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Begin New Search Topic Disinformation Publication Year within 5 Years

21. Soviet vs. Post-Soviet Russian Disinformation

Author:
Todd Leventhal
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
An intriguing and important question for students of disinformation and propaganda is: how do Soviet and post-Soviet Russian disinformation and propaganda differ, why, and what does this indicate for the future? I believe an unbiased analysis reveals that: there is a great deal of continuity between the goals and techniques of Soviet and post-Soviet Russian disinformation and propaganda. the new digital media environment offers unprecedented ways for new Russian disinformation and propaganda instruments, including RT (formerly Russia Today) and Sputnik, to influence foreign audiences. the reelection of Donald Trump would offer unparalleled opportunities for Soviet influence on US international policy at the very highest level.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Post-Soviet Space
Political Geography:
Russia and Soviet Union

22. Desinformación y censura en conflictos internacionales

Author:
Vicente Palacio
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
El fenómeno de la desinformación no se limita al ámbito de las redes sociales; no es patrimonio únicamente de los regímenes autoritarios y populistas; y no afecta únicamente a la limpieza de los procesos electorales. Si ponemos el foco en el análisis de la información en los conflictos internacionales, debemos tener en cuenta que la desinformación es un fenómeno con varias ramificaciones. El punto de partida de este documento de trabajo es la constatación de que la desinformación, la propaganda y la censura en los conflictos armados representan una amenaza vital para nuestras democracias. Ambas atentan contra el derecho de la ciudadanía a obtener una información veraz, que es la base de las democracias liberales. Para España y para la Unión Europea, que están enfrentando dos grandes conflictos en Ucrania y en Oriente Medio, una información veraz y a tiempo debería ser la base de una democracia sana y también de una política exterior que rinda cuentas a los ciudadanos. Este documento tiene un triple objetivo. Primero, realizar un balance crítico de las respuestas legislativas dadas a nivel europeo frente a la desinformación. Segundo, hacer un repaso de los aspectos más relevantes en ambos conflictos de Ucrania y Gaza. Y tercero, lanzar reflexiones y algunas propuestas para poder combatir mejor la desinformación, la propaganda o la censura en la medida de lo posible, siendo conscientes de que en esa vía podremos alcanzar éxitos parciales, aunque significativ
Topic:
Disinformation, Armed Conflict, Censorship, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Gaza

23. The securitization of foreign disinformation

Author:
Nicole J. Jackson
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper analyses the Canadian government’s foreign and security policy responses to Russian disinformation in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It asks whether, how, and why the government has securitised the “crisis of Russian disinformation.” The paper first briefly reviews literature on the Copenhagen’s School’s “securitisation” theory and how it has been used to explain responses to other crises. It then adopts the framework to contextualise the Canadian federal government’s official rhetoric, and then to categorise government policies and actions. The sources consulted include government actors’ reports and stated intentions and policies from 2022 to 2024. Adopting a securitisation framework reveals that Russian disinformation has been rhetorically securitised by government actors as an existential threat to national security and democratic integrity which requires urgent action. Within a context of cascading risks, the government has taken a range of distinct yet reinforcing policies and actions, some more comprehensive than others. The paper argues that together this “pervasive rhetorical securitisation” and “ad hoc practical securitisation” comprise the Canadian government’s ongoing process of partial securitisation. This process is legitimising different methods of governance: security and warfare communications (to address threats to national defence and security), democratic resilience (to address threats to democracy), and, most controversially, blocking and sanctioning (to signal discontent to the Russian regime). The analysis further reveals that each approach has different benefits and limits. The paper concludes that the securitisation process is incomplete compared to the government's rhetoric, with no over-arching organisation or strategy. It outlines implications for future research.
Topic:
International Security, Cybersecurity, Disinformation, Securitization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Canada

24. Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war

Author:
Marlena Zadorożna and Marin Butuc
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
Russian disinformation carried out as part of the ongoing war in Ukraine is becoming a challenge for neighbouring countries that border the conflict region. The aim of the analysis was to identify common features between Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland, which, as two of the countries that border Ukraine, were on a list of Russia’s main targets for disinformation in 2022. The geopolitical and historical importance of both countries increases their social polarisation. The study was therefore guided by the following research question: What common features can be distinguished between Russian disinformation in Moldova and Poland? The research took the form of an open comparison. According to the approach used, the empirical cases used for comparison were not explicitly limited a priori. In order to carry out the research, however, preliminary assumptions were adopted that ensured temporal, conceptual, and interpretative comparability of the data. Research results proved that Russian disinformation in both countries is based on the following common features: creating internal divisions, propagation of distrust towards the West, stimulating social emotions, use of social media, and popularising pro-Russian narratives. Analysing these areas may be helpful in increasing the ability of states to detect and disclose disinformation. Scientific publications describing Russian disinformation focus on the national perspective, which does not always correspond to the transnational nature of disinformation campaigns. Meanwhile, this article synthesises knowledge about disinformation mechanisms occurring in two countries bordering the conflict region and draws attention to the need for research in this area.
Topic:
Communications, Disinformation, Fake News, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Poland

