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21. Four Scenarios for the Iran Nuclear Deal

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After a hiatus of over five months, negotiations to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal, have finally resumed in Vienna. Struck in July 2015 by Iran and a group of six powers – France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US, as well as the EU (E3/EU+3)–, the JCPOA placed limits on Iranian nuclear activities, while also introducing a highly intrusive inspection regime by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The deal is in a comatose state due to former US President Donald Trump’s decision to unilaterally pull out of the agreement and re-adopt all sanctions on Iran in May 2018. In response, since May 2019 Iran has progressively reduced its compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the deal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Transatlantic Relations, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

22. A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jana Wattenberg
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
I n recent years, gender has come up in arms control and disarmament deliberations. Ireland, for example, submitted working papers on gender to preparatory committee meetings of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) emphasizes that nuclear weapons use affects men and women differently and calls for equal representation in disarmament negotiations. However, such references to gender are so far the exception rather than the rule in arms control and disarmament talks. We argue that a systematic inclusion of gender perspectives advances arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations in four main ways. First, a gender lens calls attention to the human and gendered consequences of the development and use of weapons. Second, it exposes arms control and disarmament agreements that lack gender provisions. Third, a gender lens highlights the absence of diversity in arms control and disarmament communities.3 Fourth, gender perspectives help reveal hierarchical power structures and encourage critical reflections on the legitimacy of established processes and agreements. In sum, the inclusion of a gender perspective produces more humane, effective, legitimate and sustainable agreements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Women, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Nigeria: National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey

Author:
Small Arms Survey
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
This report documents the findings of the first ever national assessment of small arms prevalence and impacts in Nigeria. The National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey (NSALWS), implemented in 2016 by Nigeria’s Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PRESCOM), was conducted to better understand the prevalence, proliferation, perception, use and impacts of small arms in Nigeria. The Small Arms Survey supported PRESCOM on survey methodology and analysis, and with the provision of training on survey methods specific to small arms. Nigeria: National Small Arms and Light Weapons Survey reveals that, at the time of the survey, Nigerians considered firearms-fueled armed violence a significant problem, although variations in threat perceptions show that some regions and communities were more affected than others. The survey also found that Nigerians did not feel the need to own weapons, and did not want one, even though security in their communities was poor. Furthermore, respondents felt that acquiring a firearm was difficult. While direct purchase was the most commonly reported source of small arms, the general public did not know exactly where firearms came from. Diversion and illicit supply, as well as craft production, also appeared to be important. Finally, based on survey responses, it is quite clear that Nigerians expected stronger efforts at arms control, including through civilian disarmament. They asserted that the most effective way to limit arms proliferation is to address structural conditions that cause poverty and insecurity.
Topic:
Regulation, Weapons, Trafficking, Disarmament, and Violence
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

24. Korea versus Korea: Conventional Military Balance and the Path to Disarmament

Author:
Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Varied incremental steps that embody and signal the accumulating commitment to a minimally acceptable common political future for Korea are key to this process. Progressive reduction of cross-border invasion threats through mutual confidence building force restructuring will constitute a virtuous circle of reinforcement for a changed relationship. [Through the] accumulation of the sunk costs of iterative reciprocity North and South Korea will arrive at a point where the demonstrated commitment to smaller restructured military postures is sufficient to allow rapid progress toward a stable level and disposition of arms compatible with a new peaceful political relationship.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

25. Entry into Force of the TPNW: Challenges for Revitalizing Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Hirofumi Tosaki
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
On October 24, 2020, Hondulas deposited its instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), bringing the number of countries that have ratified the treaty to over 50. In accordance with Article 15, the Treaty will thus enter into force 90 days later, that is, on January 22, 2021. The TPNW, which was adopted at the UN General Asembly in July 2017 with the approval of 122 countries, is the first treaty on nuclear weapons to prohibit its States Parties to (a) develop, test, produce, manufacture, acquire, possess, or stockpile, (b) transfer, (c) receive, (d) use or threaten to use, (e) assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party, (f) seek or receive any assistance from anyone, to engage in any activities prohibited to a State Party, and (g) allow any stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons (Article 1). Considering the enthusiasm of the proponent countries and NGOs, including the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), at the time of the adoption of the TPNW, it looks to have taken some time for the Treaty to come into effect. In addition, at the time of writing, the signatories were limited to 84 countries. Furthermore, Sweden and Switzerland, both of which voted in favor of its adoption, have stated their intentions not to sign the Treaty at present. Nevertheless, given the challenging situation surrounding nuclear disarmament, including the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the difficulty of extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), proponents of the TPNW are exploring ways of using this opportunity of its entry into force to increase the number of States Parties and reinvigorate international and domestic public opinion.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Global Focus

