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161. The Carbon-Neutral LNG Market: Creating a Framework for Real Emissions Reductions

Author:
Erin Blanton and Samer Mosis
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
As governments and companies consider options to decarbonize their energy systems, addressing greenhouse gas emissions from natural gas and liquified natural gas (LNG) will inevitably become a greater concern. Natural gas is viewed by some as potentially providing a bridge in a broad energy transition from dependence on fossil fuels to lower-emission sources. Even with advancements in renewable energy, many forecasts show natural gas will remain core to meeting global energy demand for some time, including as a backup fuel source for renewables.[1] But as the emissions profile of the natural gas value chain has become clearer, estimates of its footprint have increased, raising questions about natural gas’s transitory function. While gas will continue to have a prominent role in the energy mix,[2] without action to better account for, reduce, and offset natural gas and LNG emissions, the breadth and length of its use will increasingly come into question—including by countries with growing energy demand who see diminishing incentive to favor natural gas over high-emitting but fiscally cheap fuel sources, such as coal. Amid these considerations, discussions of value chain carbon intensity and greenhouse gas (GHG) accounting are becoming an important component of LNG trade, giving rise to the concept of “carbon-neutral LNG.” In the trade of carbon-neutral LNG, GHG emissions from supply and/or consumption are accounted for and offset by procuring and retiring carbon credits generated through GHG abatement projects, such as afforestation, farm/soil management, and methane collection.[3] Currently, carbon-neutral LNG makes up a slim portion of global LNG trade, with just 14 cargoes traded transparently since the first was sold in 2019, compared to over 5,000 cargoes of LNG being delivered globally in 2020 alone.[4] By examining the efficacy of the market at this early stage, as this commentary does, areas for improvement in the carbon-neutral LNG trade are highlighted. Procurement of carbon credits does not negate the emissions from natural gas and LNG, and accordingly, adoption of offsets should be paired with a broader and deeper reduction in the emissions intensity of these fossil fuels to ensure they remain conducive to meeting growing energy demand without needlessly jeopardizing global, national, and corporate efforts to reduce emissions. When considering this alongside the important role LNG and natural gas are likely to continue to play in meeting energy demand in key parts of the world during the transition period, it becomes clear that efforts must be made to scale GHG emissions mitigation throughout the value chain, such as through leakage reduction and employment of less carbon-intensive liquefaction technology, as well as to offset remaining emissions through the procurement and retirement of high-quality carbon credits. Serious questions remain about scaling the carbon-neutral LNG trade, including which emissions are accounted for, what methodology is employed in the emissions measurement and verification, and how the emissions are priced—either through a carbon credit or a carbon tax. If these questions are sufficiently addressed, natural gas and LNG may align better with global policy direction and emissions requirements. That is to say, GHG verification and mitigation will be critical to the sustainability of LNG in the decarbonizing global energy stack in the coming decade, with knock-on impacts on long-term LNG contract structure, trade flows, and market pricing. While this commentary does not prescribe policy to meet carbon neutrality or Paris Agreement goals specifically, it does examine an existing and growing market trade behavior that has the potential to assist countries dependent on natural gas in meeting their climate targets during this transitory period for the global energy system. Section 1 outlines the current state of the carbon-neutral LNG trade, while section 2 suggests a structure for LNG GHG accounting based on existing accounting methodologies. Section 3 discusses the different forms through which emissions mitigation can be integrated into the LNG trade, including a discussion on the risks of greenwashing. Section 4 highlights the implications of the growing carbon-neutral LNG market and provides recommendations to market participants and policy makers.
Topic:
Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Natural Resources, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