25. Russian Propaganda in Serbia and the Western Balkans: The Case of Telegram Channels

Author:
Polina Greisman
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
This study is based on the analysis of open data obtained from the Internet, dealing with Telegram channels that are directly connected to official Russian media. Serbia is no exception to the list of countries whose internal affairs found themselves on the receiving end of Russian government interference. However, due to the friendly relations between Russia and Serbia, these facts are rarely made public. Also, not all of them are obvious, at first glance, as propaganda and interference. That is why we will look at this issue in this study and, using the example of Serbia, find out what methods of propaganda and intervention Russia is using in a country that can be described as “friendly.” This study shows the propaganda tools that Russia is using in the Balkans, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro. It also contains an analysis of propaganda narratives that appear in the Russian media operating in the Balkans, and their comparison with propaganda narratives in the media that operate in Russia.
Topic:
Media, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Telegram
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Serbia, and Western Balkans

26. EU Needs Better Monitoring to Enforce Sanctions on Russian Disinformation Online

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
EU sanctions partially restrict the activities of Russian-affiliated media in the Union, but a challenge remains to reduce the scale of sanctions circumvention online. All Member States could introduce internet monitoring for compliance with EU restrictions and mechanisms to remove sites duplicating banned content. The EU should adopt a new sanctions regime on Russian destabilisation activities globally as soon as possible.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Internet, Disinformation, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

27. Effective US government strategies to address China’s information influence

Author:
Kenton Thibaut
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
China’s global influence operations have received increasing attention in the national security community. Numerous congressional hearings, media reports, and academic and industry findings have underscored China’s increased use and resourcing of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) tactics in its covert operations both in the United States and abroad. In response, US government offices the Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC), the Global Engagement Center (GEC), and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), among others, have made strides in raising awareness of the issue and charting pathways to increase the resilience of the US information ecosystem to foreign influence. To date, however, the efforts to counter the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been fragmented. That fragmentation is indicative of a lack of cohesion around the concept of influence operations itself. Across the government and nongovernment sectors alike, there is considerable variation regarding the definition and scope of information manipulation. For example, the Department of State’s (DOS’s) GEC has an expansive definition, which includes “leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media.” Others define it more narrowly as disinformation and propaganda spread by a foreign threat actor in a coordinated, inauthentic manner, and largely occurring on social media platforms. This variation is a reflection of the holistic and multifaceted nature of Chinese influence. Coercive tactics and influence operations have long been a central part of China’s strategic tool kit and core to how it engages with the outside world. Because China conceives of the information domain as a space that must be controlled and dominated to ensure regime survival, information operations are part of a much bigger umbrella of influence that spans the economic, political, and social domains. It may be more useful to think of information manipulation as existing within the broader conceptual framework of China’s weaponization of the information domain in service of its goal to gain global influence. As previous work by the Digital Forensic Lab (DFRLab) has shown, China’s approach to the information domain is coordinated and proactive, taking into account the mutually constitutive relationships between the economic, industrial, and geopolitical strategies of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The aim of its efforts is to gain influence—or “discourse power”—with the ultimate goal of decentering US power and leadership on the global stage. One of the main mechanisms through which the CCP seeks to achieve this objective is by focusing on the dominance of information ecosystems. This ecosystem encompasses not only narratives and content that appear in traditional and social media but also the digital infrastructure on which communication systems rely, the policies that govern those systems at the international level, and the diplomatic strategy deployed by Beijing’s operatives abroad to gain buy-in for the CCP’s vision of the global order. The DFRLab’s previous two reports, which explored China’s strategy and the impacts of its operations abroad, found that the United States will not be successful in addressing the challenges of Chinese influence if it sees that influence as separate from the interconnected economic, political, and technical domains in which its strategy is embedded. To this end, the DFRLab hosted a series of one-on-one expert interviews, conducted research and workshops, and held a virtual roundtable discussion with scholars and practitioners with expertise on or experience in addressing authoritarian influence and information operations, US government processes and policies around these issues, and Chinese foreign policy. This issue brief is part of a larger body of work that examines the Chinese government’s interests and capabilities and the impacts of party’s efforts to shape the global information ecosystem. The focus of this report is on how the US government can best respond to those challenges, including the architecture, tools, and strategies that exist for addressing PRC influence and information manipulation, as well as any potential gaps in the government tool kit. This report finds that, to mount the most effective response to Chinese influence and the threat it poses to democratic interests at home and on the international stage, the United States should develop a global information strategy, one that reflects the interconnected nature of regulatory, industrial, and diplomatic policies with regard to the information domain. A core assumption undergirding this concept is that US policymaking space tends to over-index on the threat of information manipulation in particular while under-indexing on the core national interest of fostering a secure, interoperable information environment on a larger scale. The limits of understanding Chinese influence as systemic and part of a broader strategy has sometimes led US response to be pigeonholed as an issue of strategic communications, rather than touching on the information and technology ecosystems, among others, where China focuses its information and influence efforts. Responding to Chinese influence with government messaging is not sufficient to address the complex nature of the challenge and places the United States in a position of reactivity. In short, understanding that the CCP (1) integrates its tech industrial strategy, governance policy, and engagement strategy and (2) connects its approach at home to how it engages abroad, the United States needs to do the same, commensurate with its values. It should not respond tit-for-tat but rather have a collective strategy for a global competition for information that connects its tech strategy to its governance approach to its engagement around the world. That is not to say that a US strategy on information resilience should mirror China’s, or that such a strategy should be developed in response to the PRC’s actions in the information domain. Nor is it to say that the United States should adopt a similar whole-of-government approach to the information domain. There are silos by design in the US system and important legal and normative foundations for the clear delineation of mission between them. What this issue brief argues for is a strategic breaking down of silos to facilitate proactive action versus a dangerous breaking down of legally required silos. This report emphasizes that the United States should articulate how major initiatives like the CHIPS and Science Act, regulatory approaches like the recent executive orders on AI and data security, and the DOS’s recent cyberspace and digital policy strategy are part of a cohesive whole and should be understood and operationalized as such. The strategy should outline what the United States stands for as much as what it is against. This requires that the United States frame its assessment of threat within a broader strategy of what its values are and how those values should be articulated in its regulatory, strategic, and diplomatic initiatives to promote open information environments and shore up information resilience. This includes working with allies and partners to ensure that a free, open, and interoperable internet is a global priority as well as a domestic one; developing common standards for understanding and thresholding foreign influence; and promoting connectivity at home and abroad. One finding of this report is that the United States is already leaning into its strengths and values, including championing policies that support openness and continuing support for civil society. This, along with the awareness of influence operations as the weaponization of the information domain, is a powerful response to authoritarian attacks on the integrity of both the domestic US and global information spaces. The United States has a core national security interest in the existence of a rules-based, orderly, and open information environment. Such an environment facilitates the essential day-to-day tasks related to public diplomacy, the basic expression of rights, and investment in industries of strategic and economic value. Absent a coherent strategy on these core issues related to the integrity of the United States’ information environment that is grounded in an understanding of the interconnected nature of their constitutive parts, the challenges of foreign influence and interference will only continue to grow. This issue brief contains three sections. For sections one and two, experts in different aspects of the PRC’s information strategy addressed two to three main questions; during the course of research, further points were raised that are included in the findings. Each section represents a synthesis of the views expressed in response to these questions. The third section comprises recommendations for the US government based on the findings from the first two sections.
Topic:
Media, Disinformation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Japan’s Gradual Move to Address Technological Challenges to Democracy

