories to the OPEC + agreement decided to avoid founding any formal IGO, and OPEC + continues to exist as a summit process.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Oil, Governance, and OPEC
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, and Saudi Arabia
334. Directions of Poland’s Energy Security Policy in the Natural Gas Sector
- Author:
- Malgorzata Kamola-Cieslik
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Polish Political Science Yearbook
- Institution:
- Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
- Abstract:
- Poland has insufficient natural gas resources to satisfy its needs. That is why it has been dependent on the imports of that raw material. One of the challenges facing the Polish government is limiting Poland’s dependency on Russian gas. The objective of the paper is to present the directions of the Polish government’s energy security policy in terms of natural gas in the years of 2015-2018. Particular attention was paid to the assumptions and the implementation of the government’s gas policy in terms of the situation in the European Union gas market. An attempt was made to answer the question: To what extent have the assumptions of policy of the government of the Law and Justice party regarding Poland’s gas security been realized? In an attempt to answer the question so formulated, the following methods were used in the study: a decision-making method, formal-legal method, statistical and comparative methods. On the grounds of the conducted research, it needs to be concluded that after 2015, as a result of the government’s policy, the imports of natural gas from the east to Poland were reduced with a simultaneous diversification of the direction from which this raw material was delivered. The resignation from the deliveries of Russian gas to Poland after 2022 will be possible thanks to putting Baltic Pipe gas pipeline into operation and raising the flow capacity of Świnoujście LNG terminal. The implementation of these investments will have a positive impact on the improvement of Poland’s gas security. Failure to launch the investments and an increase of gas consumption in Poland will make it necessary to conclude a short-term Polish-Russian agreement for imports of that fuel to Poland.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Natural Resources, European Union, and Gas
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Poland
335. 5G Security: The New Energy Security
- Author:
- Kristine Berzina
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
336. The United States Should Prioritize Energy Cooperation With Taiwan
- Author:
- Patrick Yu
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for American Progress - CAP
- Abstract:
- Solving Taiwan’s energy problems is an opportunity for the United States to achieve multiple goals.
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, International Cooperation, Strategic Interests, and Energy Crisis
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America