162. The New US-EU Energy Security Agenda: Roundtable Report

Author:
Jonathan Elkind
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On June 3, 2021, Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs), in cooperation with the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and the European Union (EU) Delegation to the US, cohosted a private virtual roundtable focusing on energy security issues during a period of heightened action on climate goals. This document summarizes the June 3 roundtable, which was conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Participants in the roundtable included just over 50 senior corporate executives, civil society representatives, academic and think tank experts, energy analysts, and government officials from the European Union and United States. In June 2021, President Joe Biden traveled to Europe, his first overseas trip since his inauguration as president, and he met with European heads of state and government in the context of a British-hosted G7 meeting, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, and a US-EU Summit.[1] The journey signaled a concerted effort by the United States and the European Union to rebuild bilateral relations, which were battered during the Trump administration. Protecting the global climate and accelerating the transition to clean energy are objectives that unify top leaders on both sides of the Atlantic today. The European Union has a legislated mandate of climate neutrality by the year 2050 and is implementing its comprehensive European Green Deal and elaborating a corresponding legal and regulatory framework for an enhanced 2030 target. In the United States, the Biden administration reentered the Paris climate agreement and announced plans to reach net-zero emissions by midcentury, though climate protection still faces significant political challenges in the US Congress and in certain states. If the European Union and the United States proceed as these plans indicate, their energy systems face a period of accelerating, unprecedented, and sustained change—new technologies, new supply chains, new business models, and new interdependencies between economic sectors.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

163. National Oil Companies and the Energy Transition: Ecopetrol's Acquisition of an Electric Transmission Company

Author:
Mauricio Cardenas and Luisa Palacios
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The energy transition strategies of international oil companies have come under increased scrutiny from investors and the media as countries across the globe grapple with targets to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.[1] It is unclear if national oil companies (NOCs) are going to feel the same pressure given their government-majority ownership and, if so, how they will adjust their business models. This commentary explores recent moves by Colombian national oil company Ecopetrol to adapt to the energy transition, especially its bid to acquire a majority stake in Interconexión Eléctrica SA (ISA), an electricity transmission company, for 14.2 trillion Colombian pesos (equal to about $3.6 billion).[2] The proposed acquisition was met with mixed reactions, with some critics suggesting it was an opportunistic move on the part of the Colombian government (which has a majority interest in both companies) to book some revenues and reduce the ballooning fiscal deficit. But rather than analyzing its fiscal merits, this piece analyzes the potential transaction from the viewpoint of Ecopetrol and whether there are lessons from the deal for other NOCs navigating the energy transition. This commentary begins with a brief background on both companies and the potential benefits for Ecopetrol in pursuing a path that is different relative to what some other oil companies are doing in order to adjust their business models. Ecopetrol faces specific as well as regional challenges that make transition strategies used by the European oil companies less attractive. The piece then discusses how, if part of the goal of the acquisition is to accelerate Ecopetrol’s energy transition and to add shareholder value, a number of complementary actions should be taken to help with the governance aspect of this acquisition while at the same time strengthening Ecopetrol’s pledge to become net zero by 2050. For example, in arranging financing, Ecopetrol could explore issuing an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) bond where the proceeds are earmarked for the purchase of ISA, which is already a net-zero company. In addition, the coupon rate could be linked to specific emissions reductions on Ecopetrol’s oil and gas activities. Tying these targets to the coupon rate could be seen as a credible mechanism to ensure that the company will comply with its ambitious climate goals. In addition, we propose that Ecopetrol maintain ISA’s current governance structure unmodified and preserve its operational independence. This would allow ISA to benefit from its investment grade status (which Ecopetrol does not enjoy) and continue to deploy its capital expenditures (CapEx) plan geared toward investing in Latin America’s electricity sector without interference. To conclude, this transaction by itself does not guarantee a successful energy transition for Ecopetrol’s core business. If Ecopetrol’s goal is to diversify its portfolio of activities and reduce its carbon footprint, then it should ensure the sum of the two companies results in synergies that reduce emissions beyond what each one of them can achieve individually. This is not a guaranteed outcome but one that will depend on how ISA performs under Ecopetrol’s ownership, the extent to which this transaction brings new opportunities in the renewable energy space, and how the revenues derived from this acquisition help to finance the decarbonization of Ecopetrol.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:
Colombia, South America, and Latin America