Author:
Maiko Ichihara
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
Maiko Ichihara, a professor at Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, explores the challenges that technological advancements pose to democracy and analyzes Japan’s recent efforts to regulate disinformation and protect private data. Despite the absence of global regulations on digital technology, Ichihara highlights Japan’s domestic fact-checking efforts as well as its multilateral initiatives with G7 to create action plans promoting international cooperation against disinformation and data privacy abuse. In order to bolster democracy in the digital realm, she advocates for a proactive development of counter-narratives to fake news on social media.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Regulation, Privacy, Social Media, G7, Disinformation, Data Collection, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

29. Seeking to undermine democracy and partnerships: How the CCP is influencing the Pacific islands information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is conducting coordinated information operations in Pacific island countries (PICs). Those operations are designed to influence political elites, public discourse and political sentiment regarding existing partnerships with Western democracies. Our research shows how the CCP frequently seeks to capitalise on regional events, announcements and engagements to push its own narratives, many of which are aimed at undermining some of the region’s key partnerships. This report examines three significant events and developments: the establishment of AUKUS in 2021 the CCP’s recent efforts to sign a region-wide security agreement the 2022 Pacific Islands Forum held in Fiji. This research, including these three case studies, shows how the CCP uses tailored, reactive messaging in response to regional events and analyses the effectiveness of that messaging in shifting public discourse online. This report also highlights a series of information channels used by the CCP to push narratives in support of the party’s regional objectives in the Pacific. Those information channels include Chinese state media, CCP publications and statements in local media, and publications by local journalists connected to CCP-linked groups.1
Topic:
Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Social Media, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Pacific

30. The United States & Japan: Allied Against Disinformation

Author:
Akira Igata, Morihiro Ogasahara, and Christopher Paul
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
In our 21st century information age security does not start with weapons or with the armed forces who wield them. A range of non-traditional security issues has arisen to test even the oldest and closest of alliances—including that of the United States and Japan. Disinformation is among these issues, and this paper series, carried out with the generous support of the US Embassy Tokyo, highlights the specific challenges that disinformation presents. The good news is that Japan, at least so far, is not demonstrating exceptionally high difficulties with disinformation so far. However, as the paper by Prof. Morihiro Ogasahara demonstrates, there are specific demographics and specific types of news consumers in the country who are vulnerable, and Dr. Christopher Paul’s findings indicate that Japan could very well find itself under a more sustained attack by adversaries wishing to weaken its relationship with the US in the future. We at Pacific Forum hope that these papers serve as a wakeup call for policymakers, and lead to proactive solutions not only for this alliance, but which may be modeled for US relationships throughout the region.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Disinformation, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America