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171. Preparing for the worst: Was North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons rational?

Author:
Sanghoon Kim
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
North Korea’s foreign policy decision-making procedure is highly centralized to a single leader or, at most, a few political/military elites. While democratic governments are restrained both horizontally and vertically, authoritarian regimes are relatively free of constraints from the public. This paper examines the motivations behind North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in light of the rational deterrence model, then discusses the strategic implications of a rational, or irrational, North Korea. It concludes that North Korea’s decision to develop nuclear weapons was rationally motivated by the deteriorating security environment surrounding the state, but that this will not guarantee deterrence.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Authoritarianism, Deterrence, Denuclearization, and Rationality
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

172. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America

173. Reconsidering U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons are dangerous relics. Whereas during the Cold War tactical nuclear weapons were believed to help bolster deterrence, today they serve no functional purpose other than to unnecessarily escalate a local crisis—such as in the Baltic states—into a potential strategic calamity. Operationally, the 150 B61 bombs the United States still deploys in Europe are effectively useless. They are basic gravity (or free-fall) bombs whose delivery would require a non-stealth plane like the F-16 or Tornado strike aircraft to fly into the teeth of Russia’s advanced air defense capabilities where it would face certain destruction well before reaching its target. Removing U.S. B61s from Europe would not be a panacea for NATO-Russia relations, but it could be a first step in reestablishing a constructive dialogue with Moscow, one that would cost the alliance nothing in actual warfighting capability. Russia is an illiberal regime with capable military forces within its own region. But it is not “the Soviet Union 2.0.” Russia does not pose the same global, existential threat it once did. In dealing with Moscow, there is thus no reason to perpetuate nuclear policies from another era that were designed to address a significantly greater challenge.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

174. Far, Far More Than Meets the Eye: Extended Deterrence in Complex Crises in Northeast Asia

Author:
Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Pacific Forum, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), brought 41 officials and experts from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), along with eight Pacific Forum Young Leaders, all attending in their private capacity, to Maui, Hawaii, Sept. 5-6, 2019 to explore the three countries’ thinking about extended deterrence and prospects for and obstacles to strengthened trilateral security cooperation. A two-move tabletop exercise (TTX) was focused on concerted and coordinated efforts by China and North Korea to revise the status quo in Northeast Asia. Key findings include: Despite political difficulties, there was little difference among participants regarding assessments of the situation and dynamics in Northeast Asia. They were generally aligned and this was evident in responses to the TTX: they sought to prevent opportunism, provide off-ramps for adversaries, and didn’t rush to connect the incidents.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Armed Forces, Crisis Management, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia

175. The Russia policy conundrum: Who blinks first?

Author:
Hugo Klijn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
On 28 September the Netherlands’ Russia policy was debated in Parliament. This policy (updated most recently in the government’s ‘Russia letter’ of December 2019) boils down to a twin-track approach of, on the one hand, exerting pressure through EU sanctions and NATO deterrence and, on the other hand, identifying common ground dossiers and engaging in people-to-people contacts. To date, this long-standing policy has not led to satisfactory outcomes. The debate took place against the backdrop of a Clingendael opinion poll indicating that the Dutch public has different threat perceptions of Russia. Anyway, the debate was rather uneventful and lawmakers focused mostly on topical issues such as the ongoing MH17 trial, Belarus, developments around Nagorno-Karabakh and the poisoning of Alexey Navalny. It may be a source of comfort that the Netherlands is not the only country struggling with its Russia policy. The list of accusations and grievances against Russia is growing, but its leadership flatly denies all wrongdoing and does not seem much impressed by Western responses which have not resulted in a change of behaviour. Under a veneer of unity, European countries are divided on Russia and the debate often hovers between two, typically Russian, eternal questions: kto vinovat (who’s to blame) and chto delat’ (what to do).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Netherlands

176. Israel Needs to Strike Hezbollah to Ensure its Freedom of Action

Author:
Omer Dostri
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A limited Israeli military operation in Lebanon would strengthen Israeli deterrence against Hezbollah. It also would deepen Iran’s sense of defeat and demonstrate Israel’s determination to check Iran’s malign activity.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Israel

177. More pressure on Iran still needed

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Trump has made it clear that attacks on American personnel are going to elicit a military reaction.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

178. Far, Far More Than Meets the Eye: Extended Deterrence in Complex Crises in Northeast Asia

Author:
Brad Glosserman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
The Pacific Forum, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), brought 41 officials and experts from the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), along with eight Pacific Forum Young Leaders, all attending in their private capacity, to Maui, Hawaii, Sept. 5-6, 2019 to explore the three countries’ thinking about extended deterrence and prospects for and obstacles to strengthened trilateral security cooperation. A two-move tabletop exercise (TTX) was focused on concerted and coordinated efforts by China and North Korea to revise the status quo in Northeast Asia. Key findings include: Despite political difficulties, there was little difference among participants regarding assessments of the situation and dynamics in Northeast Asia. They were generally aligned and this was evident in responses to the TTX: they sought to prevent opportunism, provide off-ramps for adversaries, and didn’t rush to connect the incidents. Official statements notwithstanding, there is rising anxiety in Seoul and Tokyo for a variety of reasons. In the ROK, some concerns focus on the role of nuclear solutions to national security problems. In Japan, the issue is often the US-China balance of power. Tokyo and Seoul remain committed to their alliances with the US, however. Participants acknowledged that conventional strength among allies and the ability to coordinate more seamlessly strengthened extended deterrence.
Topic:
Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, Northeast Asia, Korean Peninsula, and Pacific Ocean