164. Getting to 30-60: How China’s Biggest Coal Power, Cement, and Steel Corporations Are Responding to National Decarbonization Pledges

Author:
Edmund Downie
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
In September 2020, China announced its intentions to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. The neutrality goal in particular was a breakthrough for global climate ambitions: a net-zero target from the world’s largest emitter, responsible for around one-quarter of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The two new goals—referred to in Chinese policy discourse as the “30-60” goals—are not China’s first public targets on GHG reduction. They are, however, the centerpieces of a new Chinese climate policy in which GHG cuts are a standalone goal rather than an ancillary benefit of more immediate priorities like energy efficiency and industrial upgrading. Prior approaches had required little engagement from firms in carbon management. Indeed, none of the largest Chinese firms in the coal power, cement, and steel sectors had publicized quantitative targets for reducing or controlling carbon emissions before the government announced the 30-60 goals. They faced little pressure to do so; authorities pressed firms in climate-adjacent areas like reducing air pollution rather than carbon management. The 30-60 announcement appears to mark a break from this era, forcing firms to adjust accordingly. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, assesses how China’s high-emitting industries have responded to the 30-60 targets and the accompanying elevation of climate within national policy priorities. It focuses on corporate and sectoral emissions reduction targets through June 2021 among 30 major firms in three of China’s largest sources of direct emissions: coal power generation, cement, and steel.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Coal, Industry, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

165. Energy price hikes: which European solutions?

Author:
Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
As energy prices rise around the world, against the backdrop of the post-Covid economic recovery, the 27 EU leaders discussed what Europe could do to ease the pressure on consumers at the European Council on 21-22 October. The increase in prices is due to a particular international context and is affecting all countries: China is facing electricity shortages in many provinces due to insufficient coal supply, and in the United States the price of natural gas has risen by more than 150% since the beginning of the year. However, this increase raises questions about Europe's energy strategy and its impact on climate objectives, just a few days before the opening of COP26 in Glasgow.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

166. Green Hydrogen in a Circular Carbon Economy: Opportunities and Limits

Author:
Zhiyuan Fan, Emeka Richard Ochu, Sarah Braverman, Yushan Lou, Griffin Smith, Amar Bhardwaj, Jack Brouwder, Colin McCormick, and Julio Friedmann
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
As global warming mitigation and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reduction become increasingly urgent to counter climate change, many nations have announced net-zero emission targets as a commitment to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Low-carbon hydrogen has received renewed attention under these decarbonization frameworks as a potential low-carbon fuel and feedstock, especially for hard-to-abate sectors such as heavy-duty transportation (trucks, shipping) and heavy industries (e.g., steel, chemicals). Green hydrogen in particular, defined as hydrogen produced from water electrolysis with zero-carbon electricity, could have significant potential in helping countries transition their economies to meet climate goals. Today, green hydrogen production faces enormous challenges, including its cost and economics, infrastructure limitations, and potential increases in CO2 emissions (e.g., if produced with uncontrolled fossil power generation, which would be hydrogen but would not be green). This report, part of the Carbon Management Research Initiative at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, examines green hydrogen production and applications to understand the core challenges to its expansion at scale and the near-term opportunity to enable deployment. An analysis using Monte Carlo simulations with a varying range of assumptions, including both temporal (i.e., today versus the future) and geographical (e.g., the US, the EU, China, India, Japan) factors, anticipates emissions intensity and costs of producing green hydrogen. The authors evaluate these production costs for different scenarios as well as associated infrastructure requirements and highlight near-term market opportunities and policies to motivate development of the green hydrogen industry.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Green Technology, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