26. Majority of Iranians Oppose Development of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Amir Farmanesh
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Both the United States and Iran have been among the countries worst hit by the coronavirus, but neither country has moved away from mutual confrontation. Nationwide surveys conducted by IranPoll this winter – before the spread of the virus and before the US strike against Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani – show that although Iranians say their country should not develop nuclear weapons, they have lost confidence in the nuclear agreement and think that the P5+1 countries (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council including China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany) have not lived up to their obligations. Chicago Council survey results from January 2020 show that a majority of Americans say they would favor rejoining the agreement if Iran restarts its nuclear weapons program.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Disarmament, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

27. The Crisis of Nuclear Arms Control and its Impact on European Security

Author:
Lukasz Kulesa
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The collapse of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019 was the most recent chapter in the process of the erosion of the cold war-originated system of nuclear arms control. This paper argues that the European Union (EU) member states and the EU itself have already been negatively affected. Thus far, however, European states have remained observers rather than active players. Instead of focusing only on praising the past achievements of nuclear arms control and lamenting its demise, a new European approach is needed—one that identifies how best to address the major nuclear security threats and challenges facing Europe through arms control instruments. This paper examines the legacy of nuclear arms control, recent developments and the causes of the current crisis; and analyses the impact on European security. Finally, it presents options on how the EU and its member states might become better engaged in rethinking the nuclear arms control architecture.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Europe

28. From Critical Engagement to Credible Commitments: A Renewed EU Strategy for the North Korean Proliferation Crisis

Author:
Antoine Bondaz
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile crisis is the most serious proliferation crisis the European Union (EU) and its member states currently face on the world stage. Despite the staging of diplomatic meetings, the threat caused by this crisis to European interests, in terms of proliferation, instability and to prosperity, persists. It is now essential that the EU and its member states move from a strategy of critical engagement to implementing a more proactive strategy of credible commitments in four areas: political engagement, non-proliferation, the implementation of restrictive measures and engagement with the North Korean people. Such a renewed strategy should be highly coordinated, build on the many initiatives already being taken and facilitated by the appointment of an EU Special Representative on North Korea.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, Disarmament, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North Korea

29. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, Volume III, South Asian Perspectives

Author:
Peter Topychkanov, Sanatan Kulshrestha, Yanitra Kumaraguru, Malinda Meegoda, Kritika Roy, Saima Aman Sial, Dmitry Stefanovich, and Maaike Verbruggen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This edited volume is the third in a series of three. The series forms part of a SIPRI project that explores regional perspectives and trends related to the impact that recent advances in artificial intelligence could have on nuclear weapons and doctrines, as well as on strategic stability and nuclear risk. This volume assembles the perspectives of eight experts on South Asia on why and how machine learning and autonomy may become the focus of an arms race among nuclear-armed states. It further explores how the adoption of these technologies may have an impact on their calculation of strategic stability and nuclear risk at the regional and transregional levels.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disarmament, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, South Asia, India, East Asia, and Global Focus

30. The Arms Control–Regional Security Nexus in the Middle East

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
The erosion of the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement poses a risk for both Middle East regional security and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it highlights the need to build a more sustainable regional foundation for conflict resolution and arms control in the Middle East. This paper argues that the arms control– regional security nexus should be better reflected in European policy. While maintaining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and preventing further US–Iranian escalation should be the European Union’s (EU) first priority, the paper urges the EU to develop a more comprehensive approach in support of regional security, arms control and disarmament in the Middle East. In addition to resolving inconsistencies in current EU policies on regional security, arms control and arms exports to the Middle East, the EU should consider throwing its political weight behind two emerging processes that could provide a much-needed opening for regional cooperation: security dialogue in the Gulf and the annual Middle East weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone conferences at the United Nations. If it involved regional non-proliferation cooperation, the former process could also help manage the negative consequences of the potential collapse of the Iran nuclear agreement.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, European Union, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East