167. Stronger International Safeguards as a Condition of Supply to Nuclear Energy Programs: Coming to Consensus in the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Author:
Matt Bowen
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Nations that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons but are not allowed nuclear weapons under the treaty (“non-nuclear-weapon states”) must have international safeguards applied to civil nuclear energy facilities if they pursue such programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies these safeguards and conducts inspections on nuclear energy programs, and determined in the 1990s that it needed additional capabilities to verify states were not engaging in secret (i.e., undeclared) nuclear activities. Subsequently, the IAEA developed a set of stronger safeguards measures, known as the Model Additional Protocol (“Additional Protocol”), which was approved in 1997. Today, most nations have an Additional Protocol in force, but a few dozen do not. The nations that do not may pose a concern if they pursue nuclear energy as a means of addressing energy and environmental challenges, such as decarbonization to meet climate goals. The greater reporting requirements and inspection measures in the Additional Protocol give the international community assurance that a nation’s declarations about its civil nuclear program are both correct and complete. The enhanced inspections in turn provide greater deterrence against states pursuing illicit nuclear activities. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—which comprises 48 governments, including those representing the major reactor vendor countries—maintains guidelines governing the export of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The NSG has been considering modifying those guidelines for many years to support more universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. But adoption has been hard to come by, in part because of potential disruptions to existing supply relationships given that not all countries participating in the NSG have Additional Protocols in force and some client states of countries participating in the NSG also do not have these upgraded inspections in place. There may be room for consensus building among NSG states, however, since most support requiring an Additional Protocol as a condition of supply to further the nonproliferation regime. The remaining governments may agree if measures are proffered to address challenges that have blocked acceptance to date. This commentary discusses a history of related policy developments in the NSG, examines some of the group’s roadblocks to consensus, and suggests options for making progress on adding stronger international safeguards as a condition of supply to nuclear energy programs.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

168. Oil Intensity: The Curiously Steady Decline of Oil in GDP

Author:
Christof Ruhl and Titus Erker
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Oil is the largest primary fuel, and the trajectory of oil consumption is of great concern and consequence for economic, political, and, not least, for climate change reasons. Anticipating oil prices and production from year to year is not easy; identifying even basic ingredients of aggregate demand and supply schedules, such as price or income elasticities, is notoriously difficult. It’s an additional challenge to model the structure of a market that sometimes appears to be highly cartelized, and at other times populated by a large flock of peaceful price takers. But a remarkably steady metric—and possible tool for projecting consumption into the future—has been identified in this paper: oil intensity. Oil intensity is the volume of oil consumed per unit of gross domestic product (GDP). Measured simply in barrels per dollar, it is often viewed as a broad measure of oil efficiency; it certainly demonstrates the importance of oil in a society. The efficiency of oil use has improved, in other words oil intensity has declined, over the years and decades. In 1973, for example, when oil intensity was at its zenith, the world used a little less than one barrel of oil to produce $1,000 worth of GDP (2015 prices). By 2019 (the last data set before Covid) global oil intensity was 0.43 barrel per $1,000 of global GDP—a 56% decline. Oil has become a lot less important and humanity has become more efficient in making use of it. What is worth a closer look, and is the focus of this paper reporting on oil and gas related research at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, is the pattern by which this progress has been achieved. Since 1984, oil intensity has fallen every year in an almost perfectly linear fashion: the amount of oil used per dollar of global GDP has dropped by roughly the same amount each year. Wars and revolutions, booms and busts, OPEC successes and failures, and every other monumental event in the last 35 years left their imprint on oil markets but didn’t alter oil intensity’s steady, downward crawl. This kind of regularity is very rare in any long-time trend, in economics or in energy. Although oil intensity isn’t a new topic, an attempt to explain its curiously consistent downward progress—or even any discussion about it—is hard to find in the literature. For this paper, the authors explain the trend and cross-validate its predictive potential before delving into possible reasons behind the linear decline in oil intensity. It finally extrapolates what such a continuing trend might mean for oil consumption and policies around it going forward.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, and GDP
Political Geography:
Global Focus

169. Green Giants? China’s National Oil Companies Prepare for the Energy Transition

Author:
Erica Downs
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
On September 22, 2020, China’s leader, Xi Jinping, made a surprise announcement about China’s climate ambitions during remarks to the United Nations General Assembly. He stated that China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs), aims to achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Xi also said that China’s GHG emissions would peak before 2030, a slight revision to China’s pledge under the Paris Climate Agreement to peak emissions around 2030. China’s new climate targets spurred the country’s three major national oil companies (NOCs)—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec Group), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)—to strengthen their climate ambitions. PetroChina (the flagship subsidiary of CNPC), which had already set a goal of achieving near-zero emissions by 2050, intends to peak its carbon emissions by 2025. Sinopec Corp. (the flagship subsidiary of Sinopec Group) also aims to peak its carbon emissions by 2025 and to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. CNOOC Ltd. (the flagship subsidiary of CNOOC) plans to reduce its GHG emissions by 16 percent between 2020 and 2025 and aims to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. This report, part of the China Energy and Climate Program at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, provides a baseline for understanding how China’s NOCs are responding to climate change. It examines the activities the three companies identified as part of their emerging energy transition strategies before Xi unveiled the carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets, and why they didn’t do more. The report then assesses the implications of China’s new climate ambitions for its NOCs and lays out their preparations to date for supporting Xi’s 2030 and 2060 pledges.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
China and Asia

170. Methane Emission Controls: Redesigning EPA Regulations for Greater Efficacy

Author:
Robert Kleinberg
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Natural gas holds a critical role in the US energy economy, providing 32 percent of primary energy evenly distributed among electric power generation, industrial use, and residential and commercial consumption (LLNL 2020). As countries set targets to minimize climate change, however, widespread reliance on fossil fuels, with their attendant greenhouse gas emissions, is being scrutinized. Methane, the main constituent of natural gas, is second only to carbon dioxide in its contribution to greenhouse gas warming (Kleinberg 2020). It holds the potential to be a primary driver of global average temperature change between now and 2050—no matter what progress is made in controlling increases of atmospheric carbon dioxide over the next thirty years (Shindell et al. 2012). Half of global methane emissions come from natural sources, such as swamps and seeps, and half from anthropogenic sources, such as agriculture and fossil fuels. Regulations curbing methane emissions from the oil and gas industry are essential to mitigating global climate change over the next three decades. In the United States, current regulations were devised at a time when the technology for the measurement of natural gas emissions was relatively immature. Comprehensive performance-based regulations were not an option, and because of this, many regulations put in place were highly prescriptive. Data show these regulations have been largely ineffective. This commentary examines the potential to reduce emissions of methane from oil and natural gas infrastructure. It begins with a brief history of natural gas regulations and the effectiveness of rulemaking, before exploring unregulated and underregulated sources of methane. This is followed by a discussion about improvements in measurement capabilities and how regulations could be used to more effectively address methane emissions. This work shows the complexities of oil and gas production do not lend themselves to prescriptive regulation. Performance-based regulation, including quantitative compliance monitoring, would engage the talents of thousands of engineers, encouraging them to solve problems using locally appropriate solutions rather than relying on a prescriptive checklist approach that cannot anticipate every eventuality. The key to performance-based regulation is accurate measurement, and this capability has improved rapidly in recent years. Aircraft-based, facility-scale measurements encompassing tens of thousands of facilities spread over tens of thousands of square kilometers are economically viable and increasingly common. Permanently installed continuously monitoring sensors show promise in detecting intermittent sources; oil field pilot studies are underway. However, aircraft- and ground-based facility-scale measurements are not compliant with the current regulatory regime, which focuses on individual components. Therefore, the current regulatory regime must be completely rethought. (A comprehensive exposition of this topic, with evidentiary support, has been submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency [Kleinberg 2021b].)
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Methane
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America